TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA AND TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare Services, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), and ATC West Staffing, Inc., hereby remove the above-referenced action from the California Superior Court, County of San Diego, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1441 and 1446, based on federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331). The removal is proper for the following reasons:

I. <u>BACKGROUND</u>

- 1. On December 27, 2018, an action was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, entitled TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, individually, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs vs. ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a Georgia corporation; ATC HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING, an unknown entity; ATC WEST STAFFING, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, Defendants.
- 2. The Complaint asserts claims for: (1) "Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) § 1681o(a) (Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)"; (2) "Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) § 1681o(a) (Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Authorization)"; (3) "Violations of the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code., § 1786, et seq.)"; (4) "Failure to Make Payments Within the Required Time"; (5) "Violations of Labor Code § 226"; (6) "Remedies Under Private Attorney General Act (PAGA California Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699, et seq.)"; and (7) "Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17000, et seq. and §§ 17200, et seq."

- 3. On **January 11, 2019**, ATC Healthcare Services, LLC's registered agent for service of process received the Complaint. A true and correct copy of the document received is attached as **Exhibit A**.
- 4. On February 1, 2019, Plaintiffs purported to serve the Summons and Complaint on Defendant ATC West Staffing, Inc. (a dissolved corporation), by leaving a copy of the documents outside the door of ATC West Staffing, Inc.'s former business address. A true and correct copy of the documents delivered is attached as **Exhibit B**.
- 5. On February 4, 2019, ATC Healthcare Services, LLC's registered agent for service of process received a Notice of Case Assignment and Case Management Conference, the Summons, and an ADR Packet, along with another copy of the Complaint. A true and correct copy of the documents received is attached as **Exhibit C**.
- 6. On February 7, 2019, Defendants filed their Answer in San Diego County Superior Court. A true and correct copy of the Answer filed is attached as **Exhibit D**.
- 7. Defendants have not filed or received any other pleadings or papers, other than the pleadings described as Exhibits A through D, in this action prior to this Notice of Removal. (Declaration of Mason R. Winters ("Winters Decl.") ¶ 2.)

II. TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL

- 8. This Notice of Removal is timely because it is being filed within thirty (30) days of ATC Healthcare Services, Inc.'s receipt of the Complaint on January 11, 2019. 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(2)(B) ("Each defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons . . . to file the notice of removal.").
- 9. Thus, this Notice of Removal is filed within thirty days of service of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which this action is based and is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1446(b).

III. NO JOINDER REQUIRED

10. All named Defendants have consented to removal. Unnamed, or doe defendants, are not required to join in removal. *Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 846 F.2d 1190 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (doe defendants need not join in removal).

IV. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

- 11. This action is proper for removal to this Court on the ground that it is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.
- 12. Any civil action commenced in state court is removable if it might have been originally brought in federal court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1441; *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattach Servs., Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 563-64 (2005) ("district court has original jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of section 1441(a) as long as it has original jurisdiction over a subset of claims constituting the action").
- 13. The action may be removed to this Court by Defendants under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a) because it arises under a federal statute, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) and 1681bo(a) ("FCRA") (See Compl. pgs. 15-20.)
- 14. Specifically, on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is one for "Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) § 1681o(a) (Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)." Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is also one for "Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) § 1681o(a) (Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Authorization)." Thus, Plaintiff has expressly relied on a federal statute, the FCRA.
- 15. Plaintiffs' express reliance on the FCRA in their First and Second Causes of Action, and their numerous allegations throughout their Complaint underlying their FCRA claims, is sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, Plaintiffs are the "master[s] of [their own] complaint," and could have "avoid[ed] federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." *Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Plaintiffs did not do so. Consequently, the action is removable based on federal question jurisdiction. *See Vaden v. Discover Bank*, 556 U.S. 49, 59-60 (2009) (a suit arises under federal law when "the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law]"); *Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co.*, 300 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.") (quoting *Caterpillar*, 482 U.S. at 392-93).

16. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' reliance on the FCRA on the face of their Complaint, and their numerous allegations seeking to support claims under the FCRA, are sufficient to establish that they have pled federal causes of action; therefore, removal to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction is proper.

V. PENDENT JURISDICTION OVER STATE CLAIMS

- 17. The Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's other state law claims because they arise from a nucleus of operative facts common to the state law claims and the FCRA claims. For a District Court to have pendent jurisdiction over state law claims "[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative facts." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Once a federal court acquires removal jurisdiction over a case, it also acquires jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. See, e.g., Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[t]o conserve judicial resources, it was appropriate for the district court to decide" the state law claims).
- 18. Here, the Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims because they arise out of the same set of facts as those which form the basis of her FCRA claims.
- 19. Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for "Violations of the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act" ("ICRAA") is based on the same allegations as her First and Second Causes of Action under the federal FCRA. That is, both the FCRA and ICRAA claims allege that: (a) Plaintiffs signed an authorization form allowing ATC Healthcare Staffing to procure consumer reports regarding them (compare Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 96, 97 with Compl. ¶¶ 123, 125); and (b) reliance on those forms was purportedly unlawful because they included "a liability release and multiple state law admonitions" (compare Compl. ¶¶ 99, 100 with Compl. ¶¶ 126, 127). Indeed, Plaintiffs' FCRA and ICRAA claims both center on the Complaint's identical allegations that

Defendants provided "a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)" (i.e., the FCRA) and "in § 1786.16" (the ICRAA). (See Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 103, 129.) In short, the allegations on which Plaintiffs' FCRA and ICRAA are based are nearly identical.

20. Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action for "Failure to Make Payments Within the Required Time," "Violations of Labor Code § 226," and "Remedies Under Private Attorney General Act" also share a common nucleus of operative facts with Plaintiffs' FCRA claims. First, both sets of claims arise from Plaintiffs' employment relationship with Defendants. See Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that district court had jurisdiction over employee's federal FLSA claims and pendant jurisdiction over state law claims for breach of contract, interference with contract, conversion, deceit, and defamation; "[t]he federal and nonfederal claims [plaintiff] advances 'derive from a common nucleus of operative facts'—[the plaintiff's] contract dispute with the university...."). Second, both sets of claims rely on allegations that the wrong entity name was printed on Plaintiffs' employment documents. (Compare Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 96, 97 with Compl. ¶¶ 47, 154.) Third, both sets of claims rely on events that took place around the same time. For example, Plaintiff Olshansky signed the allegedly offending background check authorization form on November 18, 2018 (Compl. ¶ 31; FCRA allegation); and the allegedly offending paycheck stub was issued to Plaintiff Olshansky just 11 days later on November 29, 2018 (Compl. ¶ 43; wage allegation). The timeframe for the putative classes also overlaps for four of the last five years. (Compl. at 12:12-24: FCRA class from 12-27-2013 to the present; wage claims class from 12-27-2014 to the present.) Fourth, both sets of claims together underlie Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices, discussed below. Thus, Plaintiffs' wage claims share a common nucleus of operative facts with their FCRA claims.

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- Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action for "Unfair Business Practices" also 21. shares a common nucleus of operative facts with Plaintiffs' FCRA claims. The Complaint alleges that "Defendants committed the unfair business practices . . . by violating the laws alleged to have been violated in this Complaint and which allegations are incorporated herein by reference." (See Ex. A, Compl. ¶ 177.) The Complaint concludes that "Defendants' conduct, as alleged above, constitutes unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent activity prohibited by Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq." (Id. ¶ 178.) In other words, Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices is premised on the FCRA claims.
- Therefore, the District Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining causes of action along with her FCRA claims.

VI. **VENUE**

23. Removal to this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1391(b) and 1441(a) because the state court action was filed in San Diego County.

VII. NOTICE OF REMOVAL

24. Notice of this removal will promptly be served on Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.

DATED: February 8, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP


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By: /s/ Mason R. Winters Laura Wilson Shelby

Mason R. Winters

Attorneys for Defendants ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare Services, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), and ATC West Staffing, Inc.

EXHIBIT "A" TO NOTICE OF REMOVAL [PAGES 7 - 45]



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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, on behalf of themselves and acting for the interest of other current and former employees ("Represented Employees"), and all other similarly situated individuals (cumulatively "Plaintiffs"), allege the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of all individuals who applied for employment with Defendants and who executed a release and authorization form permitting Defendants to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report on them as part of their employment or application for employment with Defendants.
- Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants have a uniform policy or practice of obtaining an applicant's consumer report and have violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") through use of a legally invalid authorization form that: (1) fails to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure; and (2) fails to provide a disclosure that appears in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.
 - Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and Labor Code Private

Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), §§ 2698, 2699 of the California Labor Code, Plaintiffs also bring a class and representative action against Defendants for wage and hour abuses in violation of the California Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders (the "IWC Wage Orders"), all of which contribute to Defendants' deliberate unfair competition.

4. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of themselves and all Class Members, seek damages, penalties, restitution, injunctive and other equitable relief, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Pursuant to Article VI, § 10 of the California Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' wage and hour claims is proper in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, State of California because Plaintiffs allege claims arising under California law.
- 6. Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs FCRA claim is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1681p which provides that "[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction..."
- 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants conduct business in this State, have systematic and continuous ties with this state, and have agents and representatives that can be found in this state.
- 8. Pursuant to § 395 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, venue is proper in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego because Defendants' corporate records filed with the California Secretary of State indicate they maintain a principle business office at 9040 Friars Road, Suite 335, San Diego, California 92108.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff TONI TORRACA-RIANO is an individual currently residing in

California.

- 10. Plaintiff MICHAEL OLSHANSKY is an individual residing outside the state of California. During his employment with Defendants from on or about November 2, 2018 to November 28, 2018, however, Plaintiff OLSHANSKY resided in California.
- 11. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. is a Georgia Corporation doing business in California.
- 12. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE, INC. is a Delaware Corporation doing business in California.
- 13. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company doing business in California.
- 14. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING is an unknown entity doing business in California.
- 15. Defendant ATC WEST STAFFING, INC. is a California Corporation, but according to the California Secretary of State Website, it is "dissolved."
- 16. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 50, are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. Plaintiffs therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to § 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 50 when Plaintiffs ascertain their names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the DOE Defendants is in some manner liable to Plaintiffs for the events and actions alleged herein.
- 17. Unless otherwise specified by name, the named Defendants and DOES 1 through 50 will be collectively referred to as "DEFENDANT EMPLOYER" and/or "Defendants."
- 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting as an agent, joint venturer, an integrated enterprise and/or alter

ego for each of the other Defendants and each were co-conspirators with respect to the acts and the wrongful conduct alleged herein so that each is responsible for the acts of the other pursuant to the conspiracy and in proximate connection with the other Defendant(s).

- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting partly within and partly without the scope and course of their employment, and was acting with the knowledge, permission, consent, and ratification of every other Defendant.
- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants was an agent, managing general partner, managing member, owner, co-owner, partner, employee, and/or representative of each of the Defendants and was at all times material hereto, acting within the purpose and scope of such agency, employment, contract and/or representation, and that each of them is jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants is liable to Plaintiff under legal theories and doctrines including but not limited to (1) joint employer; (2) integrated enterprise; (3) agency; and/or (4) alter ego, based in part, on the facts set forth below.
- 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the named Defendants are part of an integrated enterprise and have acted or currently act as the employer and/or joint employer of the Plaintiffs/Class Members making each of them liable for the wage and hour violations alleged herein.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE FCRA

23. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA's passage was driven in part by two related concerns: first, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at crucial moments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing; second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies.

- 24. While recognizing that consumer reports play an important role in the economy, Congress wanted consumer reports to be "fair and equitable to the consumer" and to ensure their "confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization." 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
- 25. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of consumer reports by employers. Accordingly, Congress required employers to make a clear and conspicuous written disclosure to employees and job applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). This is commonly referred to as the "stand-alone disclosure" requirement. Congress further required that employers obtain written authorization prior to procurement of a consumer report for employment purposes. *Id*.
- 26. The FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement is one of many elements of the FCRA that combine to ensure that consumers know when consumer reports may be generated about them, that they know their rights, and that they have the opportunity to dispute errors in their reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (preadverse employment action notice requirement); § 1681b(4)(B) (notification of national security investigation); § 1681 c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681d(a) (disclosure of investigative report); § 1681g (full file disclosure to consumers); § 1681k(a)(l) (disclosure regarding the use of public record information);§ 1681h (form and conditions of disclosure); § 1681m(a) (post-adverse employment action notice requirement).
- 27. Although the disclosure and the authorization may be combined in a single document, the FTC has warned that the form should not include any extraneous information or be part of another document. For example, in response to an inquiry as to whether the disclosure may be set forth within an application for employment or whether it must be included in a separate document, the FTC stated:

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The disclosure may not be part of an employment application because the language [of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)] is intended to ensure that it appears conspicuously in a document not encumbered by any other information. The reason for requiring that the disclosure be in a stand-alone document is to prevent consumers from being distracted by other information side-by-side within the disclosure.

28. The plain language of the statute also clearly indicates that the inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form violates the disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA, because such a form would not consist "solely" of the disclosure. In fact, the FTC expressly has warned that the FCRA notice may not include extraneous information such as a waiver. In a 1998 opinion letter, the FTC stated:

> [W]e note that your draft disclosure includes a waiver by the consumer of his or her rights under the FCRA. The inclusion of such a waiver in a disclosure form will violate Section 604(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA, which requires that a disclosure consist 'solely' of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.

Consistent with the FTC's construction of the FCRA, courts have repeatedly held that extraneous information renders a purported FCRA disclosure noncompliant. See, e.g., Woods v. CaremarkPHC, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-00535, 2015 WL 6742124, *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure contained an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to defendant and its consumer reporting agency, and state specific notices that did not apply to plaintiff); Jones v. Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 14-cv-3125, 2015 WL 366244, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 27, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure form included timeframes during which applicant must challenge accuracy of any report, an acknowledgement that employment decisions are based on non-discriminatory reasons, the contact information for the consumer reporting agency and state specific notices that "stretched what should be a simple disclosure form into two full pages of eyestraining typeface writing.").

30. As discussed below, Defendant routinely violates the FCRA by failing to provide the required stand-alone disclosure to employees and job applicants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING UNLAWFUL PROCUREMENT OF CONSUMER REPORT CLAIMS

- 31. On or about November 18, 2018, as part of Plaintiffs' application for employment, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO to sign a document titled "Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation." A true and correct redacted copy of Plaintiff OLSHANSKY'S authorization is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 1.
 - 32. This form is at the heart of one key part of this dispute.
- 33. The abovementioned form purportedly authorizes "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to conduct a background investigation concerning Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class.
- 34. Plaintiffs maintain this form is illegal because, in part, it includes a release and hold harmless clause that provides, "I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information." See Ex. 1.
- 35. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it misstates the name of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employer as being "ATC Healthcare Staffing," when according to their wage and earning statements, the only legal entity identified as being Plaintiffs' employer was "ATC Healthcare Services, Inc." See Ex. 1.
- 36. To the extent "ATC Healthcare Staffing" (if it exists) is the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members, this form also fails to provide any disclosure or to obtain any authorization at all.
- 37. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it includes other extraneous information in addition to a release, including but not limited to a number

of purported unrelated state law admonitions. See Ex. 1.

- 38. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal to the extent that it is overly broad and purports to authorize the procurement of any information concerning the applicant whether otherwise lawful or appropriate. See Ex. 1.
- 39. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that pursuant to the forms that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO signed on or about November 18, 2018, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER obtained consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO.
- 40. On information and belief, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER had a practice and policy of procuring consumer reports on all Class Members based upon this or substantially similar forms during the class period.
- 41. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated both state and federal law.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING LABOR CODE VIOLATIONS

Labor Code § 226 Violations

- 42. From at least four years before the filing of this action and continuing to the present, and pursuant to company policy and/or practice and/or direction,

 Defendants issued inaccurate wage and earning statements to Plaintiffs.
- 43. On or about November 29, 2018, Defendants issued Plaintiff OLSHANKSY a paystub.
- 44. This paystub did not accurately state Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S gross wages earned or the total hours worked by the employee.
- 45. The November 29, 2018 paystub stated Plaintiff OLSHANKSY earned \$1,810.21 in gross wages, but Plaintiff actually earned \$2,194.59.
- 46. Additionally, the November 29, 2018 statement did not account for Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S 0.75 hours of overtime and two hours of double time.
 - 47. Further, if indeed "ATC Healthcare Staffing" was Plaintiffs' employer,

Defendant failed to identify such entity as	s being Plaintiffs'	employer, as	required
under Labor Code § 226(a)(8).		•	,

- 48. Plaintiff TORRACA-RIANO similarly alleges that her paystubs were inaccurate.
- 49. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that Defendants issued similarly inaccurate paystubs to similarly situated employees.
- 50. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs seeks the remedies set forth in this Complaint.

Waiting Time Penalties

- 51. Pursuant to Defendants' policies, Defendants failed to pay all wages to Plaintiffs in a timely manner.
- 52. On or about November 28, 2018, Defendants involuntarily terminated Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employment.
- 53. On Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S date of termination, however, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO all their unpaid wages immediately upon their termination.
- 54. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants similarly did not pay other similarly situated employees all wages due and payable in a timely manner.
- 55. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs seeks the remedies set forth in this Complaint.

REPRESENTATIVE ACTION (PAGA) CLAIMS

- 56. The duties and business activities of the Represented Employees were essentially the same as the duties and activities of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO described above.
- 57. This is a wage and hour representative action filed pursuant to PAGA, §§ 2698, 2699 generally consists of the following group:

All nonexempt persons Defendants employed in the State of

California from December 21, 2017 to the present.

- 58. All members of the represented groups will be referred to as the "Represented Employees."
- 59. The "Representative Period" means from **December 21, 2017** to the present, the timeframe where the scope of statute allows Plaintiffs to recover wages and penalties.
- 60. At all times during the Representative Period, all the Represented Employees were employed in the same or similar job as Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and were paid in the same manner and under the same standard employment procedures and practices as the Plaintiff.
- 61. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO further allege DEFENDANT EMPLOYER did not pay them and, on information and belief Represented Employees, all wages due at the time their employment ended with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER.
- 62. On information and belief, current and former employees of DEFENDANT EMPLOYER were subject to wage and hour violations by DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, including failing to pay for all wages due.
- 63. California law provides that an employee may file an action against an employer to recover penalties for violations of the Labor Code and Wage Orders, provided the aggrieved employee files an action on behalf of him or herself and similarly situated current and former employees.
- 64. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER was and/or is Represented Employees' employer or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

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65. As set forth in further detail below, because of the analysis and investigation of the Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' attorneys sent letters to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "LWDA") and to DEFENDANT EMPLOYER informing DEFENDANT EMPLOYER of their claims and their intent to pursue litigation.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

- Act, on **December 21, 2018**, Plaintiffs began to exhaust his/her administrative remedies by sending correspondence to the LWDA and DEFENDANT EMPLOYER indicating that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are pursuing the claims alleged in this Complaint.
- 67. By the time an amended Complaint is filed, the statutory period for Plaintiffs will have expired on the letter alleged above and the LWDA will likely not have served Plaintiffs with notice of intent to assume jurisdiction over the applicable penalty claims and did not provide notice as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3 (a)(2)(A) within the statutory period.
- 68. Therefore, Plaintiffs will have exhausted Plaintiffs' administrative remedies to enable Plaintiffs to seek the penalty claims sought in this Complaint.
- 69. The Causes of Action alleged herein are appropriately suited for a Representative Action under PAGA (Labor Code § 2698, et seq.) because:
 - a. This action involves allegations of violations of provisions of the California Labor Code that provide for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees;
 - b. Plaintiffs are "aggrieved employees" because
 Plaintiffs were employed by the alleged violator

during the applicable limitations period, did not receive all wages due in a timely manner as required by Labor Code §§ 201-204.

<u>UCL Subclass:</u> All Members of the Plaintiff Class, who, during the relevant period, Defendants owe restitution in the form of (1) unreimbursed expenses and/or (2) wages earned and unpaid because of Defendants' uniform pay policies and procedures.

- 73. The above-mentioned class-members will collectively be referred to as "Class Members."
- 74. Plaintiffs reserve the right under the California Rules of Court, to amend or modify the class description with greater specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues.
- 75. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class Action under the provisions of § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.

A. Numerosity

- 76. The potential members of the Class as defined are so numerous or many, that joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable.
- 77. While the precise number of Class Members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that DEFENDANT EMPLOYER currently employs, and during the relevant time periods employed, over 100 Class Members.
- 78. Accounting for employee turnover during the relevant periods necessarily increases this number substantially.

B. <u>Commonality</u>

- 79. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members.
 - 80. Common questions of law and fact include, without limitation and

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subject to possible further amendment, the following:

- a. Whether the Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports based on invalid authorizations;
- b. Whether Defendants' policy or practice of not paying hourly employees all their wages due in their final paychecks immediately upon involuntary termination or within 72 hours' notice of when its employees provided notice of their voluntary resignation, is unlawful under Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and/or 203;
- c. Whether Defendants violated Labor Code §§ 226 by not providing accurate paystubs; and
- d. Whether Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class may recover remedies pursuant to Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

C. <u>Typicality</u>

81. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and all members of the Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by Defendants' common course of conduct and policies in violation of laws, regulations that have the force and effect of law and statutes as alleged herein.

D. Adequacy of Representation

- 82. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are members of the Class, do not have any conflicts of interest with other Class Members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class.
- 83. Counsel representing Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class is competent and experienced in litigating employment class

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actions, including wage and overtime class actions.

84. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members.

E. Superiority of Class Action

- 85. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all Class Members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
- 86. Each Class Member was damaged or suffered injury and may recover by reasons of Defendants' illegal policies and/or practices.
- 87. Class Action treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system.
- 88. Plaintiffs are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to encounter in the management of this action that would preclude maintenance as a Class Action.
- 89. For the reasons alleged in this Complaint, this action should be certified as a Class Action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Class Claim for

Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)

(Against All Defendants)

- 90. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 91. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B), a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes.
- 92. Likewise, a consumer report may be used for the evaluation of "a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention of an employee." 15

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U.S.C. §1681a(h).

- 93. The FCRA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must: (1) provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to each applicant in writing that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (2) obtain the applicant's authorization in writing to obtain the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 94. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) further specifies that the disclosure must be in writing "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
 - 95. Specifically, Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part:
 - ... a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless--
 - a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or cause to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

- 96. During the Class Period, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class Members to sign an authorization form as part of their job application with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, which form purported to allow "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to procure consumer reports regarding the Plaintiffs.
- 97. To the extent that ATC Healthcare Staffing (if such entity exists) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS failed to provide any disclosure at all prior to procuring consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by the FCRA.
- 98. Moreover, the form that was provided facially violates the FCRA in numerous respects.

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99. Included in DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1 are reams of extraneous information, including but not limited to, a liability release and multiple state law admonitions. See Exhibit 1.

- 100. Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned, among other extraneous information, in its Notification and Authorization Form executed by applicants facially contravenes the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) that the disclosure be: (1) "clear and conspicuous"; and (2) appear "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
- 101. As a matter of law, Defendant's inclusion of the aforementioned information invalidates the Notification and Authorization Form for purposes of the FCRA. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, *10-11 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding an employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)—(ii) when it requires an employee to sign a form containing a waiver of liability provision as part of a background investigation); Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (release of liability improper); Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (a summary of consumer rights in seven different states improper); Lagos v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163119 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (inclusion of seven state law notices and sentence stating "I also understand that nothing herein shall be construed as an offer of employment or contract for services" plausibly violated stand-alone disclosure requirement); Woods v. Caremark PHC, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148051 (W.D. Mo. 2015) ("The specific 'extraneous information' Plaintiff alleges Defendant included in its Authorization Form for Consumer Reports is: (1) an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to Defendant and its consumer reporting agency, (2) state-specific notices that did not apply to Plaintiff, and (3) that the form was part of a five-page stapled packet of three documents. Where FCRA allegations involve the inclusion of extraneous information beyond an authorization,

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. 1	the complaint meets the 12(b)(6) standard to state a claim for willful violation of the
2	FCRA stand-alone requirement."); see also Letter from William Haynes, Attorney,
3	Div. of Credit Practices, Fed Trade Comm'n to Richard W. Hauxwekk, CEO,
4	Accufax Div. (June 12, 1998), 1998 W.L. 34323756 (F.T.C.) (noting that the
5	inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form will violate the FCRA).
6	102. The Notification and Authorization form is also illegal to the extent that
7	it purports to authorize the procurement of any and all information regarding
8	Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, whether legal or proper to do so.
9	103. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification
10	and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous
11	requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
12	104. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties

104. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.

105. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiffs' investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful because:

- a. Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form knowing that it was facially invalid in violation of the FCRA and Defendants' statutory duties;
- b. Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the FCRA requirements and Defendants' statutory duties when it required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form that was facially invalid and in violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements of the FCRA;
- c. Upon information and belief, Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers and other professional employees, and

Members purports to authorize "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to perform a background investigation.

- 111. To the extent the foregoing entity (if it exists at all) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and Class Members, Defendants failed to obtain any authorization at all.
- 112. Alternatively, because Defendants failed to make a clear and conspicuous disclosure that a consumer report may be procured in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiffs and other Class Members without proper authorization. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 113. The foregoing violations were willful because Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiffs and other Class Members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 114. Defendants' willful conduct is also evidenced by, among other things, the facts previously set forth.
- 115. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' willful failure to comply with the requirements imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) of an amount not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000.
- 116. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery of punitive damages for Defendants' willful violations, in an amount as the Court may allow.
- 117. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) and § 1681o(a)(2), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Violation of the

California Investigative Consumer Reporting

Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq.)

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Facially Valid Authorizations)

(Against All Defendants)

- 118. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 119. Pursuant to California Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq., a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer investigative report for employment purposes.
- 120. The ICRAA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must comply with all the following:
 - (A) The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12.
 - (B) The person procuring or causing the report to be made provides a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be made in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that:
 - (i) An investigative consumer report may be obtained.
 - (ii) The permissible purpose of the report is identified.
 - (iii)The disclosure may include information on the consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.
 - (iv)Identifies the name, address, and telephone number of the investigative consumer reporting agency conducting the investigation.
 - (v) Notifies the consumer in writing of the nature and scope of the investigation requested, including a summary of the provisions of Section 1786.22.
 - (vi)Notifies the consumer of the Internet Web site address of the investigative consumer reporting agency identified in clause (iv), or, if the agency has no Internet Web site address, the telephone number of the agency, where the consumer may find information about the investigative reporting agency's privacy practices, including whether the consumer's personal information will be sent outside the United States or its territories and information

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that complies with subdivision (d) of Section 1786.20. This clause shall become operative on January 1, 2012.

(C) The consumer has authorized in writing the procurement of the report.

(§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(2).)

- 121. In addition, the person procuring or causing the report to be made must "certify to the investigative consumer reporting agency that the person has made the applicable disclosures to the consumer required by [section 1786.16, subdivision (a)] and that the person will comply with subdivision (b)." (§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(4).)
- 122. Subdivision (b) of section 1786.16 also requires the person procuring or causing the report to be made to (1) provide the consumer a form with a box that can be checked if the consumer wishes to receive a copy of the report, and send a copy of the report to the consumer within three business days if the box is checked and (2) comply with section 1786.40 if the person procuring or causing the report to be made contemplates taking adverse action against the consumer. (§ 1786.16, subd. (b).)
- 123. During the Class Period, Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and FCRA Class Members to sign a disclosure authorization forms as part of their job applications with Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., which forms purported to allow Defendant "ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING," not Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., the alleged real employer, to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff. See Exhibit 1.
- 124. Under Civil Code § 1786.16, subd. (a) "Any person described in subdivision (d) of Section 1786.12 shall not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report unless . . . The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12," yet Civil Code § 1786.12, in relevant part, provides "An investigative consumer reporting agency shall only furnish an investigative consumer report. . . To a person that it has reason to believe: (1) Intends to use the information for employment purposes."

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- 125. If Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING was not Plaintiff's employer, it violated Civil Code § 1786.16 because it had no legal basis to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff.
- 126. In addition, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., **Exhibit 1**: (1) was a purported authorization to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report; (2) included a waiver of liability provision; (3) included a purported authorization to investigate "personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and credit history . . ."; and (4) included other extraneous language, including but not limited to a number of state law admonitions, such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, none of which are applicable since Plaintiff was applying for work in California; "." See **Exhibit 1**.
- 127. Plaintiff maintains Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned in its Notification and Authorization Form violates California law because it was not a "clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer." (§ 1786.16(a)(2)(B).) See Exhibit 1.
- 128. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated ICRAA.
- 129. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in § 1786.16.
- 130. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 131. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiff's investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful.
- 132. With respect to each of the aforementioned violations of the ICRAA provisions and pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50(a)(1), in the event this case does not

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proceed as a class action basis regarding the FCRA class claims, Plaintiffs
OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, not the Class, seek to recover statutory
damages due to Defendants' failure to comply with the requirements imposed by §
1786.16 of an amount not less than \$10,000 or seek actual damages, if any, in an
amount to be proven at trial, whichever is higher.

- 133. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are informed and believe, and based on such information and belief allege that Defendants' misconduct was reckless and/or willful and/or malicious and/or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the Plaintiff and whose recklessness and/or conscious disregard was reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to the Plaintiff, thereby warranting the assessment of punitive damages against these Defendants.
- 134. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for Failure to Pay Timely Earned Wages during Employment and **Upon Separation of Employment in Violation of** California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, and 218.6

(Against all Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.)

- 135. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 136. Pursuant to Labor Code § 201, "If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately."
- 137. Pursuant to Labor Code § 202, "If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has

given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting."

- 138. Labor Code § 203 provides, in pertinent part: "If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, ... any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefore is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. ..."
- 139. Pursuant to Labor Code § 204, "all wages ... earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays."
- 140. Alternatively, pursuant to Labor Code § 204b, employers must pay its employees on a weekly basis on a regular day determined by the employer as the regular payday.
- 141. Pursuant to Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 218.6, an action may be brought for the nonpayment of wages and fringe benefits.
- 142. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs were not properly paid pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b and thereby seek all remedies available to them.
- 143. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs' wages pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b, after Plaintiffs' demand and, therefore, Plaintiffs may recover the associated unpaid wages and waiting time penalties.
- 144. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants did this with the intent to secure for himself, herself and itself a discount on its indebtedness and/or with intent to annoy harass, oppress, hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiffs.
- 145. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of

Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code §
558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the
California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any
Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for
each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

- 146. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 147. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to full perform their obligation under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 148. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, and 204/204b. The exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 149. Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their rightfully earned wages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' failure and refusal to pay said compensation and for the reasons alleged in this Complaint.
- 150. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members request the unpaid wages, waiting time penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, costs, damages, and other remedies in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 151. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert

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Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for Violations of California Labor Code § 226

(Against all Defendants)

- 152. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 153. Plaintiffs allege that Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a) requires, in pertinent part, that every employer shall, "semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or her employee, either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee..., (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number..., (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer..., and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee..." (Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a).)
- 154. Based on the foregoing allegations, during all times relevant to this action, Defendants did not provide accurate wage statements throughout the Class Period.
- 155. Plaintiffs allege that on numerous occasions, an exact amount by which will be proven at trial, Defendants violated various provisions of § 226, including but not limited to subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and a(5) by failing to provide Plaintiffs accurate itemized statement in writing accurately showing gross wages earned, net

wages earned, total hours worked by the employee, among other things.

- 156. At all material times DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating business hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set forth in Labor Code § 558.
- 157. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 158. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to fully perform their obligations under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 159. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code § 226, the exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 160. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages, penalties, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, and 226.6 in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 161. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 226 in an amount to be proven at trial.

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162. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for PAGA
Penalties and Wage Under California Labor Code
§§ 2698, 2699, et seq. for Violations of California Labor Code
§§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.

(Against all Defendants)

- 163. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 164. Pursuant to law, written notice was provided to the LWDA and Defendants of the specific violations of the California Labor Code Defendants have violated and continue to violate.
- 165. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3, no response will likely be received from the LWDA within 60 days of the postmark date of the above-alleged letter.
- 166. Plaintiffs, therefore, will have exhausted all administrative procedures required of them under Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699, and 2699.3, and, as a result, are justified as a matter of right in bringing forward this cause of action and are entitled to pursue penalties in a representative action for Defendants' violations of the Labor Code.
- 167. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, any provision of the Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees for violation of the code may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Labor Code § 2699.3.

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- 168. Plaintiff is an "aggrieved employee" because Plaintiff was employed by the alleged violator and had one or more of the alleged violations committed against Plaintiff, and therefore is properly suited to represent the interests of other current and former Represented Employees.
- 169. Because of the acts alleged above, Plaintiffs seek penalties under Labor Code §§ 2698 and 2699 because of Defendants' violation of numerous provisions of the California Labor Code as alleged in this Complaint.
- 170. Labor Code § 2699, *et seq*. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, penalties for violating Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.
- 171. Labor Code § 558 establishes a civil penalty as follows: Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be violated, a section of this chapter or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (including the "Hours and Days of Work" section of the Wage Order) shall be subject to a civil penalty of (1) for any initial violation, fifty dollars (\$50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; (2) for each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars (\$100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; and (3) wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee.
- 172. Plaintiffs seek penalties for Defendants' conduct as alleged herein as permitted by law.
- 173. Specifically, Plaintiffs seeks penalties under Labor Code § 2699, for the following in addition to those Code provisions mentioned in this Cause of Action:
 - a. For violations of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
 and 204/204b for failing to pay Plaintiff and
 Represented Employees in a timely manner; and

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b.	For the violation of Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3
	for failing to provide Plaintiff and Represented
	Employees accurate wage statements.

174. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2698, et seq., Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney's fees, costs, civil penalties, and wages on behalf of Plaintiff and other current and former Represented Employees as alleged herein in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Remedies for Violations of the California Unfair Business Practices Code §§ 17200, et seq.

(Against all Defendants)

- 175. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 176. Defendants, and each of them, are "persons" as defined under Business and Professions Code § 17021.
- 177. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants committed the unfair business practices, as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by violating the laws alleged to have been violated in this Complaint and which allegations are incorporated herein by reference.
- 178. Defendants' conduct, as alleged above, constitutes unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent activity prohibited by Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.
- 179. The unlawful and unfair business practices conducted by Defendants, and each of them, are ongoing and present a threat and likelihood of continuing against Plaintiffs and, accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief where appropriate.
- 180. Plaintiffs has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property because of the aforementioned unfair competition.
 - 181. Because of their improper acts, Defendants, and each of them, have

reaped and continue to reap unfair benefits and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and other employees and former employees of Defendants, and each of them.

- 182. Defendants, and each of them, should be enjoined from this activity and made to disgorge these ill-gotten gains and restore to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class the wrongfully withheld wages and/or penalties, pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17202 and/or 17203.
- 183. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class have also incurred and continue to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial and for which they seek compensation pursuant to law including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of the Class, pray for an order for relief as follows:

- 1. An order that this action may proceed and be maintained as a class action;
- 2. For appointment of the Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as the representatives of the Class;
- 3. For appointment of counsel for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as Class Counsel;
- 4. That Defendants be found liable to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class;
- 5. For a declaration that Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiffs
 OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class under the FCRA and any other
 applicable law alleged in this Complaint;
- 6. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), an award of statutory damages to Plaintiff and the Class in an amount equal to \$1,000 for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and each member of the Class for Defendant's willful

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violations of the FCRA;

- 7. In the event this case does not proceed on a FCRA class action basis, pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50, an award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO in the amount of \$10,000 each, or in the alternative actual damages in an amount according to proof;
- 8. For an award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class in an amount to be determined by the Court;
- 9. For costs of suit and expenses incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs allowed under relevant provision of law including, but not limited to, those allowed under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a)(2), Civ. Code § 1786.50, and/or other applicable provisions of law;
- 10. That Defendants, and each of them, be ordered and enjoined to pay restitution to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 11. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
- 12. For disgorgement through restitution of all ill-gotten and/or ill-gained profits, including unpaid wages and/or penalties to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees, resulting from Defendants' unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 13. For an order by the Court requiring Defendants, and each of them, to show cause, if any they have, as to why to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees should not have been issued itemized wage statements as required by § 226 of the Labor Code and why Defendants should not be required to pay Plaintiff minimum wages and overtime compensation under applicable state law;

	14.	For all remedies available to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA
RIAN	IO und	er the applicable provisions of the Labor Code via PAGA Labor Code
2698,	et seq	including an award of attorneys' fees, costs, interest, liquidated
dama	ges, da	mages, penalties and waiting time penalties according to proof to the
exten	t permi	itted by law;

- 15. For maximum civil penalties available under the Labor Code and applicable Wage Order as described more particularly in this Complaint, representative PAGA claims including the payment of wages as set forth in Labor Code § 558;
- 16. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
 - 17. For Labor Code § 203 penalties in an amount to be proven at trial;
 - 18. For special and general damages;
- 19. That Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees where available by law, including but not limited to pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq., Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, and/or other applicable laws; and
- 20. For any other relief the Court may deem just, proper and equitable in the circumstances.

Dated: December 27, 2018

Law Offices of Thomas D. Rutledge

By: /s/Thomas D. Rutledge /s/Thomas D. Rutledge Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of this matter.

- 34 -




Exhibit 1

Case 3:19-cv-00295-L-BLM Document 1 Filed 02/08/19 PageID.46 Page 46 of 150

Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation

I hereby authorize ATC Healthcare Staffing and the choice of reporting company to ascertain information regarding my background to determine any and all information of concern to my record, whether same is of record or not, and I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information. I understand that this form indicates that a background search will be conducted and that this is my notification of that intent. I understand that the purpose of this background investigation is to determine my suitability for employment and may elicit information on my character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living. Additionally, you are hereby authorized to make any investigation of my personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and cridit history through an investigative or credit agency or bureau of your choice. I authorize the release of this information by the appropriate agencies to the investigating service. I understand that my consent will apply throughout my employment, unless I revoke or cancel my consent by sending a signed letter or statement to the Company at any time, stating that I revoke my consent and no longer allow the Company to obtain consumer or investigative consumer reports about me.

PLEASE PRIN	T CLEARLY
FULL NAME: Michael Olshansky	
OTHER NAMES USED/MAIDEN NAME/DATES:	
CURRENT Redacted ADDRESS:	PHONE: Redacted
LIST ALL ADDRESSES FOR PAST 7 YEARS:	Dates:
·	Dates:
	Dates;
EMAIL ADDRESS: Redacted	•
REDACTED	REDACTED OF BIRTH:
DRIVER'S LICENSE # Redacted	STATE ISSUED: PA
*** MAY WE CONTACT YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYER? YE	
*** HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME? YE	s No V
If yes, please explain:	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Notice to California Applicants - You may omit minor traffic offenses, any co convictions more than two years old for the following marijuana related offenses: HS1 for which probation was completed and the case was judicially dismissed.	
Notice to Massachusetts Applicants: You may omit a first conviction for any of traffic violations, affray, or disturbance of the peace, or any conviction of a misdemean incarceration resulting there from, whichever date is later, occurred five or more years p convicted of any offense within five years immediately preceding the date of this application Note: No applicant will be denied employment solely on the grounds of conviction surrounding circumstances and the relevance of the offense to the position will be	nor where the date of such conviction or the completion of any period of arior to the date of this application for employment, unless you have been a for employment. In of a crime. The nature of the offense, the date of the offense, the
SIGNATURE:	DATE: Nov 18, 2018
California Applicants: Under Section 1786.22 of the California Civil Code, you have the right to re www.justifacts.com), upon proper identification, the nature and substance of all information in its file to whom Justifacts has previously furnished within the three-year period preceding your request. Files as follows: (1) In-person, if he appears in person and furnishes proper identification. A copy of his fiduplication services provided. (2) By certified mail, if he makes a written request, with proper identificationatined in files on a consumer and required to be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by telephone disclosure, and the toll charge, if any, for the telethone call is prepaid by or charged directly to	is on you, including the sources of information, and the recipients of any reports on you maintained on a consumer shall be made available for the consumer's visual inspection, ile shall also be available to the consumer for a fee not to exceed the actual costs of ation, for copies to be sent to a specified addressee. (3) A summary of all information telephone, if the consumer has made a written request, with proper identification for the consumer.
California, Minnesota & Oklahoma Applicants Only: Please check this box if you would like a will receive a copy direct from Justifacts or its designee. California applicants may receive a copy from e	oither the prospective employer or Justifacts.
NOTICE: Under federal law, you have the right to request disclosure of the nature and scope of our investigation.	
Subscriber certifies that consumer credit information, consumer reports, as defined by the F only when intended to be used as a factor in establishing a consumer's eligibility for empurposes. It is recognized and understood that the FCRA provides that anyone "who kno	ployment and that consumer credit information will be used for no other

ATC Personnel/Payroll 0056

reporting agency" (such as Justifacts) "under false pretenses shall be fined not more than \$2,500 or imprisoned not more than two years or both."

EXHIBIT "B" TO NOTICE OF REMOVAL

[PAGES 46 - 90]

SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL)

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO):

See attached.

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):

TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, individually, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

SUM-100

FOR COURT USE CALLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE) : •

ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Diego

12/27/2018 at 10:37:03 PM

Clerk of the Superior Court By Vanessa Bahena, Deputy Clerk

NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being feard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at file court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Halp Center (www.courtinfo.co.goweelfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee walver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and properly

me count clerk for a see waiver form. If you go not liet your response on time, you may loss the case by genuit, and your wages, money, and properly may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away, if you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral services from a notyrofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the Callifornia Legal Services Web site (www.lewhelpcallibmia.crp), the Callifornia Courte Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinto.ca.gov/selfitelp), or by contacting your local courter county has a sesociation. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of \$10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. [ANISO! Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 dias, le corte puede decidir en su contre sin escuchar su versión. Lea le información a

Tiene 30 DIAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen este citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacar que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar corte y nacer que se entregue una copia al demandante, una carta o una llamada teleronida no lo protegon. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estat en formato legal correcto al desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que heye un formularo que usted puede usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en la bibliotece de layes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerce. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presente su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinaro y bienes sin más advertencia.

podrá quitar su suelco, disero y blenes sin más advertencia.

Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llema e un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, pueda llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Servicas, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniêndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho e reciamer las cuaras y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperación de 310,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que resper el carvamen de la corta artes de que la corta que la pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso.

CASE NUMBER: (Número del Ceso):

The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y dirección de la corte es):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

330 WEST BROADWAY, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is:
(El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es).
THOMAS D. RUTLEDGE, 500 W. HARBOR DR., STE. 1113, SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 Tel.: 619-886-7224

Bahma DATE: 12/28/2018 Clerk, by (Fecha) V. Bahena (Secretario) (For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010). (Para prueba de entrega de esta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)). NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served as an individual defendant. as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): 3. Do on behalf of (specify): ATC West Staffing, Inc. under CCP 416.10 (corporation) ·CCP 416.60 (minor) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservatee) CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (authorized person) other (specify): 4. 1 by personal delivery on (date): Fcb . 1, 2010

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. July 1, 2009]

SUMMONS

Code of Civil Procedure \$5 412.20, 465

37-2018-00066377-CU-OE-CTL

Deputy

(Adjunto)

	<u>:</u>	SUM-200(
SHORT TITLE:	CASE NUMBER:	•
Olshansky, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.		
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE	•	,
This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not perm If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendar Attachment form is attached."	it the listing of all parties or at box on the summons: "A	n the summons. Scittonal Parties
List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page for each type of p	party.):	
Plaintiff Defendant Cross-Complainant Cross-De	efendant	
ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a Georgia corporation; ATC	HEALTHCARE, INC	C., a Delaware
corporation; ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, a Georgia limite	ed liability company:	ATC
HEALTHCARE STAFFING, an unknown entity; ATC WEST STAFF and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive.	FING, INC., a Californ	nia corporation;
and DOMS I through 30 morasive.	. '	
the state of the s		in the second
	••	•
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人名英格兰 经收益 经收益 化二氯甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基		
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Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-200/A) (Rev. January 1, 2007)

ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT
Attachment to Summons

COMPLAINT - Torraca-Riano, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.

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Greenstone Law APC 1 Mark S. Greenstone (SBN 199606) 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-9156 Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 5 Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP Marc L. Godino (SBN 182689) Danielle L. Manning (SBN 313272) 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-9150 9 Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1.1 12 13 14 15 16

Plaintiffs TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, on behalf of themselves and acting for the interest of other current and former employees ("Represented Employees"), and all other similarly situated individuals (cumulatively "Plaintiffs"), allege the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of all individuals who applied for employment with Defendants and who executed a release and authorization form permitting Defendants to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report on them as part of their employment or application for employment with Defendants.
- 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants have a uniform policy or practice of obtaining an applicant's consumer report and have violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") through use of a legally invalid authorization form that: (1) fails to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure; and (2) fails to provide a disclosure that appears in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.
 - 3. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and Labor Code Private

COMPLAINT - Torraca-Riano, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.

Thomas D. Rufledge
Attorney-si-Law
500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 111
Sun Diego, California 92101
Telephone (619) 886-7224
Facsimile: (619) 259-5455

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Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), §§ 2698, 2699 of the California Labor Code,
Plaintiffs also bring a class and representative action against Defendants for wage and
hour abuses in violation of the California Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders (the "IWC Wage Orders"), all of which contribute to
Defendants' deliberate unfair competition.

4. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of themselves and all Class Members, seek damages, penalties, restitution, injunctive and other equitable relief, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Pursuant to Article VI, § 10 of the California Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' wage and hour claims is proper in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, State of California because Plaintiffs allege claims arising under California law.
- 6. Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs FCRA claim is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1681p which provides that "[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction..."
- 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants conduct business in this State, have systematic and continuous ties with this state, and have agents and representatives that can be found in this state.
- 8. Pursuant to § 395 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, venue is proper in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego because Defendants' corporate records filed with the California Secretary of State indicate they maintain a principle business office at 9040 Friars Road, Suite 335, San Diego, California 92108.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff TONI TORRACA-RIANO is an individual currently residing in

California.

- 10. Plaintiff MICHAEL OLSHANSKY is an individual residing outside the state of California. During his employment with Defendants from on or about November 2, 2018 to November 28, 2018, however, Plaintiff OLSHANSKY resided in California.
- 11. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. is a Georgia Corporation doing business in California.
- 12. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE, INC. is a Delaware Corporation doing business in California.
- 13. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company doing business in California.
- 14. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING is an unknown entity doing business in California.
- 15. Defendant ATC WEST STAFFING, INC. is a California Corporation, but according to the California Secretary of State Website, it is "dissolved."
- 16. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 50, are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. Plaintiffs therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to § 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 50 when Plaintiffs ascertain their names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the DOE Defendants is in some manner liable to Plaintiffs for the events and actions alleged herein.
- 17. Unless otherwise specified by name, the named Defendants and DOES 1 through 50 will be collectively referred to as "DEFENDANT EMPLOYER" and/or "Defendants."
- 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting as an agent, joint venturer, an integrated enterprise and/or alter

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ego for each of the other Defendants and each were co-conspirators with respect to the acts and the wrongful conduct alleged herein so that each is responsible for the acts of the other pursuant to the conspiracy and in proximate connection with the other Defendant(s).

- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting partly within and partly without the scope and course of their employment, and was acting with the knowledge, permission, consent, and ratification of every other Defendant.
- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants was an agent, managing general partner, managing member, owner, co-owner, partner, employee, and/or representative of each of the Defendants and was at all times material hereto, acting within the purpose and scope of such agency, employment, contract and/or representation, and that each of them is jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants is liable to Plaintiff under legal theories and doctrines including but not limited to (1) joint employer; (2) integrated enterprise; (3) agency; and/or (4) alter ego, based in part, on the facts set forth below.
- 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the named Defendants are part of an integrated enterprise and have acted or currently act as the employer and/or joint employer of the Plaintiffs/Class Members making each of them liable for the wage and hour violations alleged herein.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE FCRA

23. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA's passage was driven in part by two related concerns: first, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at crucial moments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing; second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies.

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COMPLAINT - Torraca-Riano, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.

