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 13 THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP LLC

14 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 15 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

16 CHRISTINA ZAIMI, individually. and
 17 on behalf of all others similarly situated,

18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20 THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP,
 21 LLC, a Delaware limited liability
 22 company; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

23 Defendants.

CASE NO.: 2:22-cv-02972

**NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION
 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTIONS
 1446, 1453 AND 1711**

Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP
 550 South Hope Street, Suite 2000
 Los Angeles, California 90071-2627

1 **TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE**
2 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that Defendant The Neiman Marcus Group LLC
4 (“Neiman Marcus”) hereby removes the state court action described below to this
5 Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1453 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
6 28 U.S.C. § 1711, *et seq.* (“CAFA”). In support thereof, Neiman Marcus states as
7 follows:

8 **I.**

9 **INTRODUCTION**

10 1. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff Christina Zaimi filed this lawsuit in the
11 Superior Court for the State of California, County of Los Angeles, styled as *Christina*
12 *Zaimi v. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC*, Case No. 22STCV01421 (the “State
13 Action”). On April 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).
14 The FAC in the State Action asserts three claims for: (1) violations of the California
15 Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100, *et seq.* (“CCPA”); (2)
16 California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, *et seq.* (“Section
17 17200”); and (3) breach of contract. Each of Plaintiff’s claims arises out of a data
18 security incident that Neiman Marcus announced in September 2021 (the “Security
19 Incident”).

20 2. The Court in the State Action set an April 29, 2022 initial status
21 conference. On April 19, 2022, the parties stipulated to continue that status
22 conference until October 28, 2022 based on Neiman Marcus’ intent to remove the
23 State Action to this Court.

24 3. On April 20 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel sent Neiman Marcus’ counsel a
25 Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt, which Neiman Marcus’ counsel executed
26 and returned to Plaintiff’s counsel that same day.

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III.

REMOVAL IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER CAFA

10. The State Action is a civil action over which this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA. Under CAFA, federal courts have original jurisdiction over a class action if: (i) it involves 100 or more putative class members; (ii) any class member is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; and (iii) the aggregated amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The State Action meets those requirements.

11. To remove a case under CAFA, a defendant need only “file in the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal’”—*i.e.*, the same liberal pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), requiring only plausible allegations as to the basis for removal. *Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens*, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). Neiman Marcus easily meets that standard.

12. As set forth below, this is a putative class action in which, as alleged: (i) there are more than 100 members in Plaintiff’s proposed class; (ii) Plaintiff and the members of the putative class have a different citizenship than Neiman Marcus; and (iii) the claims of the proposed class members exceed the sum or value of \$5,000,000 in the aggregate, exclusive of interest and costs. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

A. The State Action Is a “Class Action” Under CAFA

13. CAFA defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule or judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).

14. Here, Plaintiff styles her Complaint as a “Class Action Complaint;” she specifically alleges that she is bringing the State Action “on behalf of herself and all

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1 affected California residents” (FAC ¶ 6); she purports to set forth class action
2 allegations under Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and Cal. Civ.
3 Code § 1781 (*id.* ¶¶ 45-53); she contends a “class action is superior to any other
4 available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy” (*id.* ¶ 52);
5 and she seeks an order certifying this action as a class action, designating Plaintiff as
6 the representative of the Class, and appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the
7 Class (*id.*, Prayer). Actions seeking class treatment in this manner are “class actions”
8 under CAFA. *Bryant v. NCR Corp.*, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1150 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
9 (“Here, there is no dispute the present action is a ‘class action’ under CAFA, as the
10 action contains class allegations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.”).

11 **B. The Putative Class Consists of More than 100 Members**

12 15. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as: “All California residents
13 whose PII or PCD was subjected to the Data Breach.” FAC ¶ 45.

14 16. The putative class consists of more than 100 individuals. Indeed,
15 Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hile the exact number of class members is unknown,”
16 “reports estimate the breach to include 4.6 million compromised accounts containing
17 PII of Neiman Marcus customers, including Plaintiff and Class Members.” FAC ¶ 48.
18 Moreover, Plaintiff bases her claims on a notice Neiman Marcus sent to customers
19 potentially impacted by the Security Incident. *Id.* ¶ 36. Neiman Marcus avers that it
20 sent such notices to more than 50,000 individuals with California addresses.
21 Accordingly, the requirement of 100 or more class members is met.

22 **C. Minimal Diversity Exists**

23 17. Under CAFA’s “minimal diversity” requirement, a “federal court may
24 exercise jurisdiction over a class action if ‘any member of a class of plaintiffs is a
25 citizen of a State different from any defendant.’” *Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU*
26 *Optronics Corp.*, 134 S. Ct. 736, 740 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A));
27 *Duran v. Fernandez Bros., Inc.*, 2015 WL 7012884, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2015).
28

1 18. Under CAFA, minimal diversity exists if any member of the proposed
 2 class is a citizen of a State other than Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B);
 3 *Mississippi ex rel. Hood*, 134 S. Ct. at 740; *Duran*, 2015 WL 7012884, at *3.
 4 CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement is readily satisfied here.

5 19. Neiman Marcus avers that it is a Delaware limited liability company that
 6 has its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. Neiman Marcus, therefore, is a
 7 citizen of both Delaware and Texas for removal purposes. *Hertz Corp. v. Friend*, 559
 8 U.S.77, 80-81 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); *see also Pae v. Fox Rest. Concepts,*
 9 *LLC*, 2017 WL 3184464, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) (under CAFA, a limited
 10 liability corporation “shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its
 11 principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.”) (quoting
 12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10)).¹

13 20. Neiman Marcus further avers that Plaintiff is a California citizen, thereby
 14 making her diverse from Neiman Marcus. Indeed Plaintiff claims she has “resided in
 15 Los Angeles County, California” “[a]t all relevant times.” FAC ¶ 11. Moreover,
 16 Plaintiff purports to represent a California Class consisting of “all affected California
 17 residents.” *Id.* ¶ 6. Accordingly, at least one member of the proposed class is a
 18 citizen of a State other than Texas or Delaware. Minimal diversity exists.

19 **D. The Amount-in-Controversy Requirement Is Satisfied**

20 21. To establish CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement, Neiman
 21 Marcus “need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy
 22 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” of \$5 million. *Dart Cherokee*, 135 S. Ct. at 554.

23 22. Although Neiman Marcus denies Plaintiff or any putative class member
 24 suffered any cognizable injury as a result of the incident at issue, Plaintiff asserts
 25 causes of action for violations of the CCPA and Section 17200, as well as breach of
 26 contract. FAC ¶¶ 54-78.

27 _____
 28 ¹ In any event, Neiman Marcus’ lone member, NMG Holding Company, Inc., is a
 Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas.

1 23. In connection with the CCPA claim alone, Plaintiff is “pursu[ing] the
2 greater of statutory damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars (\$100)
3 and not greater than seven hundred and fifty (\$750) per consumer per incident, or
4 actual damages, whichever is greater.” FAC ¶ 64.

5 24. Given the putative class consists of more than 50,000 individuals, and
6 even assuming the low-end \$100 per violation statutory recovery, CAFA’s \$5 million
7 amount-in-controversy requirement is met on Plaintiff’s CCPA claim alone.

8 **WHEREFORE**, Neiman Marcus respectfully removes the State Action to this
9 Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

10
11 Dated: May 4, 2022

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

12
13 By: /s/ Ann Marie Mortimer
14 Ann Marie Mortimer
15 Jason J. Kim
16 Brandon Marvisi
17 Attorneys for Defendant
18 THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP
19 LLC
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Assigned for all purposes to: Spring Street Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Carolyn Kuhl

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/12/2022 04:50 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Martinez, Deputy Clerk

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7 *Attorneys for Plaintiff,*
8 *Christina Zaimi and the putative class*

9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – COMPLEX CIVIL**

11 CHRISTINA ZAIMI, individually. and on
12 behalf of all others similarly situated,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 v.

15 THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, LLC, a
16 Delaware limited liability company; and
17 DOES 1-50, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

Case No. **22STCV01421**

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF:

- 1. CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, *et seq.*;
- 2. CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, *et seq.*; and
- 3. BREACH OF CONTRACT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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1 Plaintiff CHRISTINA ZAIMI (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of the general public
2 and all others similarly situated (“Class members”), by and through her attorneys, upon personal
3 knowledge as to facts pertaining to herself and on information and belief as to all other matters,
4 brings this class action against Defendant, THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, LLC (“Defendant”
5 or “Neiman Marcus”), and alleges as follows:

6 **NATURE OF THE CASE**

7 1. This is a data breach class action against The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC and its
8 related entities, subsidiaries and agents for failing to secure and safeguard the personally identifiable
9 information (“PII”) and payment card data (“PCD”) that Defendant collected and maintained
10 (collectively “Private Information”), and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to
11 Plaintiffs and other Class members that their information had been stolen (the “Data Breach”).
12 Neiman Marcus, which includes Neiman Marcus, Neiman Marcus Direct, Horchow, Last Call, and
13 Bergdorf Goodman, is a nationwide retailer ranked 502nd on the Fortune 1,000 list. For its business
14 purposes, Neiman Marcus stores a substantial amount of personally identifiable information (“PII”)
15 from customers.

