

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

GINA OSTERMEIER-MCLUCAS,  
individually and on behalf of all others  
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RITE AID CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

1. This is a putative class action on behalf of Plaintiff Gina Ostermeier-McLucas, and all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiff”), against Defendant Rite Aid Corporation (“Rite Aid” or “Defendant”).

2. Defendant is one of the biggest leading retailers in the United States. Defendant owns and operates brick-and-mortar retail stores throughout the United States. Defendant markets, advertises, and sells various products, including, but not limited to pain reliever and fever reducers, to consumers in its brick-and-mortar stores.

3. Defendant distributes its own brand of pain reliever and fever reducer, including Infants’ Fever Reducer & Pain Reliever (“Infants’ Products”) and Children’s Fever Reducer & Pain Reliever (“Children’s Products”), two well-known brand-name Over The Counter (“OTC”) medications. The Infants’ Products and Children’s Products are collectively hereinafter referred to as the “Products.”

4. Acetaminophen, the active ingredient in the Products, can be dangerous, and perhaps even fatal, if taken in large doses. The potential risks associated with an acetaminophen overdose terrifies parents and caregivers and causes them to be extra careful when buying medicine for their children. Defendant exploits this fear by misleading consumers.

5. It is the manner in which Defendant markets, prices, and sells the Products in its brick-and-mortar stores that forms the underlying basis for this action.

6. Defendant's advertisements, marketing representations, and placement of the Products in its brick-and-mortar stores are misleading, untrue, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers. Defendant purposely packages Infants' Products with distinctive and colored lettering of the word "infants" on the product's front-label, while packaging Children's Products with distinctive and colored lettering of the word "Children's" on the product's front-label. Accordingly, Defendant distributes, markets, and sells the Products in a manner that deceives reasonable consumers into thinking that infants cannot safely take Children's Products.

7. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Products contain the same exact amount of acetaminophen in the same dosage amounts, Defendant markets and sells Infants' Products to consumers, such as Plaintiff, at a substantially higher price than Children's Products. In stores, the Infants' Products cost approximately three times as much per ounce than Children's Products for the same amount of medicine.

8. No reasonable consumer would pay approximately three times more for Infants' Products, as compared to Children's Products, unless he or she was deceived into thinking that infants cannot safely take Children's Products.

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

9. Jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court because a substantial portion of the acts, events, and/or failure to act giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in this judicial district. Additionally, Defendant has substantial business contacts with the State of New York, or otherwise avails itself of the markets within New York, through promotion, sale, marketing and distribution of the Products in New York to render the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court proper and necessary. Furthermore, Defendant can be brought before this Court pursuant to New York's long-arm jurisdictional statute.

10. This action is brought pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (CAFA). Jurisdiction is vested in this Court in that there is minimal diversity and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars (\$5,000,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.

11. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events and misrepresentations giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

### **PARTIES**

12. At all relevant times, Plaintiff has resided in the State of New York. Since Plaintiff purchased the Infants' Products for the first time in or around 2010, Plaintiff resided and was domiciled in the State of New York. Plaintiff is the parent of one child, age nine years old, and one granddaughter, age three years old.

13. Plaintiff saw and relied upon the Infants' Products packaging and labeling.

14. Plaintiff purchased the Infants' Products because she believed that the Infants' Products were specifically formulated and designed for infants based on the marketing and labeling of the Infants' Products. Plaintiff believed that the Infants' Products were different than the Children's Products. If Plaintiff knew that the Infants' Products were nothing more than the Children's Products, she would not have purchased the Infants' Products or paid a price premium for the Infants' Products.

15. Had Defendant not made the false, misleading, and deceptive representation that the Infants' Products were formulated and designed for "Infants," nor omitted the fact that the Infants' Products were nothing more than the Children's Products with the word "Infants" prominently displayed, Plaintiff would not have been willing to pay the premium for the Infants' Products, or she would not have been willing to purchase the Infants' Products at all. Plaintiff purchased and paid more for the Infants' Products than she would have if she had known the truth about the Infants' Products. The Infants' Products that Plaintiff received were worth less than the Infants' Products for which she paid. Plaintiff was injured in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant's fraudulent conduct.

