Case 2:18-cv-14490-RLR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/28/2018 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JAKE VELARDO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

CLASS ACTION

Plaintiff,

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

vs.

PALM BEACH SPORTS CLUB, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

_____/

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

 Plaintiff, Jake Velardo, brings this action against Defendant, Palm Beach Sports Club, LLC, to secure redress for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is a putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47
 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., (the "TCPA").

3. Defendant is a fitness center and gym. To promote its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process.

4. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available legal or equitable remedies.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiff alleges violations of a federal statute. Jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because Plaintiff alleges a national class, which will result in at least one class member belonging to a different state than that of Defendant. Plaintiff seeks up to \$1,500.00 (one-thousand-five-hundred dollars) in damages for each call in violation of the TCPA, which, when aggregated among a proposed class numbering in the tens of thousands, or more, exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 (five-million dollars) threshold for federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Therefore, both the elements of diversity jurisdiction and CAFA jurisdiction are present.

6. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because Defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and because Defendant provides and markets its services within this district thereby establishing sufficient contacts to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Further, Defendant's tortious conduct against Plaintiff occurred within the State of Florida and, on information and belief, Defendant has sent the same text messages complained of by Plaintiff to other individuals within this judicial district, such that some of Defendant's acts in making such calls have occurred within this district, subjecting Defendant to jurisdiction in the State of Florida.

PARTIES

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a resident of St.
 Lucie County, Florida.

8. Defendant is a Florida limited liability company whose principal office is located at 1001 U.S. North Highway 1, Suite 201, Jupiter, Florida 33477. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities throughout the State of Florida.

THE TCPA

9. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

10. The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") as "equipment that has the capacity - (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

11. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff'd*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).

12. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

13. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated telemarketing calls, requiring "prior express *written* consent" for such calls to wireless numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis supplied).

14. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "'clear and conspicuous

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disclosure' of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates." *In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

15. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define "telemarketing" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

16. "Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations 'require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service' where the implication of an improper purpose is 'clear from the context."" *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).

17. "Telemarketing' occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services." *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

18. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call *or in the future. Id.*

19. In other words, offers "that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute" telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and*

Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

20. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. *See In the Matter of Rules and Regulaions Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent "for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls").


21. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of "to make any call" in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); *Toney v. Quality Res., Inc.*, 2014 WL 6757978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained Plaintiff's prior express consent before sending him the *text message*). (emphasis added).

22. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA 'need not allege any *additional* harm beyond the one Congress has identified." *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp.*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (emphasis original)).

FACTS

23. On or about September 22, 2018, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in 6844 (the "6844 Number"):

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24. Defendant's text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.

25. Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff a gym membership.

26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant's special prices, which Defendant sends to promote its business.

27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.

28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.

29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6844 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6844 Number.

30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. *See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC*, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) ("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing *Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); *Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); *Hickey v. Voxernet LLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; *Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co.*, No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

31. The text messages originated from telephone number 772-672-3151, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.

32. The number used by Defendant (772-672-3151) is known as a "long code," a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages *en masse*, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual.

33. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.

34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant (Club OS) have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention.

35. The Club OS platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

36. The Club OS platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

37. The Club OS platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

38. The Club OS platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

39. The Club OS platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

40. The Club OS platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.

41. Additionally, the Club OS platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of text messages to individual's cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. "STOP") being sent by a consumer, which function was also utilized by Defendant.

42. To transmit the text messages at issue, Defendant uploaded a list of telephone numbers which are stored indefinitely by the Club OS platform.

43. Defendant then created the content of the text messages, selected the telephone numbers to transmit the messages to, and selected a date and time for transmission.

44. In making these selections, Defendant was simply creating a set of instructions that were subsequently executed automatically (i.e. with no human intervention), by the Club OS platform.


- 45. The Club OS platform automatically executed Defendant's instructions as follows:
 - (1) The platform retrieved each telephone number from the list of numbers uploaded by Defendant in the sequential order the numbers were listed by Defendant;
 - (2) The platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed by Defendant and combined each number with the content of Defendant's message to create "packets" consisting of one telephone number and the message content;
 - (3) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed by Defendant to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Club OS platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers.
 - (4) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet automatically and with no human intervention to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer's mobile telephone.

46. The above execution of Defendant's instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Club OS platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less.

47. Further, the Club OS platform "throttles" the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform

controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function.

48. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Club OS platform automatically and without any human intervention:



49. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

PROPOSED CLASS

50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated.

51. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:

All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant's behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number, advertising Defendant's services, without the recipients' prior express written consent.

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52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more.

NUMEROSITY

53. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

54. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

55. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

- Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls;
- (3) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
- (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and
- (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.

56. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular

telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.

TYPICALITY

57. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS

58. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.

PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE

59. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

60. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions.

COUNT I <u>Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)</u> (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make "any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.

64. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

65. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.

66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

67. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id*. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jake Velardo, on behalf of himself and the other members of

the Class, pray for the following relief:

- A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

COUNT II <u>Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)</u> (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

68. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein.

69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.

71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

72. As a result of Defendant's violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, Jake Velardo, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff and Class Members hereby demand a trial by jury.

Dated: November 28, 2018

SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.