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- 24. While recognizing that consumer reports play an important role in the economy, Congress wanted consumer reports to be "fair and equitable to the consumer" and to ensure their "confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization." 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
- 25. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of consumer reports by employers. Accordingly, Congress required employers to make a clear and conspicuous written disclosure to employees and job applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). This is commonly referred to as the "stand-alone disclosure" requirement. Congress further required that employers obtain written authorization prior to procurement of a consumer report for employment purposes. *Id*.
- 26. The FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement is one of many elements of the FCRA that combine to ensure that consumers know when consumer reports may be generated about them, that they know their rights, and that they have the opportunity to dispute errors in their reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (preadverse employment action notice requirement); § 1681b(4)(B) (notification of national security investigation); § 1681 c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681d(a) (disclosure of investigative report); § 1681g (full file disclosure to consumers); § 1681k(a)(l) (disclosure regarding the use of public record information);§ 1681h (form and conditions of disclosure); § 1681m(a) (post-adverse employment action notice requirement).
- 27. Although the disclosure and the authorization may be combined in a single document, the FTC has warned that the form should not include any extraneous information or be part of another document. For example, in response to an inquiry as to whether the disclosure may be set forth within an application for employment or whether it must be included in a separate document, the FTC stated:

- 5 -

Jacunss D. Kattenge
Attornoy-erl. Aw
500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113
San Diego, California 27101
Telephone: (619) 886-7224
Featumle: (619) 259-5455

The disclosure may not be part of an employment application because the language [of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)] is intended to ensure that it appears conspicuously in a document not encumbered by any other information. The reason for requiring that the disclosure be in a stand-alone document is to prevent consumers from being distracted by other information side-by-side within the disclosure.

28. The plain language of the statute also clearly indicates that the inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form violates the disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA, because such a form would not consist "solely" of the disclosure. In fact, the FTC expressly has warned that the FCRA notice may not include extraneous information such as a waiver. In a 1998 opinion letter, the FTC stated:

[W]e note that your draft disclosure includes a waiver by the consumer of his or her rights under the FCRA. The inclusion of such a waiver in a disclosure form will violate Section 604(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA, which requires that a disclosure consist 'solely' of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.

29. Consistent with the FTC's construction of the FCRA, courts have repeatedly held that extraneous information renders a purported FCRA disclosure non-compliant. See, e.g., Woods v. CaremarkPHC, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-00535, 2015 WL 6742124, *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure contained an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to defendant and its consumer reporting agency, and state specific notices that did not apply to plaintiff); Jones v. Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 14-cv-3125, 2015 WL 366244, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 27, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure form included timeframes during which applicant must challenge accuracy of any report, an acknowledgement that employment decisions are based on non-discriminatory reasons, the contact information for the consumer reporting agency and state specific notices that "stretched what should be a simple disclosure form into two full pages of eyestraining typeface writing.").

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30. As discussed below, Defendant routinely violates the FCRA by failing to provide the required stand-alone disclosure to employees and job applicants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING UNLAWFUL PROCUREMENT OF CONSUMER REPORT CLAIMS

- 31. On or about November 18, 2018, as part of Plaintiffs' application for employment, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO to sign a document titled "Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation." A true and correct redacted copy of Plaintiff OLSHANSKY'S authorization is attached hereto and marked as **Exhibit 1**.
 - 32. This form is at the heart of one key part of this dispute.
- 33. The abovementioned form purportedly authorizes "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to conduct a background investigation concerning Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class.
- 34. Plaintiffs maintain this form is illegal because, in part, it includes a release and hold harmless clause that provides, "I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information." See Ex. 1.
- 35. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it misstates the name of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employer as being "ATC Healthcare Staffing," when according to their wage and earning statements, the only legal entity identified as being Plaintiffs' employer was "ATC Healthcare Services, Inc." See Ex. 1.
- 36. To the extent "ATC Healthcare Staffing" (if it exists) is the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members, this form also fails to provide any disclosure or to obtain any authorization at all.
- 37. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it includes other extraneous information in addition to a release, including but not limited to a number

of purported unrelated state law admonitions. See Ex. 1.

- 38. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal to the extent that it is overly broad and purports to authorize the procurement of any information concerning the applicant whether otherwise lawful or appropriate. See Ex. 1.
- 39. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that pursuant to the forms that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO signed on or about November 18, 2018, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER obtained consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO.
- 40. On information and belief, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER had a practice and policy of procuring consumer reports on all Class Members based upon this or substantially similar forms during the class period.
- 41. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated both state and federal law.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING LABOR CODE VIOLATIONS

Labor Code § 226 Violations

- 42. From at least four years before the filing of this action and continuing to the present, and pursuant to company policy and/or practice and/or direction,

 Defendants issued inaccurate wage and earning statements to Plaintiffs.
- 43. On or about November 29, 2018, Defendants issued Plaintiff OLSHANKSY a paystub.
- 44. This paystub did not accurately state Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S gross wages earned or the total hours worked by the employee.
- 45. The November 29, 2018 paystub stated Plaintiff OLSHANKSY earned \$1,810.21 in gross wages, but Plaintiff actually earned \$2,194.59.
- 46. Additionally, the November 29, 2018 statement did not account for Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S 0.75 hours of overtime and two hours of double time.
 - 47. Further, if indeed "ATC Healthcare Staffing" was Plaintiffs' employer,

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California from December 21, 2017 to the present.

- 58. All members of the represented groups will be referred to as the "Represented Employees."
- 59. The "Representative Period" means from **December 21, 2017** to the present, the timeframe where the scope of statute allows Plaintiffs to recover wages and penalties.
- 60. At all times during the Representative Period, all the Represented Employees were employed in the same or similar job as Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and were paid in the same manner and under the same standard employment procedures and practices as the Plaintiff.
- 61. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO further allege DEFENDANT EMPLOYER did not pay them and, on information and belief Represented Employees, all wages due at the time their employment ended with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER.
- 62. On information and belief, current and former employees of DEFENDANT EMPLOYER were subject to wage and hour violations by DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, including failing to pay for all wages due.
- 63. California law provides that an employee may file an action against an employer to recover penalties for violations of the Labor Code and Wage Orders, provided the aggrieved employee files an action on behalf of him or herself and similarly situated current and former employees.
- 64. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER was and/or is Represented Employees' employer or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

65. As set forth in further detail below, because of the analysis and investigation of the Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' attorneys sent letters to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "LWDA") and to DEFENDANT EMPLOYER informing DEFENDANT EMPLOYER of their claims and their intent to pursue litigation.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

- Act, on **December 21, 2018**, Plaintiffs began to exhaust his/her administrative remedies by sending correspondence to the LWDA and DEFENDANT EMPLOYER indicating that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are pursuing the claims alleged in this Complaint.
- 67. By the time an amended Complaint is filed, the statutory period for Plaintiffs will have expired on the letter alleged above and the LWDA will likely not have served Plaintiffs with notice of intent to assume jurisdiction over the applicable penalty claims and did not provide notice as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3

 (a)(2)(A) within the statutory period.
- 68. Therefore, Plaintiffs will have exhausted Plaintiffs' administrative remedies to enable Plaintiffs to seek the penalty claims sought in this Complaint.
- 69. The Causes of Action alleged herein are appropriately suited for a Representative Action under PAGA (Labor Code § 2698, et seq.) because:
 - a. This action involves allegations of violations of provisions of the California Labor Code that provide for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees;
 - Plaintiffs are "aggrieved employees" because
 Plaintiffs were employed by the alleged violator

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and had one or more of the alleged violation	15
committed against them; and	

c. Plaintiffs have satisfied the procedural requirements of Labor Code § 2699.3, as set forth above.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 70. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated as a Class Action pursuant to § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- 71. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek to represent the classes and/or subclasses composed of and defined as follows:

Labor Code Class:

All current or former nonexempt employees who worked in the state of California from December 27, 2014 to the present for the Defendants who were issued wage and earning statements from ATC Healthcare Services, Inc.

FCRA Class:

All persons residing in the United States regarding whom Defendants procured or caused to be procured a consumer report for employment purposes during the period five years prior to the filing of the present action through the date of certification.

72. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO also seek to represent the following subclasses composed of and defined as follows:

Wage Statement Subclass: All Members of the Plaintiff Class who, during the applicable statute of limitations period, did not receive accurate itemized wage statements as required by Labor Code § 226.

Waiting Time Subclass: All Members of the Plaintiff Class who,

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during the applicable limitations period, did not receive all wages due in a timely manner as required by Labor Code §§ 201-204.

<u>UCL Subclass:</u> All Members of the Plaintiff Class, who, during the relevant period, Defendants owe restitution in the form of (1) unreimbursed expenses and/or (2) wages earned and unpaid because of Defendants' uniform pay policies and procedures.

- 73. The above-mentioned class-members will collectively be referred to as "Class Members."
- 74. Plaintiffs reserve the right under the California Rules of Court, to amend or modify the class description with greater specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues.
- 75. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class Action under the provisions of § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.

A. Numerosity

- 76. The potential members of the Class as defined are so numerous or many, that joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable.
- 77. While the precise number of Class Members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that DEFENDANT EMPLOYER currently employs, and during the relevant time periods employed, over 100 Class Members.
- 78. Accounting for employee turnover during the relevant periods necessarily increases this number substantially.

B. Commonality

- 79. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members.
 - 80. Common questions of law and fact include, without limitation and

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subject to possible further amendment, the following:

- a. Whether the Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports based on invalid authorizations;
- b. Whether Defendants' policy or practice of not paying hourly employees all their wages due in their final paychecks immediately upon involuntary termination or within 72 hours' notice of when its employees provided notice of their voluntary resignation, is unlawful under Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and/or 203;
- c. Whether Defendants violated Labor Code §§ 226 by not providing accurate paystubs; and
- d. Whether Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class may recover remedies pursuant to Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

C. Typicality

81. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and all members of the Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by Defendants' common course of conduct and policies in violation of laws, regulations that have the force and effect of law and statutes as alleged herein.

D. Adequacy of Representation

- 82. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are members of the Class, do not have any conflicts of interest with other Class Members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class.
- 83. Counsel representing Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class is competent and experienced in litigating employment class

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actions, including wage and overtime class actions.

84. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members.

E. Superiority of Class Action

- 85. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all Class Members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
- 86. Each Class Member was damaged or suffered injury and may recover by reasons of Defendants' illegal policies and/or practices.
- 87. Class Action treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system.
- 88. Plaintiffs are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to encounter in the management of this action that would preclude maintenance as a Class Action.
- 89. For the reasons alleged in this Complaint, this action should be certified as a Class Action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Class Claim for

Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)

(Against All Defendants)

- 90. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 91. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B), a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes.
- 92. Likewise, a consumer report may be used for the evaluation of "a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention of an employee." 15

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U.S.C. §1681a(h).

- 93. The FCRA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must: (1) provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to each applicant in writing that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (2) obtain the applicant's authorization in writing to obtain the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 94. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) further specifies that the disclosure must be in writing "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
 - 95. Specifically, Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part:

... a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless--

a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or cause to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

- 96. During the Class Period, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class Members to sign an authorization form as part of their job application with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, which form purported to allow "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to procure consumer reports regarding the Plaintiffs.
- 97. To the extent that ATC Healthcare Staffing (if such entity exists) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS failed to provide any disclosure at all prior to procuring consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by the FCRA.
- 98. Moreover, the form that was provided facially violates the FCRA in numerous respects.

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99. Included in DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., **Exhibit 1** are reams of extraneous information, including but not limited to, a liability release and multiple state law admonitions. See **Exhibit 1**.

- 100. Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned, among other extraneous information, in its Notification and Authorization Form executed by applicants facially contravenes the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) that the disclosure be: (1) "clear and conspicuous"; and (2) appear "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
- 101. As a matter of law, Defendant's inclusion of the aforementioned information invalidates the Notification and Authorization Form for purposes of the FCRA. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, *10-11 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding an employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)—(ii) when it requires an employee to sign a form containing a waiver of liability provision as part of a background investigation); Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (release of liability improper); Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (a summary of consumer rights in seven different states improper); Lagos v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163119 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (inclusion of seven state law notices and sentence stating "I also understand that nothing herein shall be construed as an offer of employment or contract for services" plausibly violated stand-alone disclosure requirement); Woods v. Caremark PHC, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148051 (W.D. Mo. 2015) ("The specific 'extraneous information' Plaintiff alleges Defendant included in its Authorization Form for Consumer Reports is: (1) an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to Defendant and its consumer reporting agency, (2) state-specific notices that did not apply to Plaintiff, and (3) that the form was part of a five-page stapled packet of three documents. Where FCRA allegations involve the inclusion of extraneous information beyond an authorization.

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the complaint meets the 12(b)(6) standard to state a claim for willful violation of the
FCRA stand-alone requirement."); see also Letter from William Haynes, Attorney,
Div. of Credit Practices, Fed Trade Comm'n to Richard W. Hauxwekk, CEO,
Accufax Div. (June 12, 1998), 1998 W.L. 34323756 (F.T.C.) (noting that the
inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form will violate the FCRA).

- 102. The Notification and Authorization form is also illegal to the extent that it purports to authorize the procurement of any and all information regarding Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, whether legal or proper to do so.
- 103. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 104. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 105. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiffs' investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful because:
 - a. Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form knowing that it was facially invalid in violation of the FCRA and Defendants' statutory duties;
 - b. Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the FCRA requirements and Defendants' statutory duties when it required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form that was facially invalid and in violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements of the FCRA;
 - c. Upon information and belief, Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers and other professional employees, and

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Members purports to authorize "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to perform a background investigation.

- 111. To the extent the foregoing entity (if it exists at all) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and Class Members, Defendants failed to obtain any authorization at all.
- 112. Alternatively, because Defendants failed to make a clear and conspicuous disclosure that a consumer report may be procured in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiffs and other Class Members without proper authorization. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 113. The foregoing violations were willful because Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiffs and other Class Members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 114. Defendants' willful conduct is also evidenced by, among other things, the facts previously set forth.
- 115. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' willful failure to comply with the requirements imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) of an amount not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000.
- 116. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery of punitive damages for Defendants' willful violations, in an amount as the Court may allow.
- 117. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) and § 1681o(a)(2), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Violation of the

California Investigative Consumer Reporting

Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq.)

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Facially Valid Authorizations)

(Against All Defendants)

- 118. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 119. Pursuant to California Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq., a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer investigative report for employment purposes.
- 120. The ICRAA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must comply with all the
 - The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12.
 - The person procuring or causing the report to be made provides a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be made in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that:
 - (i) An investigative consumer report may be obtained.
 - (ii) The permissible purpose of the report is identified.
 - (iii) The disclosure may include information on the consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode
 - (iv) Identifies the name, address, and telephone number of the investigative consumer reporting agency conducting the
 - (v) Notifies the consumer in writing of the nature and scope of the investigation requested, including a summary of the provisions of Section 1786.22.
 - (vi) Notifies the consumer of the Internet Web site address of the investigative consumer reporting agency identified in clause (iv), or, if the agency has no Internet Web site address, the telephone number of the agency, where the consumer may find information about the investigative reporting agency's privacy practices, including whether the consumer's personal information will be sent outside the United States or its territories and information

that complies with subdivision (d) of Section 1786.20. This clause shall become operative on January 1, 2012.

(C) The consumer has authorized in writing the procurement of the report.

(§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(2).)

- 121. In addition, the person procuring or causing the report to be made must "certify to the investigative consumer reporting agency that the person has made the applicable disclosures to the consumer required by [section 1786.16, subdivision (a)] and that the person will comply with subdivision (b)." (§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(4).)
- 122. Subdivision (b) of section 1786.16 also requires the person procuring or causing the report to be made to (1) provide the consumer a form with a box that can be checked if the consumer wishes to receive a copy of the report, and send a copy of the report to the consumer within three business days if the box is checked and (2) comply with section 1786.40 if the person procuring or causing the report to be made contemplates taking adverse action against the consumer. (§ 1786.16, subd. (b).)
- 123. During the Class Period, Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and FCRA Class Members to sign a disclosure authorization forms as part of their job applications with Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., which forms purported to allow Defendant "ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING," not Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., the alleged real employer, to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff. See Exhibit 1.
- 124. Under Civil Code § 1786.16, subd. (a) "Any person described in subdivision (d) of Section 1786.12 shall not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report unless . . . The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12," yet Civil Code § 1786.12, in relevant part, provides "An investigative consumer reporting agency shall only furnish an investigative consumer report. . . To a person that it has reason to believe: (1) Intends to use the information for employment purposes."

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	125.	If Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING was not Plaintiff's
emplo	yer, it	violated Civil Code § 1786.16 because it had no legal basis to procure a
consu	mer re	port on the Plaintiff.

- Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1: (1) was a purported authorization to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report; (2) included a waiver of liability provision; (3) included a purported authorization to investigate "personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and credit history . . ."; and (4) included other extraneous language, including but not limited to a number of state law admonitions, such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, none of which are applicable since Plaintiff was applying for work in California; "." See Exhibit 1.
- 127. Plaintiff maintains Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned in its Notification and Authorization Form violates California law because it was not a "clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer." (§ 1786.16(a)(2)(B).) See Exhibit 1.
- 128. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated ICRAA.
- 129. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in § 1786.16.
- 130. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 131. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiff's investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful.
- 132. With respect to each of the aforementioned violations of the ICRAA provisions and pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50(a)(1), in the event this case does not

proceed as a class action basis regarding the FCRA class claims, Plaintiffs
OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, not the Class, seek to recover statutory
damages due to Defendants' failure to comply with the requirements imposed by §
1786.16 of an amount not less than \$10,000 or seek actual damages, if any, in an
amount to be proven at trial, whichever is higher.

- 133. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are informed and believe, and based on such information and belief allege that Defendants' misconduct was reckless and/or willful and/or malicious and/or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the Plaintiff and whose recklessness and/or conscious disregard was reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to the Plaintiff, thereby warranting the assessment of punitive damages against these Defendants.
- 134. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for
Failure to Pay Timely Earned Wages during Employment and
Upon Separation of Employment in Violation of
California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
204 and/or 204b, 218.5, and 218.6

(Against all Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.)

- 135. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 136. Pursuant to Labor Code § 201, "If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately."
- 137. Pursuant to Labor Code § 202, "If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has

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given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting."

- 138. Labor Code § 203 provides, in pertinent part: "If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, ... any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefore is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. ..."
- 139. Pursuant to Labor Code § 204, "all wages ... earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays."
- 140. Alternatively, pursuant to Labor Code § 204b, employers must pay its employees on a weekly basis on a regular day determined by the employer as the regular payday.
- 141. Pursuant to Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 218.6, an action may be brought for the nonpayment of wages and fringe benefits.
- 142. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs were not properly paid pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b and thereby seek all remedies available to them.
- 143. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs' wages pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b, after Plaintiffs' demand and, therefore, Plaintiffs may recover the associated unpaid wages and waiting time penalties.
- 144. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants did this with the intent to secure for himself, herself and itself a discount on its indebtedness and/or with intent to annoy harass, oppress, hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiffs.
- 145. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of

Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

- 146. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 147. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to full perform their obligation under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 148. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, and 204/204b. The exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 149. Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their rightfully earned wages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' failure and refusal to pay said compensation and for the reasons alleged in this Complaint.
- 150. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members request the unpaid wages, waiting time penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, costs, damages, and other remedies in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 151. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert

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Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for Violations of California Labor Code § 226

(Against all Defendants)

- 152. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 153. Plaintiffs allege that Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a) requires, in pertinent part, that every employer shall, "semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or her employee, either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee..., (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number..., (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer..., and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee..." (Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a).)
- 154. Based on the foregoing allegations, during all times relevant to this action, Defendants did not provide accurate wage statements throughout the Class Period.
- 155. Plaintiffs allege that on numerous occasions, an exact amount by which will be proven at trial, Defendants violated various provisions of § 226, including but not limited to subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and a(5) by failing to provide Plaintiffs accurate itemized statement in writing accurately showing gross wages earned, net

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wages earned, total hours worked by the employee, among other things.

- 156. At all material times DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating business hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set forth in Labor Code § 558.
- 157. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 158. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to fully perform their obligations under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 159. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code § 226, the exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 160. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages, penalties, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, and 226.6 in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 161. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 226 in an amount to be proven at trial.

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162. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for PAGA

Penalties and Wage Under California Labor Code
§§ 2698, 2699, et seq. for Violations of California Labor Code
§§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.

(Against all Defendants)

- 163. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 164. Pursuant to law, written notice was provided to the LWDA and Defendants of the specific violations of the California Labor Code Defendants have violated and continue to violate.
- 165. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3, no response will likely be received from the LWDA within 60 days of the postmark date of the above-alleged letter.
- 166. Plaintiffs, therefore, will have exhausted all administrative procedures required of them under Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699, and 2699.3, and, as a result, are justified as a matter of right in bringing forward this cause of action and are entitled to pursue penalties in a representative action for Defendants' violations of the Labor Code.
- 167. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, any provision of the Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees for violation of the code may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Labor Code § 2699.3.

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168.	Plaintiff is an "aggrieved employee" because Plaintiff was employed by
the alleged	violator and had one or more of the alleged violations committed against
Plaintiff, an	d therefore is properly suited to represent the interests of other current and
former Repr	resented Employees.

- 169. Because of the acts alleged above, Plaintiffs seek penalties under Labor Code §§ 2698 and 2699 because of Defendants' violation of numerous provisions of the California Labor Code as alleged in this Complaint.
- 170. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, penalties for violating Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.
- 171. Labor Code § 558 establishes a civil penalty as follows: Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be violated, a section of this chapter or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (including the "Hours and Days of Work" section of the Wage Order) shall be subject to a civil penalty of (1) for any initial violation, fifty dollars (\$50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; (2) for each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars (\$100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; and (3) wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee.
- 172. Plaintiffs seek penalties for Defendants' conduct as alleged herein as permitted by law.
- 173. Specifically, Plaintiffs seeks penalties under Labor Code § 2699, for the following in addition to those Code provisions mentioned in this Cause of Action:
 - a. For violations of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
 and 204/204b for failing to pay Plaintiff and
 Represented Employees in a timely manner; and

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reaped and continue to reap unfair benefits and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and other employees and former employees of Defendants, and each of them.

- 182. Defendants, and each of them, should be enjoined from this activity and made to disgorge these ill-gotten gains and restore to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class the wrongfully withheld wages and/or penalties, pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17202 and/or 17203.
- 183. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class have also incurred and continue to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial and for which they seek compensation pursuant to law including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of the Class, pray for an order for relief as follows:

- 1. An order that this action may proceed and be maintained as a class action;
- 2. For appointment of the Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as the representatives of the Class;
- 3. For appointment of counsel for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as Class Counsel;
- 4. That Defendants be found liable to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class;
- 5. For a declaration that Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class under the FCRA and any other applicable law alleged in this Complaint;
- 6. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), an award of statutory damages to Plaintiff and the Class in an amount equal to \$1,000 for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and each member of the Class for Defendant's willful

- 3.2 -

violations of the FCRA;

- 7. In the event this case does not proceed on a FCRA class action basis, pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50, an award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO in the amount of \$10,000 each, or in the alternative actual damages in an amount according to proof;
- 8. For an award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class in an amount to be determined by the Court;
- 9. For costs of suit and expenses incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs allowed under relevant provision of law including, but not limited to, those allowed under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a)(2), Civ. Code § 1786.50, and/or other applicable provisions of law;
- 10. That Defendants, and each of them, be ordered and enjoined to pay restitution to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 11. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
- 12. For disgorgement through restitution of all ill-gotten and/or ill-gained profits, including unpaid wages and/or penalties to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees, resulting from Defendants' unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 13. For an order by the Court requiring Defendants, and each of them, to show cause, if any they have, as to why to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees should not have been issued itemized wage statements as required by § 226 of the Labor Code and why Defendants should not be required to pay Plaintiff minimum wages and overtime compensation under applicable state law;

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14.	For all remedies available to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA
RIANO u	nder the applicable provisions of the Labor Code via PAGA Labor Code
2698, et s	eq. including an award of attorneys' fees, costs, interest, liquidated
damages,	damages, penalties and waiting time penalties according to proof to the
extent per	mitted by law;

- 15. For maximum civil penalties available under the Labor Code and applicable Wage Order as described more particularly in this Complaint, representative PAGA claims including the payment of wages as set forth in Labor Code § 558;
- 16. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
 - 17. For Labor Code § 203 penalties in an amount to be proven at trial;
 - 18. For special and general damages;
- 19. That Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees where available by law, including but not limited to pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq., Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, and/or other applicable laws; and
- 20. For any other relief the Court may deem just, proper and equitable in the circumstances.

