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11		DISTRICT COLUMN
12		DISTRICT COURT
13	DISTRICT O	OF ARIZONA
14	Samantha Sanders, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	No.
15	Samantha Sanders, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,	No.  COMPLAINT
15 16	behalf of all others similarly situated,	
15 16 17	behalf of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an	
15 16 17 18	behalf of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a	
15 16 17 18 19	behalf of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company;	
15 16 17 18 19 20	Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A	
15 16 17 18 19	Plaintiffs,  V.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply	
15 16 17 18 19 20	Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc., a Minnesota Corporation; Factory Motor Parts International,	
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc., a Minnesota Corporation; Factory Motor Parts International, LLC, a Minnesota Limited Liability Company; The Bon Air Trust, a Nevada	
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Plaintiffs,  V.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc., a Minnesota Corporation; Factory Motor Parts International, LLC, a Minnesota Limited Liability Company; The Bon Air Trust, a Nevada Trust; Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge, a Married Couple; and Elliot Badzin and	
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Plaintiffs,  v.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc., a Minnesota Corporation; Factory Motor Parts International, LLC, a Minnesota Limited Liability Company; The Bon Air Trust, a Nevada Trust; Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge, a Married Couple; and Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin, a Married Couple,	
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Plaintiffs,  V.  Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc., a Minnesota Corporation; Factory Motor Parts International, LLC, a Minnesota Limited Liability Company; The Bon Air Trust, a Nevada Trust; Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge, a Married Couple; and Elliot Badzin and	

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Plaintiff, Samantha Sanders ("Plaintiff" or "Sanders"), individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, allege as follows:

#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated current and former Couriers/Warehouse Workers<sup>1</sup> of Defendants Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC ("Defendant Tristate Arizona"); Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC ("Defendant Tristate Nevada"); Tristate Logistics, LLC ("Defendant Tristate"); C&A Holdings, LLC ("Defendant C&A") (each aforementioned entity may also be referred to collectively as "Tristate Logistics"); Elliot Auto Supply, Inc. ("Defendants Elliot Auto Supply"); Factory Motor Parts International, LLC ("Defendant Factory Motor Parts International") (both Elliot Auto Supply, Inc. and Factory Motor Parts International, LLC are may be referred to collectively as "Factory Motor Parts"); The Bon Air Trust ("Defendant Bon Air"); Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge; and Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin (all Defendants may be referred to collectively as "Defendants") who were compensated at a straight-time rate for all hours worked, regardless of whether those hours exceeded 40 in any given workweek.

For the purposes of this Complaint, "Couriers/Warehouse Workers" is exclusively a job title used for the purpose of classifying the putative class of similarly situated individuals, is not necessarily the job title of Plaintiffs and putative class, and has no bearing or relation to any specialization, skill, education, training, or other qualification that might otherwise be associated with such a job title.

	2.	Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, brings
this	action ag	gainst Defendants for their unlawful failure to pay overtime in violation of
the I	Fair Lab	or Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (the "FLSA").

- 3. Plaintiff brings a collective action under the FLSA to recover the unpaid overtime owed to her individually and on behalf of all other similarly-situated employees, current and former, of Defendants. Members of the Collective Action are referred to as the "Collective Members."
- 4. The Collective Members are all current and former Couriers/Warehouse Workers who were employed by Defendants at any time.
- 5. This is an action for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs under the FLSA.
- 6. The FLSA was enacted "to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours." Under the FLSA, employers must pay all non-exempt employees an overtime premium for all time spent working in excess of 40 hours per week.
- 7. Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of misclassifying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers as independent contractors rather than employees. Specifically, Defendants subjected Plaintiff and the Collective Members to their policy and practice of misclassifying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, who were employees, as independent contractors and then failing and/or refusing to pay them overtime for time they worked in excess of 40 hours per week, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).

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8.	Therefore, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff or the Collective Members the
applicable ov	vertime rate, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207.

