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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JACOB KELLER, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

UDR, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. '26CV3865 AJB MMP

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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1 Plaintiff Jacob Keller (“Plaintiff”), by and through his attorneys, makes the
2 following allegations pursuant to the investigation of his counsel and based upon
3 information and belief, except as to allegations specifically pertaining to himself and
4 his counsel, which are based on personal knowledge, against UDR, Inc. (“UDR” or
5 “Defendant”).

6 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

7 1. San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1103 makes it “unlawful for a person to sell,
8 license, or otherwise provide an algorithmic device to a landlord[,]” and makes it
9 “unlawful for a landlord to use an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy
10 levels for residential rental property.”

11 2. In other words, it is illegal for a landlord to use software that performs
12 calculations using nonpublic competitor data to advise the landlord on rental prices or
13 how many units to rent.

14 3. Despite this clear mandate, Defendant is a landlord who uses an
15 algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential rental property
16 in San Diego.

17 4. Under San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1104(a), “[a] tenant may seek
18 injunctive relief, damages, or civil penalties of up to \$1,000 per violation of this
19 Division, in a civil action against a landlord.”

20 5. Thus, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiff brings this
21 action, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, to redress Defendant’s
22 violations of San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1103.

23 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

24 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
25 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this is a class action where there are more than 100 members
26 and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest,
27 fees, and costs, and at least one member of the putative Class is a citizen of a state
28

1 different from Defendant.

2 7. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant
3 has purposefully directed its activities at forum residents, has purposefully derived
4 benefit from these forum activities, and has purposefully availed themselves of the
5 privilege of conducting activities within the forum. Defendant conducts substantial
6 business in this District by operating and/or managing multiple rental residential
7 properties in this District, including the multifamily rental property that Plaintiff
8 resides in. Defendant has, at all times relevant hereto, systematically and continually
9 conducted, and continues to conduct, business in California, including within this
10 District. Defendant has intentionally availed itself of the benefits and privileges of the
11 California and San Diego rental market specifically, and has profited therefrom. Thus,
12 Defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with California such that exercising
13 personal jurisdiction over Defendant would not “offend traditional notions of fair play
14 and substantial justice.” *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984).

15 8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a
16 substantial portion of the events giving rise to this action occurred in this District.

17 **THE PARTIES**

18 9. Plaintiff Jacob Keller is an adult citizen of the state of California and is
19 domiciled in San Diego, California.

20 10. Plaintiff Keller is a tenant at a UDR-managed residential rental property
21 in San Diego, California. Plaintiff entered this lease in or around May 2025 and began
22 in or around June 2025.

23 11. Defendant UDR, Inc. (“UDR”) is a Maryland corporation with its
24 principal place of business in Highlands Ranch, Colorado. At all times material to this
25 Complaint, UDR and/or an affiliated entity manage(s), own(s), and operate(s)
26 residential rental units in residential buildings in this District and throughout the
27 United States.
28

12. UDR manages the residential rental property in which Plaintiff lives.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. The San Diego Municipal Code Makes It Unlawful To Use Algorithmic Devices to Set Rental Rates or Occupancy Levels

13. On May 22, 2025, San Diego passed an ordinance amending the Municipal Code, to make it unlawful for landlords to use an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential rental property.

14. San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1103(b) provides:

It is unlawful for a *landlord* to use an *algorithmic device* to set rental rates or occupancy levels for *residential rental property*.

(Emphasis in original).

15. “Algorithmic device” means:

[A] software or product that uses or incorporates one or more algorithms to perform calculations of *nonpublic competitor data* of two or more *landlords* to advise a *landlord* on, or recommend to a *landlord*, rental rates or occupancy levels that may be achieved for a *residential rental property* in the City of San Diego.

San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1102 (emphasis in original).

16. “Nonpublic competitor data” means:

[I]nformation that is not available to the general public, whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized or whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another *person*. *Nonpublic competitor data* includes information about actual rental rates, rental rate changes, *residential rental property* supply levels, occupancy levels, or *lease* start and end dates.

San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1102 (emphasis in original).

