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13	CITIED STATES D	ISTRICT COURT			
14	CENTRAL DISTRIC	Γ OF CALIFORNIA			
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16	SARAH HAMILTON, JESSE	Case No.:			
17	HAMILTON, MICHELLE MARIE LaMONTAGNE, individually and	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT			
18	on behalf of all others similarly				
19	situated,				
20	Plaintiffs,				
21	VS.				
22	EQUIFAX, INC.,				
23					
24	Defendant.				
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PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs SARAH HAMILTON, JESSE HAMILTON and MICHELLE MARIE LaMONTAGNE (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of the Classes defined below, allege the following against Equifax, Inc. ("Equifax") based upon personal knowledge with respect to themselves and on information and belief derived from, among other things, investigation of counsel and review of public documents as to all other matters:

NATURE OF THE CASE

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this class action case against Defendant Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency, and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to Consumer Plaintiffs and other Class members that their PII had been stolen and precisely what types of information were stolen.
- 2. Equifax has acknowledged that a cybersecurity incident ("Data Breach") potentially impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers occurred. Unauthorized persons exploited a U.S. website application vulnerability to gain access to certain files. Equifax claims that based on its investigation, the unauthorized access occurred from mid-May through July 2017. The information accessed primarily includes names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver's license numbers. In addition, the credit card numbers for approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain dispute documents with personal identifying information for approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed.
- 3. Equifax has acknowledged that it discovered the unauthorized access on July 29 2017, but failed to inform the public why it delayed notification of the Data Breach to consumers for nearly six weeks. Instead, Equifax executives sold

at least \$1.8 million worth of shares before the public disclosure of the breach. It has been reported that its Chief Financial Officer John Gamble sold shares worth \$946,374, its president of U.S. information solutions, Joseph Loughran, exercised options to dispose of stock worth \$584,099, and its president of workforce solutions, Rodolfo Ploder, sold \$250,458 of stock on August 2, 2017.

- 4. The PII for Plaintiffs and the class of consumers they seek to represent was compromised due to Equifax's acts and omissions and their failure to properly protect the PII.
- 5. Equifax could have prevented this Data Breach. On September 13, 2017, Equifax gave an update on its investigations of the breach, explaining that it had identified the culprit—a vulnerability on part of its U.S. website, specifically a flaw in the open-source Apache Struts framework it used to build its web applications. This particular vulnerability, which carries the code "CVE-2017-5638," was fixed in early March, with patches becoming available then to everyone who uses Struts. Equifax said the breach occurred in the middle of May. Equifax's IT department had the means to fix the problem for a couple of months, but did not.
- 6. The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Equifax's inadequate approach to data security and the protection of the PII that it collected during the course of its business.
- 7. Equifax disregarded the rights of Plaintiffs and Class members by failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected, failing to disclose to its customers the material fact that it did not have adequate computer systems and security practices to safeguard PII, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop the breach from ever happening, and failing to monitor and detect the breach on a timely basis.
- 8. As a result of the Equifax Data Breach, the PII of Plaintiffs and Class members has been exposed to criminals for misuse. The injuries suffered by

Plaintiffs and Class members, or likely to be suffered by Plaintiffs and Class members as a direct result of the Equifax Data Breach include:

- a. unauthorized use of their PII;
- b. theft of their personal and financial information;
- c. costs associated with the detection and prevention of identity theft and unauthorized use of their financial accounts;
- d. damages arising from the inability to use their PII;
- e. loss of use of and access to their account funds and costs associated with inability to obtain money from their accounts or being limited in the amount of money they were permitted to obtain from their accounts, including missed payments on bills and loans, late charges and fees, and adverse effects on their credit including decreased credit scores and adverse credit notations;
- f. costs associated with time spent and the loss of productivity or the enjoyment of one's life from taking time to address and attempt to ameliorate, mitigate and deal with the actual and future consequences of the Data Breach, including finding fraudulent charges, purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft protection services, and the stress, nuisance and annoyance of dealing with all issues resulting from the Equifax Data Breach;
- g. the imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential fraud and identify theft posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals and already misused via the sale of Plaintiffs' and Class members' information on the Internet black market;

- h. damages to and diminution in value of their PII entrusted to Equifax for the sole purpose of purchasing products and services from Equifax; and
- i. the loss of Plaintiffs and Class members' privacy.
- 9. The injuries to the Plaintiffs and Class members were directly and proximately caused by Equifax's failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for PII.
- 10. Plaintiffs retain a significant interest in ensuring that his PII, which, while stolen, remains in the possession of Equifax is protected from further breaches, and seek to remedy the harms suffered on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers whose PII was stolen as a result of the Equifax Data Breach.
- 11. Plaintiffs bring this action to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals whose PII was accessed during the Data Breach. Plaintiffs seek the following remedies, among others: statutory damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and state consumer protection statutes, reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses, other compensatory damages, further and more robust credit monitoring services with accompanying identity theft insurance, and injunctive relief including an order requiring Equifax to implement improved data security measures.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million exclusive of interest and costs. There are more than 100 putative class members. Plaintiffs reside in California and the headquarters for Equifax is in Georgia.
- 13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Equifax because Equifax regularly conducts business in California, and has sufficient minimum contacts in

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California. Equifax intentionally availed itself of this jurisdiction by marketing and selling products and services and by accepting and processing payments for those products and services within California.

14. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events, acts, and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in this District.

