	Case 2:17-cv-02234-DJH Document 1	Filed 07/10/17 Page 1 of 15	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 (312) 201-0575 (xbormes@bormeslaw.com cpsons@bormeslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY IN CHARGE FOR PLAINTIFF AND COLLECTIVE MEMBERS Thomas M. Ryan (<i>pro hac vice</i> admission pending) LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C. Illinois State Bar No. 6273422 35 East Wacker Drive Suite 650 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 726-3400 Tom@tomryanlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff LOCAL COUNSEL: Michelle R. Matheson #019568 MATHESON & MATHESON, P.L.C. 15300 North 90 th Street Suite 550		
19 20		TES DISTRICT COURT ICT OF ARIZONA	
20 21 22	Malaika Sallard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,		
23	Plaintiff,	COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT	
24 25	V.	(JURY TRIAL REQUESTED)	
26	MedImpact Healthcare System, Inc.,		
27	Defendant.		
28			

Plaintiff, Malaika Sallard, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly 2 situated, known and unknown, through her attorneys, complains against Defendant 3 MedImpact Healthcare, Systems, Inc. ("Defendant" or "MedImpact"), as follows: 4 **NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS** 5 6 1. This lawsuit arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 7 et seq. ("FLSA"), for Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated 8 persons all overtime pay for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 9 2. Defendant employs the telephone-based workers who are the putative class 10 members in this lawsuit. 11 3. Defendant knowingly required and/or permitted Plaintiff, who worked as 12 a telephone-dedicated employee in the position of customer service representative, and 13 other similarly situated telephone-dedicated employees to perform unpaid work before 14 and after the start and end times of their shifts. This unpaid work includes but is not 15 limited to booting up computers, initializing several software programs, reading company 16 issued emails and instructions, completing customer service calls, securing their 17 workstations, and securing any customer or proprietary information. 18 4. The amount of uncompensated time Plaintiff and those similarly situated to 19 her spend or have spent on these required and unpaid work activities averages 20 approximately 15 or more minutes per day. 21 5. Defendant's conduct violates the FLSA, which requires non-exempt 22 employees to be compensated for their overtime work at a rate of one and one-half times 23 their regular rate of pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 24 6. Plaintiff brings her FLSA overtime claims as a collective action pursuant to 29 25 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of telephone-dedicated employees who worked for Defendant in 26

27 Arizona at call centers owned by Defendant.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FLSA claims in this action under 29 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

8. Venue is proper in this Court as the illegal conduct alleged herein occurred in this district.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Malaika Sallard is an individual who worked for Defendant from
approximately June 2014 to approximately May 2016 as an hourly, non-exempt
customer service representative at the call center owned and operated by MedImpact
located in Tempe, Arizona. Plaintiff Sallard resides in and is domiciled within this judicial
district.

13 11. MedImpact is a pharmacy benefit manager that offers services related to 14 working with health plans and pharmacies to provide information regarding medicines to 15 customers. MedImpact owns and operates telephone call centers in Tempe, Arizona and 16 elsewhere where telephone-dedicated hourly employees primarily handle phone calls 17 regarding Medicare issues and pharmacy claims.

12. Defendant employed Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons as "employees," as that term is defined by Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).

13. At all material times, Defendant has been an enterprise in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 3(s)(1) of the FLSA because it has had employees engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).

Furthermore, Defendant has had, and continues to have, an annual gross
business volume in excess of \$500,000.

15. At all relevant times, Defendant was an "employer" of Plaintiff and other
similarly situated persons, as that term is defined by Section 203(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d).

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16. At all material times, Plaintiff and FLSA Class Members were individual employees who engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 USC § 206-207.

17. Further, at all material times, Defendant has operated as a "single enterprise" within the meaning of 3(r)(1) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1). That is, Defendant performs related activities through unified operation and common control for a common business purpose. *See Brennan v. Arnheim and Neely, Inc.*, 410 U.S. 512, 515 (1973); *Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc.*, 346 F.3d 908, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2003).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Defendant's Practice of Requiring and/or Permitting Telephone-Based Hourly Employees to Work Before the Start of Their Scheduled Shift Time

18. MedImpact operates and has operated "call centers" in Arizona and across the nation where telephone-dedicated employees similar to Plaintiff handle phone calls primarily regarding Medicare issues and pharmacy claims.