17. The Ordinance became effective June 21, 2025.¹

¹ Ord. No. O-21955, App. 05/22/2025, Eff. 06/21/2025, available at https://docs.sandiego.gov/council_reso_ordinance/rao2025/O-21955.pdf.

1 18. The legislature enacted this ordinance to protect San Diego tenants’
 2 rights, and the local rental housing market in San Diego, from large corporate
 3 landlords like Defendant whose “use of algorithmic devices” has “resulted in inflated
 4 rental rates and unfair rent increases and contributed to the City's unaffordability for
 5 families”:

6 The high cost of living and housing shortage in the City of San
 7 Diego (City) have contributed to the City's unaffordability.
 8 According to a March 2024 Zillow report, a family must earn
 9 \$275,000 a year to afford a home mortgage. According to an
 10 August 4, 2024, Times of San Diego article, the average rental
 rate for a two-bedroom residential dwelling unit in the City is
 \$2,489, almost 65% higher than the national median.

11 Landlords' use of algorithmic devices, which perform
 12 calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning rental
 13 rates, occupancy levels, and other information, to set rental rates
 14 and occupancy levels has resulted in inflated rental rates and
 unfair rent increases and contributed to the City's unaffordability
 for families.

15 ...

16 [S]oftware companies, such as RealPage, Inc., continue
 17 providing algorithmic devices to landlords in the City.²

18 19. The legislature noted that “[i]n response to the use of algorithmic devices
 19 to set rental rates and occupancy levels, in August 2024, the United States Department
 20 of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit”³ against RealPage and amended its lawsuit to name
 21 large corporate landlords.

22 20. “Eight Attorneys General, including California Attorney General Rob
 23 Bonta, joined the DOJ's lawsuit.”⁴ Indeed, Defendant UDR, Inc. was a large corporate
 24

25 ² Ord. No. O-21955, App. 05/22/2025, Eff. 06/21/2025, at 1-2, available at
 26 https://docs.sandiego.gov/council_reso_ordinance/rao2025/O-21955.pdf.

27 ³ *Id.*

28 ⁴ *Id.*

landlord named in an antitrust lawsuit.⁵ Nevertheless, the legislature passed the ordinance to provide “immediate relief” for San Diego tenants:

While the litigation is pending, software companies, such as RealPage, Inc., continue providing algorithmic devices to landlords in the City. City families cannot wait for the DOJ lawsuit to run its course and, if successful, provide relief from inflated rental rates and unfair rent increases. The Council wishes to provide immediate relief to City families by prohibiting the sale, licensing, and use of algorithmic devices that use or incorporate nonpublic competitor data of two or more landlords to advise a landlord on, or recommend to a landlord, rental rates or occupancy levels that may be achieved for residential rental property in the City.⁶

II. RealPage’s Algorithmic Devices and/or Software

21. RealPage, Inc. (“RealPage”) is an enterprise resource planning software company that offers more than traditional property management services. As relevant here, RealPage “licenses [various] revenue management products to property management companies and property owners (collectively, ‘landlords’)[.]”⁷

22. These RealPage algorithmic software products include but are not limited to “AI Revenue Management (‘AIRM’), YieldStar, and Lease Rent Options (‘LRO’). RealPage’s revenue management products are used by landlords to determine how to price floor plans and units in conventional multifamily rental housing, *i.e.*, multiunit apartments that they manage and lease.”⁸ RealPage algorithmic software products also

⁵ See First Amended Compl., *District of Columbia vs. RealPage, Inc. et al.*, No. 2023-CAB-006762, (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2025).

⁶ *Supra* note 1.

⁷ DOJ Antitrust Division, NOTICE PURSUANT TO THE ANTITRUST PROCEDURES AND PENALTIES ACT, *United States et al. v. RealPage, Inc. et al. Response to Public Comments*, available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/08/2026-09147/united-states-et-al-v-realpage-inc-et-al-response-to-public-comments>.

⁸ *Id.*

1 include “Market Analytics.”

2 23. Since these tools amount to automated algorithms that suggest rents and
3 occupancy in real-time, this complaint refers to them as “algorithmic devices.”

4 *AIRM/YieldStar*

5 24. AIRM is the subsequent product to YieldStar, and YieldStar and AIRM
6 leverage data in similar ways.