#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

- 9. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
- 10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. because this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
- 11. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because acts giving rise to the claims of Plaintiff and the Collective Members occurred within the District of Arizona, and Defendants regularly conduct business in and have engaged in the conduct alleged in the Complaint – and, thus, are subject to personal jurisdiction in – this judicial district.

#### **PARTIES**

- 12. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
- 13. At all times material to the matters alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiff was an individual residing in Maricopa County, Arizona, and is a former employee of Defendants.
- 14. At all material times, Plaintiff was a full-time, non-exempt employee of Defendants from approximately April 1, 2016 through approximately September 30, 2017.

15.	Throughout Plaintiff's entire employment, she was paid approximately \$96
per day, rega	rdless of the number of hours she worked for Defendants.

- and paid as an independent contractor. The Tristate Logistics Defendants employed Plaintiff to perform automobile parts delivery-related duties, which generally consisted of, but were not limited to transporting and delivering automobile parts to and from various local Factory Motor Parts locations to and from entities or individuals who either have or need certain automobile. In addition, the Factory Motor Parts Defendants employed Plaintiff to perform additional duties, such as stocking shelves with items she delivered, retrieving items from shelves for delivery, cleaning the premises (including cleaning restrooms), and other repetitive, unskilled, menial labor assigned at the discretion of Factory Motor Parts.
- 17. At all material times, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) and was a non-exempt employee under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
- 18. Plaintiff has given her written consent to be a party Plaintiff in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), a true and accurate copy of which is attached to this Complaint as "Exhibit A."
- 19. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who are current or former Couriers/Warehouse Workers of Defendants, including but not limited to Couriers/Warehouse Workers who agree in writing to join this action seeking recovery under the FLSA.

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	20.	Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all
other s	similarl	y situated current and former employees of Defendants-specifically,
Courie	ers/Wai	rehouse Workers who were not paid overtime for time worked in excess of
40 hou	ırs in a	ny given workweek and whose wages, therefore, were non-compliant with
the FL	SA.	

- 21. Defendant Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC is an Arizona limited liability company, authorized to do business in the State of Arizona and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- 22. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC owned and operated as Tristate Logistics, an auto parts courier company doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 23. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
- 24. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.

	25.	Defendant Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC is a Nevada limited liability
comp	any, au	thorized to do business in the State of Arizona and was at all relevant times
Plaint	iff's ar	nd the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

- 26. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC owned and operated as Tristate Logistics, an auto parts courier company in Clark County, Nevada.
- 27. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
- 28. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 29. Defendant Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC is a Nevada limited liability company, authorized to do business in the State of Nevada and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- 30. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics, LLC owned and operated as Tristate Logistics, an auto parts courier company in both Clark County, Nevada and Maricopa County, Arizona.

	31.	Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant Tristate Logistics,
LLC	is an e	mployer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly
or in	directly	in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.

- 32. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics, LLC had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Tristate Logistics, LLC is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 33. Defendant C&A Holdings, LLC is a Nevada limited liability company, authorized to do business in the State of Nevada and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- 34. At all relevant times, C&A Holdings, LLC owned and operated as Tristate Logistics, an auto parts courier company in Clark County, Nevada.
- 35. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant C&A Holdings, LLC is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
- 36. At all relevant times, C&A Holdings, LLC had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants.

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As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, C&A
Holdings, LLC is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.

- 37. Defendant Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc. is a Minnesota corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Arizona and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- 38. At all relevant times, Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc. owned and operated as Factory Auto Parts, a company that supplies automobile parts to dealerships, wholesale distributors, and individuals and doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 39. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc. is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
- 40. At all relevant times, Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc. had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Elliot Auto Supply Co., Inc. is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 41. Defendant Factory Motor Parts International, LLC is a Minnesota corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Arizona and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

	42.	At all relevant times, Factory Motor Parts International, LLC owned and
operat	ed as F	Factory Auto Parts, a company that supplies automobile parts to dealerships,
whole	sale di	stributors, and individuals and doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona

- 43. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant Factory Motor Parts International, LLC is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
- 44. At all relevant times, Factory Motor Parts International, LLC had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As a person who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Factory Motor Parts International, LLC is subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 45. Defendant The Bon Air Trust is a Nevada Trust, authorized to do business in the State of Arizona and was at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- 46. At all relevant times, The Bon Air Trust was an owner / manager of Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, which conducts business in Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 47. Under the FLSA, and at all relevant times, Defendant The Bon Air Trust is an employer. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.