16 2. On or about September 30, 2021, Neiman Marcus announced that an unauthorized
17 party had gained access to its data systems and stole customer information including customer
18 names and contact information, payment credit card numbers and expiration date, Neiman Marcus
19 virtual gift card number, and the username, password, and security questions and answers associated
20 with Neiman Marcus online accounts (the “Data Breach”)¹. The Neiman Marcus database accessed
21 in the Data Breach reportedly contained approximately 4.6 million individual customer records
22 containing PII and payment card data .

23 3. Although the Data Breach occurred in May 2020 placing sensitive customer
24 information in the hands of malicious actors, Neiman Marcus waited over 16 months until
25 September 30, 2021 to notify customers. This notice was still lacking in information necessary for
26 Plaintiff and Class members to understand the scope and severity of the Data Breach.

27
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¹ See <https://www.neimanmarcus.com/editorial/security/online-accounts>

1 4. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to implement and maintain
2 reasonable and adequate security measures to secure, protect, and safeguard the PII it collected from
3 its customers for business purposes and stored on its networks.

4 5. Defendant breached that duty by, *inter alia*, failing to implement and maintain
5 reasonable security procedures and practices to protect PII and PCD from unauthorized access and
6 storing and retaining Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information on inadequately protected
7 networks.

8 6. The Data Breach happened because of Defendant’s inadequate cybersecurity, which
9 caused Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII and PCD to be accessed, exfiltrated and disclosed. This
10 action seeks to remedy these failings. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all affected
11 California residents.

12 7. As set forth in the Prayer for Relief, among other things, Plaintiff seeks, for herself
13 and the Class, injunctive relief, including public injunctive relief, and actual damages.

14 **VENUE AND JURISDICTION**

15 8. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10
16 and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203-17204, 17604. This action is brought as a class action on
17 behalf of Plaintiff and Class members pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

18 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant’s has retail
19 stores in California and regularly conducts business in California.

20 10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 395 and 395.5
21 because Defendant regularly conducts business in this county, and unlawful acts or omissions have
22 occurred in this county.

23 **PARTIES**

24 11. At all relevant times, Plaintiff resided in Los Angeles County, California. Plaintiff is
25 a consumer who has shopped numerous times from Neiman Marcus stores and has used her credit
26 card(s) to make purchases at a Neiman Marcus store in this county, through Neiman Marcus’
27 website, and/or her Neiman Marcus online account. Plaintiff has made several purchases from
28 Neiman Marcus both prior to and after the May 2020 data breach.

1 12. Plaintiff provided her PII and PCD to Neiman Marcus as part of Neiman Marcus’s
2 in store sales and online sales services, including her name, telephone number, date of birth, email
3 address, physical address, and gender. Plaintiff also created an account password and provided
4 personal answers to the security questions.

5 13. As a result of Defendant’s failure to implement and maintain reasonable security
6 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the personal information it collected and
7 maintained, Plaintiff’s PII and/or PCD was accessed and exfiltrated, stolen and otherwise disclosed
8 to unauthorized persons in the Data Breach.

9 14. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC is a limited liability company organized under the
10 laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located at One Marcus Square,
11 1618 Main Street, Dallas Texas, 75201.

12 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

13 ***PII Is a Valuable Property Right that Must Be Protected***

14 15. The California Constitution guarantees every Californian a right to privacy. And PII
15 is a recognized valuable property right.² California has repeatedly recognized this property right,
16 most recently with the passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.

17 16. In a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) roundtable presentation, former
18 Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, underscored the property value attributed to PII by
19 observing:

20 Most consumers cannot begin to comprehend the types and amount of information
21 collected by businesses, or why their information may be commercially valuable.
22 Data is currency. The larger the data set, the greater potential for analysis – and
23 profit.³

24
25 ² See John T. Soma, et al., *Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable*
26 *Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets*, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, at *2 (2009)
27 (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level
28 comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

³ FTC, *Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour* (Remarks Before FTC
Exploring Privacy Roundtable) (Dec. 7, 2009), <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2009/12/remarks-ftc-exploring-privacy-roundtable>.

1 17. The value of PII as a commodity is measurable. “PII, which companies obtain at little
2 cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional
3 financial assets.”⁴ It is so valuable to identity thieves that once PII has been disclosed, criminals
4 often trade it on the “cyber black-market” for several years.

5 18. Companies recognize PII as an extremely valuable commodity akin to a form of
6 personal property. For example, Symantec Corporation’s Norton brand has created a software
7 application that values a person’s identity on the black market.⁵

8 19. As a result of its real value and the recent large-scale data breaches, identity thieves
9 and cyber criminals openly post credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, PII and other
10 sensitive information directly on various illicit Internet websites making the information publicly
11 available for other criminals to take and use. This information from various breaches, including the
12 information exposed in the Data Breach, can be aggregated and become more valuable to thieves
13 and more damaging to victims. In one study, researchers found hundreds of websites displaying
14 stolen PII and other sensitive information. Strikingly, none of these websites were blocked by
15 Google’s safeguard filtering mechanism – the “Safe Browsing list.”

16 20. Recognizing the high value that consumers place on their PII, some companies now
17 offer consumers an opportunity to sell this information to advertisers and other third parties. The
18 idea is to give consumers more power and control over the type of information they share – and who
19 ultimately receives that information. By making the transaction transparent, consumers will make a
20 profit from the surrender of their PII.⁶ This business has created a new market for the sale and
21 purchase of this valuable data.⁷

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23
24 ⁴ See Soma, *Corporate Privacy Trend, supra*.

25 ⁵ Risk Assessment Tool, Norton 2010, www.everyclickmatters.com/victim/assessment-tool.html.

26 ⁶ Steve Lohr, *You Want My Personal Data? Reward Me for It*, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2010)
27 available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/18unboxed.html>.

28 ⁷ See Julia Angwin and Emil Steel, *Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy*, Wall Street Journal
(Feb. 28, 2011) available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703529004576160764037920274>.

1 21. Consumers place a high value not only on their PII, but also on the privacy of that
2 data. Researchers shed light on how much consumers value their data privacy – and the amount is
3 considerable. Indeed, studies confirm that “when privacy information is made more salient and
4 accessible, some consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective
5 websites.”⁸

6 22. One study on website privacy determined that U.S. consumers valued the restriction
7 of improper access to their PII between \$11.33 and \$16.58 per website.⁹

8 23. Given these facts, any company that transacts business with a consumer and then
9 compromises the privacy of consumers’ PII has thus deprived that consumer of the full monetary
10 value of the consumer’s transaction with the company.

11 *Theft of PII Has Grave and Lasting Consequences for Victims*

12 24. A data breach is an incident in which sensitive, protected, or confidential data has
13 potentially been viewed, stolen, or used by an individual unauthorized to do so. As more consumers
14 rely on the internet and apps on their phone and other devices to conduct every-day transactions,
15 data breaches are becoming increasingly more harmful.

16 25. Theft or breach of PII is serious. The California Attorney General recognizes that
17 “[f]oundational” to every Californian’s constitutional right to privacy is “information security: if
18 companies collect consumers’ personal data, they have a duty to secure it. An organization cannot
19 protect people’s privacy without being able to secure their data from unauthorized access.”¹⁰

20 26. The United States Government Accountability Office noted in a June 2007 report on
21 Data Breaches (“GAO Report”) that identity thieves use PII to take over existing financial accounts,
22 open new financial accounts, receive government benefits and incur charges and credit in a person’s
23

24 ⁸ Janice Y. Tsai, et al., *The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior, An*
25 *Experimental Study Information Systems Research* 22(2) 254, 254 (June 2011), available at
26 https://www.jstor.org/stable/23015560?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

27 ⁹ II-Horn, Hann, et al., *The Value of Online Information Privacy: An Empirical Investigation*
28 (Mar. 2003) at table 3, available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0304001.html> (emphasis added).

¹⁰ California Data Breach Report, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, California Department
of Justice, February 2016.

1 name.¹¹ As the GAO Report states, this type of identity theft is so harmful because it may take time
2 for the victim to become aware of the theft and can adversely impact the victim’s credit rating.