7 25. AIRM uses landlords’ data to train its machine learning model, make
8 daily floor-plan price recommendations, and suggest unit-level prices. YieldStar uses
9 the data to perform the latter two functions.⁹

10 26. YieldStar made headlines “[i]n 2022, [when] ProPublica published an
11 article diving into [this] ‘secret’ algorithm responsible for raising rents, tracing it back
12 to a high-tech revenue management company called RealPage.”¹⁰

13 27. According to a March 2023 letter from four United States senators to
14 then-Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, RealPage
15 “indicated that ‘YieldStar uses a *proprietary algorithm* to make recommendations to
16 apartment providers about setting a price for rental units at their property[.]’”¹¹

17
18 ⁹ See DOJ Antitrust Division, NOTICE PURSUANT TO THE ANTITRUST PROCEDURES
19 AND PENALTIES ACT, *supra* note 7 (“RealPage uses nonpublic, competitively
20 sensitive data to train its algorithmic models (‘models’) that AIRM leverages and to
21 provide floor plan price recommendations and unit-level pricing to landlords when
22 they are running AIRM or YieldStar.”).

23 ¹⁰ M. Sethi et al., *Reprogramming Competition: Remedying Algorithmic Price-Fixing*
24 *in U.S. v. RealPage*, Yale Univ. Thurman Arnold Project 2025 Student Papers, Paper
25 07 (May 2025), at 3, available at <https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2025-05/7.%20RealPage-%20TAP.pdf> (citing Heather Vogell, *Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why*, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 15, 2022), available at <https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent>)).

26 ¹¹ Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Tina Smith, Bernard Sanders, and Edward J.
27 Markey, United States Senators (Mar. 2, 2023), available at
28 [https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023.03.02%20Letter%20to%20DOJ%20re%20YieldStar%20\(RealPage\).pdf](https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023.03.02%20Letter%20to%20DOJ%20re%20YieldStar%20(RealPage).pdf) (emphasis added).

1 28. AIRM is RealPage’s “flagship product[.]”¹² The AIRM “software tool
2 ingests competitively sensitive, real-time transactional data—including occupancy
3 rates, lease terms, and rent rolls—collected from competing landlords through over
4 50,000 monthly calls surveilling over 11 million total properties; and through an
5 algorithmic process delivers pricing recommendations to those same landlords.”¹³

6 29. To-date, the RealPage AI Revenue Management website¹⁴ advertises its
7 use of “AI-driven algorithms”:



Revenue Optimization

AI-driven algorithms optimize revenue by providing precise recommendations
for new and renewal leases.

13 30. This is done for setting both rent and occupancy: “Optimize with
14 Confidence: Transparent and straightforward recommendations that leverage AI
15 modeling to strategically balance *rent and occupancy*.”¹⁵

16
17 ¹² M. Sethi et al., *Reprogramming Competition: Remedying Algorithmic Price-Fixing*
18 *in U.S. v. RealPage*, at 6; see also David Bitton, *RealPage vs Yardi: Which Property*
19 *Management Platform is Right for You?*, DOORLOOP (June 2, 2026),
20 <https://www.doorloop.com/blog/realpage-vs-yardi> (last accessed June 29, 2026)
21 (“RealPage has built its reputation on AI-driven revenue management and
22 operational automation. Its flagship pricing tool, YieldStar (now part of the AI
Revenue Management suite), uses algorithms to analyze market conditions and
adjust rental prices dynamically often, daily to align with demand and occupancy
goals.”).

23 ¹³ M. Sethi et al., *Reprogramming Competition: Remedying Algorithmic Price-Fixing*
24 *in U.S. v. RealPage*, at 6 (internal citation omitted).

25 ¹⁴ <https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/revenue-management/> (last accessed
26 June 19, 2026).

27 ¹⁵ REALPAGE, REALPAGE AI REVENUE MANAGEMENT,
28 <https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/revenue-management/> (last accessed
May 14, 2026) (emphasis added).