48.	Under the FLS	SA, as an own	er or sharehol	der of Tristate	Logistics of
Arizona, LLC	C, The Bon Air	Trust is subje	ct to individu	al liability unde	er the FLSA.

- 49. Defendants Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge are, upon information and belief, husband and wife. They have caused events to take place giving rise to the claims in this Complaint as to which their marital community is fully liable. Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge are owners of Tristate Logistics and were at all relevant times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employer as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
- employers. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge are the owners of Tristate Logistics. They had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As persons who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge are subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 51. Defendants Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin are, upon information and belief, husband and wife. They have caused events to take place giving rise to the claims in this Complaint as to which their marital community is fully liable. Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin are owners of Factory Motor Parts and were at all relevant times

Plaintiff's and the Collective Members'	employer as defined	l by the FLSA	, 29 U.S.C. §
203(d).			

- 52. Under the FLSA, Defendants Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin are employers. The FLSA defines "employer" as any individual who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin are the owners of Factory Motor Parts. They had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants. As persons who acted in the interest of Defendants in relation to their employees, Elliot Badzin and Jane Doe Badzin are subject to individual liability under the FLSA.
- 53. Plaintiff is further informed, believes, and therefore alleges that each of the Defendants gave consent to, ratified, and authorized the acts of all other Defendants, as alleged in this Complaint.
- 54. Defendants, and each of them, are sued in both their individual and corporate capacities.
- 55. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Collective Members.
- 56. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were "employees" of Defendants as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

57.	The provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., apply to
Defendants.	

- 58. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be "employers" as defined by FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
- 59. Defendants individually and/or through an enterprise or agent, directed and exercised control over Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' work and wages at all relevant times.
- 60. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.
- 61. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that had annual gross sales or receipts of at least \$500,000 in 2015.
- 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that had annual gross sales or receipts of at least \$500,000 in 2016.
- 63. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that had annual gross sales or receipts of at least \$500,000 in 2017.
- 64. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that had annual gross sales or receipts of at least \$500,000 in 2018.

66. In addition, at all relevant times, the Tristate Logistics Defendants and the Factory Motor Parts Defendants were vertical joint employers of Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as defined by *Torres-Lopez v. May*, 111 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1997).

#### **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

- 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
- 68. Tristate Logistics own and operate as an enterprise doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona and Clark County Nevada.
- 69. Tristate Logistics is an enterprise that functions as an auto parts courier and whose primary marketplace offering is Couriers/Warehouse Workers who provide auto parts delivery services.
- 70. Factory Motor Parts own and operate as an enterprise doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona and Clark County Nevada.

7	71.	Factory Motor Parts is an enterprise that functions as a supplier of
automo	bile p	arts to dealerships, wholesale distributors, and individuals and whose
primary	/ mark	etplace offering is automobile parts.

- 72. At all relevant times, Tristate Logistics contracts with Factory Motor Parts to provide Factory Motor Parts with Couriers/Warehouse Workers to transport and deliver automobile parts to and from various local Factory Motor Parts locations to and from entities or individuals who either have or need certain automobile parts. In exchange, Factory Motor Parts compensates Tristate Logistics for use of their Couriers/Warehouse Workers.
- 73. On approximately April 1, 2016, Plaintiff began her employment with Defendants as a Courier/Warehouse Worker, performing various repetitive tasks for Tristate Logistics, such as transporting and delivering automobile parts to and from various local Factory Motor Parts locations to and from entities or individuals who either have or need certain automobile. In addition, Plaintiff performed various repetitive tasks within each of the local Factory Motor Parts locations to and from which she transported automobile parts, all at the direction of Factory Motor Parts. Such duties included, but were not limited to, stocking shelves with items she delivered, retrieving items from shelves for delivery, cleaning the premises (including cleaning restrooms), and other repetitive, unskilled, menial labor assigned at the discretion of Factory Motor Parts.
  - 74. At all relevant times, both Tristate Logistics and Factory Motor Parts functioned jointly as Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employers under the FLSA.