3 27. In addition, the GAO Report states that victims of identity theft will face “substantial
4 costs and inconveniences repairing damage to their credit records ... [and their] good name.”
5 According to the FTC, identity theft victims must spend countless hours and large amounts of money
6 repairing the impact to their good name and credit record.¹²

7 28. Identity thieves use personal information for a variety of crimes, including credit card
8 fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance fraud.¹³ According to Experian, “[t]he research
9 shows that personal information is valuable to identity thieves, and if they can get access to it, they
10 will use it” to among other things: open a new credit card or loan; change a billing address so the
11 victim no longer receives bills; open new utilities; obtain a mobile phone; open a bank account and
12 write bad checks; use a debit card number to withdraw funds; obtain a new driver’s license or ID;
13 use the victim’s information in the event of arrest or court action.¹⁴

14 29. According to the IBM and Ponemon Institute’s 2019 “Cost of a Data Breach” report,
15 the average cost of a data breach per consumer was \$150 per record.¹⁵ Other estimates have placed
16 the costs even higher. The 2013 Norton Report estimated that the average cost per victim of identity
17 theft – a common result of data breaches – was \$298 dollars.¹⁶ And in 2019, Javelin Strategy &
18

19 ¹¹ See GAO, GAO Report 9 (2007) available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

20 ¹² See FTC Identity Theft Website: <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft>.

21 ¹³ The FTC defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying
22 information of another person without authority.” 16 C.F.R. § 603.2. The FTC describes
23 “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with
24 any other information, to identify a specific person,” including, among other things, “[n]ame, social
security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver's license or identification
number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer
identification number.” *Id.*

25 ¹⁴ See Susan Henson, *What Can Identity Thieves Do with Your Personal Information and How
26 Can You Protect Yourself?*, EXPERIAN (Sept. 7, 2017), available at
<https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-can-identity-thieves-do-with-your-personal-information-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself/>.

27 ¹⁵ Brook, *What’s the Cost of a Data Breach in 2019*, *supra*.

28 ¹⁶ Norton By Symantec, 2013 Norton Report 8 (2013), available at
https://yle.fi/tvuutiset/uutiset/upics/liitetiedostot/norton_raportti.pdf.

1 Research compiled consumer complaints from the FTC and indicated that the median out-of-pocket
2 cost to consumers for identity theft was \$375.¹⁷

3 30. A person whose PII has been compromised may not see any signs of identity theft
4 for years. According to the GAO Report:

5 “[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for
6 up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen
7 data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may
8 continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting
from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.”

9 31. For example, in 2012, hackers gained access to LinkedIn’s users’ passwords.
10 However, it was not until May 2016, four years after the breach, that hackers released the stolen
11 email and password combinations.¹⁸

12 32. It is within this context that Plaintiff and thousands of Neiman Marcus customers
13 must now live with the knowledge that their PII is forever in cyberspace and was taken by people
14 willing to use the information for any number of improper purposes and scams, including making
15 the information available for sale on the black-market.

16 ***Neiman Marcus’s Collection of Customers’ PII***

17 33. Neiman Marcus acknowledges that it stores and transmits a substantial amount of
18 confidential, personal, and other sensitive information from its customers. The type of information
19 is detailed in Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy (last updated June 30, 2020),¹⁹ which for California
20 customers, identifies the categories of personal information it may have collected about them over
21 the past 12 months and which information is covered by the California Consumer Privacy Act
22 (“CCPA”) as follows:

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24
25 ¹⁷ Facts + Statistics: *Identity Theft and Cybercrime*, Insurance Information Institute, available
at <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime> (citing the Javelin
26 report).

27 ¹⁸ See Cory Scott, *Protecting Our Members*, LINKEDIN (May 18, 2016), available at
<https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/05/18/protecting-our-members>.

28 ¹⁹ See Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy, available at
<https://www.neimanmarcus.com/c/Assistance/Privacy-Policy-Terms-of-Use-cat33940739>.

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- Personal Identifiers – such as name, postal address, Internet Protocol address, email address, social security number, driver's license number, passport number, or other similar identifiers.
- Protected Characteristics, such as gender.
- Commercial information – such as records of products or services purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or tendencies.
- Internet or other electronic network activity information, including browsing and search history
- Geolocation data
- Audio, electronic, visual, information
- Inferences drawn from any of the information identified below, to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.

34. Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy – Security and Privacy says that it may collect names, addresses, telephone number, birth date, email address, credit card account numbers, driver’s license numbers, information such as one’s interests or product preferences, purchase information such as specific products or services purchased or used and preferences, interests, sizing and favorite brands.

Neiman Marcus Promises to Safeguard Customer PII

35. Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy promises customers that “We are committed to handling your personal information with high standards of information security. We take appropriate physical, technical, and administrative steps to maintain the security and integrity of personal information we collect, including limiting the number of people who have physical or logical access to your data, as well as employing a multitude of technical controls to guard against unauthorized access. We also routinely train our employees in security and compliance best practices.”

The Data Breach

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2 36. On September 30, 2021, Neiman Marcus sent official notice of the Data Breach to
3 customers stating “Earlier this month, we learned that in May 2020 an unauthorized party obtained
4 personal information associated with certain of our customers’ online accounts.”

5 37. According to Neiman Marcus, “The personal information for affected customers
6 varied and may have included your name and contact information; payment card number and
7 expiration date(without CVV number); Neiman Marcus virtual gift card number (without PIN); and
8 the username, password, and security questions and answers associated with your Neiman Marcus
9 online account.”

10 38. Neiman Marcus also claimed to have immediately launched its own investigation,
11 hired a cybersecurity consultant, and contacted law enforcement.

12 39. News reports about the Data Breach provide more details than offered by Neiman
13 Marcus. For instance, Neiman Marcus provided no information about how many subscribers were
14 affected by the Data Breach whereas new media reports estimate 4.6 million compromised
15 customers.

Defendants Knew or Should Have Known PII Are High Risk Targets

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17 40. Defendants knew or should have known that PII like that at issue here, are high risk
18 targets for identity thieves.

19 41. The Identity Theft Resource Center reported that the banking/credit/financial sector
20 had the third largest number of breaches in 2018. According to the ITRC this sector suffered 135
21 data breaches exposing at least 1,709,013 million records in 2018.²⁰

22 42. Prior to the breach there were many reports of high-profile data breaches that should
23 have put a company like Defendant on high alert and forced it to closely examine its own security
24 procedures, as well as those of third parties with which it did business and gave access to its
25 subscriber PII. Notable breaches included Capital One, which announced that in March 2019 a
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27 ²⁰ Identity Theft Resource Center, *2018 End-of-Year Data Breach Report*, available at
28 https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf.

1 hacker had gained access to 100 million U.S. customer accounts and credit card applications.
2 Similarly, in May 2019, First American Financial reported a security incident on its website that
3 potentially exposed 885 million real estate and mortgage related documents, among others. Across
4 industries, financial services has the second-highest cost per breached record, behind healthcare. In
5 financial services, an average breach costs \$210 per record, while a “mega breach,” like Capital
6 One’s, can cost up to \$388 per record.²¹

7 43. Anurag Kahol, CTO of Bitglass recently commented that “[g]iven that organizations
8 in the financial services industry are entrusted with highly valuable, personally identifiable
9 information (PII), they represent an attractive target for cybercriminals[.]” HelpNetSecurity reports
10 that “[h]acking and malware are leading the charge against financial services and the costs
11 associated with breaches are growing. Financial services organizations must get a handle on data
12 breaches and adopt a proactive security strategy if they are to properly protect data from an evolving
13 variety of threats.”²²

14 44. Neiman Marcus has previously been sued in 2014 for a similar albeit smaller data
15 breach when it allowed hackers to steal payment information collected between July 16, 2013 and
16 Oct. 30, 2013 from approximately 350,000 customers.

17 45. As such, Defendant was aware that PII and PCD is at high risk of theft, and
18 consequently should have but did not take appropriate and standard measures to protect Plaintiff’s
19 and Class members’ PII against cyber-security attacks that Defendant should have anticipated and
20 guarded against.

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25 _____
26 ²¹ Samantha Ann Schwartz, *62% of breached data came from financial services in 2019*,
CioDive (Dec. 23, 2019), available at <https://www.ciodive.com/news/62-of-breached-data-came-from-financial-services-in-2019/569592/>.

27 ²² HelpNetSecurity, *Hacking and malware cause 75% of all data breaches in the financial*
28 *services industry* (Dec. 17, 2019), available at <https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/12/17/data-breaches-financial-services/>.

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CLASS DEFINITION AND ALLEGATIONS

46. Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382 and Cal. Civ. Code § 1781, Plaintiff seeks certification of a class defined as: *All California residents whose PII or PCD was subjected to the Data Breach.*

47. Excluded from the Class are: (1) Defendant and its officers, directors, employees, principals, affiliated entities, controlling entities, agents, and other affiliates; (2) the agents, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, attorneys at law, attorneys in fact, or assignees of such persons or entities described herein; and (3) the Judge(s) assigned to this case and any members of their immediate families.

48. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims.

49. The Class members are so numerous and geographically dispersed throughout California that joinder of all Class members would be impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown, Defendant acknowledges the Data Breach, and reports estimate the breach to include 4.6 million compromised accounts containing PII of Neiman Marcus customers, including Plaintiff and Class members. Plaintiff therefore believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.

50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff, like all proposed members of the Class, had her PII and/or PCD compromised in the Data Breach. Plaintiff and Class members were injured by the same wrongful acts, practices, and omissions committed by Defendant, as described herein. Plaintiff’s claims therefore arise from the same practices or course of conduct that give rise to the claims of all Class members.

51. There is a well-defined community of interest in the common questions of law and fact affecting Class members. The questions of law and fact common to Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and include without limitation:

1 (a) Whether Defendant had a duty to implement and maintain reasonable security
2 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the PII it collected from Plaintiff and Class
3 members;

4 (b) Whether Defendant breached its duty to protect the PII of Plaintiff and each
5 Class member; and

6 (c) Whether Plaintiff and each Class member are entitled to damages and other
7 equitable relief.

8 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members.
9 Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class in that she has no interests adverse to or that
10 conflicts with the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial
11 experience and success in the prosecution of complex consumer protection class actions of this
12 nature.

13 53. A class action is superior to any other available method for the fair and efficient
14 adjudication of this controversy since individual joinder of all Class members is impractical.
15 Furthermore, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible
16 for the individual members of the Class to redress the wrongs done to them, especially given that
17 the damages or injuries suffered by each individual member of the Class are outweighed by the costs
18 of suit. Even if the Class members could afford individualized litigation, the cost to the court system
19 would be substantial and individual actions would also present the potential for inconsistent or
20 contradictory judgments. By contrast, a class action presents fewer management difficulties and
21 provides the benefits of single adjudication and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

22 54. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire
23 Class, thereby making it appropriate for this Court to grant final injunctive, including public
24 injunctive relief, and declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

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CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

**Violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”)
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100, *et seq.***

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55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

56. As more personal information about consumers is collected by businesses, consumers’ ability to properly protect and safeguard their privacy has decreased. Consumers entrust businesses with their personal information on the understanding that businesses will adequately protect it from unauthorized access. The California Legislature explained: “The unauthorized disclosure of personal information and the loss of privacy can have devastating effects for individuals, ranging from financial fraud, identity theft, and unnecessary costs to personal time and finances, to destruction of property, harassment, reputational damage, emotional stress, and even potential physical harm.”²³

57. As a result, in 2018, the California Legislature passed the CCPA, giving consumers broad protections and rights intended to safeguard their personal information. Among other things, the CCPA imposes an affirmative duty on businesses that maintain personal information about California residents to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices that are appropriate to the nature of the information collected. Defendant failed to implement such procedures which resulted in the Data Breach.

58. It also requires “[a] business that discloses personal information about a California resident pursuant to a contract with a nonaffiliated third party . . . [to] require by contract that the third party implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” 1798.81.5(c).

²³ CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT (CCPA) COMPLIANCE, <https://buyergenomics.com/ccpa-compliance/>.

1 59. Section 1798.150(a)(1) of the CCPA provides: “Any consumer whose nonencrypted
2 or nonredacted personal information, as defined [by the CCPA] is subject to an unauthorized access
3 and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’ violation of the duty to implement
4 and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the
5 information to protect the personal information may institute a civil action for” statutory or actual
6 damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, and any other relief the court deems proper.

7 60. Plaintiff and Class members’ are “consumer[s]” as defined by Civ. Code
8 § 1798.140(g) because they are “natural person[s] who [are] California resident[s], as defined in
9 Section 17014 of Title 18 of the California Code of Regulations, as that section read on September
10 1, 2017.”

- 11 61. Defendant is a “business” as defined by Civ. Code § 1798.140(c) because Defendant:
- 12 a. is a “sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company,
13 corporation, association, or other legal entity that is organized or operated
14 for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners”;
 - 15 b. “collects consumers’ personal information, or on the behalf of which is
16 collected and that alone, or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
17 means of the processing of consumers’ personal information”;
 - 18 c. does business in and is headquartered in California; and
 - 19 d. has annual gross revenues in excess of \$25 million; annually buys, receives
20 for the business’ commercial purposes, sells or shares for commercial
21 purposes, alone or in combination, the personal information of 50,000 or
22 more consumers, households, or devices; or derives 50 percent or more of
23 its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information.

24 62. The PII taken in the Data Breach is personal information as defined by Civil Code
25 § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A) because it contains Plaintiff’s and Class members’ unencrypted first and last
26 names and encrypted Social security numbers, among other information.

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1 63. Plaintiff's PII and/or PCD was subject to unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft
2 or disclosure because her PII, including name and contact information, and payment card
3 information was wrongfully accessed and taken by unauthorized persons.

4 64. The Data Breach occurred as a result of Defendant's failure to implement and
5 maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information
6 to protect Plaintiff's and Class members' PII. Defendant failed to implement reasonable security
7 procedures to prevent an attack on its servers by hackers and to prevent unauthorized access of
8 Plaintiff's and Class members' PII as a result of this attack.

9 65. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff provided Defendant with written notice of its
10 violations of the CCPA, pursuant to Civil Code § 1798.150(b)(1). *See Ex. A.* If Defendant does not
11 cure the violation within 30 days, Plaintiff will amend her complaint to pursue statutory damages as
12 permitted by Civil Code § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).

13 66. As a result of Defendant's failure to implement and maintain reasonable security
14 procedures and practices that resulted in the Data Breach, Plaintiff seeks actual damages, injunctive
15 relief, including public injunctive relief, and declaratory relief, and any other relief as deemed
16 appropriate by the Court.

17 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

18 **Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL")**

19 **(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*)**

20 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully
21 set forth herein.

22 68. The UCL prohibits any "unlawful," "fraudulent" or "unfair" business act or practice
23 and any false or misleading advertising, as those terms are defined by the UCL and relevant case
24 law. By virtue of the above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary
25 care that directly and proximately caused the Data Breach, Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair
26 and fraudulent practices within the meaning, and in violation of, the UCL.

27 69. In the course of conducting its business, Defendant committed "unlawful" business
28 practices by, *inter alia*, knowingly failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,

1 manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures,
2 protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff's and Class
3 members' PII, and by violating the statutory and common law alleged herein, including, *inter alia*,
4 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100, *et seq.*) and Article I,
5 Section 1 of the California Constitution (California's constitutional right to privacy) and Civil Code
6 § 1798.81.5. Plaintiff and Class members reserve the right to allege other violations of law by
7 Defendant constituting other unlawful business acts or practices. Defendant's above-described
8 wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care are ongoing and continue to this
9 date.

10 70. Defendant also violated the UCL by failing to timely notify Plaintiff and Class
11 members pursuant to Civil Code § 1798.82(a) regarding the unauthorized access and disclosure of
12 their PII. If Plaintiff and Class members had been notified in an appropriate fashion, they could have
13 taken precautions to safeguard and protect their PII and identities.

14 71. Defendant's above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, want of ordinary
15 care, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures also constitute "unfair" business acts and
16 practices in violation of the UCL in that Defendant's wrongful conduct is substantially injurious to
17 consumers, offends legislatively-declared public policy, and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, and
18 unscrupulous. Defendant's practices are also contrary to legislatively declared and public policies
19 that seek to protect PII and ensure that entities who solicit or are entrusted with personal data utilize
20 appropriate security measures, as reflected by laws such as the CCPA, Article I, Section 1 of the
21 California Constitution, and the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45). The gravity of Defendant's wrongful
22 conduct outweighs any alleged benefits attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably
23 available alternatives to further Defendant's legitimate business interests other than engaging in the
24 above-described wrongful conduct.

25 72. The UCL also prohibits any "fraudulent business act or practice." Defendant's
26 above-described claims, nondisclosures and misleading statements were false, misleading and likely
27 to deceive the consuming public in violation of the UCL.

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1 custody and control, and (vii) clear and effective notice to Class members about the serious risks
2 posed by the exposure of their personal information and the precise steps that must be taken to
3 protect themselves. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's and Class members' claims for relief have
4 been performed and occurred.

5 83. **Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs.** Plaintiff and Class members also
6 are entitled to recover their attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and court costs in prosecuting this
7 action.