1 31. The algorithm “captur[es] detailed lease terms and individual
2 transactions” which “gives RealPage’s algorithm deep insight into real-time market
3 dynamics and competitor pricing.”¹⁶

4 ***Lease Rent Options***

5 32. Lease Rent Options (“LRO”) is an algorithmic tool that provides price
6 optimization for apartments. LRO uses a different approach than YieldStar/AIRM.
7 LRO generates pricing recommendations primarily from information about competitor
8 prices users manually input into the system.¹⁷

9 33. RealPage acquired LRO in 2017 from The Rainmaker Group, “after
10 months of scrutiny by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.”¹⁸ Similar to
11 RealPage, The Rainmaker Group is a “provider of automated Revenue Management
12 and profit optimization solutions in several industries[.]”¹⁹

14 ¹⁶ M. Sethi et al., *Reprogramming Competition: Remediating Algorithmic Price-Fixing*
15 *in U.S. v. RealPage*, at 8; *see also* Eric Weld, MassLandlords, Inc.,
16 MASSLANDLORDS.NET (Sep. 24, 2024), [https://masslandlords.net/realpage-](https://masslandlords.net/realpage-automated-price-optimization-software-in-doj-crosshairs-for-possible-antitrust-violations/)
17 [automated-price-optimization-software-in-doj-crosshairs-for-possible-antitrust-](https://masslandlords.net/realpage-automated-price-optimization-software-in-doj-crosshairs-for-possible-antitrust-violations/)
18 [violations/](https://masslandlords.net/realpage-automated-price-optimization-software-in-doj-crosshairs-for-possible-antitrust-violations/) (“One sticky issue for RealPage is that some of the statistics incorporated
19 by the AIRM algorithm are not public information. For example, the algorithm uses
rent prices received on actual executed leases, as well as real lease terms – data not
available to the public.”).

20 ¹⁷ *See* DOJ Antitrust Division, NOTICE PURSUANT TO THE ANTITRUST PROCEDURES
21 AND PENALTIES ACT, *supra* note 7 (“Owner Inputted Data refers to data that is
22 directly inputted by landlords into a revenue management product and includes both
23 public and nonpublic data. ... [L]andlords directly exchanged competitively sensitive
information to update rents within another RealPage revenue management product
known as Lease Rent Options or LRO.”).

24 ¹⁸ Heather Vogell, *Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why*,
25 PROPUBLICA (Oct. 15, 2022), available at
26 <https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent>.

27 ¹⁹ *See* RealPage® to Acquire Lease Rent Options, LRO®, available at
28 <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286225/000128622517000008/0001286225-17-000008-index.html>;

1 34. An exhibit to RealPage, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC discussing
2 the LRO acquisition confirms that LRO is a “revenue management solution” similar
3 to YieldStar/AIRM:

4 LRO is a revenue management solution that empowers
5 optimized pricing for over 1.5 million apartments. LRO, coupled
6 with the recent acquisition of Axiometrics, expands RealPage’s
7 suite of solutions for precision data analytics and asset
optimization for the rental housing industry.²⁰

8 ***Market Analytics***

9 35. “Market Analytics is the multifamily industry’s leading intelligence
10 platform for market-rate, student housing, and Build-to-Rent communities ... it
11 delivers clear visibility into market, submarket, and asset performance with daily
12 updates on rents, concessions, floor plans, and occupancy—helping teams turn data
13 into actionable insights.”²¹

14 36. RealPage designed Market Analytics software for, *inter alia*, “Property
15 Managers” like Defendant in the “multifamily industry, providing robust and granular
16 market intelligence for a wide range of property types, including conventional
17 apartments”²² like Plaintiff’s multifamily residential apartment unit.

18 37. To-date, RealPage concedes on its publicly available website that
19 “RealPage Market Analytics integrates RealPage’s proprietary historical apartment
20

21
22 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286225/000128622517000008/a20170227_prxriptide-01.htm.


23 ²⁰

24 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286225/000128622517000008/a20170227_prxriptide-01.htm


25
26 ²¹ REALPAGE, MARKET ANALYTICS, [https://www.realpage.com/insights-](https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/market-analytics/)
27 [analytics/market-analytics/](https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/market-analytics/) (last accessed May 14, 2026).