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75.	At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were subject to
both Tristate I	Logistics' and Factory Motor Parts' control. Specifically, all
Couriers/Ware	ehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, were
subject to both	Tristate Logistics' and Factory Motor Parts' supervisory and disciplinary
authority; wer	e expected and required to follow rules and guidelines set by both Tristate
Logistics and	Factory Motor Parts; and were trained by Defendants with regard to policy
and procedure	related to working for each entity, respectively.

- Rather than classify their Couriers/Warehouse Workers as employees, 76. Defendants classified them as independent contractors.
- 77. Defendants misclassified all of their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as independent contractors.
- 78. Despite Defendants having misclassified all of their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as independent contractors, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were actually employees, as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
- 79. All of Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, used Defendants' equipment and wore company uniforms.
- 80. Defendants controlled their Couriers/Warehouse Workers' schedules, including those of Plaintiff and the Collective Members.

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81.	At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were
economicall	y dependent on all Defendants, including Tristate Logistics and Factory
Motor Parts.	

- 82. The following further demonstrate that the Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, were employees of Defendants:
  - The work performed by the Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including a. Plaintiff and the Collective Members, was akin to a specialty job on the production line;
  - b. Defendants had the right to hire and fire their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members;
  - c. Responsibility under the contracts between Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, and Defendants passed from one Courier/Warehouse Worker to another without material changes;
  - d. Defendants made the decision not to pay overtime to their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members;
  - Defendants supervised their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including e. Plaintiff and the Collective Members, and subjected them to Defendants' rules;

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f.	Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and
	the Collective Members, had relatively insignificant financial
	investment with Defendants' business;

- Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and g. the Collective Members, had no opportunity for profit or loss in the business;
- h. The work that Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, performed for Defendants was piecework and not work that required initiative, judgment, or foresight;
- i. The services rendered by Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants was integral to Defendants' business;
- Defendants' Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and j. the Collective Members, were hired as permanent employees, working for Defendants for continuous unspecified amounts of time.
- 83. At all relevant times, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff or the Collective Members one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek.
- 84. Defendants classified their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as independent contractors to avoid Defendants' obligation to pay their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the

per week.

1	Collective N	Members, one- and one-half time their regular rates of pay for all hours
2	worked in e	xcess of 40 hours per week.
3	85.	Plaintiff and the Collective Members were non-exempt employees.
4 5	86.	From the beginning of Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment
6		present day, Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the
7	Collective N	Members for any of their overtime hours. During this time, Plaintiff and the
8	Collective N	Members worked approximately between forty-eight (48) and sixty (60) hours

- 87. Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours without being paid an overtime premium in at least one workweek during which they worked for Defendants.
- 88. Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours without being paid an overtime premium in multiple workweeks during which they worked for Defendants.
- 89. Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than 40 hours without being paid an overtime premium in at least one workweek during which they worked for Defendants.
- 90. Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than 40 hours without being paid an overtime premium in multiple workweeks during which they worked for Defendants.
- 91. Plaintiff, in her work for Defendants, was never paid any overtime premium whatsoever for time spent working in excess of 40 hours per week.
- 92. Plaintiff and the Collective Members were generally paid on a daily, flat rate basis.