19. Plaintiff's schedule at Defendant's call center varied but it would be for eight
and one-half hours with a thirty-minute meal break during the work day. When Plaintiff
first began working at Defendant's call center in approximately June 2014, she was placed
to work there by Aerotek, Inc., and was paid an hourly rate of approximately \$14.00.
Beginning in approximately September 2015, Defendant directly employed Plaintiff and
paid her an hourly rate of about \$16.44.

23 20. Prior to starting work on the call center floor, Plaintiff and other similarly
24 situated telephone-based employees were and are interviewed by employees and managers
25 of Defendant.

26 21. Defendant had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and other persons similarly
27 situated.

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At the MedImpact call center where Plaintiff worked, Defendant had 22. managers on the floor of the call center during the workday, managing the work activities of the Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons.

23. Defendant does not allow telephone-based employees to use its phones and computers for any personal use. Additionally, Defendant generally prohibits and does not allow telephone-based employees to use their own personal cell phones on the call center floor. Under Defendant's policies and practices, telephone-based employees are required to store their personal cell phones during the work day and can generally only use them on breaks and off the call center floor.

10 At the call center where Plaintiff worked, MedImpact's managers on the call 24. center floor could and did regularly see with their own eyes that Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees arrived at their work stations before the start of their scheduled shift time, logged into Defendant's computers, and began working on their computers prior to the start of their scheduled shift time.

25. Despite seeing and knowing that Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-16 based employees performed work at their work stations prior to their scheduled shift time 17 start, Defendant and its managers on the floor of the call center did not make any effort to 18 stop or otherwise disallow this pre-shift work and instead allowed and permitted it to 19 happen. 20

Defendant possesses, controls and/or has access to information and 26. 21 electronic data that shows the times Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based 22 employees logged into their computers each day and the time they logged into their 23 telephone systems. 24

25 27. By possessing, controlling and/or accessing this information, Defendant 26 knew that Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees worked prior to the 27 start of their scheduled shift time.

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28. Despite having this information and knowing that Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees logged into their computers, initialized necessary software programs, and read company issued emails and instructions prior to the start of their scheduled shift time, Defendant did not make any effort to stop or otherwise disallow this pre-shift work and instead allowed and permitted it to happen.

29. Defendant knowingly required and/or permitted Plaintiff and those similarly situated to her to perform unpaid work before and after the start and end times of their shifts, including but not limited to booting up computers, initializing several software programs, and reading company issued emails and instructions prior to the start of their scheduled shift time, and completing customer service calls, closing down the software programs, logging off the system, securing their workstations, and securing any customer or proprietary information after the end of their scheduled shift times.

30. The amount of uncompensated time Plaintiff and those similarly situated to her spend or have spent on these required and unpaid work activities averages approximately 15 or more minutes per day.

31. Defendant monitored and directed the work activities of Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, including the unpaid work at issue.

B. Defendant Knew of and Assented to the Pre-Shift Work

32. Defendant's policy and practice permits and/or requires telephone-based employees to be logged into their phones by the employee's scheduled start time.

33. In order to be logged into MedImpact's telephone systems, Defendant required and/or permitted Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees to arrive at their work station prior to their scheduled shift time and boot up computers, initialize several software programs, and read company emails and instructions.

34. Defendant's policy and practice disciplines telephone-based employees if they are not logged into their phones and ready to handle calls by the start of their scheduled

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shift time.

35. This policy and practice of Defendant results in telephone-based employees, including the Plaintiff, to boot up their computers, initialize several software programs and/or read company emails and instructions prior to their start of their scheduled shift time.

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36. As set forth herein, via its policies and practices and through its own telephone and computer systems, Defendant knew and was aware that the telephone-based employees performed work prior to the start of their scheduled shift.