PARTIES

- 15. Plaintiff SARAH HAMILTON is a resident of the state of California. Plaintiff is a victim of the Data Breach. Plaintiff SARAH HAMILTON has spent time and effort monitoring her financial accounts.
- 16. Plaintiff JESSE HAMILTON is a resident of the state of California. Plaintiff is a victim of the Data Breach. Plaintiff JESSE HAMILTON has spent time and effort monitoring his financial accounts.
- 17. Plaintiff MICHELLE MARIE LaMONTAGNE is a resident of the state of California. Plaintiff is a victim of the Data Breach. Plaintiff MICHELLE MARIE LaMONTAGNE has spent time and effort monitoring her financial accounts.
- 18. Defendant Equifax, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at 1550 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309. Equifax, Inc. may be served through its registered agent, Shawn Baldwin, at its principal office address identified above.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

19. Equifax is one of three nationwide credit-reporting companies that track and rate the financial history of U.S. consumers. The companies are supplied with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as information on everything from child support payments, credit limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer history. All this information, and more, factors into credit scores.

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- 20. Unlike other data breaches, not all of the people affected by the Equifax breach may be aware that they are customers of the company. Equifax gets its data from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders who report on the credit activity of individuals to credit reporting agencies, as well as by purchasing public records.
- Included among the files exposed by Equifax was a treasure trove of personal data: names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and addresses. In some cases -- Equifax states around 209,000 -- the records also included actual credit card numbers. Documentation about disputed charges was also leaked. Those documents contained additional personal information on around 182,000 Americans.
- 22. Plaintiffs suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of their PII – a form of intangible property that Plaintiffs entrusted to Equifax and that was compromised in and as a result of the Equifax Data Breach.
- 23. Plaintiffs have suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the substantially increased risk of future fraud, identity theft and misuse posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals who have already, or will imminently, misuse such information.
- 24. Plaintiffs have a continuing interest in ensuring that their private information, which remains in the possession of Equifax, is protected and safeguarded from future breaches.
- 25. Equifax was well-aware that the PII collected, maintained and stored in the POS systems is highly sensitive, susceptible to attack, and could be used for wrongful purposes by third parties, such as identity theft and fraud.
- 26. It is well known and the subject of many media reports that PII is highly coveted and a frequent target of hackers. Despite the frequent public announcements of data breaches of corporate entities, including Experian, Equifax

maintained an insufficient and inadequate system to protect the PII of Plaintiffs and Class members.

- 27. PII is a valuable commodity because it contains not only payment card numbers but PII as well. A "cyber blackmarket" exists in which criminals openly post stolen payment card numbers, social security numbers, and other personal information on a number of underground Internet websites. PII is "as good as gold" to identity thieves because they can use victims' personal data to open new financial accounts and take out loans in another person's name, incur charges on existing accounts, or clone ATM, debit, or credit cards.
- 28. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground alike recognize the value in PII contained in a merchant's data systems; otherwise, they would not aggressively seek or pay for it. For example, in "one of 2013's largest breaches . . . not only did hackers compromise the [card holder data] of three million customers, they also took registration data [containing PII] from 38 million users."
- 29. Equifax was fully aware of the significant number of people whose PII it collected, and thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by a breach of Equifax's systems.
- 30. The FTC defines identity theft as "a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority." The FTC describes "identifying information" as "any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person."
- 31. Personal identifying information is a valuable commodity to identity thieves once the information has been compromised. As the FTC recognizes, once identity thieves have personal information, "they can drain your bank account, run up your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical treatment on your health insurance."

- 32. Identity thieves can use personal information, such as that of Plaintiffs and Class members which Equifax failed to keep secure, to perpetrate a variety of crimes that harm victims. For instance, identity thieves may commit various types of government fraud such as: immigration fraud; obtaining a driver's license or identification card in the victim's name but with another's picture; using the victim's information to obtain government benefits; or filing a fraudulent tax return using the victim's information to obtain a fraudulent refund.
- 33. Javelin Strategy and Research reports that identity thieves have stolen \$112 billion in the past six years.
- 34. Reimbursing a consumer for a financial loss due to fraud does not make that individual whole again. On the contrary, identity theft victims must spend numerous hours and their own money repairing the impact to their credit. After conducting a study, the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") found that identity theft victims "reported spending an average of about 7 hours clearing up the issues" and resolving the consequences of fraud in 2014.
- 35. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also between when PII or PCD is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.

36. Plaintiffs and Class members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their PII.

- 37. The PII of Plaintiffs and Class members is private and sensitive in nature and was left inadequately protected by Equifax. Equifax did not obtain Plaintiffs' and Class members' consent to disclose their PII to any other person as required by applicable law and industry standards.
- 38. The Equifax Data Breach was a direct and proximate result of Equifax's failure to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices, and the common law, including Equifax's failure to establish and implement appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII to protect against reasonably foreseeable threats to the security or integrity of such information.
- 39. Equifax had the resources to prevent a breach, but neglected to adequately invest in data security, despite the growing number of well-publicized data breaches.
- 40. Had Equifax remedied the deficiencies in its data security systems, followed security guidelines, and adopted security measures recommended by experts in the field, Equifax would have prevented the Data Breach and, ultimately, the theft of its customers' PII.
- 41. As a direct and proximate result of Equifax's wrongful actions and inaction and the resulting Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class members have been placed at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm from identity theft and identity fraud, requiring them to take the time which they otherwise would have dedicated to other life demands such as work and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives including, inter alia, by placing "freezes" and "alerts" with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for

unauthorized activity, and filing police reports. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured. In all manners of life in this country, time has constantly been recognized as compensable, for many consumers it is the way they are compensated, and even if retired from the work force, consumers should be free of having to deal with the consequences of a credit reporting agency's slippage, as is the case here.