Dated: December 27, 2018

Law Offices of Thomas D. Rutledge

By: /s/Thomas D. Rutledge /s/Thomas D. Rutledge Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of this matter.

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


Exhibit 1

Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation

I hereby authorize ATC Healthcare Staffing and their choice of reporting company to ascertain information regarding my background to determine any and all information of concern to my record, whether same is of record or not, and I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information. I understand that this form indicates that a background search will be conducted and that this is my notification of that intent. I understand that the purpose of this background investigation is to determine my suitability for employment and may elicit information on my character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living. Additionally, you are hereby authorized to make any investigation of my personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and cridit history through an investigative or credit agency or bureau of your choice. I authorize the release of this information by the appropriate agencies to the investigating service. I understand that my consent will apply throughout my employment, unless I revoke or cancel my consent by sending a signed letter or statement to the Company at any time, stating that I revoke my consent and no longer allow the Company to obtain consumer or investigative consumer reports about me.

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

FULL NAME: Michael Olshansky	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
OTHER NAMES USED/MAIDEN NAME/DATES:		
CURRENT Redacted ADDRESS:	PHONE:	Redacted
LIST ALL ADDRESSES FOR PAST 7 YEARS;	, Dates:	
	Dates:	
	Dates:	
EMAIL ADDRESS: Redacted		
SOCIAL SECURITY # REDACTED DA	TE OF BIRTH:	
DRIVER'S LICENSE # Redacted	STATE ISSUED: PA	;
*** MAY WE CONTACT YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYER?	YES NO NO	
*** HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME?	YES NO V	•
If yes, please explain:		
Notice to California Applicants - You may omit minor traffic offenses, any convictions more than two years old for the following marijuana related offenses: for which probation was completed and the case was judicially dismissed. Notice to Massachusetts Applicants: You may omit a first conviction for any raffic violations, affray, or disturbance of the peace, or any conviction of a misder nearceration resulting there from, whichever date is later, occurred five or more year convicted of any offense within five years immediately preceding the date of this applicance. No applicant will be denied employment solely on the grounds of convictor arrounding circumstances and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the offense to the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of the position will be dealed and the relevance of	HS11357b&c, HS11360c, HS11364, HS11365, HS of the following misde peanors: drunkenness, simple and the following misde peanors: drunkenness, simple and the following misde of such conviction or the case prior to the date of this application for employment, action of a crime. The nature of the offense, the labe considered.	11550, and misdemeanors ble assault, speeding, minor ompletion of any period of nent, unless you have been the date of the offense, the
SIGNATURE:	DATE: Nov 18	
California Applicants: Under Section 1786.22 of the California Civil Code, you have the right vww.justifacts.com), upon proper identification, the nature and substance of all information in it to whom Justifacts has previously furnished within the three-year period preceding your request. Fi follows: (1) In-person, if he appears in person and furnishes proper identification. A copy of upilication services provided. (2) By certified mail, if he makes a written request, with proper iden ontained in files on a consumer and required to be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided the provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided the provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided the provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided the provided by Section 1786.10 shall be	s files on you, including the sources of infor tation, and the les maintained on a consumer shall be made available for the is file shall also be available to the consumer for a fee mutification, for copies to be sent to a specified addressee. (3) by telephone, if the consumer has made a written reques	recipients of any reports on you to consumer's visual inspection, of to exceed the actual costs of A summary of all information
California, Minnesota & Oklahoma Applicants Only: Plense check this box if you would little cook a copy direct from Justifacts or its designee. California applicants may receive a copy for	om either the prospective employer or Justifacts.	
OTICE: Under federal law, you have the right to request disclosure of the nature and scope of exestigation.		
subscriber certifies that consumer credit information, consumer reports, as defined by the nly when intended to be used as a factor in establishing a consumer's eligibility for urposes. It is recognized and understood that the FCRA provides that anyone "who is enorthing agency?' (such as Instiffacts) "under folse pretences shall be fined not	employment and that consumer credit information knowingly and willfully obtains information on a co	will be used for no other onsumer from a consumer

ATC Personnel/Payroll 0056

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STREET ADDRESS: 330 W Broadway
MAILING ADDRESS: 330 W Broadway

CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101-3827

BRANCH NAME: Central

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (619) 450-7071

PLAINTIFF(S) / PETITIONER(S): MICHAEL OLSHANSKY et.al.

DEFENDANT(S) / RESPONDENT(S): ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC et.al.

TORRACA-RIANO VS. ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC [EFILE]

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT

CONFERENCE on MANDATORY eFILE CASE

CASE NUMBER:

37-2018-00065377-CU-QE-CTL

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Judge: Gregory W Pollack

Department: C-71

COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED: 12/27/2018

TYPE OF HEARING SCHEDULED

DATE

TIME

DEPT

JUDGE

Civil Case Management Conference

05/31/2019

01:30 pm

C-71

Gregory W Pollack

A case management statement must be completed by counsel for all parties or self-represented litigants and timely filed with the court at least 15 days prior to the initial case management conference. (San Diego Local Rules, Division II, CRC Rule 3.725).

All counsel of record or parties in pro per shall appear at the Case Management Conference, be familiar with the case, and be fully prepared to participate effectively in the hearing, including discussions of ADR* options.

IT IS THE DUTY OF EACH PLAINTIFF (AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT) TO SERVE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE WITH THE COMPLAINT (AND CROSS-COMPLAINT), THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION FORM (SDSC FORM #CIV-730), A STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) (SDSC FORM #CIV-359), AND OTHER DOCUMENTS AS SET OUT IN SDSC LOCAL RULE 2.1.5.

ALL COUNSEL WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH SUPERIOR COURT RULES WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AS DIVISION II, AND WILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED.

TIME STANDARDS: The following timeframes apply to general civil cases and must be adhered to unless you have requested and been granted an extension of time. General civil cases consist of all civil cases except: small claims proceedings, civil petitions, unlawful detainer proceedings, probate, guardianship, conservatorship, juvenile, parking citation appeals, and family law proceedings.

COMPLAINTS: Complaints and all other documents listed in SDSC Local Rule 2.1.5 must be served on all named defendants.

DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE: Defendant must generally appear within 30 days of service of the complaint. (Plaintiff may stipulate to no more than 15 day extension which must be in writing and filed with the Court.) (SDSC Local Rule 2.1.6)

JURY FEES: In order to preserve the right to a jury trial, one party for each side demanding a jury trial shall pay an advance jury fee in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars (\$150) on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action.

MANDATORY eFILE: Case assigned to mandatory eFile program per CRC 3.400-3.403 and SDSC Rule 2.4.11. All documents must be eFiled at www.onelegal.com. Refer to General Order in re procedures regarding electronically imaged court records, electronic filling, and access to electronic court records in civil and probate cases or guidelines and procedures.

COURT REPORTERS: Court reporters are not provided by the Court in Civil cases. See policy regarding normal availability and unavailability of official court reporters at www.sdcourt.ca.gov.

*ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): THE COURT ENCOURAGES YOU TO CONSIDER UTILIZING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO TRIAL, INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION, PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. PARTIES MAY FILE THE ATTACHED STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (SDSC FORM #CIV-359).

SDSC CIV-721 (Rev. 01-17)

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF S	AN DIEGO	FOR COURT USE ONLY
STREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway	•	
MAILING ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway		
CITY, STATE, 8.ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA, 92101-3827		· · ·
BRANCH NAME: Central		
PLAINTIFF(S): MICHAEL OLSHANSKY et.al.		
	·.	
DEFENDANT(S): ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC	ot.al. 	
SHORT TITLE: TORRACA-RIANO VS. ATC HEALTH	CARE SERVICES INC [E	FILE]
STIPULATION TO USE AL DISPUTE RESOLUTION	·	CASE NUMBER: 37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL
Judge: Gregory W Pollack		Department: C-71
The parties and their attorneys stipulate that the malternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. Sele	atter is at issue and the	e claims in this action shall be submitted to the following ptions will not delay any case management timelines.
Mediation (court-connected)	*******	private arbitration
Mediation (private)	☐ Binding prive	ate arbitration
	=	
☐ Voluntary settlement conference (private)		judicial arbitration (discovery until 15 days before trial)
		judicial arbitration (discovery until 30 days before trial)
Other (specify e.g., private mini-trial, private judg	ge, etc.):	
•		•
it is also, supulated that the following shall serve as arbitr	ator, mediator or other ne	outral: (Name)
Alternate neutral (for court Civil Mediation Program and a	rbitration only):	
Date:		Date:
		P810.
Name of Plaintiff	•	Name of Defendant
		Tellio di Dolondan
Signature		Signature
Name of Plaintiff's Attorney	•	Name of Defendant's Attorney
		• '
Signature	· ·	Signature
If there are more parties and/or attorneys, please attach a	additional completed and t	-
		les of Court, rule 3.1385. Upon notification of the settlement,
No new parties may be added without leave of court.		
T IS SO ORDERED.		
Pated: 12/28/2018	•	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

STIPULATION TO USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION



SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

CASE NUMBER: 37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL

CASE TITLE: Torraca-Riano vs. ATC Healthcare Services Inc [EFILE]

NOTICE: All plaintiffs/cross-complainants in a general civil case are required to serve a copy of the following three forms on each defendant/cross-defendant, together with the complaint/cross-complaint:

- (1) this Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information form (SDSC form #CIV-730),
- (2) the Stipulation to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) form (SDSC form #CIV-359), and
- (3) the Notice of Case Assignment form (SDSC form #CIV-721).

Most civil disputes are resolved without filing a lawsuit, and most civil lawsuits are resolved without a trial. The courts, community organizations, and private providers offer a variety of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes to help people resolve disputes without a trial. The San Diego Superior Court expects that litigants will utilize some form of ADR as a mechanism for case settlement before trial, and it may be beneficial to do this early in the case.

Below is some information about the potential advantages and disadvantages of ADR, the most common types of ADR, and how to find a local ADR program or neutral. A form for agreeing to use ADR is attached (SDSC form #CIV-359).

Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of ADR

ADR may have a variety of advantages or disadvantages over a trial, depending on the type of ADR process used and the particular case:

Potential Advantages:

- Saves time
- Saves money
- resolution process and outcome
- Preserves or improves relationships

Potential Disadvantages

- · May take more time and money if ADR does not resolve the dispute
- Gives parties more control over the dispute Procedures to learn about the other side's case (discovery), jury trial, appeal, and other court protections may be limited or unavailable

Most Common Types of ADR

You can read more information about these ADR processes and watch videos that demonstrate them on the court's ADR webpage at http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr.

Mediation: A neutral person called a "mediator" helps the parties communicate in an effective and constructive manner so they can try to settle their dispute. The mediator does not decide the outcome, but helps the parties to do so. Mediation is usually confidential, and may be particularly useful when parties want or need to have an ongoing relationship, such as in disputes between family members, neighbors, co-workers, or business partners, or when parties want to discuss non-legal concerns or creative resolutions that could not be ordered at a trial.

Settlement Conference: A judge or another neutral person called a "settlement officer" helps the parties to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their case and to discuss settlement. The judge or settlement officer does not make a decision in the case but helps the parties to negotiate a settlement. Settlement conferences may be particularly helpful when the parties have very different ideas about the likely outcome of a trial and would like an experienced neutral to help guide them toward a resolution.

Arbitration: A neutral person called an "arbitrator" considers arguments and evidence presented by each side and then decides the outcome of the dispute. Arbitration is less formal than a trial, and the rules of evidence are usually relaxed. If the parties agree to binding arbitration, they waive their right to a trial and agree to accept the arbitrator's decision as final. With nonbinding arbitration, any party may reject the arbitrator's decision and request a trial. Arbitration may be appropriate when the parties want another person to decide the outcome of their dispute but would like to avoid the formality, time, and expense of a trial.

SDSC CIV-730 (Rev 12-10)

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

Other ADR Processes: There are several other types of ADR which are not offered through the court but which may be obtained privately, including neutral evaluation, conciliation, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. Sometimes parties will try a combination of ADR processes. The important thing is to try to find the type or types of ADR that are most likely to resolve your dispute. Be sure to learn about the rules of any ADR program and the qualifications of any neutral you are considering, and about their fees.

Local ADR Programs for Civil Cases

Mediation: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a Civil Mediation Panel of approved mediators who have met certain minimum qualifications and have agreed to charge \$150 per hour for each of the first two (2) hours of mediation and their regular hourly rate thereafter in court-referred mediations.

On-line mediator search and selection: Go to the court's ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr and click on the "Mediator Search" to review individual mediator profiles containing detailed information about each mediator including their dispute resolution training, relevant experience, ADR specialty, education and employment history, mediation style, and fees and to submit an on-line Mediator Selection Form (SDSC form #CIV-005). The Civil Mediation Panel List, the Available Mediator List, individual Mediator Profiles, and Mediator Selection Form (CIV-005) can also be printed from the court's ADR webpage and are available at the Mediation Program Office or Civil Business Office at each court location.

Settlement Conference: The judge may order your case to a mandatory settlement conference, or voluntary settlement conferences may be requested from the court if the parties certify that; (1) settlement negotiations between the parties have been pursued, demands and offers have been tendered in good faith, and resolution has failed; (2) a judicially supervised settlement conference presents a substantial opportunity for settlement; and (3) the case has developed to a point where all parties are legally and factually prepared to present the issues for settlement consideration and further discovery for settlement purposes is not required. Refer to SDSC Local Rule 2.2.1 for more information. To schedule a settlement conference, contact the department to which your case is assigned.

Arbitration: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a panel of approved judicial arbitrators who have practiced law for a minimum of five years and who have a certain amount of trial and/or arbitration experience. Refer to SDSC Local Rules <u>Division II. Chapter III</u> and Code Civ. Proc. § 1141.10 et seg or contact the Arbitration Program Office at (619) 450-7300 for more information.

More information about court-connected ADR: Visit the court's ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr or contact the court's Mediation/Arbitration Office at (619) 450-7300.

Dispute Resolution Programs Act (DRPA) funded ADR Programs: The following community dispute resolution programs are funded under DRPA (Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 465 et seq.):

- In Central, East, and South San Diego County, contact the National Conflict Resolution Center (NCRC) at <u>www.ncrconline.com</u> or (619) 238-2400.
- In North San Diego County, contact North County Lifeline, Inc. at www.nclifeline.org or (760) 726-4900.

Private ADR: To find a private ADR program or neutral, search the Internet, your local telephone or business directory, or legal newspaper for dispute resolution, mediation, settlement, or arbitration services.

Legal Representation and Advice

To participate effectively in ADR, it is generally important to understand your legal rights and responsibilities and the likely outcomes if you went to trial. ADR neutrals are not allowed to represent or to give legal advice to the participants in the ADR process. If you do not already have an attorney, the California State Bar or your local County Bar Association can assist you in finding an attorney. Information about obtaining free and low cost legal assistance is also available on the California courts website at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/lowcost.

SDSC CIV-730 (Rev 12-10)

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

EXHIBIT "C" TO NOTICE OF REMOVAL

[PAGES 91 - 136]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STREET ADDRESS:

330 W Broadway

MAILING ADDRESS: 330 W Broadway

CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101-3827

BRANCH NAME:

Central

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (619) 450-7071

PLAINTIFF(S) / PETITIONER(S): MIC

MICHAEL OLSHANSKY et.al.

DEFENDANT(S) / RESPONDENT(S): ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC et.al.

TORRACA-RIANO VS. ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC [EFILE]

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT

CONFERENCE on MANDATORY OF ILE CASE

CASE NUMBER:

37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Judge: Gregory W Pollack

Department: C-71

COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED: 12/27/2018

TYPE OF HEARING SCHEDULED

DATE

TIME

DEPT

JUDGE

Civil Case Management Conference

05/31/2019

01:30 pm

C-71

Gregory W Pollack

A case management statement must be completed by counsel for all parties or self-represented litigants and timely filed with the court at least 15 days prior to the initial case management conference. (San Diego Local Rules, Division II, CRC Rule 3,725).

All counsel of record or parties in pro per shall appear at the Case Management Conference, be familiar with the case, and be fully prepared to participate effectively in the hearing, including discussions of ADR* options.

IT IS THE DUTY OF EACH PLAINTIFF (AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT) TO SERVE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE WITH THE COMPLAINT (AND CROSS-COMPLAINT), THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION FORM (SDSC FORM #CIV-730), A STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) (SDSC FORM #CIV-359), AND OTHER DOCUMENTS AS SET OUT IN SDSC LOCAL RULE 2.1.5.

ALL COUNSEL WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH SUPERIOR COURT RULES WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AS DIVISION II, AND WILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED.

TIME STANDARDS: The following timeframes apply to general civil cases and must be adhered to unless you have requested and been granted an extension of time. General civil cases consist of all civil cases except: small claims proceedings, civil petitions, unlawful detainer proceedings, probate, guardianship, conservatorship, juvenile, parking citation appeals, and family law proceedings.

COMPLAINTS: Complaints and all other documents listed in SDSC Local Rule 2.1.5 must be served on all named defendants.

DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE: Defendant must generally appear within 30 days of service of the complaint. (Plaintiff may stipulate to no more than 15 day extension which must be in writing and filed with the Court.) (SDSC Local Rule 2.1.6)

JURY FEES: In order to preserve the right to a jury trial, one party for each side demanding a jury trial shall pay an advance jury fee in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars (\$150) on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action.

MANDATORY eFiLE: Case assigned to mandatory eFile program per CRC 3.400-3.403 and SDSC Rule 2.4.11. All documents must be eFiled at www.onelegal.com. Refer to General Order in re procedures regarding electronically imaged court records, electronic filling, and access to electronic court records in civil and probate cases or guidelines and procedures.

COURT REPORTERS: Court reporters are not provided by the Court in Civil cases. See policy regarding normal availability and unavailability of official court reporters at www.sdcourt.ca.gov.

*ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): THE COURT ENCOURAGES YOU TO CONSIDER UTILIZING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO TRIAL, INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION, PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. PARTIES MAY FILE THE ATTACHED STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (SDSC FORM #CIV-359).

SDSC CIV-721 (Rev. 01-17)

Page: 1

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STREET ADDRESS:

330 W Broadway

MAILING ADDRESS: 330 W Broadway

CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101-3827

PLAINTIFF(S) / PETITIONER(S):

BRANCH NAME:

Central

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (619) 450-7071

MICHAEL OLSHANSKY et.al.

DEFENDANT(S) / RESPONDENT(S): ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC et.al.

TORRACA-RIANO VS. ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC [EFILE]

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE on MANDATORY OFILE CASE

CASE NUMBER:

37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Judge: Gregory W Pollack

Department: C-71

COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED: 12/27/2018

TYPE OF HEARING SCHEDULED

DATE

TIME

DEPT

JUDGE

Civil Case Management Conference

05/31/2019

01:30 pm

C-71

Gregory W Pollack

A case management statement must be completed by counsel for all parties or self-represented litigants and timely filed with the court at least 15 days prior to the initial case management conference. (San Diego Local Rules, Division II, CRC Rule 3.725).

All counsel of record or parties in pro per shall appear at the Case Management Conference, be familiar with the case, and be fully prepared to participate effectively in the hearing, including discussions of ADR* options.

IT IS THE DUTY OF EACH PLAINTIFF (AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT) TO SERVE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE WITH THE COMPLAINT (AND CROSS-COMPLAINT), THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION FORM (SDSC FORM #CIV-730), A STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) (SDSC FORM #CIV-359), AND OTHER DOCUMENTS AS SET OUT IN SDSC LOCAL RULE 2.1.5.

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TIME STANDARDS: The following timeframes apply to general civil cases and must be adhered to unless you have requested and been granted an extension of time. General civil cases consist of all civil cases except; small claims proceedings, civil petitions, unlawful detainer proceedings, probate, guardianship, conservatorship, juvenile, parking citation appeals, and family law proceedings.

COMPLAINTS: Complaints and all other documents listed in SDSC Local Rule 2.1.5 must be served on all named defendants.

DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE: Defendant must generally appear within 30 days of service of the complaint. (Plaintiff may stipulate to no more than 15 day extension which must be in writing and filed with the Court.) (SDSC Local Rule 2.1.6)

JURY FEES: In order to preserve the right to a jury trial, one party for each side demanding a jury trial shall pay an advance jury fee in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars (\$150) on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action.

MANDATORY eFILE: Case assigned to mandatory eFile program per CRC 3.400-3.403 and SDSC Rule 2.4.11. All documents must be eFiled at www.onelegal.com. Refer to General Order in re procedures regarding electronically imaged court records, electronic filing, and access to electronic court records in civil and probate cases or guidelines and procedures

COURT REPORTERS: Court reporters are not provided by the Court in Civil cases. See policy regarding normal availability and unavailability of official court reporters at www.sdcourt.ca.gov.

*ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): THE COURT ENCOURAGES YOU TO CONSIDER UTILIZING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO TRIAL, INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION, PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. PARTIES MAY FILE THE ATTACHED STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (SDSC FORM #CIV-369).

SDSC CIV-721 (Rev. 01-17)

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NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL)

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO):

See attached.

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):

TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, individually, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

SUM-100

FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE).

ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California,

County of San Diego 12/27/2018 at 10:37:03 PM

Clerk of the Superior Court By Vanessa Bahena,Deputy Clerk

NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information

below.

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warming from the court.

There are other legal regulgements. You may want to call an attorney right sway, if you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney.

may be taken windth further warring from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral services if you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcelifomia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selffielp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of \$10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. [AVISOI Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 dias, le corte puede decloir en su contra sin escuchar su versión. Lea la información a

Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que as entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una liamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que ustad pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su suelcio, dinero y blenes sin más advertencia.

Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llama a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Sarvicas, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Cantro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniándose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperación de \$10,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pegar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte puede desechar el caso.

The name and address of the (El nambre y dirección de la c	court is: corte es):		CASE NUMBER: (Número del Caso): 37-2018-000	065377-CU-OE-CTI
(El nombre, la dirección y el n	AY, SAN DIEGO, CAI phone number of plaintiffs a fumero de teléfono del abog	ttorney, or plaintiff without an a lado del demandante, o del den	torney, is: nandante que no tiene abogado IEGO, CA 92101 Tel.: 6	o, es): 19-886-7224
DATE: 12/28/2018 (Fecha)		Clerk, by (Secretario)	Y. Bahma v. Bahena	, Deputy (Adjunto)
(For proof of service of this.su	sta citatión use el formulario NOTICE TO THE PERS 1 as an individua	ued under the fictitious name o	(POS-010)).	

on behalf of (specify)

CCP 416.10 (corporation)

CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)

CCP 416.40 (association or partnership)
other (specify):

by personal delivery on (date):

SUMMONS

Page 1 of 1

Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 465 www.countinfo.ca.gov

·CCP 418.60 (minor)

CCP 416.70 (conservatee)

CCP 416.90 (authorized person)

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California • SUM-100 TRev. July 1, 2009]

SHORT TITLE:	SUM-200(A
Olshansky, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et a	al.
INSTRUCTION	NS FOR USE
 This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space. If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plantachment form is attached." 	ace does not permit the listing of all parties on the summons. laintiff or defendant box on the summons: "Additional Parties
List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page	for each type of party.):
Plaintiff Defendant Cross-Complainant	Cross-Defendant
ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a Georgia cor	rporation; ATC HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, a HEALTHCARE STAFFING, an unknown entity; ATC and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive.	Georgia limited liability company; ATC WEST STAFFING, INC., a California corporation;
and DODS I allough 50 inclusive.	
	in the work of the interest of the second
And the Control of the Angle of the Control of the	

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California

ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT
Attachment to Summons

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SA	AN DIEGO	I	FOR COURT USE ONLY
STREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway			•
MAILING ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway	•		
ITY, STATE, & ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101-3827		İ	
RANCH NAME: Central			
PLAINTIFF(S): MICHAEL OLSHANSKY et.al.			
REELIDANTON ATO HEATTHCARE REDVICED INC.	t al		
DEFENDANT(S): ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC et al. SHORT TITLE: TORRACA-RIANO VS. ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC (EEI) EL			
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TELEPLET			CASE NUMBER:
STIPULATION TO USE AL DISPUTE RESOLUTION			37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL
udge: Gregory W Pollack		Department	: C-71
he parties and their attorneys stipulate that the ma Iternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. Selec	atter is at issue and the	ne claims in this act	ion shall be submitted to the following y any case management timelines.
Mediation (court-connected)		g private arbitration	•
Mediation (private)	Binding priv	vate arbitration	·
Voluntary settlement conference (private)	Non-binding	judicial arbitration (d	iscovery until 15 days before trial)
Neutral evaluation (private)	☐ Non-binding	judicial arbitration (d	iscovery until 30 days before trial)
Other (specify e.g., private mini-trial, private judg		•	
Iternate neutral (for court Civil Mediation Program and a	rbitration only):		
ate:	Marian Mayoring	Date:	
ame of Plaintiff		Name of Defendan	t
gnature		Signature	
ame of Plaintiff's Attorney	·	Name of Defendan	t's Attorney
			•
gnature		Signature	<u> </u>
there are more parties and/or attorneys, please attach a	dditional completed and	fully executed sheets	3,
s the duty of the parties to notify the court of any settlen court will place this matter on a 45-day dismissal caler	nent pursuant to Cal. Ruidar.	iles of Court, rule 3.13	385. Upon notification of the settlement,
new parties may be added without leave of court.			
IS SO ORDERED.			
ated: 12/28/2018		JUD	GE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

SDSC CIV-359 (Rev 12-10)

STIPULATION TO USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Page; 1



SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

CASE NUMBER: 37-2018-00065377-CU-OE-CTL

CASE TITLE: Torraca-Riano vs. ATC Healthcare Services Inc [EFILE]

NOTICE: All plaintiffs/cross-complainants in a general civil case are required to serve a copy of the following three forms on each defendant/cross-defendant, together with the complaint/cross-complaint:

- (1) this Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information form (SDSC form #CIV-730),
- (2) the Stipulation to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) form (SDSC form #CIV-359), and
- (3) the Notice of Case Assignment form (SDSC form #CIV-721).