28 ²² *Id.*, Frequently Asked Questions (last accessed June 29, 2026).

data,”²³ among other data:



38. Market Analytics is “[p]owered by Lumina AI” to provide “daily updates on **rents**, concessions, floor plans, and **occupancy**—helping teams turn data into actionable insights.”²⁴



²³ *Id.*

²⁴ REALPAGE, MARKET ANALYTICS, <https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/market-analytics/> (last accessed July 2, 2026) (emphasis added).

39. RealPage boasts that the “proprietary” data available to landlords through this algorithmic software “makes it easy to gain ... niche level granularity, ... and other key insights powering comprehensive multifamily trends.”²⁵ This data is provided to landlords in real-time:

Asset Intelligence delivers *instant*, data-driven insights ... and reduces analysis time from hours to seconds. It enhances organizational effectiveness by providing granular ... *rent comparisons*, ... and highly configurable comp and assumption analysis.²⁶

40. In addition to Market Analytics providing “AI [Artificial Intelligence] Forecasting,” the Market Analytics software uses algorithms:

Rely on our automated **True Comps** selection algorithms, driven by enhanced RealPage Data Science models, that intelligently select ideal rent comps and sales comps based on property attributes and performance to underwrite and evaluate more deals faster.²⁷

41. To date, RealPage admits its platform allows access to: “**Proprietary**”—*i.e.* nonpublic—“apartment data covering millions of units across 425+ markets[.]”²⁸

No other multifamily market research platform has our data resources:		
Proprietary apartment data covering millions of units across 425+ markets	MSCI Real Capital Analytics sales data covering \$2.9T in MF transactions over 25 years	Historical apartment data spanning 30+ years and multiple market cycles

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.* (emphasis added).

²⁷ RealPage PDF Flyer, Customized Market Visibility & AI Valuation for Smarter Answers Faster, available at <https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/market-analytics/?showPdf=true>.

²⁸ REALPAGE, MARKET ANALYTICS, <https://www.realpage.com/insights-analytics/market-analytics/> (last accessed July 2, 2026) (emphasis added).

1 **III. Defendant Admits It Used RealPage’s Software**

2 42. UDR has admitted in antitrust litigation that it uses RealPage software.

3 43. For example, in Defendant UDR, Inc.’s Answer to the District of
4 Columbia’s First Amended Complaint in and Affirmative Defenses in *District of*
5 *Columbia vs. RealPage, Inc. et al.*, No. 2023-CAB-006762 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,
6 2025):

7 UDR further admits that it has used YieldStar as one tool among
8 others to help with UDR’s independent decision-making
9 concerning the management of certain of its multifamily units
10 during the past four years, ... UDR further admits that it signed
11 a One Master Agreement with RealPage dated April 15, 2017.
(*Id.* ¶ 24).

12 UDR admits that it has used YieldStar as one tool among others
13 to help with UDR’s independent decision-making concerning the
management of certain of its multifamily units, (*Id.* ¶ 72).

14 44. As of 2024, “RealPage’s algorithmic coverage,” including at least LRO
15 and AIRM/YieldStar,²⁹ extends to large swaths of metropolitan areas” including San
16 Diego:

17 ///

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
23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 _____
27 ²⁹ This chart presumably does not take into account the Market Analysis algorithmic
28 software.

Figure 1. RealPage Rental Pricing Software Usage: Share of Multifamily Rental Units by Metro in 2023



Council of Economic Advisers

Sources: RealPage, American Housing Survey, American Community Survey; CEA calculations.

Note: Multifamily units are in buildings with at least five units. Each label refers to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). "Other MSAs" is defined as average over all MSAs not listed above.

As of December 12, 2024 at 8:00am.

As of December 12, 2024 at 8:00am.


IV. The Use of Algorithmic Devices to Set Rents or Occupancy Levels Harms San Diego Tenants

45. As the City and County of San Diego has recognized, the use of algorithmic rent devices to set rents or occupancy levels harms San Diego tenants.