- 42. Equifax's wrongful actions and inaction directly and proximately caused the theft and dissemination into the public domain of Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII, causing them to suffer, and continue to suffer, economic damages and other actual harm for which they are entitled to compensation, including:
 - a. theft of their personal and financial information;
 - b. unauthorized charges on their debit and credit card accounts;
 - c. the imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential fraud and identity theft posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals and already misused via the sale of Plaintiffs' and Class members' information on the black market;
 - d. the untimely and inadequate notification of the Data Breach;
 - e. the improper disclosure of their PII;
 - f. loss of privacy;
 - g. ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data Breach;
 - h. ascertainable losses in the form of deprivation of the value of their PII and PCD, for which there is a well-established national and international market;

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- ascertainable losses in the form of the loss of cash back or other benefits as a result of their inability to use certain accounts and cards affected by the Data Breach;
- j. loss of use of and access to their account funds and costs associated with the inability to obtain money from their accounts or being limited in the amount of money they were permitted to obtain from their accounts, including missed payments on bills and loans, late charges and fees, and adverse effects on their credit including adverse credit notations; and,
- k. the loss of productivity and value of their time spent to address attempt to ameliorate, mitigate and deal with the actual and future consequences of the data breach, including finding fraudulent charges, cancelling and reissuing cards, purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft protection services, imposition of withdrawal and purchase limits on compromised accounts, and the stress, nuisance and annoyance of dealing with all such issues resulting from the Data Breach.
- 43. Plaintiffs and Class members are left to their own actions to protect themselves from the financial damage Equifax has allowed to occur. The additional cost of adequate and appropriate coverage, or insurance, against the losses and exposure that Equifax's actions have created for Plaintiffs and Class members, is ascertainable and is a determination appropriate for the trier of fact. Equifax has also not offered to cover any of the damages sustained by Plaintiffs or Class members.
- 44. While the PII of Plaintiffs and members of the Class has been stolen, Equifax continues to hold PII of consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class members. Particularly because Equifax and has demonstrated an inability to prevent a breach or stop it from continuing even after being detected, Plaintiffs

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and members of the Class have an undeniable interest in insuring that their PII is secure, remains secure, is properly and promptly destroyed and is not subject to further theft.

CHOICE OF LAW

- 45. Georgia, which seeks to protect the rights and interests of Georgia and other U.S. residents against a company doing business in Georgia, has a greater interest in the claims of Plaintiffs and the Class members than any other state and is most intimately concerned with the claims and outcome of this litigation.
- 46. The principal place of business of Equifax, located at 1550 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309, is the "nerve center" of its business activities – the place where its high-level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities, including its data security, and where: a) major policy, b) advertising, c) distribution, d) accounts receivable departments and e) financial and legal decisions originate.
- 47. Equifax's response to, and corporate decisions surrounding such response to, the Data Breach were made from and in Georgia.
- 48. Equifax's breach of its duty to customers, and Plaintiffs, emanated from Georgia.
- 49. Application of Georgia law to a nationwide Class with respect to Plaintiffs' and the Class members' claims is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair because Georgia has significant contacts and a significant aggregation of contacts that create a state interest in the claims of the Plaintiffs and the nationwide Class.
- Further, under Georgia's choice of law principles, which are 50. applicable to this action, the common law of Georgia will apply to the common law claims of all Class members.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

51. Plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of themselves and as representatives of all others who are similarly situated. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4), Plaintiffs seek certification of a Nationwide class defined as follows:

All persons residing in the United States whose personally identifiable information was acquired by unauthorized persons in the data breach announced by Equifax in September 2017 (the "Nationwide Class").

52. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and in the alternative to claims asserted on behalf of the Nationwide Class, Plaintiffs assert claims under the laws of California, and on behalf of a separate statewide class, defined as follows:

All persons residing in California whose personally identifiable information was acquired by unauthorized persons in the data breach announced by Equifax in September 2017 (the "Statewide Classes").

- 53. Excluded from each of the above Classes are Equifax and any of its affiliates, parents or subsidiaries; all employees of Equifax; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; government entities; and the judges to whom this case is assigned and their immediate family and court staff.
- 54. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the class definition with greater specificity or division after having had an opportunity to conduct discovery.
- 55. Each of the proposed Classes meets the criteria for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), b)(2), b)(3) and (c)(4).
- 56. **Numerosity**. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Consistent with Rule 23(a)(1), the members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that the joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, the proposed Class include at least 143 million individuals whose PII was compromised in the Equifax Data Breach. Class

members may be identified through objective means. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, internet postings, and/or published notice.

- 57. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and with 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, this action involves common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members. The common questions include:
 - Whether Equifax had a duty to protect PII; a.
 - b. Whether Equifax knew or should have known of the susceptibility of their data security systems to a data breach;
 - c. Whether Equifax's security measures to protect their systems were reasonable in light of the measures recommended by data security experts;
 - d. Whether Equifax was negligent in failing to implement reasonable and adequate security procedures and practices;
 - Whether Equifax's failure to implement adequate data e. security measures allowed the breach to occur;
 - f. conduct constituted deceptive Whether Equifax's trade practices under Georgia law;
 - Whether Equifax's conduct, including their failure to act, g. resulted in or was the proximate cause of the breach of its systems, resulting in the loss of the PII of Plaintiffs and Class members:
 - h. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members were injured and suffered damages or other acceptable losses because of Equifax's failure to reasonably protect its POS systems and data network; and,