8 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the Class respectfully
9 requests that (i) this action be certified as a class action, (ii) Plaintiff be designated representative of
10 the Class, (iii) Plaintiff's counsel be appointed as counsel for the Class. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself
11 and members of the Class further request that upon final trial or hearing, judgment be awarded
12 against Defendant for:

- 13 (i) actual and punitive damages to be determined by the trier of fact;
- 14 (ii) equitable relief, including restitution;
- 15 (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rates applicable;
- 16 (iv) appropriate injunctive relief;
- 17 (v) attorneys' fees and litigation expenses under Code of Civil Procedure
18 § 1021.5 and other applicable law;
- 19 (vi) costs of suit; and
- 20 (vii) such other and further relief the Court deems just and proper.

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Dated: January 12, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC

By: 

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Mona Amini (SBN 296829)
245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
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/s/ William F. Cash III
William F. Cash III (*pro hac vice motion forthcoming*)
Scott Warrick (*pro hac vice motion forthcoming*)
**LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, RAFFERTY,
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and the putative class

EXHIBIT A



245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
Costa Mesa, California 92626
Telephone: (800) 400-6808
Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
www.kazlg.com

January 12, 2022

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC
Attn: Legal Department
1618 Main Street
Dallas, TX 75201

Re: Christina Zaimi, et al. v. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, et al.

To Whom It May Concern:

We represent Plaintiff Christina Ziaimi (“Plaintiff”) and all other similarly situated consumers in a putative class action against The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC (“Neiman Marcus”) arising out of, *inter alia*, Neiman Marcus’ failure to provide reasonable security for Plaintiff’s and the proposed class members’ personal information and payment card information, which resulted in the unauthorized access, theft, or disclosure of this information (the “Data Breach”). To our knowledge the Data Breach occurred sometime during May 2020.

The full claims, including the facts and circumstances surrounding these claims are detailed in Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference. Neiman Marcus’ conduct constitutes violations of California Civil Code §§ 1798.81.5(a)(1) and 1798.150(a)(1) among other consumer protection statutes.

While this letter and the attached Class Action Complaint constitute sufficient notice of the claims asserted against Neiman Marcus, pursuant to California Civil Code 1798.150(b)(1), Plaintiff demands that, in the event a cure is possible, Neiman Marcus is hereby provided the opportunity to actually cure the noticed violations and provide Plaintiff with an express written statement within 30 days that the violations have been cured and that no further violations shall occur. A cure, if possible, requires that all the information taken has been recovered and that Plaintiff and the proposed class members of similarly situated persons are not at any risk of any of the information being used.

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

s/ Abbas Kazerounian

Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
Direct Line: (800) 400-6808, Ext. 2
E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

[Enclosure]

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FILED
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
04/11/2022

Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer / Clerk of Court
By: M. Miro Deputy

6 [Additional Plaintiff’s Counsel on Signature Page]

7 *Attorneys for Plaintiff,*
8 *Christina Zaimi and the putative Class*

9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – COMPLEX CIVIL**

11 CHRISTINA ZAIMI, individually, and on
12 behalf of all others similarly situated,

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15 THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, LLC, a
16 Delaware limited liability company; and
17 DOES 1-50, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCV01421
Assigned for All Purposes to:
Judge Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl
Dept. 12

CLASS ACTION

**AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR VIOLATIONS OF:**

- 1. CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, *et seq.*;
- 2. CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, *et. seq.*; and
- 3. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Action Filed: January 12, 2022
Trial Date: TBD

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Electronically Received 04/11/2022 03:34 PM
KAZEROUNI
LAW GROUP, APC

1 Plaintiff CHRISTINA ZAIMI (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of the general public
2 and all others similarly situated (“Class members”), by and through her attorneys, upon personal
3 knowledge as to facts pertaining to herself and on information and belief as to all other matters,
4 brings this class action against Defendant, THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, LLC (“Defendant”
5 or “Neiman Marcus”), and alleges as follows:

6 **NATURE OF THE CASE**

7 1. This is a data breach class action against The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC and its
8 related entities, subsidiaries and agents for failing to secure and safeguard the personally
9 identifiable information (“PII”) and payment card data (“PCD”) that Defendant collected and
10 maintained (collectively “Private Information”), and for failing to provide timely and adequate
11 notice to Plaintiff and other Class members that their information had been stolen (the “Data
12 Breach”). Neiman Marcus, which includes Neiman Marcus, Neiman Marcus Direct, Horchow, Last
13 Call, and Bergdorf Goodman, is a nationwide retailer ranked 502nd on the Fortune 1,000 list. For its
14 business purposes, Neiman Marcus stores a substantial amount of personally identifiable
15 information (“PII”) from customers.

16 2. On or about September 30, 2021, Neiman Marcus announced that an unauthorized
17 party had gained access to its data systems and stole customer information including customer
18 names and contact information, payment credit card numbers and expiration date, Neiman Marcus
19 virtual gift card number, and the username, password, and security questions and answers associated
20 with Neiman Marcus online accounts (the “Data Breach”)¹. The Neiman Marcus database accessed
21 in the Data Breach reportedly contained approximately 4.6 million individual customer records
22 containing PII and payment card data.

23 3. Although the Data Breach occurred in May 2020 placing sensitive customer
24 information in the hands of malicious actors, Neiman Marcus waited over 16 months until
25 September 30, 2021, to notify customers. This notice was still lacking in information necessary for
26 Plaintiff and Class members to understand the scope and severity of the Data Breach.

27
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¹ See <https://www.neimanmarcus.com/editorial/security/online-accounts>

1 4. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to implement and maintain
2 reasonable and adequate security measures to secure, protect, and safeguard the PII it collected from
3 its customers for business purposes and stored on its networks.

4 5. Defendant breached that duty by, *inter alia*, failing to implement and maintain
5 reasonable security procedures and practices to protect PII and PCD from unauthorized access and
6 storing and retaining Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information on inadequately protected
7 networks.

8 6. The Data Breach happened because of Defendant’s inadequate cybersecurity, which
9 caused Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII and PCD to be accessed, exfiltrated and disclosed. This
10 action seeks to remedy these failings. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all affected
11 California residents.

12 7. As set forth in the Prayer for Relief, among other things, Plaintiff seeks, for herself
13 and the Class, statutory damages, injunctive relief, including public injunctive relief, and actual
14 damages.

15 **VENUE AND JURISDICTION**

16 8. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10
17 and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203-17204, 17604. This action is brought as a class action on
18 behalf of Plaintiff and Class members pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

19 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant’s has retail
20 stores in California and regularly conducts business is in California.

21 10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 395 and 395.5
22 because Defendant regularly conducts business in this county, and unlawful acts or omissions have
23 occurred in this county.

24 **PARTIES**

25 11. At all relevant times, Plaintiff resided in Los Angeles County, California. Plaintiff is
26 a consumer who has shopped numerous times from Neiman Marcus stores and has used her credit
27 card(s) to make purchases at a Neiman Marcus store in this county, through Neiman Marcus’
28



1 website, and/or her Neiman Marcus online account. Plaintiff has made several purchases from
2 Neiman Marcus both prior to and after the May 2020 data breach.

3 12. Plaintiff provided her PII and PCD to Neiman Marcus as part of Neiman Marcus’s in
4 store sales and online sales services, including her name, telephone number, date of birth, email
5 address, physical address, and gender. Plaintiff also created an account password and provided
6 personal answers to the security questions.

7 13. As a result of Defendant’s failure to implement and maintain reasonable security
8 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the personal information it collected and
9 maintained, Plaintiff’s PII and/or PCD was accessed and exfiltrated, stolen and otherwise disclosed
10 to unauthorized persons in the Data Breach.

11 14. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC is a limited liability company organized under the
12 laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located at One Marcus Square,
13 1618 Main Street, Dallas Texas, 75201.

14 **ADDITIONAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

15 ***PII Is a Valuable Property Right that Must Be Protected***

16 15. The California Constitution guarantees every Californian a right to privacy. And PII
17 is a recognized valuable property right.² California has repeatedly recognized this property right,
18 most recently with the passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.

19 16. In a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) roundtable presentation, former
20 Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, underscored the property value attributed to PII by
21 observing:

22 Most consumers cannot begin to comprehend the types and amount of
23 information collected by businesses, or why their information may be
24 commercially valuable. Data is currency. The larger the data set, the
greater potential for analysis – and profit.³

25 ² See John T. Soma, et al., *Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable*
26 *Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets*, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, at *2 (2009)
27 (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level
comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

28 ³ FTC, *Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour* (Remarks Before FTC Exploring
Privacy Roundtable) (Dec. 7, 2009), <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2009/12/remarks-ftc-exploring-privacy-roundtable>.





1 17. The value of PII as a commodity is measurable. “PII, which companies obtain at
2 little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of
3 traditional financial assets.”⁴ It is so valuable to identity thieves that once PII has been disclosed,
4 criminals often trade it on the “cyber black-market” for several years.