46. Economists and regulators agree that the use of algorithmic devices causes economic and social harm.

47. Economists find that RealPage's algorithmic software inflates rental prices. The Council of Economic Advisers to the Biden administration quantified that algorithmic pricing in rental housing increased costs to San Diego renters by \$99 per month on average.³⁰

³⁰ Council of Economic Advisers, *The Cost of Anticompetitive Pricing Algorithms in Rental Housing*, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2024), available at



48. Additionally, the White House said:

We find that ... algorithmic pricing cost[s] renters in algorithm-utilizing units \$70 a month, or 4% of rent, on average nationally. In six major metros, the cost exceeds \$100 a month. Monthly costs ... for units using RealPage software by metro are shown in Figure 2. The total cost to renters in 2023 was approximately \$3.8 billion.³¹

49. The use of algorithmic devices in setting rent and occupancy levels can further social harms that pervade the housing market, including but not limited to discrimination:

Mounting evidence reveals that algorithmic decisions can produce biased, discriminatory, and unfair outcomes in a variety

<https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/12/17/the-cost-of-anticompetitive-pricing-algorithms-in-rental-housing/>.

³¹ *Id.*

1 of high-stakes economic spheres including employment, credit,
2 health care, and housing.³²

3 50. For example, former FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter notes
4 that AI has led to proxy discrimination, or, “the use of facially neutral factors that
5 generate discriminatory results[.]”³³ “Facebook’s use of Lookalike Audiences that
6 facilitated housing discrimination presents one of the clearest illustrations of proxy
7 discrimination.”³⁴

8 51. “This problem may persist across ... algorithms”³⁵ including the
9 RealPage algorithmic software at issue here.

10 52. This is especially so where the RealPage algorithmic software captures
11 niche, granular insights and lease details. “[A]lgorithms ... bring the risk of
12 perpetuating or even amplifying longstanding patterns of housing-related
13 discrimination.”³⁶

14 ///

15 ///

16 ///

17 ///

18
19 ³² Rebecca Kelly Slaughter (with J. Kopec and M. Batal), *Algorithms and Economic*
20 *Justice: A Taxonomy of Harms and a Path Forward for the Federal Trade*
21 *Commission*, YALE INFORMATION SOCIETY PROJECT | YALE JOURNAL OF LAW &
22 TECHNOLOGY VOL. 23. (Aug. 2021), at 3, available at
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/algorithms_and_economic_justice_master_final.pdf (internal citation omitted).

23 ³³ *Id.* at 23.

24 ³⁴ *Id.* at 21.

25 ³⁵ *Id.* at 22.

26 ³⁶ Foggo, V., & Villasenor, J., Abstract for *Algorithms, Housing Discrimination, and*
27 *the New Disparate Impact Rule*, 22 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW (2021),
28 available at <https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/stlr/article/view/7963>.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

53. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as:

All persons who rented apartments from Defendant in San Diego during the class period (the “Class”).

54. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definition, including by using subclasses, as appropriate based on further investigation and discovery obtained in the case.

55. The “Class Period” is the time period beginning on the date established by the Court’s determination of any applicable statute of limitations, after considering of any tolling, concealment, and accrual issues, and ending on the date of entry of judgement.

56. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge presiding over this action and members of her or her family; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest (including current and former employees, officers, or directors); (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons.

57. **Numerosity/Ascertainability:** Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be unfeasible and not practicable. The exact number of Class Members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time; however, it is estimated that there are hundreds of individuals in the Class. The identity of such membership is readily ascertainable from Defendant’s records and non-party records, such as those of RealPage.

58. **Typicality:** The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims

1 of the Class because the named Plaintiff, like all other class members, had the rental
2 rate or occupancy level of their residential rental property set using an algorithmic
3 device.

4 **59. Adequate Representation:** Plaintiff is fully prepared to take all
5 necessary steps to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the Class Members.
6 Plaintiff's interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the members
7 of the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys with experience in the prosecution of
8 complex class action litigation generally, and in litigation concerning unfair and anti-
9 competitive practices specifically. Plaintiff's attorneys are committed to vigorously
10 prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class.

11 **60. Commonality and Predominance:** There are well-defined common
12 questions of fact and law that exist as to all members of the Class and that predominate
13 over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These common
14 legal and factual questions, which do not vary between members of the Class, and
15 which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any
16 Class member, include, but are not limited to, the following: whether Defendant
17 violated San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1103(b), whether Defendant uses nonpublic
18 competitor data, and whether Plaintiff and the proposed Class members are entitled to
19 damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, prejudgment interest and costs of this suit.