37. Defendant did not instruct Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees to not log into their computers or telephone, or to not read company emails prior to the start of their scheduled shift time. Rather, Defendant required, permitted and/or allowed Plaintiff and the putative class members to work prior to their scheduled shift time.

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C. Defendant's Failure to Pay Overtime Wages to Its Telephone-Based Hourly Employees

39. Defendant determined the rate of pay for Plaintiff other similarly situated
persons.

22 40. Defendant's managers reviewed and approved Plaintiff and other similarly
23 situated persons' time records prior to receiving their paychecks.

24 41. Defendant supervised and controlled the work schedule of Plaintiff and other
25 similarly situated persons.

26 42. Defendant issued paychecks to Plaintiff other similarly situated persons, and
27 was involved in determining the actual amount of compensation paid by the paycheck.

43. Plaintiff and those employees similarly situated are individuals who were, or are, employed by Defendant in customer service and similar positions at MedImpact's Tempe, Arizona call center who were not paid for some or all of their work activities prior to the beginning of their shifts, and after the end of their shifts.

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44. Plaintiff and the other employees are similarly situated to one another because their duties consisted primarily of providing services related to handling phone calls regarding Medicare issues and pharmacy claims. Plaintiff and others similarly situated all shared similar policies, job titles, job descriptions, training, job duties and compensation, among other things.

45. Plaintiff and the other employees are also similar because Defendant did not
pay them for all time they actually worked. Defendant knowingly required Plaintiff and the
similarly situated individuals to perform unpaid work before and after their scheduled
shifts, including but not limited to booting-up computers, initializing several software
programs, reading company emails and instructions, completing customer service calls,
securing their workstations, and securing any customer or proprietary information.

46. The net effect of Defendant's policies and practices, instituted and approved
by company managers, is that Defendant willfully failed to pay regular and overtime
compensation to Plaintiff and others similarly situated, and willfully failed to keep accurate
time records to save payroll costs. Defendant thus enjoyed ill-gained profits at the expense
of its hourly employees.

47. Plaintiff and others similarly situated at times work or worked in excess of
forty hours per week for Defendant in a given workweek.

24 48. Defendant's policy and practice of requiring and/or permitting its employees,
25 including Plaintiff and other non-exempt, hourly employees, to perform work without pay
26 for such work performed, violates Section 6 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206.

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49. Defendant's policy and practice of requiring its employees to perform work

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without pay in many instances has caused and continues to cause Plaintiff and certain other similarly situated hourly employees to work in excess of forty hours per week, without being properly compensated at a wage of 1.5 times their respective hourly rate for such work performed, as required by Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.

50. Defendant's failure to compensate its non-exempt, hourly call center employees with the full amount of the applicable regular wage or overtime wage has caused Plaintiff and other similarly situated non-exempt call center employees to suffer harm.

51. Defendant's non-exempt, call center hourly employees are entitled to compensation for all time they worked without pay in any given workweek.

COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

52. Plaintiff brings Count I of this Complaint as a collective action on behalf of herself and all other current and former hourly employees of Defendant who Defendant required to perform the work described herein without pay at any time during the three years prior to the commencement of the action to present at call centers owned or operated by Defendant.

53. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Class Members have also been
denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty hours per workweek. That is, Plaintiff
worked with other telephone dedicated employees who worked at the MedImpact call
center. As such, she has first-hand personal knowledge that the same pay violations
occurred to other class members. Furthermore, other telephone dedicated employees at
MedImpact's call centers have shared with her similar pay violation experiences as those
described in this complaint.

54. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff work or have worked at
MedImpact's call centers, but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their
regular rate when those hours exceeded forty hours per workweek.