Most civil disputes are resolved without filing a lawsuit, and most civil lawsuits are resolved without a trial. The courts, community organizations, and private providers offer a variety of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes to help people resolve disputes without a trial. The San Diego Superior Court expects that litigants will utilize some form of ADR as a mechanism for case settlement before trial, and it may be beneficial to do this early in the case.

Below is some information about the potential advantages and disadvantages of ADR, the most common types of ADR, and how to find a local ADR program or neutral. A form for agreeing to use ADR is attached (SDSC form #CIV-359).

Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of ADR

ADR may have a variety of advantages or disadvantages over a trial, depending on the type of ADR process used and the particular case:

Potential Advantages

· Saves time

Francisco S

- · Saves money
- Gives parties more control over the dispute resolution process and outcome
- Preserves or improves relationships

Potential Disadvantages

- May take more time and money if ADR does not resolve the dispute
- Procedures to learn about the other side's case (discovery), jury trial, appeal, and other court protections may be limited or unavailable

Most Common Types of ADR

You can read more information about these ADR processes and watch videos that demonstrate them on the court's ADR webpage at http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr.

Mediation: A neutral person called a "mediator" helps the parties communicate in an effective and constructive manner so they can try to settle their dispute. The mediator does not decide the outcome, but helps the parties to do so. Mediation is usually confidential, and may be particularly useful when parties want or need to have an ongoing relationship, such as in disputes between family members, neighbors, co-workers, or business partners, or when parties want to discuss non-legal concerns or creative resolutions that could not be ordered at a trial.

Settlement Conference: A judge or another neutral person called a "settlement officer" helps the parties to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their case and to discuss settlement. The judge or settlement officer does not make a decision in the case but helps the parties to negotiate a settlement. Settlement conferences may be particularly helpful when the parties have very different ideas about the likely outcome of a trial and would like an experienced neutral to help guide them toward a resolution.

Arbitration: A neutral person called an "arbitrator" considers arguments and evidence presented by each side and then decides the outcome of the dispute. Arbitration is less formal than a trial, and the rules of evidence are usually relaxed. If the parties agree to binding arbitration, they waive their right to a trial and agree to accept the arbitrator's decision as final. With nonbinding arbitration, any party may reject the arbitrator's decision and request a trial. Arbitration may be appropriate when the parties want another person to decide the outcome of their dispute but would like to avoid the formality, time, and expense of a trial.

SDSC CIV-730 (Rev 12-10)

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

Other ADR Processes: There are several other types of ADR which are not offered through the court but which may be obtained privately, including neutral evaluation, conciliation, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. Sometimes parties will try a combination of ADR processes. The important thing is to try to find the type or types of ADR that are most likely to resolve your dispute. Be sure to learn about the rules of any ADR program and the qualifications of any neutral you are considering, and about their fees.

Local ADR Programs for Civil Cases

Mediation: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a Civil Mediation Panel of approved mediators who have met certain minimum qualifications and have agreed to charge \$150 per hour for each of the first two (2) hours of mediation and their regular hourly rate thereafter in court-referred mediations.

On-line mediator search and selection: Go to the court's ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr and click on the "Mediator Search" to review Individual mediator profiles containing detailed information about each mediator including their dispute resolution training, relevant experience, ADR specialty, education and employment history, mediation style, and fees and to submit an on-line Mediator Selection Form (SDSC form #CIV-005). The Civil Mediation Panel List, the Available Mediator List, individual Mediator Profiles, and Mediator Selection Form (CIV-005) can also be printed from the court's ADR webpage and are available at the Mediation Program Office or Civil Business Office at each court location.

Settlement Conference: The judge may order your case to a mandatory settlement conference, or voluntary settlement conferences may be requested from the court if the parties certify that: (1) settlement negotiations between the parties have been pursued, demands and offers have been tendered in good faith, and resolution has failed; (2) a judicially supervised settlement conference presents a substantial opportunity for settlement; and (3) the case has developed to a point where all parties are legally and factually prepared to present the issues for settlement consideration and further discovery for settlement purposes is not required. Refer to SDSC Local Rule <u>2.2.1</u> for more information. To schedule a settlement conference, contact the department to which your case is assigned.

Arbitration: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a panel of approved judicial arbitrators who have practiced law for a minimum of five years and who have a certain amount of trial and/or arbitration experience. Refer to SDSC Local Rules <u>Division II. Chapter III</u> and Code Civ. Proc. § 1141.10 et seq or contact the Arbitration Program Office at (619) 450-7300 for more Information.

More information about court-connected ADR: Visit the court's ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.gov/adr or contact the court's Mediation/Arbitration Office at (619) 450-7300.

Dispute Resolution Programs Act (DRPA) funded ADR Programs: The following community dispute resolution programs are funded under DRPA (Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 465 et seq.):


- In Central, East, and South San Diego County, contact the National Conflict Resolution Center (NCRC) at www.ncrconline.com or (619) 238-2400.
- In North San Diego County, contact North County Lifeline, Inc. at www.nclifeline.org or (760) 726-4900.

Private ADR: To find a private ADR program or neutral, search the Internet, your local telephone or business directory, or legal newspaper for dispute resolution, mediation, settlement, or arbitration services.

Legal Representation and Advice

To participate effectively in ADR, it is generally important to understand your legal rights and responsibilities and the likely outcomes if you went to trial. ADR neutrals are not allowed to represent or to give legal advice to the participants in the ADR process. If you do not already have an attorney, the California State Bar or your local County Bar Association can assist you in finding an attorney. Information about obtaining free and low cost legal assistance is also available on the California courts website at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/lowcost.

SDSC CIV-730 (Rev 12-10)



Greenstone Law APC 1 Mark S. Greenstone (SBN 199606) 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, California 90067 3 Telephone: (310) 201-9156 Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 5 Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP Marc L. Godino (SBN 182689) Danielle L. Manning (SBN 313272) 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-9150 Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11

Plaintiffs TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, on behalf of themselves and acting for the interest of other current and former employees ("Represented Employees"), and all other similarly situated individuals (cumulatively "Plaintiffs"), allege the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of all individuals who applied for employment with Defendants and who executed a release and authorization form permitting Defendants to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report on them as part of their employment or application for employment with Defendants.
- 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants have a uniform policy or practice of obtaining an applicant's consumer report and have violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") through use of a legally invalid authorization form that: (1) fails to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure; and (2) fails to provide a disclosure that appears in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.
 - 3. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and Labor Code Private

COMPLAINT - Torraca-Riano, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.

Thomas D. Kutledge
Attorney-st-Law
West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113
San Diego, Caffornia 92101
Telephone: (619) 886-7224
Facsimile: (619) 259-5455

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Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), §§ 2698, 2699 of the California Labor Code,

Plaintiffs also bring a class and representative action against Defendants for wage and
hour abuses in violation of the California Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders (the "IWC Wage Orders"), all of which contribute to
Defendants' deliberate unfair competition.

4. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of themselves and all Class Members, seek damages, penalties, restitution, injunctive and other equitable relief, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Pursuant to Article VI, § 10 of the California Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' wage and hour claims is proper in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, State of California because Plaintiffs allege claims arising under California law.
- 6. Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs FCRA claim is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1681p which provides that "[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction..."
- 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants conduct business in this State, have systematic and continuous ties with this state, and have agents and representatives that can be found in this state.
- 8. Pursuant to § 395 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, venue is proper in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego because Defendants' corporate records filed with the California Secretary of State indicate they maintain a principle business office at 9040 Friars Road, Suite 335, San Diego, California 92108.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff TONI TORRACA-RIANO is an individual currently residing in

California.

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- 10. Plaintiff MICHAEL OLSHANSKY is an individual residing outside the state of California. During his employment with Defendants from on or about November 2, 2018 to November 28, 2018, however, Plaintiff OLSHANSKY resided in California.
- 11. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. is a Georgia Corporation doing business in California.
- 12. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE, INC. is a Delaware Corporation doing business in California.
- 13. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company doing business in California.
- 14. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING is an unknown entity doing business in California.
- 15. Defendant ATC WEST STAFFING, INC. is a California Corporation, but according to the California Secretary of State Website, it is "dissolved."
- 16. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 50, are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. Plaintiffs therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to § 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 50 when Plaintiffs ascertain their names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the DOE Defendants is in some manner liable to Plaintiffs for the events and actions alleged herein.
- 17. Unless otherwise specified by name, the named Defendants and DOES 1 through 50 will be collectively referred to as "DEFENDANT EMPLOYER" and/or "Defendants."
- 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting as an agent, joint venturer, an integrated enterprise and/or alter

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ego for each of the other Defendants and each were co-conspirators with respect to the acts and the wrongful conduct alleged herein so that each is responsible for the acts of the other pursuant to the conspiracy and in proximate connection with the other Defendant(s).

- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting partly within and partly without the scope and course of their employment, and was acting with the knowledge, permission, consent, and ratification of every other Defendant.
- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants was an agent, managing general partner, managing member, owner, co-owner, partner, employee, and/or representative of each of the Defendants and was at all times material hereto, acting within the purpose and scope of such agency, employment, contract and/or representation, and that each of them is jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants is liable to Plaintiff under legal theories and doctrines including but not limited to (1) joint employer; (2) integrated enterprise; (3) agency; and/or (4) alter ego, based in part, on the facts set forth below.
- 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the named Defendants are part of an integrated enterprise and have acted or currently act as the employer and/or joint employer of the Plaintiffs/Class Members making each of them liable for the wage and hour violations alleged herein.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE FCRA

23. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA's passage was driven in part by two related concerns: first, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at crucial moments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing; second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies.

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- 24. While recognizing that consumer reports play an important role in the economy, Congress wanted consumer reports to be "fair and equitable to the consumer" and to ensure their "confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization." 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
- 25. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of consumer reports by employers. Accordingly, Congress required employers to make a clear and conspicuous written disclosure to employees and job applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). This is commonly referred to as the "stand-alone disclosure" requirement. Congress further required that employers obtain written authorization prior to procurement of a consumer report for employment purposes. *Id*.
- 26. The FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement is one of many elements of the FCRA that combine to ensure that consumers know when consumer reports may be generated about them, that they know their rights, and that they have the opportunity to dispute errors in their reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (preadverse employment action notice requirement); § 1681b(4)(B) (notification of national security investigation); § 1681 c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681d(a) (disclosure of investigative report); § 1681g (full file disclosure to consumers); § 1681k(a)(l) (disclosure regarding the use of public record information);§ 1681h (form and conditions of disclosure); § 1681m(a) (post-adverse employment action notice requirement).
- 27. Although the disclosure and the authorization may be combined in a single document, the FTC has warned that the form should not include any extraneous information or be part of another document. For example, in response to an inquiry as to whether the disclosure may be set forth within an application for employment or whether it must be included in a separate document, the FTC stated:

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Attorney-et-Law 500 West Harbor Dive, Suite 1113 San Diego, Caifornia 92101 Telephone: (619) 886-7224 Facsimile: (619) 259-5455 The disclosure may not be part of an employment application because the language [of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)] is intended to ensure that it appears conspicuously in a document not encumbered by any other information. The reason for requiring that the disclosure be in a stand-alone document is to prevent consumers from being distracted by other information side-by-side within the disclosure.

28. The plain language of the statute also clearly indicates that the inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form violates the disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA, because such a form would not consist "solely" of the disclosure. In fact, the FTC expressly has warned that the FCRA notice may not include extraneous information such as a waiver. In a 1998 opinion letter, the FTC stated:

[W]e note that your draft disclosure includes a waiver by the consumer of his or her rights under the FCRA. The inclusion of such a waiver in a disclosure form will violate Section 604(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA, which requires that a disclosure consist 'solely' of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.

29. Consistent with the FTC's construction of the FCRA, courts have repeatedly held that extraneous information renders a purported FCRA disclosure non-compliant. See, e.g., Woods v. CaremarkPHC, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-00535, 2015 WL 6742124, *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure contained an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to defendant and its consumer reporting agency, and state specific notices that did not apply to plaintiff); Jones v. Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 14-cv-3125, 2015 WL 366244, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 27, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure form included timeframes during which applicant must challenge accuracy of any report, an acknowledgement that employment decisions are based on non-discriminatory reasons, the contact information for the consumer reporting agency and state specific notices that "stretched what should be a simple disclosure form into two full pages of eyestraining typeface writing.").

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30. As discussed below, Defendant routinely violates the FCRA by failing to provide the required stand-alone disclosure to employees and job applicants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING UNLAWFUL PROCUREMENT OF CONSUMER REPORT CLAIMS

- 31. On or about November 18, 2018, as part of Plaintiffs' application for employment, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO to sign a document titled "Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation." A true and correct redacted copy of Plaintiff OLSHANSKY'S authorization is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 1.
 - 32. This form is at the heart of one key part of this dispute.
- 33. The abovementioned form purportedly authorizes "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to conduct a background investigation concerning Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class.
- 34. Plaintiffs maintain this form is illegal because, in part, it includes a release and hold harmless clause that provides, "I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information." See Ex. 1.
- 35. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it misstates the name of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employer as being "ATC Healthcare Staffing," when according to their wage and earning statements, the only legal entity identified as being Plaintiffs' employer was "ATC Healthcare Services, Inc." See Ex. 1.
- 36. To the extent "ATC Healthcare Staffing" (if it exists) is the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members, this form also fails to provide any disclosure or to obtain any authorization at all.
- 37. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it includes other extraneous information in addition to a release, including but not limited to a number

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of purported unrelated state law admonitions. See Ex. 1.

- 38. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal to the extent that it is overly broad and purports to authorize the procurement of any information concerning the applicant whether otherwise lawful or appropriate. See Ex. 1.
- 39. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that pursuant to the forms that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO signed on or about November 18, 2018, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER obtained consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO.
- 40. On information and belief, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER had a practice and policy of procuring consumer reports on all Class Members based upon this or substantially similar forms during the class period.
- 41. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated both state and federal law.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING **LABOR CODE VIOLATIONS**

Labor Code § 226 Violations

- 42. From at least four years before the filing of this action and continuing to the present, and pursuant to company policy and/or practice and/or direction, Defendants issued inaccurate wage and earning statements to Plaintiffs.
- 43. On or about November 29, 2018, Defendants issued Plaintiff OLSHANKSY a paystub.
- 44. This paystub did not accurately state Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S gross wages earned or the total hours worked by the employee.
- 45. The November 29, 2018 paystub stated Plaintiff OLSHANKSY earned \$1,810.21 in gross wages, but Plaintiff actually earned \$2,194.59.
- 46. Additionally, the November 29, 2018 statement did not account for Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S 0.75 hours of overtime and two hours of double time.
 - 47. Further, if indeed "ATC Healthcare Staffing" was Plaintiffs' employer,

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All nonexempt persons Defendants employed in the State of

California from December 21, 2017 to the present.

- 58. All members of the represented groups will be referred to as the "Represented Employees."
- 59. The "Representative Period" means from **December 21, 2017** to the present, the timeframe where the scope of statute allows Plaintiffs to recover wages and penalties.
- 60. At all times during the Representative Period, all the Represented Employees were employed in the same or similar job as Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and were paid in the same manner and under the same standard employment procedures and practices as the Plaintiff.
- 61. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO further allege DEFENDANT EMPLOYER did not pay them and, on information and belief Represented Employees, all wages due at the time their employment ended with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER.
- 62. On information and belief, current and former employees of DEFENDANT EMPLOYER were subject to wage and hour violations by DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, including failing to pay for all wages due.
- 63. California law provides that an employee may file an action against an employer to recover penalties for violations of the Labor Code and Wage Orders, provided the aggrieved employee files an action on behalf of him or herself and similarly situated current and former employees.
- 64. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER was and/or is Represented Employees' employer or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

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65. As set forth in further detail below, because of the analysis and investigation of the Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' attorneys sent letters to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "LWDA") and to DEFENDANT EMPLOYER informing DEFENDANT EMPLOYER of their claims and their intent to pursue litigation.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

- 66. As to penalty claims under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act, on **December 21, 2018**, Plaintiffs began to exhaust his/her administrative remedies by sending correspondence to the LWDA and DEFENDANT EMPLOYER indicating that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are pursuing the claims alleged in this Complaint.
- 67. By the time an amended Complaint is filed, the statutory period for Plaintiffs will have expired on the letter alleged above and the LWDA will likely not have served Plaintiffs with notice of intent to assume jurisdiction over the applicable penalty claims and did not provide notice as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3 (a)(2)(A) within the statutory period.
- 68. Therefore, Plaintiffs will have exhausted Plaintiffs' administrative remedies to enable Plaintiffs to seek the penalty claims sought in this Complaint.
- 69. The Causes of Action alleged herein are appropriately suited for a Representative Action under PAGA (Labor Code § 2698, et seq.) because:
 - a. This action involves allegations of violations of provisions of the California Labor Code that provide for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees;
 - b. Plaintiffs are "aggrieved employees" because
 Plaintiffs were employed by the alleged violator

during the applicable limitations period, did not receive all wages due in a timely manner as required by Labor Code §§ 201-204.

<u>UCL Subclass:</u> All Members of the Plaintiff Class, who, during the relevant period, Defendants owe restitution in the form of (1) unreimbursed expenses and/or (2) wages earned and unpaid because of Defendants' uniform pay policies and procedures.

- 73. The above-mentioned class-members will collectively be referred to as "Class Members."
- 74. Plaintiffs reserve the right under the California Rules of Court, to amend or modify the class description with greater specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues.
- 75. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class Action under the provisions of § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.

A. Numerosity

- 76. The potential members of the Class as defined are so numerous or many, that joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable.
- 77. While the precise number of Class Members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that DEFENDANT EMPLOYER currently employs, and during the relevant time periods employed, over 100 Class Members.
- 78. Accounting for employee turnover during the relevant periods necessarily increases this number substantially.

B. <u>Commonality</u>

- 79. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members.
 - 80. Common questions of law and fact include, without limitation and

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subject to possible further amendment, the following:

- a. Whether the Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports based on invalid authorizations;
- b. Whether Defendants' policy or practice of not paying hourly employees all their wages due in their final paychecks immediately upon involuntary termination or within 72 hours' notice of when its employees provided notice of their voluntary resignation, is unlawful under Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and/or 203;
- c. Whether Defendants violated Labor Code §§ 226 by not providing accurate paystubs; and
- d. Whether Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class may recover remedies pursuant to Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

C. Typicality

81. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and all members of the Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by Defendants' common course of conduct and policies in violation of laws, regulations that have the force and effect of law and statutes as alleged herein.

D. Adequacy of Representation

- 82. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are members of the Class, do not have any conflicts of interest with other Class Members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class.
- 83. Counsel representing Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class is competent and experienced in litigating employment class

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actions, including wage and overtime class actions.

84. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members.

E. Superiority of Class Action

- 85. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all Class Members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
- 86. Each Class Member was damaged or suffered injury and may recover by reasons of Defendants' illegal policies and/or practices.
- 87. Class Action treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system.
- 88. Plaintiffs are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to encounter in the management of this action that would preclude maintenance as a Class Action.
- 89. For the reasons alleged in this Complaint, this action should be certified as a Class Action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Class Claim for

Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)

(Against All Defendants)

- 90. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 91. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B), a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes.
- 92. Likewise, a consumer report may be used for the evaluation of "a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention of an employee." 15

U.S.C. §1681a(h).

- 93. The FCRA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must: (1) provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to each applicant in writing that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (2) obtain the applicant's authorization in writing to obtain the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 94. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) further specifies that the disclosure must be in writing "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
 - 95. Specifically, Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part:
 - ... a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless--
 - a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or cause to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

- 96. During the Class Period, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class Members to sign an authorization form as part of their job application with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, which form purported to allow "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to procure consumer reports regarding the Plaintiffs.
- 97. To the extent that ATC Healthcare Staffing (if such entity exists) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS failed to provide any disclosure at all prior to procuring consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by the FCRA.
- 98. Moreover, the form that was provided facially violates the FCRA in numerous respects.

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- 99. Included in DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1 are reams of extraneous information, including but not limited to, a liability release and multiple state law admonitions. See Exhibit 1.
- 100. Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned, among other extraneous information, in its Notification and Authorization Form executed by applicants facially contravenes the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) that the disclosure be: (1) "clear and conspicuous"; and (2) appear "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
- 101. As a matter of law, Defendant's inclusion of the aforementioned information invalidates the Notification and Authorization Form for purposes of the FCRA. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, *10-11 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding an employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)—(ii) when it requires an employee to sign a form containing a waiver of liability provision as part of a background investigation); Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (release of liability improper); Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (a summary of consumer rights in seven different states improper); Lagos v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163119 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (inclusion of seven state law notices and sentence stating "I also understand that nothing herein shall be construed as an offer of employment or contract for services" plausibly violated stand-alone disclosure requirement); Woods v. Caremark PHC, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148051 (W.D. Mo. 2015) ("The specific 'extraneous information' Plaintiff alleges Defendant included in its Authorization Form for Consumer Reports is: (1) an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to Defendant and its consumer reporting agency, (2) state-specific notices that did not apply to Plaintiff, and (3) that the form was part of a five-page stapled packet of three documents. Where FCRA allegations involve the inclusion of extraneous information beyond an authorization,

1	the complaint meets the 12(b)(6) standard to state a claim for willful violation of the
2	FCRA stand-alone requirement."); see also Letter from William Haynes, Attorney,
3	Div. of Credit Practices, Fed Trade Comm'n to Richard W. Hauxwekk, CEO,
4	Accufax Div. (June 12, 1998), 1998 W.L. 34323756 (F.T.C.) (noting that the
5	inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form will violate the FCRA).

- 102. The Notification and Authorization form is also illegal to the extent that it purports to authorize the procurement of any and all information regarding Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, whether legal or proper to do so.
- 103. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 104. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 105. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiffs' investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful because:
 - a. Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form knowing that it was facially invalid in violation of the FCRA and Defendants' statutory duties;
 - b. Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the FCRA requirements and Defendants' statutory duties when it required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form that was facially invalid and in violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements of the FCRA;
 - c. Upon information and belief, Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers and other professional employees, and

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Members purports to authorize "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to perform a background investigation.