20 **61. Superiority:** Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and
21 efficient adjudication of the controversy. Such treatment will permit a large number
22 of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum
23 simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence,
24 effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of
25 proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons or
26 entities a method for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably be pursued
27 individually, substantially outweighs potential difficulties in management of this class
28

1 action. Plaintiff knows of no special difficulty to be encountered in litigating this
2 action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

3
4 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

5 **COUNT I**

6 **Violation of San Diego Mun. Code c. 9, § 98.1103(b)**

7 62. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if
8 fully set forth herein and brings this count individually and on behalf of the members
9 of the Class.

10 63. The San Diego Municipal Code makes it “unlawful for a landlord to use
11 an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential rental
12 property.” San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1103(b).

13 64. In San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1102, a “landlord has the same meaning as
14 in San Diego Municipal Code section 98.0702[.]” And per San Diego Mun. Code §
15 98.0702: “Landlord means an owner and any person, acting as principal or through an
16 agent, who has the right to offer residential rental property for rent, and includes a
17 predecessor in interest to the landlord.”

18 65. Defendant UDR is a landlord because it has the right to offer UDR-
19 managed property for rent.

20 66. San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1102 defines an “[a]lgorithmic device” as
21 follows:

22 [A] software or product that uses or incorporates one or more
23 algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data
24 of two or more landlords to advise a landlord on, or recommend
25 to a landlord, rental rates or occupancy levels that may be
26 achieved for a residential rental property in the City of San
27 Diego.

28 ///

///

1 67. The RealPage software, including Yieldstar/AIRM, LRO, and Market
2 Analytics, use one or more algorithms to advise Defendant on setting rent and/or
3 occupancy.

4 68. San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1102 defines “[n]onpublic competitor data”
5 as follows:

6 [I]nformation that is not available to the general public, whether
7 the information is attributable to a specific competitor or
8 anonymized or whether the information is derived from or
9 otherwise provided by another person. Nonpublic competitor
10 data includes information about actual rental rates, rental rate
changes, residential rental property supply levels, occupancy
levels, or lease start and end dates.

11 69. The RealPage software uses one or more algorithms to perform
12 calculations of non-public, proprietary data.

13 70. Under the Municipal Code, “[a] tenant may seek injunctive relief,
14 damages, or civil penalties of up to \$1,000 per violation of this Division, in a civil
15 action against a landlord.” San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1104(a).

16 71. “For *each month* a violation of section 98.1103(b) exists or continues,
17 and for each residential rental property a landlord uses an algorithmic device, it shall
18 constitute a *separate and distinct violation*.” *Id.* § 98.1103(b) (emphasis added).

19 72. In violation of the San Diego Municipal Code, Defendant used one or
20 more RealPage algorithmic device(s) when setting rents or occupancy levels for
21 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ residential dwelling units in San Diego.

22 73. Pursuant to San Diego Mun. Code § 98.1104, Plaintiff and Class
23 Members seek (1) injunctive relief, (2) damages, (3) civil penalties of up to \$1,000 per
24 violation; and (4) costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

25 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

26 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

27 a. For a determination that this action is a proper class action;
28

- 1 b. For an order certifying the Class, naming Plaintiff as
2 representative of the Class, and naming Plaintiff's attorneys
3 as Class Counsel to represent the Class;
4 c. For an order declaring that Defendant's conduct violates the
5 statute referenced herein;
6 d. For an order enjoining the illegal acts detailed herein;
7 e. For an order finding in favor of Plaintiff and the Class on all
8 counts asserted herein;
9 f. For an award of compensatory damages, including statutory
10 damages where available, to Plaintiff and Class Members
11 against Defendant for all damages sustained as a result of
12 Defendant's wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial;
13 g. For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded;
14 h. For an order awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable
15 attorneys' fees and expenses and costs of suit; and
16 i. For an order granting Plaintiff and Class Members such
17 further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

18 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

19 Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all causes of action and issues so triable.

20 Dated: July 2, 2026

21 Respectfully submitted,

22 **BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.**

23 By: /s/ L. Timothy Fisher

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