16. Plaintiff desires to purchase “Infants” products in the future and regularly visits retail locations where such products are sold. If Plaintiff knew that the Infants’ Products’ labels were truthful and non-misleading, she would continue to purchase the Infants’ Products in the future.

17. At present, however, Plaintiff cannot purchase the Infants’ Products because she remains unsure whether the labeling of the Products is, and will be, truthful and non-misleading. If the Infants’ Products were in fact different from the Children’s Products, or if it were disclosed that the Infants’ Products were the same as the Children’s Products, Plaintiff would purchase the Products in the immediate future, and she would be willing to pay a price premium if they were in fact specially formulated for infants.

18. Defendant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Delaware and is a “person” as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.

19. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Defendant conducts business in all fifty states of the United States, including this District. Defendant can sue and be sued in this Court.

### **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

20. Defendant distributes two different pediatric OTC painkillers – Infants’ Products and Children’s Products.

21. Prior to the acts complained herein, liquid acetaminophen marketed for “infants” was only available in 80 mg/0.8 mL or 80 mg/mL concentrations, while liquid acetaminophen marketed for “children” was only available in 160 mg/5 mL concentrations.

22. The difference in concentrations caused some consumers to accidentally provide the wrong dosage of medicine to their children, thereby causing them to overdose.

23. Between 2000 and 2009, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received reports of twenty (20) children dying from acetaminophen toxicity, and at least three (3) deaths were tied to mix-ups involving the two pediatric medicines.

24. On December 22, 2011, the FDA informed the public that liquid acetaminophen marketed for infants would only be available in 160 mg/5 mL in order to prevent confusion and accidental acetaminophen toxicity.

25. Since then, the only differences in liquid acetaminophen marketed for infants versus children has been the price and dosing instrument included with the product (i.e. Defendant's Infants' Products come with a syringe while the Children's Products come with a plastic cup).

26. The Products have the same 160 milligram concentration of acetaminophen, are interchangeable and therefore suitable for infants and children, adjusting the dosage based only on the weight and age of the child.

27. Defendant has been engaging in the unfair, unlawful, deceptive, and fraudulent practice of manufacturing, marketing and selling the same product as two unique medicines, such that parents and caregivers mistakenly believe that they cannot purchase the significantly cheaper Children's Products for an infant.

28. Defendant misleads consumers by using deceptive marketing techniques which obscure critical facts that infants can safely take Children's Products and that the Products are exactly the same from consumers nationwide.

29. Defendant deceives consumers so that they will buy the deceptively-labeled Infants' Products for infants, which cost significantly more than Children's Products, even though the Products contain the same exact amount of acetaminophen in the same dosage amounts.

30. There are various conventions applied in sub-dividing the pediatric population by age. The FDA classification<sup>1</sup> for infants and children is as follows: infant (1 month to 2 years) and children (2 to 12 years).<sup>2</sup> Consumers may reasonably believe that a product that is labeled and

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<sup>1</sup> Guidance for Industry – General Considerations for Pediatric Pharmacokinetic Studies for Drugs and Biological products, Draft Guidance, US FDA, 10 November 1998.

<sup>2</sup> <http://archives.who.int/eml/expcom/children/Items/PositionPaperAgeGroups.pdf> (last visited March 25, 2020).

marketed for consumption by infants should only be consumed by those between the ages of one (1) month to two (2) years old.

31. Defendant distributes, markets, and sells the Products in a manner that deceives reasonable consumers into thinking that infants cannot safely take the Children's Products.

32. Specifically, Defendant distinguishes the two products by calling one "infants'" and one "children's" in distinctive and colored lettering.



33. Additionally, at the top right corner of the Infants' Products, Defendant states "Compare to the active ingredient of Infants' Tylenol® Oral Suspension," while the top right corner of the Children's Products states, "Compare to the active ingredient of Children's Tylenol® Oral Suspension." Through this wording, Defendant attempts to deceive reasonable consumers into believing that the active ingredient in Infant Tylenol® is *different* than the active ingredient in Children's Tylenol®, when it knows that the active ingredient is the same, further inducing reasonable consumers to purchase the more expensive Infants' Products.

34. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Products contain the same exact amount of acetaminophen in the same dosage amounts, Defendant markets and sells Infants' Products to consumers, such as Plaintiff, at a substantially higher cost than the Children's Products. In stores,

Infants' Products cost approximately three times as much per ounce over Children's Products for the same amount of medicine.

35. Defendant knows that consumers, such as Plaintiff, are typically more cautious about what medicine they give to infants, especially when they are giving their infant a product that has caused accidental deaths in the past.

36. No reasonable consumer would be willing to pay more money and certainly not three times as much per ounce for Infants' Products unless he or she had good reason to believe that Infants' Products were different than or superior to the Children's Products.

37. Indeed, Defendant's misrepresentations and omissions, as described above, would be important to a reasonable consumer in deciding whether to purchase Infants' Products.

#### **RULE 9(b) ALLEGATIONS**

38. Defendant made material misrepresentations and failed to adequately disclose that the Products are the same. Except as identified herein, Plaintiff and Class members are unaware, and therefore, unable to identify, the true names and identities of those individuals at Defendant who are responsible for such material misrepresentations and omissions.

39. Defendant made material misrepresentations regarding Infants' Products. Specifically, Defendant marketed, priced and sold Infants' Products in a manner to indicate to reasonable consumers that they are superior or somehow more appropriate for infants than Children's Products to justify charging the inflated price for Infants' Products. These representations were false and misleading because Infants' Products are the same as the Children's Products.

40. Defendant's advertising, in-store labeling, marketing, and placement of the Products contained the material misrepresentations, omissions, and non-disclosures continuously at every point of purchase and consumption throughout the Class Period.

41. Defendant made numerous misrepresentations on the advertising, in-store labeling, marketing, and pricing of Infants' Products that were designed to, and, in fact, did, mislead Plaintiff and Class members into purchasing Infants' Products.

42. Defendant made these material misrepresentations, omissions, and non-disclosures for the express purpose of inducing Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers to purchase or otherwise pay a price premium for Infants' Products based on the belief that Infants' Products were specifically designed for infants and different from the identical Children's Products. Defendant profited by selling Infants' Products to thousands of unsuspecting consumers.

### **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

43. Plaintiff seeks to bring this action as a class action, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.

44. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class: All persons who purchased Infants' Products for personal use in the United States (the "Nationwide Class").

45. Plaintiff also brings this suit as a class action on behalf of the following subclass: All persons who purchased Infants' Products for personal use in New York ("New York Subclass").

46. The following persons are excluded from the Nationwide Class and New York Subclass (collectively, the "Classes"): Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in Defendant, and Defendant's legal representatives, assigns and successors. Also excluded are the judges to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge's immediate family.

47. Plaintiff reserves the right to re-define the Classes prior to class certification.

48. The Classes satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3).

49. **Numerosity:** The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Classes is impracticable. Although the precise number of members of the Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, on information and belief, the proposed Classes contain thousands of purchasers of Infants' Products who have been damaged by Defendant's conduct as alleged herein.



50. **Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact:** There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes. These questions predominate over individual questions because the actions of Defendant complained of herein were generally applicable to the Classes. These legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to:

- a. Whether Infants' Products and Children's Products are the same;
- b. Whether Defendant knew or should have known that Infants' Products and Children's Products are the same;
- c. Whether Defendant's conduct and/or omissions in its marketing, pricing and selling the Infants' product in the manner discussed herein indicated to the members of the Classes that Infants' Products were superior or somehow more appropriate for infants than Children's Products;
- d. Whether Defendant's misrepresentations and omissions were material to reasonable consumers;
- e. Whether Defendant's labeling, marketing, and the sale of Infants' Products constitute false advertising;
- f. Whether Defendant's conduct injured Plaintiff and the Classes and, if so, the extent of the damages; and
- g. The appropriate remedies for Defendant's conduct.