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- i. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to relief.
- 58. **Typicality**. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of other Class members. Plaintiffs had their PII compromised in the Data Breach. Plaintiffs' damages and injuries are akin to other Class members and Plaintiffs seek relief consistent with the relief of the Class.
- 59. **Adequacy**. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because Plaintiffs are members of the Class and are committed to pursuing this matter against Equifax to obtain relief for the Class. Plaintiffs have no conflicts of interest with the Class. Plaintiffs' Counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions, including privacy litigation. Plaintiffs intend to vigorously prosecute this case and will fairly and adequately protect the Class' interests.
- 60. **Superiority**. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The quintessential purpose of the class action mechanism is to permit litigation against wrongdoers even when damages to individual Plaintiffs may not be sufficient to justify individual litigation. Here, the damages suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class are relatively small compared to the burden and expense required to individually litigate their claims against Equifax, and thus, individual litigation to redress Equifax's wrongful conduct would be impracticable. Individual litigation by each Class member would also strain the court system. Individual litigation creates the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single

adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

- 61. **Injunctive and Declaratory Relief**. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (c). Defendant, through its uniform conduct, has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the Class as a whole.
- 62. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for certification because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Whether Equifax failed to timely notify the public of the Breach;
 - b. Whether Equifax owed a legal duty to Plaintiffs and the Class to exercise due care in collecting, storing, and safeguarding their PII;
 - c. Whether Equifax's security measures were reasonable in light of data security recommendations, and other measures recommended by data security experts;
 - d. Whether Equifax failed to adequately comply with industry standards amounting to negligence;
 - e. Whether Defendant failed to take commercially reasonable steps to safeguard the PII of Plaintiffs and the Class members; and,
 - f. Whether adherence to data security recommendations, and measures recommended by data security experts would have reasonably prevented the Data Breach.

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63. members of the proposed Classes are readily all ascertainable. Equifax has access to information regarding the Data Breach, the time period of the Data Breach, and which individuals were potentially affected. Using this information, the members of the Class can be identified and their contact information ascertained for purposes of providing notice to the Class.

COUNT I

(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS)

- 64. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 63 as if fully set forth herein.
- Upon accepting and storing the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members 65. in its computer systems and on its networks, Equifax undertook and owed a duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to exercise reasonable care to secure and safeguard that information and to use commercially reasonable methods to do so. Equifax knew that the PII was private and confidential and should be protected as private and confidential.
- Equifax owed a duty of care not to subject Plaintiffs, along with their 66. PII, and Class members to an unreasonable risk of harm because they were foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate security practices.
- Equifax owed numerous duties to Plaintiffs and to members of the 67. Nationwide Class, including the following:
 - to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, retaining, securing, safeguarding, deleting and protecting PII in its possession;
 - to protect PII using reasonable and adequate security b. procedures and systems that are compliant with industrystandard practices; and
 - to implement processes to quickly detect a data breach and to c. timely act on warnings about data breaches.

- 68. Equifax also breached its duty to Plaintiffs and the Class Members to adequately protect and safeguard PII by knowingly disregarding standard information security principles, despite obvious risks, and by allowing unmonitored and unrestricted access to unsecured PII. Furthering their dilatory practices, Equifax failed to provide adequate supervision and oversight of the PII with which they were and are entrusted, in spite of the known risk and foreseeable likelihood of breach and misuse, which permitted an unknown third party to gather PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members, misuse the PII and intentionally disclose it to others without consent.
- 69. Equifax knew, or should have known, of the risks inherent in collecting and storing PII, the vulnerabilities of its data security systems, and the importance of adequate security. Equifax knew about numerous, well-publicized data breaches, including the breach at Experian.
- 70. Equifax knew, or should have known, that their data systems and networks did not adequately safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII.
- 71. Equifax breached its duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
- 72. Because Equifax knew that a breach of its systems would damage millions of individuals, including Plaintiffs and Class members, Equifax had a duty to adequately protect their data systems and the PII contained thereon.
- 73. Equifax had a special relationship with Plaintiffs and Class members. Plaintiffs' and Class members' willingness to entrust Equifax with their PII was predicated on the understanding that Equifax would take adequate security precautions. Moreover, only Equifax had the ability to protect its systems and the PII it stored on them from attack.
- 74. Equifax's own conduct also created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiffs and Class members and their PII. Equifax's misconduct included failing

to: (1) secure its systems, despite knowing their vulnerabilities, (2) comply with

industry standard security practices, (3) implement adequate system and event

monitoring, and (4) implement the systems, policies, and procedures necessary to prevent this type of data breach.

75. Equifax also had independent duties under state and federal laws that required Equifax to reasonably safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class members' Personal Information and promptly notify them about the data breach.

- 76. Equifax breached its duties to Plaintiffs and Class members in numerous ways, including:
 - a. by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard PII of Plaintiffs and Class members;
 - b. by creating a foreseeable risk of harm through the misconduct previously described;
 - by failing to implement adequate security systems,
 protocols and practices sufficient to protect Plaintiffs' and
 Class members' PII both before and after learning of the Data
 Breach;
 - d. by failing to comply with the minimum industry data security standards during the period of the Data Breach; and,
 - e. by failing to timely and accurately disclose that Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII had been improperly acquired or accessed.
- 77. Through Equifax's acts and omissions described in this Complaint, including Equifax's failure to provide adequate security and its failure to protect PII of Plaintiffs and Class members from being foreseeably captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen and misused, Equifax unlawfully breached its duty to use reasonable care to adequately protect and secure PII of Plaintiffs and Class members during the time it was within Equifax possession or control.

78. The law further imposes an affirmative duty on Equifax to timely disclose the unauthorized access and theft of the PII to Plaintiffs and the Class so that Plaintiffs and Class members can take appropriate measures to mitigate damages, protect against adverse consequences, and thwart future misuse of their PII.