- 111. To the extent the foregoing entity (if it exists at all) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and Class Members, Defendants failed to obtain any authorization at all.
- 112. Alternatively, because Defendants failed to make a clear and conspicuous disclosure that a consumer report may be procured in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiffs and other Class Members without proper authorization. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 113. The foregoing violations were willful because Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiffs and other Class Members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 114. Defendants' willful conduct is also evidenced by, among other things, the facts previously set forth.
- 115. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' willful failure to comply with the requirements imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) of an amount not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000.
- 116. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery of punitive damages for Defendants' willful violations, in an amount as the Court may allow.
- 117. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) and § 1681o(a)(2), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Violation of the

California Investigative Consumer Reporting

Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq.)

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Facially Valid Authorizations)

(Against All Defendants)

- 118. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 119. Pursuant to California Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq., a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer investigative report for employment purposes.
- 120. The ICRAA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must comply with all the following:
 - (A) The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12.
 - (B) The person procuring or causing the report to be made provides a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be made in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that:
 - (i) An investigative consumer report may be obtained.
 - (ii) The permissible purpose of the report is identified.
 - (iii)The disclosure may include information on the consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.
 - (iv)Identifies the name, address, and telephone number of the investigative consumer reporting agency conducting the investigation.
 - (v) Notifies the consumer in writing of the nature and scope of the investigation requested, including a summary of the provisions of Section 1786.22.
 - (vi)Notifies the consumer of the Internet Web site address of the investigative consumer reporting agency identified in clause (iv), or, if the agency has no Internet Web site address, the telephone number of the agency, where the consumer may find information about the investigative reporting agency's privacy practices, including whether the consumer's personal information will be sent outside the United States or its territories and information

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that complies with subdivision (d) of Section 1786.20. This clause shall become operative on January 1, 2012.

(C) The consumer has authorized in writing the procurement of the report.

(§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(2).)

- 121. In addition, the person procuring or causing the report to be made must "certify to the investigative consumer reporting agency that the person has made the applicable disclosures to the consumer required by [section 1786.16, subdivision (a)] and that the person will comply with subdivision (b)." (§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(4).)
- 122. Subdivision (b) of section 1786.16 also requires the person procuring or causing the report to be made to (1) provide the consumer a form with a box that can be checked if the consumer wishes to receive a copy of the report, and send a copy of the report to the consumer within three business days if the box is checked and (2) comply with section 1786.40 if the person procuring or causing the report to be made contemplates taking adverse action against the consumer. (§ 1786.16, subd. (b).)
- 123. During the Class Period, Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and FCRA Class Members to sign a disclosure authorization forms as part of their job applications with Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., which forms purported to allow Defendant "ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING," not Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., the alleged real employer, to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff. See **Exhibit 1**.
- 124. Under Civil Code § 1786.16, subd. (a) "Any person described in subdivision (d) of Section 1786.12 shall not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report unless . . . The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12," yet Civil Code § 1786.12, in relevant part, provides "An investigative consumer reporting agency shall only furnish an investigative consumer report. . . To a person that it has reason to believe: (1) Intends to use the information for employment purposes."

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125.	If Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING was not Plaintiff's
employer, it	violated Civil Code § 1786.16 because it had no legal basis to procure a
onsumer re	port on the Plaintiff,

- 126. In addition, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1: (1) was a purported authorization to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report; (2) included a waiver of liability provision; (3) included a purported authorization to investigate "personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and credit history . . ."; and (4) included other extraneous language, including but not limited to a number of state law admonitions, such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, none of which are applicable since Plaintiff was applying for work in California; "." See Exhibit 1.
- 127. Plaintiff maintains Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned in its Notification and Authorization Form violates California law because it was not a "clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer." (§ 1786.16(a)(2)(B).) See Exhibit 1.
- 128. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated ICRAA.
- 129. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in § 1786.16.
- 130. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 131. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiff's investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful.
- 132. With respect to each of the aforementioned violations of the ICRAA provisions and pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50(a)(1), in the event this case does not

proceed as a class action basis regarding the FCRA class claims, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, not the Class, seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' failure to comply with the requirements imposed by § 1786.16 of an amount not less than \$10,000 or seek actual damages, if any, in an amount to be proven at trial, whichever is higher.

- 133. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are informed and believe, and based on such information and belief allege that Defendants' misconduct was reckless and/or willful and/or malicious and/or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the Plaintiff and whose recklessness and/or conscious disregard was reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to the Plaintiff, thereby warranting the assessment of punitive damages against these Defendants.
- 134. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for
Failure to Pay Timely Earned Wages during Employment and
Upon Separation of Employment in Violation of
California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
204 and/or 204b, 218.5, and 218.6

(Against all Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.)

- 135. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 136. Pursuant to Labor Code § 201, "If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately."
- 137. Pursuant to Labor Code § 202, "If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has

given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting."

- 138. Labor Code § 203 provides, in pertinent part: "If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, ... any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefore is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. ..."
- 139. Pursuant to Labor Code § 204, "all wages ... earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays."
- 140. Alternatively, pursuant to Labor Code § 204b, employers must pay its employees on a weekly basis on a regular day determined by the employer as the regular payday.
- 141. Pursuant to Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 218.6, an action may be brought for the nonpayment of wages and fringe benefits.
- 142. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs were not properly paid pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b and thereby seek all remedies available to them.
- 143. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs' wages pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b, after Plaintiffs' demand and, therefore, Plaintiffs may recover the associated unpaid wages and waiting time penalties.
- 144. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants did this with the intent to secure for himself, herself and itself a discount on its indebtedness and/or with intent to annoy harass, oppress, hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiffs.
- 145. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of

Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

- 146. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 147. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to full perform their obligation under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 148. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, and 204/204b. The exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 149. Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their rightfully earned wages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' failure and refusal to pay said compensation and for the reasons alleged in this Complaint.
- 150. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members request the unpaid wages, waiting time penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, costs, damages, and other remedies in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 151. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert

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Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for Violations of California Labor Code § 226

(Against all Defendants)

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152. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations

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as though set forth herein. 153. Plaintiffs allege that Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a) requires, in

pertinent part, that every employer shall, "semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or her employee, either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee..., (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number... (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer..., and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee..." (Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a).)

- 154. Based on the foregoing allegations, during all times relevant to this action, Defendants did not provide accurate wage statements throughout the Class Period.
- 155. Plaintiffs allege that on numerous occasions, an exact amount by which will be proven at trial, Defendants violated various provisions of § 226, including but not limited to subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and a(5) by failing to provide Plaintiffs accurate itemized statement in writing accurately showing gross wages earned, net

wages earned, total hours worked by the employee, among other things.

- 156. At all material times DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating business hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set forth in Labor Code § 558.
- 157. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 158. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to fully perform their obligations under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 159. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code § 226, the exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 160. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages, penalties, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, and 226.6 in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 161. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 226 in an amount to be proven at trial.

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162. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for PAGA

Penalties and Wage Under California Labor Code
§§ 2698, 2699, et seq. for Violations of California Labor Code
§§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.

(Against all Defendants)

- 163. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 164. Pursuant to law, written notice was provided to the LWDA and Defendants of the specific violations of the California Labor Code Defendants have violated and continue to violate.
- 165. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3, no response will likely be received from the LWDA within 60 days of the postmark date of the above-alleged letter.
- 166. Plaintiffs, therefore, will have exhausted all administrative procedures required of them under Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699, and 2699.3, and, as a result, are justified as a matter of right in bringing forward this cause of action and are entitled to pursue penalties in a representative action for Defendants' violations of the Labor Code.
- 167. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, any provision of the Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees for violation of the code may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Labor Code § 2699.3.

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168. Plaintiff is an "aggrieved employee" because Plaintiff was employed by the alleged violator and had one or more of the alleged violations committed against Plaintiff, and therefore is properly suited to represent the interests of other current and former Represented Employees.

- 169. Because of the acts alleged above, Plaintiffs seek penalties under Labor Code §§ 2698 and 2699 because of Defendants' violation of numerous provisions of the California Labor Code as alleged in this Complaint.
- 170. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, penalties for violating Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.
- 171. Labor Code § 558 establishes a civil penalty as follows: Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be violated, a section of this chapter or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (including the "Hours and Days of Work" section of the Wage Order) shall be subject to a civil penalty of (1) for any initial violation, fifty dollars (\$50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; (2) for each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars (\$100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; and (3) wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee.
- 172. Plaintiffs seek penalties for Defendants' conduct as alleged herein as permitted by law.
- 173. Specifically, Plaintiffs seeks penalties under Labor Code § 2699, for the following in addition to those Code provisions mentioned in this Cause of Action:
 - a. For violations of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
 and 204/204b for failing to pay Plaintiff and
 Represented Employees in a timely manner; and

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þ.	For the violation of Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3
	for failing to provide Plaintiff and Represented
	Employees accurate wage statements.

174. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2698, et seq., Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney's fees, costs, civil penalties, and wages on behalf of Plaintiff and other current and former Represented Employees as alleged herein in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Remedies for Violations of the California Unfair Business Practices Code §§ 17200, et seq.

(Against all Defendants)

- 175. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 176. Defendants, and each of them, are "persons" as defined under Business and Professions Code § 17021.
- 177. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants committed the unfair business practices, as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by violating the laws alleged to have been violated in this Complaint and which allegations are incorporated herein by reference.
- 178. Defendants' conduct, as alleged above, constitutes unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent activity prohibited by Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.
- 179. The unlawful and unfair business practices conducted by Defendants, and each of them, are ongoing and present a threat and likelihood of continuing against Plaintiffs and, accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief where appropriate.
- 180. Plaintiffs has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property because of the aforementioned unfair competition.
 - 181. Because of their improper acts, Defendants, and each of them, have

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reaped and continue to reap unfair benefits and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and other employees and former employees of Defendants, and each of them.

- 182. Defendants, and each of them, should be enjoined from this activity and made to disgorge these ill-gotten gains and restore to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class the wrongfully withheld wages and/or penalties, pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17202 and/or 17203.
- 183. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class have also incurred and continue to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial and for which they seek compensation pursuant to law including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of the Class, pray for an order for relief as follows:

- 1. An order that this action may proceed and be maintained as a class action;
- 2. For appointment of the Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as the representatives of the Class;
- 3. For appointment of counsel for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as Class Counsel;
- 4. That Defendants be found liable to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class;
- For a declaration that Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiffs
 OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class under the FCRA and any other applicable law alleged in this Complaint;
- 6. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), an award of statutory damages to Plaintiff and the Class in an amount equal to \$1,000 for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and each member of the Class for Defendant's willful

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violations of the FCRA;

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- 7. In the event this case does not proceed on a FCRA class action basis, pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50, an award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO in the amount of \$10,000 each, or in the alternative actual damages in an amount according to proof;
- 8. For an award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class in an amount to be determined by the Court;
- 9. For costs of suit and expenses incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs allowed under relevant provision of law including, but not limited to, those allowed under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a)(2), Civ. Code § 1786.50, and/or other applicable provisions of law;
- 10. That Defendants, and each of them, be ordered and enjoined to pay restitution to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 11. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
- 12. For disgorgement through restitution of all ill-gotten and/or ill-gained profits, including unpaid wages and/or penalties to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees, resulting from Defendants' unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 13. For an order by the Court requiring Defendants, and each of them, to show cause, if any they have, as to why to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees should not have been issued itemized wage statements as required by § 226 of the Labor Code and why Defendants should not be required to pay Plaintiff minimum wages and overtime compensation under applicable state law;

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	14.	For all remedies available to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA
RIAN	VO und	der the applicable provisions of the Labor Code via PAGA Labor Code §
2698	, et seq	. including an award of attorneys' fees, costs, interest, liquidated
lama	ges, da	amages, penalties and waiting time penalties according to proof to the
xten	t perm	itted by law;

- 15. For maximum civil penalties available under the Labor Code and applicable Wage Order as described more particularly in this Complaint, representative PAGA claims including the payment of wages as set forth in Labor Code § 558;
- 16. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
 - 17. For Labor Code § 203 penalties in an amount to be proven at trial;
 - 18. For special and general damages;
- 19. That Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees where available by law, including but not limited to pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq., Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, and/or other applicable laws; and
- 20. For any other relief the Court may deem just, proper and equitable in the circumstances.

Dated: December 27, 2018

Law Offices of Thomas D. Rutledge

By: /s/Thomas D. Rutledge /s/Thomas D. Rutledge Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of this matter.

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COMPLAINT - Torraca-Riano, et al. v. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., et al.

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


Exhibit 1

Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation

I hereby authorize ATC Healthcare Staffing and their choice of reporting company to ascertain information regarding my background to determine any and all information of concern to my record, whether same is of record or not, and I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information. I understand that this form indicates that a background search will be conducted and that this is my notification of that intent. I understand that the purpose of this background investigation is to determine my suitability for employment and may elicit information on my character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living. Additionally, you are hereby authorized to make any investigation of my personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and cridit history through an investigative or credit agency or bureau of your choice. I authorize the release of this information by the appropriate agencies to the investigating service. I understand that my consent will apply throughout my employment, unless I revoke or cancel my consent by sending a signed letter or statement to the Company at any time, stating that I revoke my consent and no longer allow the Company to obtain consumer or investigative consumer reports about me.

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

FULL NAME: Michael Olshansky				
OTHER NAMES USED/MAIDEN NAME/DATES:				
CURRENT Redacted Redacted ADDRESS: PHONE:				
LIST ALL ADDRESSES FOR PAST 7 YEARS:				
Dates:				
Dates;				
EMAIL ADDRESS: Redacted				
SOCIAL SECURITY # REDACTED DATE OF BIRTH: REDACTED				
DRIVER'S LICENSE# Redacted STATE ISSUED: PA				
*** MAY WE CONTACT YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYER? YES NO				
*** HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME? YES NO				
If yes, please explain:				
Notice to California Applicants - You may omit minor traffic offenses, any convictions which have been sealed, expunged or statutorily eradicated, convictions more than two years old for the following marijuana related offenses: HS11357b&c, HS11360c, HS11364, HS11365, HS11550, and misdemeanors for which probation was completed and the case was judicially dismissed.				
Notice to Massachusetts Applicants: You may omit a first conviction for any of the following misdemeanors: drunkenness, simple assault, speeding, minor traffic violations, affray, or disturbance of the peace, or any conviction of a misdemeanor where the date of such conviction or the completion of any period of incarceration resulting there from, whichever date is later, occurred five or more years prior to the date of this application for employment, unless you have been convicted of any offense within five years immediately preceding the date of this application for employment. Note: No applicant will be denied employment solely on the grounds of conviction of a crime. The nature of the offense, the date of the offense, the				
surrounding circumstances and the relevance of the offense to the position will be considered.				
SIGNATURE: DATE: Nov 18, 2018				
California Applicants: Under Section 1786.22 of the California Civil Code, you have the right to request from Justifacts (5250 Logan Ferry Rd, Murrysville PA 15626 - 800-356-6885, www.justifacts.com), upon proper identification, the nature and substance of all information in its files on you, including the sources of inforfaction, and the recipients of any reports on you to whom Justifacts has previously furnished within the three-year period preceding your request. Files maintained on a consumer shall be made available for the consumer's visual inspection, as follows: (1) In-person, if he appears in person and furnishes proper identification. A copy of his file shall also be available to the consumer for a fee not to exceed the actual costs of duplication services provided. (2) By certified mall, if he makes a written request, with proper identification, for copies to be sent to a specified addressee. (3) A summary of all information contained in files on a consumer and required to be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by tolephone, if the consumer has made a written request, with proper identification for telephone disclosure, and the toll charge, if any, for the telefinone call is prepaid by or charged directly to the consumer.				
California, Minnesota & Oklahoma Applicants Only: Please check this box if you would like a copy of the background check maile to you. Minnesota and Oklahoma applicants will receive a copy direct from Justifacts or its designee. California applicants may receive a copy from either the prospective employer or Justifacts.				
NOTICE: Under federal law, you have the right to request disclosure of the nature and scope of our investigation by providing us with a written request within 60 days of our background investigation.				
Subscriber certifies that consumer credit information, consumer reports, as defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 at seq. ("FCRA"), will be ordered only when intended to be used as a factor in establishing a consumer's eligibility for employment and that consumer credit information will be used for no other purposes. It is recognized and understood that the FCRA provides that anyone "who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency" (such as Justifacts) "under false pretenses shall be fined not more than \$2,500 or imprisoned not more than two years or both."				

ATC Personnel/Payroll 0056

EXHIBIT "D" TO NOTICE OF REMOVAL

[PAGES 137 - 149]

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1	Defendants ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare Services, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC
2	Healthcare Services, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), and ATC West Staffing, Inc., (all together
3	"Defendants") hereby answer the Complaint of Plaintiffs Toni Torraca-Riano and Michael Olshansky
4	("Plaintiffs") as follows:
5	GENERAL DENIAL
6	Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30(d), Defendants generally deny
7	each allegation as well as the purported causes of action against Defendants set forth in Plaintiffs'
8	Complaint. In further answer to the Complaint and without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
9	Defendants deny that Plaintiffs have been damaged in any amount, or at all, by reason of any acts or
10	omissions of Defendants.
11	AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSES
12	In further answer to the Complaint, and as separate and distinct affirmative and additional
13	defenses, and without assuming the burden of proof on any defense, Defendants allege as follows:
14	FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
15	(Failure to State a Cause of Action)
16	Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
17	Defendants.
18	SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
19	(Reasonable Procedures)
20	Defendants followed reasonable procedures in the preparation of Plaintiffs' consumer report, an
21	otherwise made good faith efforts to comply with California's Investigative Consumer Reporting
22	Agencies Act ("ICRAA"), California's Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act ("CCRAA"), and all
23	applicable laws.
24	THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
25	(Strict Procedures)
26	Defendants maintained strict procedures to ensure that any information reported about Plaintiffs
27	was complete and up to date, and otherwise made good faith efforts to comply with the ICRAA,
28	CCRAA, and all applicable laws.
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	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

1 FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 2 (Failure to Mitigate) To the extent Plaintiffs has failed to mitigate their alleged damages, their recovery, if any, must 3 4 be reduced accordingly. 5 FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 6 (No Causation) Any damages sustained by Plaintiffs were not proximately caused by Defendants. 7 8 SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 9 (Statute of Limitations) Plaintiffs' claims are barred to the extent they occurred and/or accrued outside the applicable 10 11 statutes of limitations. 12 SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 13 (Preemption) 14 Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 16 EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 17 (Waiver) 18 Plaintiffs have waived their right to assert the purported claims contained in the Complaint, and each purported cause of action therein, against Defendants. Plaintiffs, by their own conduct and actions, 19 have waived the right, if any, to assert the claims alleged in the Complaint. 20 21 NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 22 (Estoppel) Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of estoppel from pursuing their Complaint, and each 23 24 purported cause of action alleged therein. Plaintiffs, by their own conduct and actions, are estopped, as 25 a matter of law, from pursuing the claims alleged in the Complaint. 26 27 28 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 54259879v.1

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TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Laches)

Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of laches from pursuing their Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, because Plaintiffs exercised inexcusable delay in commencing this action.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Unclean Hands)

Plaintiffs are precluded from maintaining the Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, because Plaintiffs engaged in conduct showing unclean hands.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To Use Ordinary Care)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred to the extent that Plaintiffs received good consideration in agreement to serve as an employee of Defendants, yet failed to use ordinary care and diligence during their employment, or employment-related duties, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2854.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred to the extent that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust any administrative or statutory remedies provided under California Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 226, 226.7, and 2698 et seq. To the extent that Plaintiffs were required to exhaust any administrative remedies provided by various sections of the Labor Code, they lack standing.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Contribution By Plaintiffs' Own Acts)

If the injuries and alleged damages in the Complaint occurred at all (which Defendants deny), such injuries and alleged damages were proximately caused by or contributed to by Plaintiffs' own acts, omissions, or failures to act.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

54259879v.1

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Avoidable Consequences Doctrine)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred by the avoidable consequences doctrine.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Lack Of Standing Under Proposition 64)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs, or any person upon whose behalf Plaintiffs purport to act, lacks the requisite standing to sue under Proposition 64, enacted on November 2, 2004, as California Business and Professions Code Section 17204. Under Proposition 64, any plaintiff suing for an alleged violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (the "UCL"), California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., must show that he or she has suffered an injury in fact, in addition to simply alleging a loss of money or property. Since Plaintiffs, or any other person on whose behalf Plaintiffs purports to act, cannot allege the requisite injury in fact, in addition to the requisite loss of money or property, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue under the UCL.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Ratification)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred on the ground that Plaintiffs ratified Defendants' alleged actions.

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To State Facts Warranting Class Certification And Class Damages Or Any Other Representative Action)

Plaintiffs' allegations that this action should be certified as a class action, or representative action fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs cannot allege facts sufficient to warrant class certification and/or an award of class damages, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 or Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs likewise failed to set forth any facts supporting any other form of representative action.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

54259879v.1

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Failure To State Facts Warranting A Predominance Of Common Questions Of Fact And Law)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs cannot allege predominant questions of fact and law, as required under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 or Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Inadequate Class Representative)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives of alleged class that they purport to represent. Defendants allege that Plaintiffs do not have claims typical of the alleged class, if any, and that Plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic to the alleged class they purport to represent. As such, the class action claims and allegations fail as a matter of law.

TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To Show Adequate Damages)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs cannot show a specific or reliable measure of alleged damages owed to Plaintiffs or the members of the purported class.

TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(No Penalty)

Plaintiffs, and those persons in the putative class, are not entitled to any penalty award under any section of the California Labor Code because, at all times relevant and material herein, Defendants did not willfully, knowingly, or intentionally fail to comply with the compensation provisions of the California Labor Code, Cal. Labor Code § 200 et seq., but rather acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that their policies and procedures fully complied with California law.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

54259879v.1

TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To Allege Facts To Support Restitution)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs cannot show a specific and individualized amount of property claimed by Plaintiffs and/or any other member of the purported class, as required for a remedy of restitution under the UCL.

TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Inability To Pursue Legal And Equitable Claims Involving Same Alleged Facts)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails to the extent that Plaintiffs seek a jury trial for their legal claims based on the California Labor Code while simultaneously seeking equitable relief for their claims under the UCL. Given that these claims require different triers of fact to address the same facts and legal theories, Plaintiffs' request for both legal and equitable relief may lead to inconsistent results. Also, because Plaintiffs' claims under the California Labor Code involve the same facts and legal theories as Plaintiffs' claims under the UCL, Defendants are necessarily denied the benefits of the streamlined procedure based on the UCL if Plaintiffs continue to pursue both legal and equitable claims.

TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(No Unfair Business Practice)

Without admitting the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fails because the alleged practices of Defendants are not unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent; the public is not likely to be deceived by any alleged practices; Defendants gained no competitive advantage by such practices; and the benefits of the alleged practices outweigh any harm or other impact they may cause.

TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Adequate Remedy At Law)

Plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable relief sought insofar as they have an adequate remedy at law and/or cannot make the requisite showing to obtain injunctive relief.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

54259879v.1

TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Offset)

To the extent a court holds that Plaintiffs are entitled to damages or penalties, Defendants are entitled to an offset for wages and/or a proportionate reduction in any damages or penalties for any overpayments of wages or other consideration previously provided to Plaintiffs.

TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To Show The Lack Of Itemized Or Accurate Wage Statements)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each cause of action contained therein, is barred to the extent that Plaintiffs and the "aggrieved employees" cannot show that Defendants failed to furnish an accurate, itemized statement in writing at the time of each payment of wages.

TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Lack Of Standing)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent Plaintiffs and the "aggrieved employees" lack standing to assert any of the causes of action contained in the Complaint because Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury.

THIRTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Consent/Authorization)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred, in whole or in part, because the alleged conduct of Defendants complained of in the Complaint was approved, consented to, or otherwise authorized by Plaintiffs through their actions or omissions.

THIRTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Accord and Satisfaction/Release)

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred, in whole or in part, pursuant to an accord and satisfaction, or is barred to the extent that Plaintiffs or any purportedly similarly aggrieved individual has entered into or are otherwise bound by compromise, settlement, or release agreements regarding those claims.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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THIRTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Inability To Pursue Penalties Under California Labor Code § 2698 et seq.)