1	93.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff was not a manager.
2	94.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff did not have supervisory authority
3	over any em	ployees.
4	95.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff did not possess the authority to hire of
5	fire employe	ees.
6 7	96.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff did not possess authority to make
8		
9		ecisions with respect to any of Defendants' employees.
10	97.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff did not direct the work of two or mor
11	employees.	
12	98.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff did not exercise discretion and
13	independent	judgment with respect to matters of significance.
14	99.	In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff's primary duty was not the
15	management	t of the enterprise in which she was employed or any recognized department
16 17	of the enterp	rise.
18	100.	In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were
19		
20	not manager	
21	101.	In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not
22	have supervi	sory authority over any employees.
23	102.	In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not
24	possess the a	authority to hire or fire employees.
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103. In	their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not
possess authorit	ty to make critical job decisions with respect to any of Defendants'
employees.	
104. In	their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not
direct the work	of two or more employees.

- 105. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.
- 106. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' primary duty was not the management of the enterprise in which they were employed or any recognized department of the enterprise.
- 107. From the beginning of Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment through the present day, Defendants failed to properly compensate them for any of their overtime hours.
- 108. Defendants knew that—or acted with reckless disregard as to whether—their refusal or failure to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Members over the course of their employment would violate federal and state law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA overtime wage requirements during Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment. As such, Defendants' conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA.
- 109. Defendants refused and/or failed to properly disclose to or apprise Plaintiff and the Collective Members of their rights under the FLSA.

11	0. Defendants failed to post and keep posted in a conspicuous place the
required p	poster / notice explaining their employee's rights under the FLSA pursuant to 29
C.F.R. § :	516.4.

- 111. Therefore, in a given workweek, and during each and every workweek of Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were subject to Defendants' policy and practice of not paying one-and one-half times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' regular rates of pay.
- 112. In a given workweek, and during each and every workweek of Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than 40 hours but were not paid the applicable one- and one-half times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' regular rates of pay for time they spent working in excess of 40 hours.
- 113. Plaintiff believes and therefore claims that Defendants subjected each and every Courier/Warehouse Worker that they employed, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, to their policy and specific course of not paying one- and one-half times Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' regular rates of pay for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek.
- 114. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are covered employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
- 115. Defendants individually and/or through an enterprise or agent, directed and exercised control over Plaintiff's and Collective Members' work and wages at all relevant times.

116. Due to Defendants' illegal wage practices, Plaintiff and the Collective
Members are entitled to recover from Defendants compensation for unpaid overtime
wages, an additional amount equal amount as liquidated damages, interest, and
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of this action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

#### **COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

- 117. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
- 118. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on her own behalf and as a representative of individuals similarly situated who are current or former Couriers/Warehouse Workers of Defendants.
- 119. At all times material, Defendants paid Plaintiff and the Collective Members a fixed daily compensation.
- 120. Defendants subjected all of their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, to their policy and practice of misclassifying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, who were actually employees, as independent contractors.
  - 121. Defendants subjected all of their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, to their policy and practice of not paying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for time they spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
  - 122. At all times material, Plaintiff and the Collective Members are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay

provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendants' decision, policy, plan, and
common programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules of willfully
subjecting Plaintiff and the Collective Members to their policy and practice of not paying
their Couriers/Warehouse Workers one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for
time they spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek, in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 207(a).

- 123. Plaintiff's claims stated in this complaint are essentially the same as those of the Collective Members. This action is properly maintained as a collective action because in all pertinent aspects the employment relationship of individuals similarly situated to Plaintiff is identical or substantially similar.
- 124. Plaintiff and the Collective Members were each compensated on a fixed daily rate of compensation for the duration of their employment with Defendants.
- 125. The Collective Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff.
- 126. Defendants' failure to pay overtime compensation required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the Collective Members.
- 127. While Plaintiff has described Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' job titles as Couriers/Warehouse Workers, the specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Collective Member does not prevent collective treatment.

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1	128.	All Collective Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements
and job	titles,	are entitled to proper overtime wage compensation for all hours worked in
excess (	of 40	in a given workweek.
1	129.	Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the Collective
Membe	ers, the	e damages for the Collective Members can be easily calculated by a simple

formula. The claims of all Collective Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by the Defendants that caused harm to all of the Collective Members.

As such, Plaintiff brings her FLSA overtime wage claim as a collective action on behalf of the following class:

> The FLSA Collective Members are all of Defendants' current and former Couriers/Warehouse Workers who were not paid one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek.