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1	55. Although Defendant permitted and/or required the FLSA Class Members to	
2	work in excess of forty hours per workweek, Defendant has denied them full compensation	
2	for their hours worked over forty. Defendant has also denied them full compensation at	
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5	the federally mandated minimum wage rate.	
6	56. FLSA Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work	
7	as Plaintiff.	
8	57. FLSA Class Members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty hours	
9	during a workweek.	
10	58. FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay at the	
10	federally mandated wage rate under the FLSA.	
11	59. As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of job duties,	
12	pay structure, and the denial of overtime wages.	
13 14	60. Defendant's failure to pay the overtime compensation wage rate required by	
14	the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on	
15 16	the personal circumstances of the FLSA Class Members.	
10	61. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to her pay, are typical of the	
17	experiences of the FLSA Class Members.	
10	62. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each FLSA Class	
20	Member do not prevent collective treatment.	
21	63. All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements,	
22	are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty during a	
23	workweek.	
24	64. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among FLSA Class	
25	Members, the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple	
26	formula. The claims of all FLSA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts.	
27	Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused	
28	Lucinity is called on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused	

1	harm to all FLSA Class Members.		
2	65. As such, Plaintiff brings her FLSA overtime as a collective action on behalf		
3	of the following class, and Plaintiff's Counsel seek to send notice of this lawsuit to the		
4	following described persons:		
5	All persons who worked for Defendant as telephone-dedicated		
6	employees, however titled, who were compensated, in part or		
7	in full, on an hourly basis at the MedImpact, Tempe, Arizona call center at any time between July 10, 2014 and the present		
8	who did not receive the full amount of overtime wages earned and owed to them.		
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10	66. There are questions of law or fact common to the employees described in		
11	paragraph 65.		
12	67. Plaintiff is similarly situated to the employees described in paragraph 65, as		
13	Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of those persons.		
14	68. Plaintiff's claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the		
15	persons described in paragraph 65.		
16	69. This is not a collusive or friendly action. Plaintiff has retained counsel		
17 18	experienced in complex employment litigation, and Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and		
10 19	adequately protect the interests of the persons described in paragraph 65.		
20	70. A collective action is the most appropriate method for the fair and efficient		
20	resolution of the matters alleged in Count I.		
22	71. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff and the persons described		
23	in paragraph 65.		
24	72. At all relevant times, Defendant paid Plaintiff and the persons described in		
25	paragraph 65 to work.		
26	73. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an "employer" of Plaintiff and the		
27	persons described in paragraph 65 as the term "employer" is defined by Section 3(d) of the		
28	FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).		

1	74 At all relevant times Plaintiff and the persons described in personant 65 have	
1	74. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the persons described in paragraph 65 have	
2	been "employees" of Defendant as defined by Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §	
3	203(e).	
4	<u>COUNT I – FLSA</u>	
5	(Failure to Pay Overtime Wages)	
6 7	75. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 74	
-	as paragraph 75 of this Count I.	
8 9	76. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf and the members of the class described	
10	in paragraph 65, asserts claims for unpaid overtime pursuant to the FLSA.	
11	77. At any and all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an "enterprise engaged	
12	in commerce" within the meaning of Section 3(s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).	
13	78. At any and all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an "employer" of the	
14	Plaintiff and the members of the class described in paragraph 65 within the meaning of	
15	Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).	
16	79. At any and all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and the members of the class	
17	described in paragraph 65 were "employees" of Defendant as defined by Section 3(e) of	
18	the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).	
19	80. Plaintiff and the members of the class described in paragraph 65 were not	
20	paid for all time worked in excess of 40 hours in a week during the applicable statutory	
21	time period, in violation of the maximum hours provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.	
22	81. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and the	
23	members of the class described in paragraph 65 premium pay for all time worked over 40	
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25		
26	a. Defendant knew that the FLSA required it to pay time and one-half for all time worked over 40 hours in a week;	
27	b. Defendant failed to maintain true and accurate time records; and	
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1 Defendant encouraged Plaintiff and other similarly situated c. 2 employees to not record all time worked. 3 82. As a direct and proximate result thereof, Plaintiff and the members of the 4 5 class described in paragraph 65 are due unpaid back wages and liquidated damages, 6 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. 7 **DAMAGES SOUGHT** 8 83. Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover compensation 9 for the hours they worked for which they were not paid at the federally mandated overtime 10 wage rate. 11 Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are also entitled to an amount equal 84. 12 to all of their unpaid wages as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 13 85. Plaintiff and FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover their attorneys' 14 fees and costs as required by the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 15 16 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 17 by and through her attorneys, demands judgment against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff 18 and all others similarly situated, for a sum that will properly, adequately and completely 19 compensate them for the nature, extent and duration of their damages, the costs of this 20 action and as follows: 21 A. Conditionally certify the class described in paragraph 65, and grant Plaintiff's 22 counsel leave to send notice of this lawsuit to the members of the class and allow them the opportunity to opt-in as party plaintiffs pursuant to Section 16 of the FLSA, 23 29 U.S.C. § 216; 24 B. Declare and find that the Defendant committed one or more of the following acts: 25 i. Violated provisions of the FLSA for Plaintiff and all persons who opt-in as 26 party plaintiffs; and 27 28