51. All questions as to the representations and publicly disseminated advertisements and statements attributable to Defendant at issue herein are similarly common. A determination of Defendant's knowledge regarding the misleading and deceptive nature of the statements made in its website, advertisements, and labels will be applicable to all members of the Classes. Further, whether Defendant violated any applicable state laws and pursued the course of conduct complained of herein, whether Defendant acted intentionally or recklessly in engaging in the conduct described herein, and the extent of the appropriate measure of injunctive and declaratory relief, damages and restitutionary relief are common questions to the Classes.

52. **Typicality:** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Classes because Defendant injured all members of the Classes through the uniform misconduct described herein; all members of the Classes were subject to Defendant's false, misleading, and unfair marketing practices and representations, including the false and misleading claim that Infants' Products were different from Children's Products warranting a premium price; and Plaintiff seeks the same relief as the members of the Classes.

53. Further, there are no defenses available to Defendant that are unique to Plaintiff.

54. **Adequacy of Representation:** Plaintiff is a fair and adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiff's interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will prosecute this action vigorously and is highly motivated to seek redress against Defendant. Further, Plaintiff has selected competent counsel that is experienced in class action and other complex litigation. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the Classes and have the resources to do so.

55. **Superiority:** The class action mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy for reasons including but not limited to the following:

- a. The damages individual members of the Classes suffered are small compared to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation needed to address Defendant's conduct.
- b. It would be virtually impossible for the members of the Classes individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if they could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation would unnecessarily increase the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system and presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory rulings and judgments. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, allows the hearing of claims which might otherwise go unaddressed because of the relative expense of bringing individual lawsuits, and provides the benefits of single

adjudications, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

- c. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual members of the Classes would create a risk inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Classes members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant.
- d. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Classes not parties to adjudications or that would substantively impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

56. The claims of the Classes may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3).

The members of the Class also seek declaratory and injunctive relief but also seek sizeable monetary relief.

**FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL SECTION 349**  
**(On behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Subclass)**

57. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-56 as if fully set forth herein.

58. New York General Business Law Section 349 (“GBL Section 349”) declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state . . .”

59. The conduct of Defendant alleged herein constitutes recurring, “unlawful” deceptive acts and practices in violation of GBL Section 349, and as such, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members seek monetary damages and the entry of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant, enjoining it from inaccurately describing, labeling, marketing, and promoting the Products.

60. There is no adequate remedy at law.

61. Defendant misleadingly, inaccurately, and deceptively advertises and markets its Products to consumers.

62. Defendant's improper consumer-oriented conduct is misleading in a material way in that it, among other things, induced Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members to purchase and pay a premium for Defendant's Products and to use the Products when they otherwise would not have. Defendant made its untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth.

63. Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members have been injured inasmuch as they paid a premium for products that were—contrary to Defendant's representations—the same products as Infants' Products. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members received less than what they bargained and/or paid for.

64. Defendant's advertising and Products' packaging and labelling induced Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members to buy Defendant's Products and to pay a premium price for them.

65. Defendant's deceptive and misleading practices constitute a deceptive act and practice in the conduct of business in violation of New York General Business Law Section 349(a), and Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members have been damaged thereby.

66. As a result of Defendant's recurring, "unlawful" deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members are entitled to monetary, compensatory, treble and punitive damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant's unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney's fees and costs.

**SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL SECTION 350**  
**(On behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Subclass)**

67. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-56 as if fully set forth herein.

68. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. Section 350 provides, in part, as follows:

False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful.

69. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. Section 350a(1) provides, in part, as follows:

The term ‘false advertising,’ includes labeling, of a commodity, or of the kind, character, terms or conditions of any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which the advertising relates under the conditions proscribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual . . .

70. Defendant’s labeling and advertisements contain untrue and materially misleading statements concerning Defendant’s Products inasmuch as they misrepresent that the Products are different from one another.

71. Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members have been injured inasmuch as they relied upon the labeling, packaging, and advertising and paid a premium for the Products which were—contrary to Defendant’s representations—substantially the same products, and not in fact “Infants” as represented. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members received less than what they bargained and/or paid for.

72. Defendant’s advertising, packaging, and products’ labeling induced Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members to buy Defendant’s Products.