Plaintiff's Complaint is barred to the extent that Plaintiff and the "aggrieved employees" seek civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code that already contain a statutory or other civil penalty.

THIRTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Excessive Penalties)

Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any civil penalties because, under the circumstances of this case, any such recovery would be unjust, arbitrary, and oppressive, or confiscatory or disproportionate to any damage or loss incurred as a result of Defendants' alleged conduct and therefore unconstitutional under numerous provisions of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, including the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, and other provisions of the United States Constitution, and the excessive fines clause of Section 17 of Article I, the due process clause of Section 7 of Article I, the self-incrimination clause of Section 15 of Article I, and other provisions of the California Constitution.

THIRTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Not "Aggrieved Employees")

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported claim alleged therein, is barred because Plaintiffs are not aggrieved employees and are not entitled to any relief under Labor Code § 2698 et seq. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each purported claim alleged therein, is further barred to the extent it seeks to recover penalties on behalf of individuals who are not "aggrieved employees."

THIRTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure To State Factual Or Legal Theories To Show Manageability)

Plaintiffs' allegations do not contain any factual or legal theory to show a representative PAGA action is manageable. The alleged violations under PAGA cannot be maintained because it requires numerous individualized assessments to identify the aggrieved employees and to determine PAGA violations, for which a PAGA trial will abridge Defendants' due process to present their defenses.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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THIRTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Due Process Violations)

The application of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 to non-California Plaintiffs or to conduct occurring outside of California's borders by actors operating outside of California, violates the due process requirements of the California and Federal Constitutions.

THIRTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Punitive Damages)

Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages because Defendants' reading of their obligations under the ICRAA and all applicable laws was objectively reasonable and made in good faith.

THIRTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Award of Punitive Damages is Unconstitutional)

Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages because such an award would violate the right of Defendants to be protected from "excessive fines," as provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution of the State of California. Moreover, such an award would violate the right of Defendants to procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under the Constitution of the State of California.

THIRTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Improper Party)

Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, on the grounds that ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC West Staffing, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing are not proper parties to this case because they were not Plaintiffs' employer. ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., also is not a proper party because it is merely the predecessor of Defendant ATC Healthcare Services, LLC.

FORTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Right To Raise Other Defenses)

Defendants hereby give notice that they intend to rely upon such other and further affirmative defenses as may become available during discovery in this action and Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer to assert any such defenses.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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Į	<u>PRAYER</u>		
2	WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:		
;	1. That Plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint on file herein;		
.	2.	2. That judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on all counts of	
	the Complain	the Complaint;	
;	3.	That Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees according to proof;	
	4.	That Defendants be awarded the costs of suit incurred herein; and	
	5.	. That Defendants be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may deem	
	appropriate.	priate.	
	DATED: Feb	ruary 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,	
		SEYFARTH SHAW LLP	
		Ву:	
		Laura Wilson Shelby Mason R. Winters	
		Attorneys for Defendants ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare	
		Services, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), and ATC West Staffing,	
		Inc.	

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	44040000	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT	

1	PROOF OF SERVICE			
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES) SS.			
4 5	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90067. On February 7, 2019, I served the within document(s):			
6	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT			
7 8 9 10	(BY MAIL) The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.			
11 12 13	(BY HAND DELIVERY) I delivered the within documents to Nationwide Legal, Inc. for delivery to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below with instructions that such envelope be delivered personally on , 2019.			
14 15 16	(BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing with GSO/FedEx. Under that practice it would be deposited with GSO/FedEx on that same day thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. The envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practices.			
17 18 19	Thomas D. Rutledge Attorney at Law 500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 886-7224 Facsimile: (619) 259-5455 [Attorneys for Plaintiffs Toni Torraca-Riano and Michael Olshansky, et al.]			
20	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.			
21	Executed on February 7, 2019, at Los Angeles, California.			
22	Tamien & Marles a			
24	JAMES AGUILERA			
25	V			
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	54858684v.1 PROOF OF SERVICE			

Case 3:19-cv-00295-L-BLM Document 1 Filed 02/08/19 PageID.150 Page 150 of 150

DECLARATION OF MASON R. WINTERS


I, Mason R. Winters, hereby declare:

- 1. I am an attorney admitted to practice in the State of California, and I am an attorney in the law firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP. I am one of the lawyers responsible for representing ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare Services, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), and ATC West Staffing, Inc., ("Defendants") in the above-captioned lawsuit filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Toni Torraca-Riano and Michael Olshansky ("Plaintiffs"). All of the pleadings and correspondence in this lawsuit are maintained in our office in the ordinary course of business under my direction and control. I have reviewed the pleadings and correspondence in preparing this declaration.
- 2. Exhibits A through D to the concurrently filed Notice of Removal constitute all of the pleadings in the Superior Court's record that have been served on Defendants or filed by Defendants.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 8th day of February 2019, at Los Angeles, California.

Mason R. Winters



Greenstone Law APC
Mark S. Greenstone (SBN 199606)
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-9156
Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP
Marc L. Godino (SBN 182689)
Danielle L. Manning (SBN 313272)
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-9150
Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs TONI TORRACA-RIANO and MICHAEL OLSHANSKY, on behalf of themselves and acting for the interest of other current and former employees ("Represented Employees"), and all other similarly situated individuals (cumulatively "Plaintiffs"), allege the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of all individuals who applied for employment with Defendants and who executed a release and authorization form permitting Defendants to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report on them as part of their employment or application for employment with Defendants.
- 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants have a uniform policy or practice of obtaining an applicant's consumer report and have violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") through use of a legally invalid authorization form that: (1) fails to provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure; and (2) fails to provide a disclosure that appears in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.
 - 3. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and Labor Code Private

Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), §§ 2698, 2699 of the California Labor Code,
Plaintiffs also bring a class and representative action against Defendants for wage and
hour abuses in violation of the California Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders (the "IWC Wage Orders"), all of which contribute to
Defendants' deliberate unfair competition.

4. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of themselves and all Class Members, seek damages, penalties, restitution, injunctive and other equitable relief, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Pursuant to Article VI, § 10 of the California Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' wage and hour claims is proper in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, State of California because Plaintiffs allege claims arising under California law.
- 6. Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs FCRA claim is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1681p which provides that "[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction..."
- 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants conduct business in this State, have systematic and continuous ties with this state, and have agents and representatives that can be found in this state.
- 8. Pursuant to § 395 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, venue is proper in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego because Defendants' corporate records filed with the California Secretary of State indicate they maintain a principle business office at 9040 Friars Road, Suite 335, San Diego, California 92108.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff TONI TORRACA-RIANO is an individual currently residing in

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California.

- 10. Plaintiff MICHAEL OLSHANSKY is an individual residing outside the state of California. During his employment with Defendants from on or about November 2, 2018 to November 28, 2018, however, Plaintiff OLSHANSKY resided in California.
- 11. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. is a Georgia Corporation doing business in California.
- 12. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE, INC. is a Delaware Corporation doing business in California.
- 13. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company doing business in California.
- 14. Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING is an unknown entity doing business in California.
- 15. Defendant ATC WEST STAFFING, INC. is a California Corporation, but according to the California Secretary of State Website, it is "dissolved."
- 16. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 50, are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. Plaintiffs therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to § 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 50 when Plaintiffs ascertain their names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the DOE Defendants is in some manner liable to Plaintiffs for the events and actions alleged herein.
- 17. Unless otherwise specified by name, the named Defendants and DOES 1 through 50 will be collectively referred to as "DEFENDANT EMPLOYER" and/or "Defendants."
- 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting as an agent, joint venturer, an integrated enterprise and/or alter

ego for each of the other Defendants and each were co-conspirators with respect to the acts and the wrongful conduct alleged herein so that each is responsible for the acts of the other pursuant to the conspiracy and in proximate connection with the other Defendant(s).

- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each Defendant was acting partly within and partly without the scope and course of their employment, and was acting with the knowledge, permission, consent, and ratification of every other Defendant.
- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants was an agent, managing general partner, managing member, owner, co-owner, partner, employee, and/or representative of each of the Defendants and was at all times material hereto, acting within the purpose and scope of such agency, employment, contract and/or representation, and that each of them is jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege that each of the Defendants is liable to Plaintiff under legal theories and doctrines including but not limited to (1) joint employer; (2) integrated enterprise; (3) agency; and/or (4) alter ego, based in part, on the facts set forth below.
- 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that each of the named Defendants are part of an integrated enterprise and have acted or currently act as the employer and/or joint employer of the Plaintiffs/Class Members making each of them liable for the wage and hour violations alleged herein.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE FCRA

23. Enacted in 1970, the FCRA's passage was driven in part by two related concerns: first, that consumer reports were playing a central role in people's lives at crucial moments, such as when they applied for a job or credit, and when they applied for housing; second, despite their importance, consumer reports were unregulated and had widespread errors and inaccuracies.

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- 24. While recognizing that consumer reports play an important role in the economy, Congress wanted consumer reports to be "fair and equitable to the consumer" and to ensure their "confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization." 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
- 25. Congress was particularly concerned about the use of consumer reports by employers. Accordingly, Congress required employers to make a clear and conspicuous written disclosure to employees and job applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). This is commonly referred to as the "stand-alone disclosure" requirement. Congress further required that employers obtain written authorization prior to procurement of a consumer report for employment purposes. *Id*.
- 26. The FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement is one of many elements of the FCRA that combine to ensure that consumers know when consumer reports may be generated about them, that they know their rights, and that they have the opportunity to dispute errors in their reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (preadverse employment action notice requirement); § 1681b(4)(B) (notification of national security investigation); § 1681 c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681d(a) (disclosure of investigative report); § 1681g (full file disclosure to consumers); § 1681k(a)(l) (disclosure regarding the use of public record information);§ 1681h (form and conditions of disclosure); § 1681m(a) (post-adverse employment action notice requirement).
- 27. Although the disclosure and the authorization may be combined in a single document, the FTC has warned that the form should not include any extraneous information or be part of another document. For example, in response to an inquiry as to whether the disclosure may be set forth within an application for employment or whether it must be included in a separate document, the FTC stated:

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The disclosure may not be part of an employment application because the language [of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)] is intended to ensure that it appears conspicuously in a document not encumbered by any other information. The reason for requiring that the disclosure be in a stand-alone document is to prevent consumers from being distracted by other information side-by-side within the disclosure.

28. The plain language of the statute also clearly indicates that the inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form violates the disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA, because such a form would not consist "solely" of the disclosure. In fact, the FTC expressly has warned that the FCRA notice may not include extraneous information such as a waiver. In a 1998 opinion letter, the FTC stated:

> [W]e note that your draft disclosure includes a waiver by the consumer of his or her rights under the FCRA. The inclusion of such a waiver in a disclosure form will violate Section 604(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA, which requires that a disclosure consist 'solely' of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.

Consistent with the FTC's construction of the FCRA, courts have repeatedly held that extraneous information renders a purported FCRA disclosure noncompliant. See, e.g., Woods v. CaremarkPHC, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-00535, 2015 WL 6742124, *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure contained an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to defendant and its consumer reporting agency, and state specific notices that did not apply to plaintiff); Jones v. Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 14-cv-3125, 2015 WL 366244, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 27, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss FCRA complaint where plaintiff alleged that purported disclosure form included timeframes during which applicant must challenge accuracy of any report, an acknowledgement that employment decisions are based on non-discriminatory reasons, the contact information for the consumer reporting agency and state specific notices that "stretched what should be a simple disclosure form into two full pages of eyestraining typeface writing.").

30. As discussed below, Defendant routinely violates the FCRA by failing to provide the required stand-alone disclosure to employees and job applicants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING UNLAWFUL PROCUREMENT OF CONSUMER REPORT CLAIMS

- 31. On or about November 18, 2018, as part of Plaintiffs' application for employment, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO to sign a document titled "Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation." A true and correct redacted copy of Plaintiff OLSHANSKY'S authorization is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 1.
 - 32. This form is at the heart of one key part of this dispute.
- 33. The abovementioned form purportedly authorizes "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to conduct a background investigation concerning Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class.
- 34. Plaintiffs maintain this form is illegal because, in part, it includes a release and hold harmless clause that provides, "I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information." See Ex. 1.
- 35. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it misstates the name of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employer as being "ATC Healthcare Staffing," when according to their wage and earning statements, the only legal entity identified as being Plaintiffs' employer was "ATC Healthcare Services, Inc." See Ex. 1.
- 36. To the extent "ATC Healthcare Staffing" (if it exists) is the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members, this form also fails to provide any disclosure or to obtain any authorization at all.
- 37. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal because it includes other extraneous information in addition to a release, including but not limited to a number

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of purported unrelated state law admonitions. See Ex. 1.

- 38. Plaintiffs maintain this form is also illegal to the extent that it is overly broad and purports to authorize the procurement of any information concerning the applicant whether otherwise lawful or appropriate. See Ex. 1.
- 39. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that pursuant to the forms that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO signed on or about November 18, 2018, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER obtained consumer reports on Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO.
- 40. On information and belief, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER had a practice and policy of procuring consumer reports on all Class Members based upon this or substantially similar forms during the class period.
- 41. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated both state and federal law.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING LABOR CODE VIOLATIONS

Labor Code § 226 Violations

- 42. From at least four years before the filing of this action and continuing to the present, and pursuant to company policy and/or practice and/or direction,

 Defendants issued inaccurate wage and earning statements to Plaintiffs.
- 43. On or about November 29, 2018, Defendants issued Plaintiff OLSHANKSY a paystub.
- 44. This paystub did not accurately state Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S gross wages earned or the total hours worked by the employee.
- 45. The November 29, 2018 paystub stated Plaintiff OLSHANKSY earned \$1,810.21 in gross wages, but Plaintiff actually earned \$2,194.59.
- 46. Additionally, the November 29, 2018 statement did not account for Plaintiff OLSHANKSY'S 0.75 hours of overtime and two hours of double time.
 - 47. Further, if indeed "ATC Healthcare Staffing" was Plaintiffs' employer,

Defendant failed to identify such entity as being Plain	tiffs' employer, as required
under Labor Code § 226(a)(8).	•

- 48. Plaintiff TORRACA-RIANO similarly alleges that her paystubs were inaccurate.
- 49. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore allege that Defendants issued similarly inaccurate paystubs to similarly situated employees.
- 50. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs seeks the remedies set forth in this Complaint.

Waiting Time Penalties

- 51. Pursuant to Defendants' policies, Defendants failed to pay all wages to Plaintiffs in a timely manner.
- 52. On or about November 28, 2018, Defendants involuntarily terminated Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S employment.
- 53. On Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S date of termination, however, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO all their unpaid wages immediately upon their termination.
- 54. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants similarly did not pay other similarly situated employees all wages due and payable in a timely manner.
- 55. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs seeks the remedies set forth in this Complaint.

REPRESENTATIVE ACTION (PAGA) CLAIMS

- 56. The duties and business activities of the Represented Employees were essentially the same as the duties and activities of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO described above.
- 57. This is a wage and hour representative action filed pursuant to PAGA, §§ 2698, 2699 generally consists of the following group:

All nonexempt persons Defendants employed in the State of

California from December 21, 2017 to the present.

- 58. All members of the represented groups will be referred to as the "Represented Employees."
- 59. The "Representative Period" means from **December 21, 2017** to the present, the timeframe where the scope of statute allows Plaintiffs to recover wages and penalties.
- 60. At all times during the Representative Period, all the Represented Employees were employed in the same or similar job as Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and were paid in the same manner and under the same standard employment procedures and practices as the Plaintiff.
- 61. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO further allege DEFENDANT EMPLOYER did not pay them and, on information and belief Represented Employees, all wages due at the time their employment ended with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER.
- 62. On information and belief, current and former employees of DEFENDANT EMPLOYER were subject to wage and hour violations by DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, including failing to pay for all wages due.
- 63. California law provides that an employee may file an action against an employer to recover penalties for violations of the Labor Code and Wage Orders, provided the aggrieved employee files an action on behalf of him or herself and similarly situated current and former employees.
- 64. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER was and/or is Represented Employees' employer or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

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65. As set forth in further detail below, because of the analysis and investigation of the Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' attorneys sent letters to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "LWDA") and to DEFENDANT EMPLOYER informing DEFENDANT EMPLOYER of their claims and their intent to pursue litigation.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

- 66. As to penalty claims under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act, on **December 21, 2018**, Plaintiffs began to exhaust his/her administrative remedies by sending correspondence to the LWDA and DEFENDANT EMPLOYER indicating that Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are pursuing the claims alleged in this Complaint.
- 67. By the time an amended Complaint is filed, the statutory period for Plaintiffs will have expired on the letter alleged above and the LWDA will likely not have served Plaintiffs with notice of intent to assume jurisdiction over the applicable penalty claims and did not provide notice as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3 (a)(2)(A) within the statutory period.
- 68. Therefore, Plaintiffs will have exhausted Plaintiffs' administrative remedies to enable Plaintiffs to seek the penalty claims sought in this Complaint.
- 69. The Causes of Action alleged herein are appropriately suited for a Representative Action under PAGA (Labor Code § 2698, et seq.) because:
 - a. This action involves allegations of violations of provisions of the California Labor Code that provide for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees;
 - b. Plaintiffs are "aggrieved employees" because
 Plaintiffs were employed by the alleged violator

and had one or more of the alleged violations
committed against them; and

c. Plaintiffs have satisfied the procedural requirements of Labor Code § 2699.3, as set forth above.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 70. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated as a Class Action pursuant to § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- 71. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek to represent the classes and/or subclasses composed of and defined as follows:

Labor Code Class:

All current or former nonexempt employees who worked in the state of California from December 27, 2014 to the present for the Defendants who were issued wage and earning statements from ATC Healthcare Services, Inc.

FCRA Class:

All persons residing in the United States regarding whom Defendants procured or caused to be procured a consumer report for employment purposes during the period five years prior to the filing of the present action through the date of certification.

72. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO also seek to represent the following subclasses composed of and defined as follows:

Wage Statement Subclass: All Members of the Plaintiff Class who, during the applicable statute of limitations period, did not receive accurate itemized wage statements as required by Labor Code § 226.

Waiting Time Subclass: All Members of the Plaintiff Class who,

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during the applicable limitations period, did not receive all wages due in a timely manner as required by Labor Code §§ 201-204.

<u>UCL Subclass:</u> All Members of the Plaintiff Class, who, during the relevant period, Defendants owe restitution in the form of (1) unreimbursed expenses and/or (2) wages earned and unpaid because of Defendants' uniform pay policies and procedures.

- 73. The above-mentioned class-members will collectively be referred to as "Class Members."
- 74. Plaintiffs reserve the right under the California Rules of Court, to amend or modify the class description with greater specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues.
- 75. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class Action under the provisions of § 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.

A. Numerosity

- 76. The potential members of the Class as defined are so numerous or many, that joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable.
- 77. While the precise number of Class Members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that DEFENDANT EMPLOYER currently employs, and during the relevant time periods employed, over 100 Class Members.
- 78. Accounting for employee turnover during the relevant periods necessarily increases this number substantially.

B. <u>Commonality</u>

- 79. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members.
 - 80. Common questions of law and fact include, without limitation and

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subject to possible further amendment, the following:

- a. Whether the Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports based on invalid authorizations;
- b. Whether Defendants' policy or practice of not paying hourly employees all their wages due in their final paychecks immediately upon involuntary termination or within 72 hours' notice of when its employees provided notice of their voluntary resignation, is unlawful under Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and/or 203;
- c. Whether Defendants violated Labor Code §§ 226 by not providing accurate paystubs; and
- d. Whether Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class may recover remedies pursuant to Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

C. Typicality

81. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY'S and TORRACA-RIANO'S claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and all members of the Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by Defendants' common course of conduct and policies in violation of laws, regulations that have the force and effect of law and statutes as alleged herein.

D. Adequacy of Representation

- 82. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are members of the Class, do not have any conflicts of interest with other Class Members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class.
- 83. Counsel representing Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the putative Class is competent and experienced in litigating employment class

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actions, including wage and overtime class actions.

84. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members.

E. Superiority of Class Action

- 85. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all Class Members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
- 86. Each Class Member was damaged or suffered injury and may recover by reasons of Defendants' illegal policies and/or practices.
- 87. Class Action treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system.
- 88. Plaintiffs are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to encounter in the management of this action that would preclude maintenance as a Class Action.
- 89. For the reasons alleged in this Complaint, this action should be certified as a Class Action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Class Claim for

Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Disclosure)

(Against All Defendants)

- 90. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 91. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B), a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes.
- 92. Likewise, a consumer report may be used for the evaluation of "a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention of an employee." 15

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U.S.C. §1681a(h).

- 93. The FCRA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must: (1) provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to each applicant in writing that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (2) obtain the applicant's authorization in writing to obtain the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 94. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) further specifies that the disclosure must be in writing "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
 - 95. Specifically, Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part:
 - ... a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless--
 - a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or cause to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

- 96. During the Class Period, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class Members to sign an authorization form as part of their job application with DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, which form purported to allow "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to procure consumer reports regarding the Plaintiffs.
- 97. To the extent that ATC Healthcare Staffing (if such entity exists) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS failed to provide any disclosure at all prior to procuring consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by the FCRA.
- 98. Moreover, the form that was provided facially violates the FCRA in numerous respects.

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99. Included in DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1 are reams of extraneous information, including but not limited to, a liability release and multiple state law admonitions. See Exhibit 1.

- 100. Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned, among other extraneous information, in its Notification and Authorization Form executed by applicants facially contravenes the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) that the disclosure be: (1) "clear and conspicuous"; and (2) appear "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure."
- 101. As a matter of law, Defendant's inclusion of the aforementioned information invalidates the Notification and Authorization Form for purposes of the FCRA. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, *10-11 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding an employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)—(ii) when it requires an employee to sign a form containing a waiver of liability provision as part of a background investigation); Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (release of liability improper); Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (a summary of consumer rights in seven different states improper); Lagos v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163119 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (inclusion of seven state law notices and sentence stating "I also understand that nothing herein shall be construed as an offer of employment or contract for services" plausibly violated stand-alone disclosure requirement); Woods v. Caremark PHC, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148051 (W.D. Mo. 2015) ("The specific 'extraneous information' Plaintiff alleges Defendant included in its Authorization Form for Consumer Reports is: (1) an overbroad authorization for third parties to provide information to Defendant and its consumer reporting agency, (2) state-specific notices that did not apply to Plaintiff, and (3) that the form was part of a five-page stapled packet of three documents. Where FCRA allegations involve the inclusion of extraneous information beyond an authorization,

the complaint meets the 12(b)(6) standard to state a claim for willful violation of the
FCRA stand-alone requirement."); see also Letter from William Haynes, Attorney,
Div. of Credit Practices, Fed Trade Comm'n to Richard W. Hauxwekk, CEO,
Accufax Div. (June 12, 1998), 1998 W.L. 34323756 (F.T.C.) (noting that the
inclusion of a waiver in a disclosure form will violate the FCRA).

- 102. The Notification and Authorization form is also illegal to the extent that it purports to authorize the procurement of any and all information regarding Plaintiffs and FCRA Class Members, whether legal or proper to do so.
- 103. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
- 104. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 105. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiffs' investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful because:
 - a. Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form knowing that it was facially invalid in violation of the FCRA and Defendants' statutory duties;
 - b. Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the FCRA requirements and Defendants' statutory duties when it required Plaintiff and the Class to execute the Notification and Authorization Form that was facially invalid and in violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements of the FCRA;
 - c. Upon information and belief, Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers and other professional employees, and

advisors knowledgeable about the FCRA requirements;

- d. The plain language of the statute unambiguously indicates that inclusion of a liability release in a disclosure form violates the disclosure and authorization requirements;
- e. The FTC's express statements, pre-dating Defendants' conduct, state that it is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) to include a liability waiver in the FCRA disclosure form; and
- f. By adopting such a policy, Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater that the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.

106. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class may recover statutory damages due to Defendant's willful failure to comply with the requirements imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) of an amount not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000.

107. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery of punitive damages for Defendants' willful violations, in an amount as the Court may allow.

108. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) and § 1681o(a)(2), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Class Claim for

Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Proper Authorization)

- 109. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
 - 110. As alleged above, the form presented to Plaintiffs and FCRA Class

Members purports to authorize "ATC Healthcare Staffing" to perform a background investigation.