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1	ii. Willfully violated provisions of the FLSA for Plaintiff and all persons who		
2	opt-in as party plaintiffs.		
3	C. Award compensatory damages, including all wages and overtime pay owed, in		
4	an amount according to proof;		
5	D. Award liquidated damages on all wages and overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and all persons who opt-in as party plaintiffs;		
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7	E. Award all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred prosecuting this claim;		
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9 10	F. Grant leave to amend to add claims under applicable state and federal laws to conform with the proofs at trial;		
10 11	comorni with the proofs at that,		
11	G. Grant leave to add additional plaintiffs by motion or any other method approved by		
12	the Court to conform with the proofs at trial; and		
14	H. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.		
14 15			
	 H. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. DATED this 10th day of July 2017. 		
15			
15 16	DATED this 10 th day of July 2017. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.		
15 16 17	DATED this 10 th day of July 2017. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C. <u>s/ James X. Bormes</u> <u>(pro hac vice admission pending)</u>		
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19	FOR THE DISTR	CT OF ARIZO	NA
20			
21	MALAIKA SALLARD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	No.:	
22			
23	Plaintiff,		
24	v .	CONSENT TO PLAINTIFF	D BECOME A PARTY
25	MEDIMPACT HEALTHCARE		
26	SYSTEMS, INC.,		
27	Defendant.		
28		I	

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Sec. 1. 18

Now comes Malaika Sallard, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), and files this consent to become a party plaintiff in the above-styled lawsuit.

I hereby consent to be a party plaintiff in this lawsuit and specifically authorize counsel of record to represent me and all those similarly situated.

Malaika Sallaro

Date

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civil Cover Sheet

This automated JS-44 conforms generally to the manual JS-44 approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974. The data is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. The information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form is authorized for use <u>only</u> in the District of Arizona.

The completed cover sheet must be printed directly to PDF and filed as an attachment to the Complaint or Notice of Removal.

Plaintiff (s): Malaika Sallard		Defendant (s): MedImpact Healthcare, Systems, Inc.
County of Residence: Maricopa		County of Residence: Outside the State of Arizona
County Where Claim For Relief A	rose: Maricopa	
Plaintiff's Atty(s):		Defendant's Atty(s):
Michelle Ray Matheson , Attorney Matheson & Matheson, PLC 15300 N 90th St., Ste 550 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 480-889-8951		
II. Basis of Jurisdiction:	3. Federal Question (U	.S. not a party)
III. Citizenship of Principal Parties (Diversity Cases Only) Plaintiff Defendant		
<u>IV. Origin</u> :	1. Original Proceeding	
V. Nature of Suit:	710 Fair Labor Standa	rds Act
VI.Cause of Action:	29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA")	
VII. Requested in Complaint		
Class Action: Yes Dollar Demand:		
Jury Demand: Yes		
<u>VIII. This case</u> is not related to and	other case.	

Signature: /S Michelle R. Matheson

Date: <u>7/10/17</u>

http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bi...

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Customer Service Phone Worker Alleges MedImpact Healthcare Owes Overtime</u>