- 131. Defendants' unlawful conduct, as described in this Collective Action Complaint, is pursuant to Defendants' corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by refusing and/or failing to properly compensate its employees according to the FLSA.
- 132. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that federal law prohibited them from not paying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers-namely, Plaintiff and the Collective Members—an overtime premium wage for time spent working in excess of 40 hours per given workweek.

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133.	Defendants' unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and
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consistent.	

- 134. This action is properly brought and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
- 135. Upon information and belief, the individuals similarly situated to Plaintiff include more than five hundred (500) employees currently and/or formerly employed by Defendants, and Plaintiff is unable to state the precise number of similarly-situated employees because that information is solely in Defendants' possession, custody, or control, but it can be readily ascertained from their employment records and the records of Defendants' payroll processor.
- Notice can be provided to the Collective Members by First Class Mail to the last address known to Defendants, via email at the last known email address known to Defendants, and by text message to the last known telephone number known to Defendants.

### **DAMAGES**

- Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all 137. preceding paragraphs.
- 138. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are entitled to recover overtime compensation for the hours they worked in excess of 40 per given workweek for which they were not paid at the federally mandated one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay.

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139.	Plaintiff and the Collective Members are also entitled to an amount equal	l to
all of their un	npaid wages as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).	

140. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are also entitled to recover their attorneys' fees and costs as required by the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

#### **COUNT ONE: FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT** FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME

- 141. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.
- At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of classifying their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as independent contractors when they were in reality employees as defined by the FLSA.
- At all relevant times, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff or the Collective 143. Members one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek.
- 144. Defendants misclassified their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, as independent contractors to avoid Defendants' obligation to pay their Couriers/Warehouse Workers, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, one- and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.
- Defendants engaged in such conduct in direct violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).

146. As such, unpaid overtime wages for such time Plaintiff and the Collective
Members worked in excess of 40 hours per given workweek is owed to Plaintiff and the
Collective Members for the entire time they were employed by Defendants.
147. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether –
their refusal or failure to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Members over
the course of their employment would violate federal and state law, and Defendants were
aware of the FLSA overtime wage requirements during Plaintiff's and the Collective
Members' employment. As such, Defendants' conduct constitutes a willful violation of
the FLSA.

148. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are therefore entitled to compensation for their unpaid overtime wages at an hourly rate, to be proven at trial, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, together with interest, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Samantha Sanders, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons, requests that this Court grant the following relief in Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' favor, and against Defendants:

- A. For the Court to declare and find that the Defendants committed one or more of the following acts:
  - i. violated overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by failing to pay proper overtime wages;
  - ii. willfully violated overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207;

В.	For the Court to award damages in the amounts of all unpaid overtime
	compensation due and owing to Plaintiff and the Collective Members for
	time they spent working in excess of 40 hours per given workweek;

- C. For the Court to award compensatory damages, including liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in amounts to be determined at trial;
- D. For the Court to award prejudgment and post-judgment interest on any damages awarded;
- E. For the Court to award Plaintiff's and the Collective Members' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and all other causes of action set forth in this Complaint;
- F. For the Court to provide reasonable incentive awards to Plaintiff to compensate her for the time she spent attempting to recover wages for the Collective Members and for the risks she took in doing so; and
- G. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

### REQUEST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION CERTIFICATION

As to Count I of this Complaint, Plaintiff requests that the Court designate this action as a collective action on behalf of the FLSA Collective Members and promptly issue a notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to timely assert FLSA claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue Forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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#### **JURY TRIAL DEMAND**

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th Day of January 2019.

#### BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC

By: /s/ Clifford P. Bendau, II
Clifford P. Bendau, II
Christopher J. Bendau
Attorneys for Plaintiff

#### **ZOLDAN LAW GROUP PLLC**

By: /s/ Jason Barrat
Michael Zoldan
Jason Barrat
Attorneys for Plaintiff

### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

## **Civil Cover Sheet**

This automated JS-44 conforms generally to the manual JS-44 approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974. The data is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. The information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form is authorized for use <u>only</u> in the District of Arizona.