- 79. Equifax breached its duty to notify Plaintiffs and Class Members of the unauthorized access by waiting many months after learning of the breach to notify Plaintiffs and Class Members and then by failing to provide Plaintiffs and Class Members information regarding the breach until September 2017. Instead, its executives disposed of at least \$1.8 million worth of shares in the company after Equifax learned of the data breach but before it was publicly announced. To date, Equifax has not provided sufficient information to Plaintiffs and Class Members regarding the extent of the unauthorized access and continues to breach its disclosure obligations to Plaintiffs and the Class.
- 80. Through Equifax's acts and omissions described in this Complaint, including Equifax's failure to provide adequate security and its failure to protect PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members from being foreseeably captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen and misused, Equifax unlawfully breached its duty to use reasonable care to adequately protect and secure PII of Plaintiffs and Class members during the time it was within Equifax's possession or control.
- 81. Further, through its failure to provide timely and clear notification of the Data Breach to consumers, Equifax prevented Plaintiffs and Class Members from taking meaningful, proactive steps to secure their financial data and bank accounts.
- 82. Upon information and belief, Equifax improperly and inadequately safeguarded PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members in deviation of standard industry rules, regulations, and practices at the time of the unauthorized access. Equifax's failure to take proper security measures to protect sensitive PII of Plaintiffs and

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Class members as described in this Complaint, created conditions conducive to a foreseeable, intentional criminal act, namely the unauthorized access of PII of Plaintiffs and Class members.

- 83. Equifax's conduct was grossly negligent and departed from all reasonable standards of care, including, but not limited to: failing to adequately protect the PII; failing to conduct regular security audits; failing to provide adequate and appropriate supervision of persons having access to PII of Plaintiffs and Class members; and failing to provide Plaintiffs and Class members with timely and sufficient notice that their sensitive PII had been compromised.
- 84. Neither Plaintiffs nor the other Class members contributed to the Data Breach and subsequent misuse of their PII as described in this Complaint.
- As a direct and proximate cause of Equifax's conduct, Plaintiffs and 85. the Class suffered damages including, but not limited to: damages arising from the unauthorized charges on their debit or credit cards or on cards that were fraudulently obtained through the use of the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members; damages arising from Plaintiffs' inability to use their debit or credit cards because those cards were cancelled, suspended, or otherwise rendered unusable as a result of the Data Breach and/or false or fraudulent charges stemming from the Data Breach, including but not limited to late fees charges and foregone cash back rewards; damages from lost time and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives including, inter alia, by placing "freezes" and "alerts" with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity, and filing police reports and damages from identity theft, which may take months if not years to discover and detect, given the far-reaching, adverse and detrimental consequences of identity theft and loss of privacy. The nature of other forms of economic damage and injury may take years to detect, and the potential scope can only be assessed after

a thorough investigation of the facts and events surrounding the theft mentioned above.

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NEGLIGENCE PER SE (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS)

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negligence per se.

86. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 63 as if fully set forth herein.

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affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as Equifax, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII. The FTC publications and orders described above also

form part of the basis of Equifax's duty in this regard.

Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair . . . practices in or

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88. Equifax violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII and not complying with applicable industry standards, as described in detail herein. Equifax's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII it obtained and stored, and the foreseeable consequences of a data breach at a corporation such as Equifax, including, specifically, the immense damages that would result to Plaintiffs and

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Class Members.

89. Equifax's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act constitutes

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90. Plaintiffs and Class Members are within the class of persons that the FTC Act was intended to protect.

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91. The harm that occurred as a result of the Equifax Data Breach is the type of harm the FTC Act was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class.

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92. As a direct and proximate result of Equifax's negligence per se, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered, and continue to suffer, injuries damages arising from Plaintiffs' inability to use their debit or credit cards because those cards were cancelled, suspended, or otherwise rendered unusable as a result of the Data Breach and/or false or fraudulent charges stemming from the Data Breach, including but not limited to late fees charges and foregone cash back rewards; damages from lost time and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives including, inter alia, by placing "freezes" and "alerts" with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity, and filing police reports and damages from identity theft, which may take months if not years to discover and detect, given the far-reaching, adverse and detrimental consequences of identity theft and loss of privacy.

COUNT III WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT ("FCRA") (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS AND THE

CALIFORNIA CLASS)

- 93. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 65 as if fully set forth here.
- 94. As individuals, Plaintiffs and Class members are consumers entitled to the protections of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).
- 95. Under the FCRA, a "consumer reporting agency" is defined as "any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties" 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).

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- 96. Equifax is a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA because, for monetary fees, it regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.
- 97. As a consumer reporting agency, the FCRA requires Equifax to "maintain reasonable procedures designed to . . . limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 1681b of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).
- 98. Under the FCRA, a "consumer report" is defined as "any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for -- (A) credit . . . to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; . . . or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). The compromised data was a consumer report under the **FCRA** because it was a communication of information bearing on Class members' credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living used, or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part, for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the Class members' eligibility for credit.
- 99. As a consumer reporting agency, Equifax may only furnish a consumer report under the limited circumstances set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, "and no other." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). None of the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b permit credit reporting agencies to furnish consumer reports to unauthorized or unknown entities, or computer hackers such as those who accessed the Nationwide Class members' PII. Equifax violated § 1681b by

furnishing consumer reports to unauthorized or unknown entities or computer hackers, as detailed above.

- 100. Equifax furnished the Nationwide Class members' consumer reports by disclosing their consumer reports to unauthorized entities and computer hackers; allowing unauthorized entities and computer hackers to access their consumer reports; knowingly and/or recklessly failing to take security measures that would prevent unauthorized entities or computer hackers from accessing their consumer reports; and/or failing to take reasonable security measures that would prevent unauthorized entities or computer hackers from accessing their consumer reports.
- 101. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has pursued enforcement actions against consumer reporting agencies under the FCRA for failing to "take adequate measures to fulfill their obligations to protect information contained in consumer reports, as required by the" FCRA, in connection with data breaches.
- 102. Equifax willfully and/or recklessly violated § 1681b and § 1681e(a) by providing impermissible access to consumer reports and by failing to maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes outlined under section 1681b of the FCRA. The willful and reckless nature of Equifax's violations is supported by, among other things, former employees' admissions that Equifax's data security practices have deteriorated in recent years, and Equifax's numerous other data breaches in the past. Further, Equifax touts itself as an industry leader in breach prevention; thus, Equifax was well aware of the importance of the measures organizations should take to prevent data breaches, and willingly failed to take them.
- 103. Equifax also acted willfully and recklessly because it knew or should have known about its legal obligations regarding data security and data breaches under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission. See, e.g.,

55 Fed. Reg. 18804 (May 4, 1990), 1990 Commentary On The Fair Credit Reporting Act. 16 C.F.R. Part 600, Appendix To Part 600, Sec. 607 2E. Equifax obtained or had available these and other substantial written materials that apprised them of their duties under the FCRA. Any reasonable consumer reporting agency knows or should know about these requirements. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Equifax acted consciously in breaching known duties regarding data security and data breaches and depriving Plaintiffs and other members of the classes of their rights under the FCRA.