5 18. Companies recognize PII as an extremely valuable commodity akin to a form of
6 personal property. For example, Symantec Corporation’s Norton brand has created a software
7 application that values a person’s identity on the black market.⁵

8 19. As a result of its real value and the recent large-scale data breaches, identity thieves
9 and cyber criminals openly post credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, PII and other
10 sensitive information directly on various illicit Internet websites making the information publicly
11 available for other criminals to take and use. This information from various breaches, including the
12 information exposed in the Data Breach, can be aggregated and become more valuable to thieves
13 and more damaging to victims. In one study, researchers found hundreds of websites displaying
14 stolen PII and other sensitive information. Strikingly, none of these websites were blocked by
15 Google’s safeguard filtering mechanism—the “Safe Browsing list.”

16 20. Recognizing the high value that consumers place on their PII, some companies now
17 offer consumers an opportunity to sell this information to advertisers and other third parties. The
18 idea is to give consumers more power and control over the type of information they share and who
19 ultimately receives that information. By making the transaction transparent, consumers will make a
20 profit from the surrender of their PII.⁶ This business has created a new market for the sale and
21 purchase of this valuable data.⁷

22 21. Consumers place a high value not only on their PII, but also on the privacy of that
23 data. Researchers shed light on how much consumers value their data privacy—and the amount is
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26 ⁴ See Soma, *Corporate Privacy Trend*, *supra*.

27 ⁵ Risk Assessment Tool, Norton 2010, www.everyclickmatters.com/victim/assessment-tool.html.

28 ⁶ Steve Lohr, *You Want My Personal Data? Reward Me for It*, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2010) available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/18unboxed.html>.

⁷ See Julia Angwin and Emil Steel, *Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy*, Wall Street Journal (Feb. 28,
2011) available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703529004576160764037920274>.

1 considerable. Indeed, studies confirm that “when privacy information is made more salient and
2 accessible, some consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective
3 websites.”⁸

4 22. One study on website privacy determined that U.S. consumers valued the restriction
5 of improper access to their PII between \$11.33 and \$16.58 per website.⁹

6 23. Given these facts, any company that transacts business with a consumer and then
7 compromises the privacy of consumers’ PII has thus deprived that consumer of the full monetary
8 value of the consumer’s transaction with the company.

9 ***Theft of PII Has Grave and Lasting Consequences for Victims***

10 24. A data breach is an incident in which sensitive, protected, or confidential data has
11 potentially been viewed, stolen, or used by an individual unauthorized to do so. As more consumers
12 rely on the internet and apps on their phone and other devices to conduct every-day transactions,
13 data breaches are becoming increasingly more harmful.

14 25. Theft or breach of PII is serious. The California Attorney General recognizes that
15 “[f]oundational” to every Californian’s constitutional right to privacy is “information security: if
16 companies collect consumers’ personal data, they have a duty to secure it. An organization cannot
17 protect people’s privacy without being able to secure their data from unauthorized access.”¹⁰

18 26. The United States Government Accountability Office noted in a June 2007 report on
19 Data Breaches (“GAO Report”) that identity thieves use PII to take over existing financial accounts,
20 open new financial accounts, receive government benefits and incur charges and credit in a person’s
21 name.¹¹ As the GAO Report states, this type of identity theft is so harmful because it may take time
22 for the victim to become aware of the theft and can adversely impact the victim’s credit rating.

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25 ⁸ Janice Y. Tsai, et al., *The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior, An*
26 *Experimental Study Information Systems Research* 22(2) 254, 254 (June 2011), available at
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/23015560?seq=1#>.

27 ⁹ II–Horn, Hann, et al., *The Value of Online Information Privacy: An Empirical Investigation* (Mar.
2003) at table 3, available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0304001.html> (emphasis added).

28 ¹⁰ California Data Breach Report, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, California Department of
Justice, February 2016.

¹¹ See GAO, GAO Report 9 (2007) available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

1 27. In addition, the GAO Report states that victims of identity theft will face “substantial
2 costs and inconveniences repairing damage to their credit records ... [and their] good name.”
3 According to the FTC, identity theft victims must spend countless hours and large amounts of
4 money repairing the impact to their good name and credit record.¹²

5 28. Identity thieves use personal information for a variety of crimes, including credit
6 card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance fraud.¹³ According to Experian, “[t]he research
7 shows that personal information is valuable to identity thieves, and if they can get access to it, they
8 will use it” to among other things: open a new credit card or loan; change a billing address so the
9 victim no longer receives bills; open new utilities; obtain a mobile phone; open a bank account and
10 write bad checks; use a debit card number to withdraw funds; obtain a new driver’s license or ID;
11 use the victim’s information in the event of arrest or court action.¹⁴

12 29. According to the IBM and Ponemon Institute’s 2019 “Cost of a Data Breach” report,
13 the average cost of a data breach per consumer was \$150 per record.¹⁵ Other estimates have placed
14 the costs even higher. The 2013 Norton Report estimated that the average cost per victim of identity
15 theft—a common result of data breaches—was \$298 dollars.¹⁶ And in 2019, Javelin Strategy &
16 Research compiled consumer complaints from the FTC and indicated that the median out-of-pocket
17 cost to consumers for identity theft was \$375.¹⁷

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20 ¹² See FTC Identity Theft Website: <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft>.

21 ¹³ The FTC defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information
22 of another person without authority.” 16 C.F.R. § 603.2. The FTC describes “identifying information” as
23 “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a
24 specific person,” including, among other things, “[n]ame, social security number, date of birth, official
25 State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number,
26 government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.” *Id.*

27 ¹⁴ See Susan Henson, *What Can Identity Thieves Do with Your Personal Information and How Can You
28 Protect Yourself?*, EXPERIAN (Sept. 7, 2017), available at <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-can-identity-thieves-do-with-your-personal-information-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself/>.

¹⁵ Brook, *What’s the Cost of a Data Breach in 2019*, *supra*.

¹⁶ Norton By Symantec, 2013 Norton Report 8 (2013), available at https://yle.fi/tvuutiset/uutiset/upics/liitetiedostot/norton_raportti.pdf.

¹⁷ Facts + Statistics: *Identity Theft and Cybercrime*, Insurance Information Institute, available at <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime> (citing the Javelin report).

1 30. A person whose PII has been compromised may not see any signs of identity theft for
2 years. According to the GAO Report:

3 [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be
4 held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft.
5 Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent
6 use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that
7 attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot
8 necessarily rule out all future harm.

9 31. For example, in 2012, hackers gained access to LinkedIn’s users’ passwords.
10 However, it was not until May 2016, four years after the breach, that hackers released the stolen
11 email and password combinations.¹⁸

12 32. It is within this context that Plaintiff and thousands of Neiman Marcus customers
13 must now live with the knowledge that their PII is forever in cyberspace and was taken by people
14 willing to use the information for any number of improper purposes and scams, including making
15 the information available for sale on the black-market.

16 ***Neiman Marcus’s Collection of Customers’ PII***

17 33. Neiman Marcus acknowledges that it stores and transmits a substantial amount of
18 confidential, personal, and other sensitive information from its customers. The type of information
19 is detailed in Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy (last updated June 30, 2020),¹⁹ which for California
20 customers, identifies the categories of personal information it may have collected about them over
21 the past 12 months and which information is covered by the California Consumer Privacy Act
22 (“CCPA”) as follows:

- 23 • Personal Identifiers – such as name, postal address, Internet Protocol address,
24 email address, social security number, driver's license number, passport number,
25 or other similar identifiers.
- 26 • Protected Characteristics, such as gender.
- 27 • Commercial information – such as records of products or services purchased,
28 obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or
tendencies.

29 ¹⁸ See Cory Scott, *Protecting Our Members*, LINKEDIN (May 18, 2016), available at
<https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/05/18/protecting-our-members>.

30 ¹⁹ See Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy, available at
<https://www.neimanmarcus.com/c/Assistance/Privacy-Policy-Terms-of-Use-cat33940739>.

- Internet or other electronic network activity information, including browsing and search history.
- Geolocation data.
- Audio, electronic, visual, information.
- Inferences drawn from any of the information identified below, to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.

34. Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy – Security and Privacy says that it may collect names, addresses, telephone number, birth date, email address, credit card account numbers, driver’s license numbers, information such as one’s interests or product preferences, purchase information such as specific products or services purchased or used and preferences, interests, sizing and favorite brands.

Neiman Marcus Promises to Safeguard Customer PII

35. Neiman Marcus’s Privacy Policy promises customers that “We are committed to handling your personal information with high standards of information security. We take appropriate physical, technical, and administrative steps to maintain the security and integrity of personal information we collect, including limiting the number of people who have physical or logical access to your data, as well as employing a multitude of technical controls to guard against unauthorized access. We also routinely train our employees in security and compliance best practices.”

The Data Breach

36. On September 30, 2021, Neiman Marcus sent official notice of the Data Breach to customers stating, “Earlier this month, we learned that in May 2020 an unauthorized party obtained personal information associated with certain of our customers’ online accounts.”