<u>/s/ Andrew J. Shamis</u> Andrew J. Shamis, Esq. Florida Bar No. 101754 ashamis@shamisgentile.com 14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205 Miami, FL 33132 Telephone: 305-479-2299 *Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class*

EDELSBERG LAW, PA

Scott Edelsberg, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0100537 scott@edelsberglaw.com 19495 Biscayne Blvd #607 Aventura, FL 33180 Telephone: 305-975-3320 *Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class*

Case 2:18-cv-14490-RLR Document 1-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/28/2018 Page 1 of 1 JS 44 (Rev. 08/18) **CIVIL COVER SHEET**

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.) I. (a) PLAINTIFFS **DEFENDANTS** Jake Velardo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Palm Beach Sports Club, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company St. Lucie County, FL (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Palm Beach County, FL County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED. NOTE: (c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Shamis & Gentile, P.A. Attorneys (If Known) 14 NE 1st Ave, STE 1205, Miami, FL 33132 (305) 479-2299 II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff (For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant) ★ 3 Federal Question □ 1 U.S. Government PTF DEF DEF PTF Plaintiff Incorporated or Principal Place (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State σ1 01 04 of Business In This State 1 2 U.S. Government **4** Diversity Citizen of Another State <u>0</u>2 Incorporated and Principal Place 02 0 5 05 Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State Citizen or Subject of a 03 3 Foreign Nation 06 Foreign Country IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only) Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions (CONTRACTOR STORIO BURGENERAL STORES ig a plix TO BELLEROST AVERATIONS REALIZATION OF THE REAL 🗇 110 Insurance 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 625 Drug Related Seizure 375 False Claims Act 🗇 120 Marine 310 Airplane 365 Personal Injury 423 Withdrawal of Property 21 USC 881 🗇 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 130 Miller Act C 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a)) 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 367 Health Care/ 1 400 State Reapportionment σ σ 150 Recovery of Overpayment 🗇 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical 410 Antitrust & Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury 820 Copyrights C 430 Banks and Banking I 151 Medicare Act 330 Federal Employers' Product Liability 🗇 830 Patent □ 450 Commerce 152 Recovery of Defaulted □ 460 Deportation Liability 368 Asbestos Personal 835 Patent - Abbreviated Student Loans 🗇 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 470 Racketeer Influenced and (Excludes Veterans) 345 Marine Product Liability 840 Trademark **Corrupt Organizations** □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment PERSONAL PROPERTY Liability DESCOLORANCE ACTIVITES 480 Consumer Credit of Veteran's Benefits □ 350 Motor Vehicle 370 Other Fraud 710 Fair Labor Standards 2 861 HIA (1395ff) 485 Telephone Consumer 160 Stockholders' Suits 355 Motor Vehicle 371 Truth in Lending 862 Black Lung (923) Act Protection Act □ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 190 Other Contract Product Liability 380 Other Personal 720 Labor/Management □ 490 Cable/Sat TV 195 Contract Product Liability 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations 864 SSID Title XVI □ 850 Securities/Commodities/ 🗇 865 RSI (405(g)) 196 Franchise □ 385 Property Damage 740 Railway Labor Act Injury Exchange □ 890 Other Statutory Actions 362 Personal Injury -Product Liability 751 Family and Medical Medical Malpractice Leave Act 891 Agricultural Acts INU RICHTS E ANDORANGIA. ASIONS 790 Other Labor Litigation REALPROPERCE PRISONERPERIUMON 893 Environmental Matters 210 Land Condemnation 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: 791 Employee Retirement 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff 895 Freedom of Information □ 220 Foreclosure 441 Voting 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act or Defendant) Act □ 442 Employment 🗇 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 510 Motions to Vacate Ø 871 IRS—Third Party 896 Arbitration 240 Torts to Land 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 D 899 Administrative Procedure 🗇 530 General 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations Act/Review or Appeal of 290 All Other Real Property 445 Amer. w/Disabilities 🗇 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION Agency Decision Employment Other: 462 Naturalization Application □ 950 Constitutionality of 446 Amer. w/Disabilities 540 Mandamus & Other □ 465 Other Immigration State Statutes Other 550 Civil Rights Actions ٥ 448 Education 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee Conditions of Confinement V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only) **⋈**1 Original □ 2 Removed from **D** 3 Remanded from □ 5 Transferred from 4 Reinstated or 06 Multidistrict 8 Multidistrict State Court Appellate Court Proceeding Reopened Litigation -Litigation -Another District Transfer Direct File (specify Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (*Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity*): Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause: This is a putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. **VII. REQUESTED IN** X CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION **DEMAND \$** CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. **COMPLAINT:** JURY DEMAND: X Yes DNo VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions): **IF ANY** JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD 11/09/2018

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

RECEIPT #

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JAKE VELARDO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Case No.

CLASS ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.

PALM BEACH SPORTS CLUB, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) Palm Beach Sports Club, LLC Registered Agent: CT Corporation System 1200 South Pine Island Road Plantation, FL 33324

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: Shamia & Contile P A

Shamis & Gentile, P.A. Andrew J. Shamis, Esq. 14 NE 1st Ave, STE 1205 Miami, FL 33132 305-479-2299

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

SUMMONS

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Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

	This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)	
	was received by me on (<i>date</i>)	
	I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)On(date):or	
	I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,	(name)
	on (date), and mailed a copy to the individual's last	known address; or
□ de	I served the summons on (<i>name of individual</i>)	, who is
	on (<i>date</i>)	; or
	I returned the summons unexecuted because	; or
	Other (specify); In the formal sector of the sec	
I d	declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.	
Da	Date	Servers Signature
		servers signuture

Printed name and title

Server's Address

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Class Action Lawsuit Takes Issue with Allegedly Unsolicited Text Sent by Palm Beach Sports Club</u>