- 104. Equifax's willful and/or reckless conduct provided a means for unauthorized intruders to obtain and misuse Plaintiffs' and Nationwide Class members' personal information for no permissible purposes under the FCRA.
- 105. Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class members have been damaged by Equifax's willful or reckless failure to comply with the FCRA. Therefore, Plaintiffs and each of the Nationwide Class members are entitled to recover "any actual damages sustained by the consumer . . . or damages of not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000." 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
- 106. Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class members are also entitled to punitive damages, costs of the action, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2) & (3).

COUNT IV NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS)

- 107. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 65 as if fully set forth herein.
- 108. Equifax was negligent in failing to maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes outlined under section 1681b of the FCRA. Equifax's negligent failure to maintain reasonable

procedures is supported by, among other things, former employees' admissions that Equifax's data security practices have deteriorated in recent years, and Equifax's numerous other data breaches in the past. Further, as an enterprise claiming to be an industry leader in data breach prevention, Equifax was well aware of the importance of the measures organizations should take to prevent data breaches, yet failed to take them.

- 109. Equifax's negligent conduct provided a means for unauthorized intruders to obtain Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide Class members' PII and consumer reports for no permissible purposes under the FCRA.
- 110. Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class member have been damaged by Equifax's negligent failure to comply with the FCRA. Therefore, Plaintiffs and each of the Nationwide Class members are entitled to recover "any actual damages sustained by the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1).
- 111. Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class members are also entitled to recover their costs of the action, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a)(2).

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS)

- 112. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
- 113. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." For the reasons discussed above, Equifax violated (and continues to violate) California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq., by engaging in the unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, deceptive, untrue, and misleading acts and practices.

- 114. Equifax's unfair and fraudulent acts and practices include but are not limited to the following:
 - a. Equifax failed to enact adequate privacy and security measures, in California, to protect the Class members' PII from unauthorized disclosure, release, data breaches, and theft, in violation of industry standards and best practices, which was a direct and proximate cause of the Data Breach;
 - b. Equifax failed to take proper action, in California, following known security risks and prior cybersecurity incidents, which was a direct and proximate cause of the Data Breach;
 - c. Equifax knowingly and fraudulently misrepresented, in California, that they would maintain adequate data privacy and security practices and procedures to safeguard Class members' PII from unauthorized disclosure, release, data breaches, and theft;
 - d. Equifax knowingly and fraudulently misrepresented that it did and would comply with the requirements of relevant federal and state laws pertaining to the privacy and security of Class members' PII;
 - e. Equifax knowingly omitted, suppressed, and concealed the inadequacy of its privacy and security protections for Class members' PII;
 - f. Equifax failed to maintain reasonable security, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5; and
 - g. Equifax failed to disclose the Data Breach to Class members in a timely and accurate manner, in violation of the duties imposed by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 et seq.

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115. Equifax's acts and practices also constitute "unfair" business acts and practices, in that the harm caused by Equifax's wrongful conduct outweighs any utility of such conduct, and such conduct (i) offends public policy, (ii) is immoral, unscrupulous, unethical, oppressive, deceitful and offensive, and/or (iii) has caused and will continue to cause substantial injury to consumers such as Plaintiffs and the Class.

116. Equifax's acts and practices also constitute "unlawful" business acts and practices by virtue of their violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e (as described fully above), the GLBA, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (as described fully above), California's fraud and deceit statutes, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1572, 1573, 1709, 1711; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., 17500, et seq., the California Customer Records' Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80, et seq. (as described fully below), and California common law.

117. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Equifax's legitimate business interests, including using best practices to protect Class members' PII, other than Equifax's wrongful conduct described herein.

118. As a direct and/or proximate result of Equifax's unfair practices, Plaintiffs and the California Subclass have suffered injury in fact in connection with the Data Breach, including but not limited to time and expenses related to monitoring their financial accounts for fraudulent activity, an increased, imminent risk of fraud and identity theft, and loss of value of their PII. As a result, Plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to compensation, restitution, disgorgement, and/or other equitable relief. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203.

119. Equifax knew or should have known that its data security practices and infrastructure were inadequate to safeguard Class members' PII, and that the risk of a data breach or theft was highly likely. Defendants'

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actions in engaging in the above named unfair practices and deceptive acts were negligent, knowing and willful, and/or wanton and reckless with respect to Class members' rights.

- 120. On information and belief, Equifax's unlawful and unfair business practices, except as otherwise indicated herein, continue to this day and are ongoing.
- 121. Plaintiffs and other Class members also are entitled to injunctive relief, under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17203, 17204, to stop Equifax's wrongful acts and to require Equifax to maintain adequate security measures to protect the personal and financial information in its possession.
- 122. Under Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., Plaintiffs seek restitution of money or property that the Defendants may have acquired by means of Defendants' deceptive, unlawful, and unfair business practices (to be proven at trial), restitutionary disgorgement of all profits accruing to Defendants because of their unlawful and unfair business practices (to be proven at trial), declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs (allowed by Cal. Code Civil Pro. §1021.5).

VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CUSTOMER RECORDS ACT Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq. (ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA SUBCLASS)

- 123. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
- 124. "[T]o ensure that personal information about California residents is protected," Civil Code § 1798.81.5 requires any "business that owns, licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident [to] implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of

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the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure."

- 125. Equifax owns, maintains, and licenses personal information, within the meaning of § 1798.81.5, about Plaintiffs and the California Subclass.
- Equifax violated Civil Code § 1798.81.5 by failing to implement reasonable measures to protect Class members' PII.
- 127. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of section 1798.81.5 of the California Civil Code, the Data Breach described above occurred.
- 128. In addition, California Civil Code § 1798.82(a) provides that "[a] person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay "
- 129. Section 1798.2(b) provides that "[a] person or business that maintains computerized data that includes personal information that the person or business does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of the breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person."
- 130. Equifax is a business that owns or licenses computerized data that include personal information as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80 et seq.
- In the alternative, Equifax maintains computerized data that includes personal information that Equifax does not own as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80 et seq.
 - Plaintiffs and the California Subclass members' PII (including but not

limited to names, addresses, and Social Security numbers) includes personal information covered by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(d)(1).

- 133. Because Equifax reasonably believed that Plaintiffs and the California Subclass members' personal information was acquired by unauthorized persons during the Data Breach, it had an obligation to disclose the Data Breach in a timely and accurate fashion under Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a), or in the alternative, under Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(b).
- 134. By failing to disclose the Data Breach in a timely and accurate manner, Equifax violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82.
- 135. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of sections 1798.81.5 and 1798.82 of the California Civil Code, Plaintiffs and the California Subclass Members suffered the damages described above, including but not limited to time and expenses related to monitoring their financial accounts for fraudulent activity, an increased, imminent risk of fraud and identity theft, and loss of value of their PII.
- 136. Plaintiffs and the California Subclass seek relief under § 1798.84 of the California Civil Code, including, but not limited to, actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial, and injunctive relief.

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REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all Class members proposed in this Complaint, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in their favor and against Equifax as follows:

- a. For an Order certifying the Classes, as defined herein, and appointing Plaintiffs and his Counsel to represent the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative a California Class;
- b. For equitable relief enjoining Equifax from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete and accurate disclosures to the Plaintiffs and Class members;
- c. For equitable relief compelling Equifax to use appropriate cyber security methods and policies with respect to consumer data collection, storage and protection and to disclose with specificity to Class members the type of PII compromised;
- d. For an award of damages, as allowed by law in an amount to be determined;
- e. For an award of attorneys' fees costs and litigation expenses, as allowable by law;
- f. For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; and
- g. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.

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1	JURY TRIAL DEMAND			
2	Plaintiffs demand a jury trial.			
3	DATED: September 19, 2017	GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.		
4		Dry g/Igmag Pohant Noblin		
5		By: <u>s/James Robert Noblin</u> James Robert Noblin		
6		4500 East Pacific Coast Highway		
7		Fourth Floor Long Beach, CA 90804		
8 9		Telephone: (562) 391-2487 Facsimile: (415) 477-6710		
10		Email: gnecf@classcounsel.com		
11		Robert S. Green (SBN 136183) GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.		
12		2200 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 101		
13		Larkspur, CA 94939 Telephone: (415) 477-6700 Facsimile: (415) 477-6710		
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15		Carin L. Marcussen Joshua D. Wells		
16 17		FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD 10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue		
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21		jdw@federmanlaw.com		
22		Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class		
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- 1	I .			

Case 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUNT) CENTRAL DISTRICT POF WALTFORNOGE 1 of 3 CIVIL COVER SHEET

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS (Che	ck box if you are repre	esenting yourself [)	DEFENDANTS	(Check box if you are re	presenting yourself [])			
Sarah Hamilton, Jesse Hamilt behalf of all others similarly s		ntagne, individually and	on Equifax, Inc.		_			
(b) County of Residence	e of First Listed Plain	tiff Los Angeles	County of Reside	ence of First Listed Defer	ndant			
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASI	ES)		(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CAS	(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)				
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name representing yourself, pro James Robert Noblin (State E GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C. 4500 East Pacific Coast High Long Beach, CA 90804 Tel: (5	vide the same informa Bar No. 114442) Email: gn way, 4th Floor	ation.		Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are representing yourself, provide the same information.				
II. BASIS OF JURISDIC		ne box onlv.)	III. CITIZENSHIP OF PR	RINCIPAL PARTIES-For D	Diversity Cases Only			
	of Parties in lin one box only.) emoved from 3. Re	Not a Party) ndicate Citizenship tem III) manded from 4. Rei	(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant) PTF DEF Citizen of This State 1 1 1 Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in this State Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place of Business in Another State					
V. REQUESTED IN COM		•	pened District (No (Check "Yes" o	nly if demanded in com				
CLASS ACTION under	F.R.Cv.P. 23: 🔀	res No	⋈ MONEY DEMA	ANDED IN COMPLAINT:	\$ Subject to Proof			
28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), claims	for loss of personal data	by credit reporting agenc		nt of cause. Do not cite jurisdi	ctional statutes unless diversity.)			
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (
OTHER STATUTES	CONTRACT 110 Insurance	REAL PROPERTY CONT 240 Torts to Land		PRISONER PETITIONS	PROPERTY RIGHTS			
375 False Claims Act 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) 400 State Reapportionment	120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument	245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property TORTS	462 Naturalization Application 465 Other Immigration Actions TORTS PERSONAL PROPERTY	Habeas Corpus: 463 Alien Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty	820 Copyrights 830 Patent 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application 840 Trademark			
410 Antitrust	150 Recovery of Overpayment &	PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane	370 Other Fraud	Other:	SOCIAL SECURITY			
430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/Etc. 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Org. 480 Consumer Credit	Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loan (Excl. Vet.)	315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Fed. Employers' Liability 340 Marine	□ 371 Truth in Lending □ 380 Other Personal Property Damage □ 385 Property Damage Product Liability ■ 422 Appeal 28	550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition	861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405 (g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405 (g))			
490 Cable/Sat TV 850 Securities/Com-	153 Recovery of Overpayment of	345 Marine Product Liability	USC 158	625 Drug Related	FEDERAL TAX SUITS 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or			
modities/Exchange 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 893 Environmental Matters	Vet. Benefits 160 Stockholders' Suits 190 Other Contract	350 Motor Vehicle 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury 362 Personal Injury	423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 CIVIL RIGHTS 440 Other Civil Rights 441 Voting	Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 690 Other LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards Act	Defendant) 871 IRS-Third Party 26 USC 7609			
895 Freedom of Info.	195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise	Med Malpratice 365 Personal Injury- Product Liability	442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations	720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 740 Railway Labor Act				