37. According to Neiman Marcus, “The personal information for affected customers varied and may have included your name and contact information; payment card number and expiration date (without CVV number); Neiman Marcus virtual gift card number (without PIN); and the username, password, and security questions and answers associated with your Neiman Marcus online account.”

1 38. Neiman Marcus also claims to have immediately launched its own investigation,
2 hired a cybersecurity consultant, and contacted law enforcement.

3 39. News reports about the Data Breach provide more details than offered by Neiman
4 Marcus. For instance, Neiman Marcus provided no information about how many subscribers were
5 affected by the Data Breach, whereas new media reports estimate 4.6 million compromised
6 customers.

7 ***Defendants Knew or Should Have Known PII Are High Risk Targets***

8 40. Defendants knew or should have known that PII like that at issue here, are high risk
9 targets for identity thieves.

10 41. The Identity Theft Resource Center reported that the banking/credit/financial sector
11 had the third largest number of breaches in 2018. According to the ITRC this sector suffered 135
12 data breaches exposing at least 1,709,013 million records in 2018.²⁰ Further, the ITRC identified
13 “hacking” as the most common form of data breach in 2018, accounting for 39% of data breaches.

14 42. Prior to the breach there were many reports of high-profile data breaches that should
15 have put a company like Defendant on high alert and forced it to closely examine its own security
16 procedures, as well as those of third parties with which it did business and gave access to its
17 subscriber PII. Notable breaches included Capital One, which announced that in March 2019 a
18 hacker had gained access to 100 million U.S. customer accounts and credit card applications.
19 Similarly, in May 2019, First American Financial reported a security incident on its website that
20 potentially exposed 885 million real estate and mortgage related documents, among others. Across
21 industries, financial services has the second-highest cost per breached record, behind healthcare. In
22 financial services, an average breach costs \$210 per record, while a “mega breach,” like Capital
23 One’s, can cost up to \$388 per record.²¹

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26 ²⁰ Identity Theft Resource Center, *2018 End-of-Year Data Breach Report*, available at
[https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-
Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf).

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28 ²¹ Samantha Ann Schwartz, *62% of breached data came from financial services in 2019*, CioDive (Dec.
23, 2019), available at [https://www.ciodive.com/news/62-of-breached-data-came-from-financial-
services-in-2019/569592/](https://www.ciodive.com/news/62-of-breached-data-came-from-financial-services-in-2019/569592/).



1 43. Anurag Kahol, CTO of Bitglass recently commented that “[g]iven that organizations
2 in the financial services industry are entrusted with highly valuable, personally identifiable
3 information (PII), they represent an attractive target for cybercriminals[.]” HelpNetSecurity reports
4 that “[h]acking and malware are leading the charge against financial services and the costs
5 associated with breaches are growing. Financial services organizations must get a handle on data
6 breaches and adopt a proactive security strategy if they are to properly protect data from an
7 evolving variety of threats.”²²

8 44. Defendant was aware that PII and PCD is at high risk of theft, and consequently
9 should have but did not take appropriate and standard measures to protect Plaintiff’s and Class
10 members’ PII against cyber-security attacks that Defendant should have anticipated and guarded
11 against.

12 **CLASS DEFINITION AND ALLEGATIONS**

13 45. Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382 and Cal. Civ. Code § 1781, Plaintiff seeks to
14 represent and intends to move for certification of a class defined as:

15 ***All California residents whose PII or PCD was subjected to the Data Breach.***

16 46. Excluded from the Class are: (1) Defendant and its officers, directors, employees,
17 principals, affiliated entities, controlling entities, agents, and other affiliates; (2) the agents,
18 affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, attorneys at law, attorneys in fact, or assignees of such persons
19 or entities described herein; and (3) the Judge(s) assigned to this case and any members of their
20 immediate families.

21 47. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because
22 Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as
23 would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims.

24 48. The Class members are so numerous and geographically dispersed throughout
25 California that joinder of all Class members would be impracticable. While the exact number of
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27 _____
28 ²² HelpNetSecurity, *Hacking and malware cause 75% of all data breaches in the financial services industry* (Dec. 17, 2019), available at <https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/12/17/data-breaches-financial-services/>.



1 Class members is unknown, Defendant acknowledges the Data Breach, and reports estimate the
2 breach to include 4.6 million compromised accounts containing PII of Neiman Marcus customers,
3 including Plaintiff and Class members. Plaintiff therefore believes that the Class is so numerous that
4 joinder of all members is impractical.

5 49. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff, like all proposed
6 members of the Class, had her PII and/or PCD compromised in the Data Breach. Plaintiff and Class
7 members were injured by the same wrongful acts, practices, and omissions committed by
8 Defendant, as described herein. Plaintiff's claims therefore arise from the same practices or course
9 of conduct that give rise to the claims of all Class members.

10 50. There is a well-defined community of interest in the common questions of law and
11 fact affecting Class members. The questions of law and fact common to Class members
12 predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and include without
13 limitation:

14 a) Whether Defendant had a duty to implement and maintain reasonable security
15 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the PII it collected from Plaintiff and
16 Class members;

17 b) Whether Defendant breached its duty to protect the PII of Plaintiff and each Class
18 member; and

19 c) Whether Plaintiff and each Class member are entitled to damages and other
20 equitable relief.

21 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members.
22 Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class in that she has no interests adverse to or that
23 conflicts with the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial
24 experience and success in the prosecution of complex consumer protection class actions of this
25 nature.

26 52. A class action is superior to any other available method for the fair and efficient
27 adjudication of this controversy since individual joinder of all Class members is impractical.
28 Furthermore, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible

1 for the individual members of the Class to redress the wrongs done to them, especially given that
2 the damages or injuries suffered by each individual member of the Class are outweighed by the
3 costs of suit. Even if the Class members could afford individualized litigation, the cost to the court
4 system would be substantial and individual actions would also present the potential for inconsistent
5 or contradictory judgments. By contrast, a class action presents fewer management difficulties and
6 provides the benefits of single adjudication and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

7 53. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire
8 Class, thereby making it appropriate for this Court to grant final injunctive, including public
9 injunctive relief, and declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

10 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

11 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

12 **Violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”)
13 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100, et seq.**

14 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully
15 set forth herein.

16 55. As more personal information about consumers is collected by businesses,
17 consumers’ ability to properly protect and safeguard their privacy has decreased. Consumers entrust
18 businesses with their personal information on the understanding that businesses will adequately
19 protect it from unauthorized access. The California Legislature explained: “The unauthorized
20 disclosure of personal information and the loss of privacy can have devastating effects for individuals,
21 ranging from financial fraud, identity theft, and unnecessary costs to personal time and finances, to
22 destruction of property, harassment, reputational damage, emotional stress, and even potential
23 physical harm.”²³

24 56. As a result, in 2018, the California Legislature passed the CCPA, giving consumers
25 broad protections and rights intended to safeguard their personal information. Among other things,
26 the CCPA imposes an affirmative duty on businesses that maintain personal information about
27 California residents to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices that are

28 ²³ California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) Compliance, <https://buyergenomics.com/ccpa-compliance/>.



1 appropriate to the nature of the information collected. Defendant failed to implement such
2 procedures which resulted in the Data Breach.

3 57. It also requires “[a] business that discloses personal information about a California
4 resident pursuant to a contract with a nonaffiliated third party . . . [to] require by contract that the
5 third party implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
6 nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction,
7 use, modification, or disclosure.” 1798.81.5(c).

8 58. Section 1798.150(a)(1) of the CCPA provides: “Any consumer whose nonencrypted
9 or nonredacted personal information, as defined [by the CCPA] is subject to an unauthorized access
10 and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’ violation of the duty to implement
11 and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the
12 information to protect the personal information may institute a civil action for” statutory or actual
13 damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, and any other relief the court deems proper.

14 59. Plaintiff and Class members’ are “consumer[s]” as defined by Civ. Code
15 § 1798.140(g) because they are “natural person[s] who [are] California resident[s], as defined in
16 Section 17014 of Title 18 of the California Code of Regulations, as that section read on September
17 1, 2017.”

18 60. Defendant is a “business” as defined by Civ. Code § 1798.140(c) because Defendant:

19 a) is a “sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
20 association, or other legal entity that is organized or operated for the profit or financial
21 benefit of its shareholders or other owners”;

22 b) “collects consumers’ personal information, or on the behalf of which is
23 collected and that alone, or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of
24 the processing of consumers’ personal information”;

25 c) does business in and is headquartered in California; and

26 d) has annual gross revenues in excess of \$25 million; annually buys, receives
27 for the business’ commercial purposes, sells or shares for commercial purposes, alone or
28 in combination, the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or

1 devices; or derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’
2 personal information.