The completed cover sheet must be printed directly to PDF and filed as an attachment to the Complaint or Notice of Removal.

Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC; Tristate Logistics, LLC; C&A Holdings, LLC; Elliot Auto Supply

Defendant(s): Co., Inc.; Factory Motor Parts International, LLC; The Bon Air

> Trust ; Carlos Jorge ; Jane Doe Jorge ; Elliot Badzin ; Jane Doe

Badzin

County of Residence: Maricopa County of Residence: Maricopa

County Where Claim For Relief Arose: Maricopa

**Plaintiff(s): Samantha Sanders** 

Plaintiff's Atty(s):

Clifford Phillip Bendau II, Founding Partner Bendau & Bendau PLLC P.O. Box 97066 Phoenix, Arizona 85060 (480) 382-5176

Christopher Jacob Bendau , Founding Partner Bendau & Bendau PLLC P.O. Box 97066 Phoenix, Arizona 85060 (480) 382-5176

Michael Zoldan , Partner Zoldan Law Group PLLC 14500 N. Northsight Blvd., Ste. 133 Defendant's Atty(s):

Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 442-3410

Jason Barrat , Partner Zoldan Law Group PLLC 14500 N. Northsight Blvd., Ste. 133 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 442-3410

II. Basis of Jurisdiction:

3. Federal Question (U.S. not a party)

III. Citizenship of Principal

Parties (Diversity Cases Only)

Plaintiff:- **N/A**Defendant:- **N/A** 

IV. Origin:

1. Original Proceeding

V. Nature of Suit:

710 Fair Labor Standards Act

VI.Cause of Action:

29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., failure to pay overtime wages

VII. Requested in Complaint

Class Action: **No**Dollar Demand:
Jury Demand: **Yes** 

VIII. This case is not related to another case.

Signature: /s/ Clifford P. Bendau, II

Date: <u>1/9/2019</u>

If any of this information is incorrect, please go back to the Civil Cover Sheet Input form using the *Back* button in your browser and change it. Once correct, save this form as a PDF and include it as an attachment to your case opening documents.

Revised: 01/2014

# **BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC**

# Exhibit A

#### **BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC**

Clifford P. Bendau, II (AZ Bar No. 030204) Christopher J. Bendau (AZ Bar No. 032981)

P.O. Box 97066

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Phoenix, Arizona 85060 Telephone: (480) 382-5176

Fax: (480) 304-3805

Email: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com

chris@bendaulaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samantha Sanders, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

No. \_\_\_\_\_

**CONSENT TO JOIN FLSA** 

#### Plaintiffs,

v.

Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Tristate Logistics, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; C&A Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and Carlos Jorge and

Jane Doe Jorge, a Married Couple,

COLLECTIVE ACTION

PLAINTIFF SAMANTHA SANDERS'

Defendants.

I, Samantha Sanders, do hereby consent to be a party plaintiff to the above-entitled action. I have read the complaint to be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, and authorize my attorneys, Bendau & Bendau PLLC, and its associated attorneys (the "Attorneys"), to file the Complaint on my behalf and for other employees similarly situated. I authorize the Attorneys to represent me in the Lawsuit and make decisions on my behalf, including how to conduct the lawsuit, settlement, and all other matters related to the Lawsuit. I agree to provide the Attorneys forty percent

(40%) of any recovery they obtain on my behalf in the lawsuit or the reasonable hourly value of their legal services for time expended in the lawsuit, as paid by Defendants, whichever is greater. I authorize the Attorneys to deduct from any recovery my pro rata share of any reasonable costs incurred by the Attorneys on my behalf.

DocuSigned by:

Samantha Sanders

Samantha Sanders

1/9/2019

Date

# **ClassAction.org**

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Lawsuit: Tristate Logistics, Factory Motor Parts International 'Misclassified' Worker as OT-Exempt</u>