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY: Case Number:

Case 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUNT) CENTRAL DISTRICTOR OF 2 of 3 CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII. VENUE: Your answers to the questions below will determine the division of the Court to which this case will be initially assigned. This initial assignment is subject to change, in accordance with the Court's General Orders, upon review by the Court of your Complaint or Notice of Removal.

QUESTION A: Was this case removed from state court?	STATE CASE WAS PENDING IN THE COUNTY OF:				INITIAL DIV	INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD IS:		
Yes X No	Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo				V	Western		
If "no, " skip to Question B. If "yes," check the box to the right that applies, enter the	Orange				So	Southern		
corresponding division in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.	Riverside or San Bernardino				E	Eastern		
QUESTION B: Is the United States, or one of its agencies or employees, a PLAINTIFF in this action?	B.1. Do 50% or more of the defendants the district reside in Orange Co.? <i>check one of the boxes to the right</i>	who res	ide in		case will initially be assigne chern" in response to Quest			
☐ Yes 区 No	check one of the boxes to the right			☐ NO. Contir	nue to Question B.2.	Question B.2.		
If "no, " skip to Question C. If "yes," answer Question B.1, at right.	B.2. Do 50% or more of the defendants who reside in the district reside in Riverside and/or San Bernardino Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)		YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division. Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.					
	check one of the boxes to the right	+			ase will initially be assigned tern" in response to Questi			
QUESTION C: Is the United States, or one of its agencies or employees, a	C.1. Do 50% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the district reside in Orange Co.? check one of the boxes to the right		YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Southern Division. Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue					
DEFENDANT in this action? ☐ Yes ⋈ No			from there. NO. Continue to Question C.2.					
If "no, " skip to Question D. If "yes," answer Question C.1, at right.	C.2. Do 50% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the district reside in Riverside and/or San Bernardino Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)		YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division. Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.					
	check one of the boxes to the right		NO. Your case will initially be assigned to the Western Division. Enter "Western" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.					
QUESTION D: Location of plaintiff	s and defendants?		Oran	A. ge County	B. Riverside or San Bernardino County	C. Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo County		
Indicate the location(s) in which 50% or more of <i>plaintiffs who reside in this di</i> reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these choices apply						\boxtimes		
Indicate the location(s) in which 50% or more of <i>defendants who reside in this district</i> reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these choice apply.)								
D.1. Is there at least one	answer in Column A?			D.2. Is there a	t least one answer in C	Column B?		
Yes X No If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the SOUTHERN DIVISION. Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there. If "no," go to question D2 to the right.			☐ Yes ⊠ No					
			If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the					
			EASTERN DIVISION. Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below. If "no," your case will be assigned to the WESTERN DIVISION.					
								ir "no," go to question
QUESTION E: Initial Division?				INI	TIAL DIVISION IN CACD			
Enter the initial division determined by C	Question A, B, C, or D above:	WEST	ERN			▼		
QUESTION F: Northern Counties?								
Do 50% or more of plaintiffs or defendar	nts in this district reside in Ventura, Sa	anta Ba	rbara, c	or San Luis Obis	po counties?	Yes 🔀 No		

CV-71 (05/17) CIVIL COVER SHEET Page 2 of 3

Case 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUNT) CENTRAL DISTRICTED STATES DISTRICTED AND 3 OF 3 CIVIL COVER SHEET

IX(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court?		× NO	YES					
If yes, list case number(s):								
IX(b). RELATED CASES : Is this case related (as defined below) to any civil or criminal case(s) previous	viously filed in this cou	urt?	× YES					
If yes, list case number(s): 8:17-cv-01561-JAK(KSx)								
Civil cases are related when they (check all that apply):								
igigigig B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of	of law and fact; or							
 								
Note: That cases may involve the same patent, trademark, or copyright is not, in itself, suffic	ient to deem cases rela	ated.						
A civil forfeiture case and a criminal case are related when they (check all that apply):								
A. Arise from the same or a closely related transaction, happening, or event;								
B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of	of law and fact; or							
C. Involve one or more defendants from the criminal case in common and would a labor if heard by different judges.	entail substantial dupl	ication of						
X. SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (OR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT): s/ James Robert Noblin	DATE: <u></u>	September	19, 2017					
Notice to Counsel/Parties: The submission of this Civil Cover Sheet is required by Local Rule 3-1. The neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by more detailed instructions, see separate instruction sheet (CV-071A).								
Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:								

Nature of Suit Code	Abbreviation HIA	Substantive Statement of Cause of Action All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program.
862	BL	(42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b)) All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C. 923)
863	DIWC	All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405 (g))
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405 (g))
864	SSID	All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security Act, as amended.
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405 (g))

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