3 61. The PII taken in the Data Breach is personal information as defined by Civil Code
4 § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A) because it contains Plaintiff’s and Class members’ unencrypted first and last
5 names, contact information, payment card number and expiration date, and the username, password,
6 and security questions and answers associated with their Neiman Marcus online account,, among
7 other information.

8 62. Plaintiff’s PII and/or PCD was subject to unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft
9 or disclosure because her PII, including name and contact information, and payment card
10 information was wrongfully accessed and taken by unauthorized persons.

11 63. The Data Breach occurred as a result of Defendant’s failure to implement and
12 maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to
13 protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII. Defendant failed to implement reasonable security
14 procedures to prevent an attack on its servers by hackers and to prevent unauthorized access of
15 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII as a result of this attack.

16 64. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff provided written notice to Defendant identifying the
17 specific provisions of the CCPA Plaintiff alleges Defendant has violated. Defendant has not cured
18 the violation within thirty (30) days thereof. Accordingly, Plaintiff amends the complaint to
19 additionally pursue the greater of statutory damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars
20 (\$100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty (\$750) per consumer per incident, or actual
21 damages, whichever is greater. *See* Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a)(1)(A) & (b).

22 65. As a result of Defendant’s failure to implement and maintain reasonable security
23 procedures and practices that resulted in the Data Breach, Plaintiff seeks actual and statutory
24 damages, injunctive relief, including public injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and any other relief
25 as deemed appropriate by the Court.

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1 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

2 **Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)**
3 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.**

4 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully
5 set forth herein.

6 67. The UCL prohibits any “unlawful,” “fraudulent” or “unfair” business act or practice
7 and any false or misleading advertising, as those terms are defined by the UCL and relevant case
8 law. By virtue of the above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary
9 care that directly and proximately caused the Data Breach, Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair
10 and fraudulent practices within the meaning, and in violation of, the UCL.

11 68. In the course of conducting its business, Defendant committed “unlawful” business
12 practices by, *inter alia*, knowingly failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,
13 manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures,
14 protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class
15 members’ PII, and by violating the statutory and common law alleged herein, including, *inter alia*,
16 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100, *et seq.*) and Article I,
17 Section 1 of the California Constitution (California’s constitutional right to privacy) and Civil Code
18 § 1798.81.5. Plaintiff and Class members reserve the right to allege other violations of law by
19 Defendant constituting other unlawful business acts or practices. Defendant’s above-described
20 wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care are ongoing and continue to this
21 date.

22 69. Defendant also violated the UCL by failing to timely notify Plaintiff and Class
23 members pursuant to Civil Code § 1798.82(a) regarding the unauthorized access and disclosure of
24 their PII. If Plaintiff and Class members had been notified in an appropriate fashion, they could
25 have taken precautions to safeguard and protect their PII and identities.

26 70. Defendant’s above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, want of ordinary
27 care, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures also constitute “unfair” business acts and
28 practices in violation of the UCL in that Defendant’s wrongful conduct is substantially injurious to
consumers, offends legislatively-declared public policy, and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, and



1 unscrupulous. Defendant’s practices are also contrary to legislatively declared and public policies
2 that seek to protect PII and ensure that entities who solicit or are entrusted with personal data utilize
3 appropriate security measures, as reflected by laws such as the CCPA, Article I, Section 1 of the
4 California Constitution, and the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45). The gravity of Defendant’s wrongful
5 conduct outweighs any alleged benefits attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably
6 available alternatives to further Defendant’s legitimate business interests other than engaging in the
7 above-described wrongful conduct.

8 71. The UCL also prohibits any “fraudulent business act or practice.” Defendant’s
9 above-described claims, nondisclosures and misleading statements were false, misleading and likely
10 to deceive the consuming public in violation of the UCL.

11 72. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s above-described wrongful actions,
12 inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and proximately caused the Data Breach
13 and its violations of the UCL, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered (and will continue to
14 suffer) economic damages and other injury and actual harm in the form of, *inter alia*, (i) an
15 imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity theft and identity fraud—risks
16 justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for which they are entitled to
17 compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of the confidentiality of their PII, (iv) statutory
18 damages under the CCPA, (v) deprivation of the value of their PII for which there is a well-
19 established national and international market, and/or (vi) the financial and temporal cost of
20 monitoring their credit, monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating damages.

21 73. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendant will continue to engage in the above-
22 described wrongful conduct and more data breaches will occur. Plaintiff, therefore, on behalf of
23 herself, Class members, and the general public, also seeks restitution and an injunction, including
24 public injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from continuing such wrongful conduct, and
25 requiring Defendant to modify its corporate culture and design, adopt, implement, control, direct,
26 oversee, manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies,
27 procedures protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect the PII entrusted
28



1 to it, as well as all other relief the Court deems appropriate, consistent with Bus. & Prof. Code
2 § 17203.

3 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

4 **Breach of Contract**

5 74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully
6 set forth herein.

7 75. Plaintiff and Class members entered into express contracts with Defendant that
8 included Defendant's promise to protect nonpublic personal information given to Defendant or that
9 Defendant gathered on its own, from disclosure.

10 76. Plaintiff and Class members performed their obligations under the contracts when
11 they provided their PII to Defendant in relation to their purchases of Neiman Marcus's products and
12 services.

13 77. Defendant breached its contractual obligation to protect the nonpublic personal
14 information Defendant gathered when the information was exposed as part of the Data Breach.

15 78. As a direct and proximate result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members
16 have been harmed and have suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages and injuries.

17 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

18 79. **Damages.** As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful actions,
19 inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and proximately caused the Data
20 Breach, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to statutory damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §
21 1798.150(a)(1)(A) and have suffered (and will continue to suffer) actual damages and other injury
22 and harm in the form of, *inter alia*, (i) an imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of
23 identity theft and fraud—risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for
24 which they are entitled to compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of the confidentiality
25 of their PII, (iv) deprivation of the value of their PII, for which there is a well-established national
26 and international market, and/or (v) the financial and temporal cost of monitoring their credit,
27 monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating damages. Plaintiff and Class members also are
28 entitled to equitable relief, including, without limitation, restitution. Plaintiff's and Class members'

1 damages were foreseeable by Defendant and exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court.
2 All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's and Class members' claims have been performed and
3 occurred.

4 80. **Punitive Damages.** Plaintiff and Class members also are entitled to punitive
5 damages from Defendant, as punishment and to deter such wrongful conduct. All conditions
6 precedent to Plaintiff's and Class members' claims have been performed and occurred.

7 81. **Injunctive Relief.** Pursuant to, *inter alia*, the CCPA and the UCL, Plaintiff and Class
8 members also are entitled to injunctive relief in multiple forms including, without limitation,
9 (i) credit monitoring, (ii) Internet monitoring, (iii) identity theft insurance, (iv) prohibiting
10 Defendant from continuing its above-described wrongful conduct, (v) requiring Defendant to
11 modify its corporate culture and implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
12 practices to safeguard and protect the PII entrusted to it, (vi) periodic compliance audits by a third
13 party to ensure that Defendant is properly safeguarding and protecting the PII in its possession,
14 custody and control, and (vii) clear and effective notice to Class members about the serious risks
15 posed by the exposure of their personal information and the precise steps that must be taken to
16 protect themselves. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's and Class members' claims for relief have
17 been performed and occurred.

18 82. **Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs.** Plaintiff and Class members also
19 are entitled to recover their attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and court costs in prosecuting this
20 action.

21 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the Class respectfully
22 requests that (i) this action be certified as a class action, (ii) Plaintiff be designated representative of
23 the Class, (iii) Plaintiff's counsel be appointed as counsel for the Class. Plaintiff, on behalf of
24 herself and members of the Class further request that upon final trial or hearing, judgment be
25 awarded against Defendant for:

- 26 (i) actual and punitive damages to be determined by the trier of fact;
- 27 (ii) statutory damages;
- 28 (ii) equitable relief, including restitution;

- 1 (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rates applicable;
- 2 (iv) appropriate injunctive relief;
- 3 (v) attorneys' fees and litigation expenses under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5
- 4 and other applicable law;
- 5 (vi) costs of suit; and
- 6 (vii) such other and further relief the Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

8 Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the Class, hereby demands a jury trial on all
9 issues so triable.

11 Dated: April 11, 2022

KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC

12
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18 /s/ William F. Cash III
 19 William F. Cash III (*pro hac vice motion*
forthcoming)
 20 Scott Warrick (*pro hac vice motion forthcoming*)
21 LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, RAFFERTY,
22 PROCTOR, BUCHANAN, O'BRIEN,
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ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Neiman Marcus Group Hit with Class Action Over 2020 Data Breach](#)