- 111. To the extent the foregoing entity (if it exists at all) is not the entity that procured consumer reports on Plaintiffs and Class Members, Defendants failed to obtain any authorization at all.
- 112. Alternatively, because Defendants failed to make a clear and conspicuous disclosure that a consumer report may be procured in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiffs and other Class Members without proper authorization. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 113. The foregoing violations were willful because Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiffs and other Class Members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
- 114. Defendants' willful conduct is also evidenced by, among other things, the facts previously set forth.
- 115. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the FCRA Class seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' willful failure to comply with the requirements imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) of an amount not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000.
- 116. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery of punitive damages for Defendants' willful violations, in an amount as the Court may allow.
- 117. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) and § 1681o(a)(2), Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Violation of the

California Investigative Consumer Reporting

Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq.)

(Obtaining Consumer Reports Without Facially Valid Authorizations)

(Against All Defendants)

- 118. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
- 119. Pursuant to California Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq., a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer investigative report for employment purposes.
- 120. The ICRAA requires that, before procuring a consumer report on an individual for employment purposes, the employer must comply with all the following:
 - (A) The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12.
 - (B) The person procuring or causing the report to be made provides a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be made in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that:
 - (i) An investigative consumer report may be obtained.
 - (ii) The permissible purpose of the report is identified.
 - (iii)The disclosure may include information on the consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.
 - (iv)Identifies the name, address, and telephone number of the investigative consumer reporting agency conducting the investigation.
 - (v) Notifies the consumer in writing of the nature and scope of the investigation requested, including a summary of the provisions of Section 1786.22.
 - (vi)Notifies the consumer of the Internet Web site address of the investigative consumer reporting agency identified in clause (iv), or, if the agency has no Internet Web site address, the telephone number of the agency, where the consumer may find information about the investigative reporting agency's privacy practices, including whether the consumer's personal information will be sent outside the United States or its territories and information

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that complies with subdivision (d) of Section 1786.20. This clause shall become operative on January 1, 2012.

(C) The consumer has authorized in writing the procurement of the report.

(§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(2).)

- 121. In addition, the person procuring or causing the report to be made must "certify to the investigative consumer reporting agency that the person has made the applicable disclosures to the consumer required by [section 1786.16, subdivision (a)] and that the person will comply with subdivision (b)." (§ 1786.16, subd. (a)(4).)
- 122. Subdivision (b) of section 1786.16 also requires the person procuring or causing the report to be made to (1) provide the consumer a form with a box that can be checked if the consumer wishes to receive a copy of the report, and send a copy of the report to the consumer within three business days if the box is checked and (2) comply with section 1786.40 if the person procuring or causing the report to be made contemplates taking adverse action against the consumer. (§ 1786.16, subd. (b).)
- 123. During the Class Period, Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. required Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and FCRA Class Members to sign a disclosure authorization forms as part of their job applications with Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., which forms purported to allow Defendant "ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING," not Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., the alleged real employer, to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff. See Exhibit 1.
- 124. Under Civil Code § 1786.16, subd. (a) "Any person described in subdivision (d) of Section 1786.12 shall not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report unless . . . The person procuring or causing the report to be made has a permissible purpose, as defined in Section 1786.12," yet Civil Code § 1786.12, in relevant part, provides "An investigative consumer reporting agency shall only furnish an investigative consumer report. . . To a person that it has reason to believe: (1) Intends to use the information for employment purposes."

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125. If Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE STAFFING was not Plaintiff's employer, it violated Civil Code § 1786.16 because it had no legal basis to procure a consumer report on the Plaintiff.

- 126. In addition, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S Notification and Authorization Form, i.e., Exhibit 1: (1) was a purported authorization to procure a consumer report and/or investigative consumer report; (2) included a waiver of liability provision; (3) included a purported authorization to investigate "personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and credit history . . ."; and (4) included other extraneous language, including but not limited to a number of state law admonitions, such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, none of which are applicable since Plaintiff was applying for work in California; "." See Exhibit 1.
- 127. Plaintiff maintains Defendants' inclusion of the aforementioned in its Notification and Authorization Form violates California law because it was not a "clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the consumer." (§ 1786.16(a)(2)(B).) See Exhibit 1.
- 128. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated ICRAA.
- 129. Defendants acted willfully by providing a facially invalid Notification and Authorization Form that was in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous requirements set forth in § 1786.16.
- 130. Defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard of its statutory duties and the rights of applicants and employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, thus knowingly and/or recklessly disregarding its statutory duties.
- 131. On information and belief, as well as Plaintiff's investigation, Defendants' conduct was willful.
- 132. With respect to each of the aforementioned violations of the ICRAA provisions and pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50(a)(1), in the event this case does not

proceed as a class action basis regarding the FCRA class claims, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, not the Class, seek to recover statutory damages due to Defendants' failure to comply with the requirements imposed by § 1786.16 of an amount not less than \$10,000 or seek actual damages, if any, in an amount to be proven at trial, whichever is higher.

- 133. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO are informed and believe, and based on such information and belief allege that Defendants' misconduct was reckless and/or willful and/or malicious and/or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the Plaintiff and whose recklessness and/or conscious disregard was reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to the Plaintiff, thereby warranting the assessment of punitive damages against these Defendants.
- 134. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO seek the recovery costs of suit with reasonable attorneys' fees, as determined by the Court.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for

Failure to Pay Timely Earned Wages during Employment and

Upon Separation of Employment in Violation of

California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,

204 and/or 204b, 218.5, and 218.6

(Against all Defendant ATC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.)

- 135. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 136. Pursuant to Labor Code § 201, "If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately."
- 137. Pursuant to Labor Code § 202, "If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has

given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting."

- 138. Labor Code § 203 provides, in pertinent part: "If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, ... any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefore is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. ..."
- 139. Pursuant to Labor Code § 204, "all wages ... earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays."
- 140. Alternatively, pursuant to Labor Code § 204b, employers must pay its employees on a weekly basis on a regular day determined by the employer as the regular payday.
- 141. Pursuant to Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 218.6, an action may be brought for the nonpayment of wages and fringe benefits.
- 142. Based on the misconduct alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs were not properly paid pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b and thereby seek all remedies available to them.
- 143. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs' wages pursuant to the requirements of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 204/204b, after Plaintiffs' demand and, therefore, Plaintiffs may recover the associated unpaid wages and waiting time penalties.
- 144. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants did this with the intent to secure for himself, herself and itself a discount on its indebtedness and/or with intent to annoy harass, oppress, hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiffs.
- 145. At all material times, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of

Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set for in Labor Code § 558.

- 146. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 147. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to full perform their obligation under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 148. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, and 204/204b. The exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 149. Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their rightfully earned wages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' failure and refusal to pay said compensation and for the reasons alleged in this Complaint.
- 150. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and Class Members request the unpaid wages, waiting time penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, costs, damages, and other remedies in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 151. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert

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Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for Violations of California Labor Code § 226

(Against all Defendants)

- 152. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 153. Plaintiffs allege that Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a) requires, in pertinent part, that every employer shall, "semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or her employee, either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee..., (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number..., (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer..., and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee..." (Labor Code § 226 subdivision (a).)
- 154. Based on the foregoing allegations, during all times relevant to this action, Defendants did not provide accurate wage statements throughout the Class Period.
- 155. Plaintiffs allege that on numerous occasions, an exact amount by which will be proven at trial, Defendants violated various provisions of § 226, including but not limited to subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and a(5) by failing to provide Plaintiffs accurate itemized statement in writing accurately showing gross wages earned, net

wages earned, total hours worked by the employee, among other things.

- 156. At all material times DEFENDANT EMPLOYER and DOES 1 through 50 were and/or are Represented Employees' employers or persons acting on behalf of Represented Employees' employer, within the meaning of California Labor Code § 558, who violated or caused to be violated, a section of Part 2, Chapter 1 of the California Labor Code or any provision regulating business hours and days of work in any Order of the Industrial Welfare Commission and, as such, are subject to penalties for each underpaid employee as set forth in Labor Code § 558.
- 157. In committing the violations of state law as herein alleged, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate Represented Employees for all wages earned and all hours worked.
- 158. As a direct result, Represented Employees have suffered and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the use and enjoyment of such compensation, wages, lost interest on such monies and expenses and attorney's fees in seeking to compel Defendants to fully perform their obligations under state law, all to their respective damage in amounts according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limitations of this Court.
- 159. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, a penalty of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred (\$200.00) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation in which DEFENDANT EMPLOYER violated Labor Code § 226, the exact amount of the applicable penalty is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.
- 160. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages, penalties, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, and 226.6 in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 161. For Defendants' misconduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 226 in an amount to be proven at trial.

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162. Where any of the foregoing statutes do not provide for a private right of actions, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO nevertheless assert Defendants violated these provisions as part of their PAGA cause of action alleged herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual and Representative Claim for PAGA
Penalties and Wage Under California Labor Code
§§ 2698, 2699, et seq. for Violations of California Labor Code
§§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.

(Against all Defendants)

- 163. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 164. Pursuant to law, written notice was provided to the LWDA and Defendants of the specific violations of the California Labor Code Defendants have violated and continue to violate.
- 165. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3, no response will likely be received from the LWDA within 60 days of the postmark date of the above-alleged letter.
- 166. Plaintiffs, therefore, will have exhausted all administrative procedures required of them under Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699, and 2699.3, and, as a result, are justified as a matter of right in bringing forward this cause of action and are entitled to pursue penalties in a representative action for Defendants' violations of the Labor Code.
- 167. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, any provision of the Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees for violation of the code may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Labor Code § 2699.3.

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168. Plaintiff is an "aggrieved employee" because Plaintiff was employed by the alleged violator and had one or more of the alleged violations committed against Plaintiff, and therefore is properly suited to represent the interests of other current and former Represented Employees.

- 169. Because of the acts alleged above, Plaintiffs seek penalties under Labor Code §§ 2698 and 2699 because of Defendants' violation of numerous provisions of the California Labor Code as alleged in this Complaint.
- 170. Labor Code § 2699, *et seq*. imposes upon Defendants, and each of them, penalties for violating Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204 and/or 204b, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.3, and 226.6.
- 171. Labor Code § 558 establishes a civil penalty as follows: Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be violated, a section of this chapter or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (including the "Hours and Days of Work" section of the Wage Order) shall be subject to a civil penalty of (1) for any initial violation, fifty dollars (\$50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; (2) for each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars (\$100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages; and (3) wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee.
- 172. Plaintiffs seek penalties for Defendants' conduct as alleged herein as permitted by law.
- 173. Specifically, Plaintiffs seeks penalties under Labor Code § 2699, for the following in addition to those Code provisions mentioned in this Cause of Action:
 - a. For violations of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
 and 204/204b for failing to pay Plaintiff and
 Represented Employees in a timely manner; and

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b.	For the violation of Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3
	for failing to provide Plaintiff and Represented
	Employees accurate wage statements.

174. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2698, et seq., Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney's fees, costs, civil penalties, and wages on behalf of Plaintiff and other current and former Represented Employees as alleged herein in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial and within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Individual Claim for Remedies for Violations of the California Unfair Business Practices Code §§ 17200, et seq.

(Against all Defendants)

- 175. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though set forth herein.
- 176. Defendants, and each of them, are "persons" as defined under Business and Professions Code § 17021.
- 177. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants committed the unfair business practices, as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by violating the laws alleged to have been violated in this Complaint and which allegations are incorporated herein by reference.
- 178. Defendants' conduct, as alleged above, constitutes unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent activity prohibited by Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.
- 179. The unlawful and unfair business practices conducted by Defendants, and each of them, are ongoing and present a threat and likelihood of continuing against Plaintiffs and, accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief where appropriate.
- 180. Plaintiffs has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property because of the aforementioned unfair competition.
 - 181. Because of their improper acts, Defendants, and each of them, have

reaped and continue to reap unfair benefits and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and other employees and former employees of Defendants, and each of them.

- 182. Defendants, and each of them, should be enjoined from this activity and made to disgorge these ill-gotten gains and restore to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class the wrongfully withheld wages and/or penalties, pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17202 and/or 17203.
- 183. Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class have also incurred and continue to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial and for which they seek compensation pursuant to law including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO, on behalf of the Class, pray for an order for relief as follows:

- 1. An order that this action may proceed and be maintained as a class action;
- 2. For appointment of the Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as the representatives of the Class;
- 3. For appointment of counsel for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO as Class Counsel;
- 4. That Defendants be found liable to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class;
- 5. For a declaration that Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiffs
 OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the Class under the FCRA and any other
 applicable law alleged in this Complaint;
- 6. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), an award of statutory damages to Plaintiff and the Class in an amount equal to \$1,000 for Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and each member of the Class for Defendant's willful

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violations of the FCRA;

- 7. In the event this case does not proceed on a FCRA class action basis, pursuant to Civ. Code § 1786.50, an award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO in the amount of \$10,000 each, or in the alternative actual damages in an amount according to proof;
- 8. For an award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and the members of the Class in an amount to be determined by the Court;
- 9. For costs of suit and expenses incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs allowed under relevant provision of law including, but not limited to, those allowed under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a)(2), Civ. Code § 1786.50, and/or other applicable provisions of law;
- 10. That Defendants, and each of them, be ordered and enjoined to pay restitution to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 11. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
- 12. For disgorgement through restitution of all ill-gotten and/or ill-gained profits, including unpaid wages and/or penalties to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees, resulting from Defendants' unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-05;
- 13. For an order by the Court requiring Defendants, and each of them, to show cause, if any they have, as to why to Plaintiff and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees should not have been issued itemized wage statements as required by § 226 of the Labor Code and why Defendants should not be required to pay Plaintiff minimum wages and overtime compensation under applicable state law;

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- 14. For all remedies available to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO under the applicable provisions of the Labor Code via PAGA Labor Code § 2698, et seq. including an award of attorneys' fees, costs, interest, liquidated damages, damages, penalties and waiting time penalties according to proof to the extent permitted by law;
- 15. For maximum civil penalties available under the Labor Code and applicable Wage Order as described more particularly in this Complaint, representative PAGA claims including the payment of wages as set forth in Labor Code § 558;
- 16. That Defendants, and each of them, be required to issue to Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees accurate wage and earning statements;
 - 17. For Labor Code § 203 penalties in an amount to be proven at trial;
 - 18. For special and general damages;
- 19. That Plaintiffs OLSHANSKY and TORRACA-RIANO and/or the Class and/or Represented Employees be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees where available by law, including but not limited to pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq., Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, and/or other applicable laws; and
- 20. For any other relief the Court may deem just, proper and equitable in the circumstances.

Dated: December 27, 2018

Law Offices of Thomas D. Rutledge

By: /s/Thomas D. Rutledge /s/Thomas D. Rutledge Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of this matter.

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


Exhibit 1

Case 3:19-cv-00295-L-BLM Document 1-2 Filed 02/08/19 PageID.190 Page 38 of 38

Notification and Authorization to Conduct Employment Background Investigation

I hereby authorize ATC Healthcare Staffing and the choice of reporting company to ascertain information regarding my background to determine any and all information of concern to my record, whether same is of record or not, and I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information. I understand that this form indicates that a background search will be conducted and that this is my notification of that intent. I understand that the purpose of this background investigation is to determine my suitability for employment and may elicit information on my character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living. Additionally, you are hereby authorized to make any investigation of my personal history, educational background, military record, motor vehicle records, criminal records, and cridit history through an investigative or credit agency or bureau of your choice. I authorize the release of this information by the appropriate agencies to the investigating service. I understand that my consent will apply throughout my employment, unless I revoke or cancel my consent by sending a signed letter or statement to the Company at any time, stating that I revoke my consent and no longer allow the Company to obtain consumer or investigative consumer reports about me.

PLEASE PRINT CI	LEARLY	
FULL NAME: Michael Olshansky		<u></u>
OTHER NAMES USED/MAIDEN NAME/DATES:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
CURRENT Redacted ADDRESS:	PHONE:	Redacted
LIST ALL ADDRESSES FOR PAST 7 YEARS:	Dates;	
·	Dates:	
	Dates:	
EMAIL ADDRESS: Redacted		
SOCIAL SECURITY # REDACTED DATE OF BI	REDACTED	
DRIVER'S LICENSE # Redacted	STATE ISSUED: PA	
*** MAY WE CONTACT YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYER? YES	NO	
*** HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME? YES	NO V	
If yes, please explain:	***	
Notice to California Applicants - You may omit minor traffic offenses, any convictions more than two years old for the following marijuana related offenses: HS11357 for which probation was completed and the case was judicially dismissed.	ons which have been sealed, expu b&c, HS11360c, HS11364, HS1136	inged or statutorily eradicated, 5, HS11550, and misdemeanors
Notice to Massachusetts Applicants: You may omit a first conviction for any of the following traffic violations, affray, or disturbance of the peace, or any conviction of a misdemeanor with incarceration resulting there from, whichever date is later, occurred five or more years prior to convicted of any offense within five years immediately preceding the date of this application for environment. No applicant will be denied employment solely on the grounds of conviction of surrounding circumstances and the relevance of the offense to the position will be constituted.	here the date of such conviction or on the date of this application for entemployment. a crime. The nature of the offen	the completion of any period of aployment, unless you have been
SIGNATURE:	DATE: <u>No</u>	v 18, 2018
California Applicants: Under Section 1786.22 of the California Civil Code, you have the right to request twww.justifacts.com), upon proper identification, the nature and substance of all information in its files on yet to whom Justifacts has previously furnished within the three-year period preceding your request. Files maintai as follows: (1) In-person, if he appears in person and furnishes proper identification. A copy of his file shall duplication services provided. (2) By certified mail, if he makes a written request, with proper identification, to contained in files on a consumer and required to be provided by Section 1786.10 shall be provided by telephone disclosure, and the toil charge, if any, for the telethone call is prepaid by or charged directly to the co	ou, including the sources of information, a ned on a consumer shall be made available il also be available to the consumer for a for copies to be sent to a specified addres one, if the consumer has made a written nsumer.	nd the recipients of any reports on you e for the consumer's visual inspection, fee not to exceed the actual costs of see. (3) A summary of all information request, with proper identification for
California, Minnesota & Oklahoma Applicants Only: Please check this box if you would like a copy writ receive a copy direct from Justifacts or its designee. California applicants may receive a copy from either the control of the co	ne prospective employer or Justifacts.	
NOTICE: Under federal law, you have the right to request disclosure of the nature and scope of our investigation. Subscriber certifies that consumer credit information, consumer reports, as defined by the Fair Cr		
only when intended to be used as a factor in establishing a consumer's eligibility for employr purposes. It is recognized and understood that the FCRA provides that anyone "who knowing!"	nent and that consumer credit infor	mation will be used for no other

reporting agency" (such as Justifacts) "under false pretenses shall be fined not more than \$2,500 or imprisoned not more than two years or both."

MASTER PROOF OF SERVICE

54869486v.1

Case 3:19-cv-00295-L-BLM Document 1-3 Filed 02/08/19 PageID.191 Page 1 of 3

1		MASTER PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STA	TE OF CALIFORNIA) CS
3	COU	UNTY OF LOS ANGELES SS.
4	age o	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 2029 Century Park Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90067.
5	East,	
6		On February 8, 2019, I served the within document(s):
7		SEE ATTACHED LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVED
8 9 10 11 12	×	(BY MAIL) The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
13 14		(BY HAND DELIVERY) I delivered the within documents to Nationwide Legal, Inc. for delivery to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below with instructions that such envelope be delivered personally on , 2019.
15 16 17		(BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing with GSO/FedEx. Under that practice it would be deposited with GSO/FedEx on that same day thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. The envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practices.
18 19		Electronically by using the Court's CM/ECF System
20 21 22		Thomas D. Rutledge Attorney at Law 500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 886-7224 Facsimile: (619) 259-5455 [Attorneys for Plaintiffs Toni Torraca-Riano and Michael Olshansky, et al.]
23		I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at
24	whos	e direction the service was made.
25 26		Executed on February 8, 2019, at Los Angeles, California
27		JAMES AQUILERA
28		
	l	MASTER PROOF OF SERVICE

54869486v.1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVED CIVIL COVER SHEET 1. **DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE** UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NOTICE OF PARTY WITH FINANCIAL INTEREST [Southern District 3. Civil Rule 40.2] **DEFENDANTS' RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT** 4. DECLARATION OF MASON R. WINTERS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF REMOVAL 5. MASTER PROOF OF SERVICE 6.

54869486v.1

JS 44 (Rev. 06/17)

Case 3:19-cv-00295-L-BLM Document 1-4 Filed 02/08/19 PageID.210 Page 1 of 2 CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS				DEFENDANTS	3				
Toni Torraca-Riano and Michael Olshanksy				ATC Healthcare, Inc., ATC Healthcare Servs, LLC (erroneously sued as ATC Healthcare Servs, Inc., and ATC Healthcare Staffing), et al.					
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Riverside (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)					
				NOTE: IN LAND CO THE TRACT	ONDEMNATION CA	ASES, USE T VED.	HE LOCATION O	F	
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Thomas D. Rutledge (SBN 200497) 500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113, San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 886-7224				Attorneys (If Known) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Laura Wilson Shelby (SBN 2029 Century Park East, St Telephone: (310) 277-7200	151870); Mason R. Wi uite 3500, Los Angeles,	inters (273639 , CA 90067	•	.	BLM_
II. BASIS OF JURISD	ICTION (Place an "X" in (One Box Only)		TIZENSHIP OF P				Эпе Вох	for Plaintif
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	▶ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government)	Not a Party)	•			porated <i>or</i> Pr Business In T		r Defend PTF 4	lant) DEF
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant	☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizensh	 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) 		en of Another State	2	porated and F Business In A		O 5	5
				n or Subject of a	3 G 3 Forei	gn Nation		5 6	□ 6
IV. NATURE OF SUIT							of Suit Code Des		
□ 110 Insurance □ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ∞ Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY □ 210 Land Condemnation □ 220 Foreclosure □ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment □ 240 Torts to Land □ 245 Tort Product Liability □ 290 All Other Real Property	PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel &	PERSONAL INJUR' 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability Pharmaceutical Personal Injury - Product Liability Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPER 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Fraud Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITION Habeas Corpus: 463 Alien Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty Other: 540 Mandamus & Othe 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement	RTY	5 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 0 Other LABOR 0 Fair Labor Standards Act 0 Labor/Management Relations 0 Railway Labor Act 1 Family and Medical Leave Act 0 Other Labor Litigation 1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act IMMIGRATION 2 Naturalization Application 5 Other Immigration Actions	422 Appeal 28 U 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 28 USC 15	JSC 158 7 IGHTS Oreviated Application (923) W (405(g)) KVI) X SUITS Plaintiff ptt) Party	□ 375 False Cla □ 376 Qui Tam	ims Act (31 USC (31 USC) pportion d Bankir be on r Influen organizat r Credit TV s/Commo e tutory A ral Acts ental Ma of Inform on rative Pr bev or Ap becision conality of	ment ng nced and tions odities/ ctions atters mation occedure opeal of
	noved from 3	Remanded from C	J 4 Reins Reop	ened Anothe	r District	Litigation	- I	Multidis	on -
VI. CAUSE OF ACTIO	15119 € 1691	use:	e filing (D	(specify) o not cite jurisdictional stat		Transfer:		irect Fi	10
VII. REQUESTED IN		IS A CLASS ACTION	DE	EMAND \$		-	if demanded in o	-	nt:
COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CASE IF ANY		JUDGE		H	DOCKET NUM	MBER	⊠ Yes	□No	
DATE 02/08/2019 OR OFFICE USE ONLY		SIGNATURE OF ATT /s/ Mason R. W		F RECORD					
	IOUNT	APPLYING IFP		JUDGE		MAG. JUD	GE		

JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 06/17)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

- **Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.
- (b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
- (c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
- II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.

 United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.

United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.

- Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
- Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.)
- III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
- IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
- V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.
 - Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
 - Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
 - Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.
 - Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date. Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.
 - Multidistrict Litigation Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
 - Multidistrict Litigation Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.

 PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statue.
- VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
- VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.

 Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.

 Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
- VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>ATC Healthcare Services Hit with FCRA, Wage and Hour Class Action in California</u>