73. Defendant made these untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth.

74. Defendant’s conduct constitutes multiple, separate violations of New York General Business Law Section 350.

75. Defendant made the material representations described in this Complaint in Defendant’s advertising, and on the Products’ packaging and labeling.

76. Defendant’s material misrepresentations were substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Moreover, all consumers purchasing the Products were and continue to be exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations.

77. As a result of Defendant's recurring, "unlawful" deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass members are entitled to monetary, compensatory, treble and punitive damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant's unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney's fees and costs.

**THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT,**  
**15 U.S.C. § 2301 ET SEQ.**  
**(On behalf of Plaintiff and Nationwide Class)**

78. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-56 as if fully set forth herein.

79. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the Nationwide Class. Upon certification, the Class will consist of more than 100 named plaintiffs.

80. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides a federal remedy for consumers who have been damaged by the failure of a supplier or warrantor to comply with any obligation under a written warranty or implied warranty, or other various obligations established under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 *et seq.*

81. The Infants' Products are "consumer products" within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1).

82. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members are "consumers" within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).

83. Defendant is the "supplier" and "warrantor" of the Infants' Products within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) & 2301(5).

84. Defendant represented in writing that the Infants' Products were manufactured or designed for infants by prominently displaying the word "infants" on the front-label packaging and the product information and price tags displayed next to Infants' Products on the store shelves.

85. These statements were made in connection with the sale of the Infants' Products and relate to the nature of the Infants' Products and affirm and promise that the Infants' Products are as represented and, as such, are "written warranties" within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A).

86. As alleged herein, Defendant breached the written warranty by selling consumers Infants' Products that were nothing more than Children's Products with the word "infants" prominently displayed.

87. The Infants' Products do not conform to Defendant's written warranty and therefore violate the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 *et seq.* Consequently, Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members have suffered injury and are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

**FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY**  
**(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

88. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-56 as if fully set forth herein.

89. As part of each contract for the sale of Infants' Products, Defendant represented that the Infants' Products were manufactured or designed for infants by prominently displaying the word "infants" on the front-label packaging and the product information and price tags displayed next to the Infants' Products on the store shelves.

90. Defendant's representations that the Infants' Products were manufactured, developed, and designed to be used for infants constituted express warranties and became part of the basis of the bargain between Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class, on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other.

91. Defendant represented that Infants' Products were manufactured, developed, and designed to be used for infants to induce Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class to purchase Infants' Products, and pay more for them than they otherwise would have had they known the truth.

92. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class relied on Defendant's representations that Infants' Products were manufactured, developed, and designed to be used for infants, when it knew that the Children's Products were the same product, yet sold at a significantly lower cost.

93. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class have performed all conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under the above-referenced contracts when they purchased the Infants' Products for their ordinary purposes.

94. Defendant breached its express warranties regarding the Infants' Products because they were nothing more than the Children's Products with the word "infants" prominently displayed.

95. As a result of Defendant's breach of express warranties, Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class were damaged in the amount of the purchase price or the premium they paid for the Infants' Products, together with interest thereon from the date of purchase, in an aggregate amount that Plaintiff will prove at trial.

96. On May 18, 2020, a reasonable time after they knew or should have known of such breach, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Nationwide Class, sent a notice letter to Defendant which provided notice of Defendant's breach and demanded that Defendant correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the breach complained of herein. The letter also stated that if Defendant refused to do so, a complaint would be filed seeking damages. Defendant failed to comply with the letter.

97. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class seek actual damages and punitive damages for Defendant's breach of warranty, in an amount to be proven at trial.

**FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**UNJUST ENRICHMENT**  
**(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

98. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-56 as if fully set forth herein.

99. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and on behalf of the Nationwide Class members, brings a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment.

100. Defendant's conduct violated, *inter alia*, state and federal law by manufacturing, advertising, marketing, and selling Infants' Products while misrepresenting and omitting material facts.

101. Defendant's unlawful conduct as described in this Complaint allowed Defendant to knowingly realize substantial revenues from selling Infants' Products at the expense of, and to the detriment or impoverishment of, Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members, and to Defendant's



benefit and enrichment. Defendant has thereby violated fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.

102. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members conferred significant financial benefits and paid substantial compensation to Defendant for Infants' Products, which were not as Defendant represented them to be.

103. Under New York's common law principles of unjust enrichment, it is inequitable for Defendant to retain the benefits conferred by Plaintiff's and the Nationwide Class members' overpayments.

104. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members seek disgorgement of all profits resulting from such overpayments and establishment of a constructive trust from which Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members may seek restitution.

#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Classes, prays for judgment as follows:

- (a) Certifying that the action may be maintained as a Class Action and that Plaintiff be appointed the Class Representative and its counsel as Class Counsel;
- (b) Declaring that Defendant is financially responsible for notifying the members of the Class of the pendency of this suit;
- (c) Declaring that Defendant has committed the violations of law alleged herein;
- (d) Providing for any and all injunctive relief the Court deems appropriate;
- (e) Awarding statutory damages in the maximum amount for which the law provides;
- (f) Awarding monetary damages, including but not limited to any compensatory, incidental, or consequential damages in an amount that the Court or jury will determine, in accordance with applicable law;
- (g) Providing for any and all equitable monetary relief the Court deems appropriate;
- (h) Awarding Plaintiffs reasonable costs and expenses of suit, including attorneys' fees;

- (i) Awarding pre- and post-judgment interest to the extent the law allows; and
- (j) For such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: July 1, 2020

/s/ Andrew Shamis

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CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

GINA OSTERMEIER-MCLUCAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Dutchess, New York (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Andrew Shamis, Esq., Shamis & Gentile, P.A., 14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705, Miami, FL 33132

DEFENDANTS

RITE AID CORPORATION

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant New Castle, Delaware (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
2 U.S. Government Defendant
4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- Citizen of This State PTF DEF 1 X 1
Citizen of Another State PTF DEF 2 2
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country PTF DEF 3 3
Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State PTF DEF 4 4
Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State PTF DEF 5 X 5
Foreign Nation PTF DEF 6 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Table with 5 columns: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, TORTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes various legal categories like Insurance, Personal Injury, Real Estate, etc.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding
2 Removed from State Court
3 Remanded from Appellate Court
4 Reinstated or Reopened
5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
6 Multidistrict Litigation

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. § 2301

Brief description of cause: Deceptive marketing and labeling

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: X Yes [ ] No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE 07/01/2020 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /s/ Andrew Shamis

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

**CERTIFICATION OF ARBITRATION ELIGIBILITY**

Local Arbitration Rule 83.7 provides that with certain exceptions, actions seeking money damages only in an amount not in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs, are eligible for compulsory arbitration. The amount of damages is presumed to be below the threshold amount unless a certification to the contrary is filed.

Case is Eligible for Arbitration

I, Andrew Shamis, counsel for GINA OSTERMEIER-MCLUCAS, do hereby certify that the above captioned civil action is ineligible for compulsory arbitration for the following reason(s):

- monetary damages sought are in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
- the complaint seeks injunctive relief,
- the matter is otherwise ineligible for the following reason

**DISCLOSURE STATEMENT - FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE 7.1**

Identify any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stocks:

**RELATED CASE STATEMENT (Section VIII on the Front of this Form)**

Please list all cases that are arguably related pursuant to Division of Business Rule 50.3.1 in Section VIII on the front of this form. Rule 50.3.1 (a) provides that "A civil case is "related" to another civil case for purposes of this guideline when, because of the similarity of facts and legal issues or because the cases arise from the same transactions or events, a substantial saving of judicial resources is likely to result from assigning both cases to the same judge and magistrate judge." Rule 50.3.1 (b) provides that " A civil case shall not be deemed "related" to another civil case merely because the civil case: (A) involves identical legal issues, or (B) involves the same parties." Rule 50.3.1 (c) further provides that "Presumptively, and subject to the power of a judge to determine otherwise pursuant to paragraph (d), civil cases shall not be deemed to be "related" unless both cases are still pending before the court."

**NY-E DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 50.1(d)(2)**

- 1.) Is the civil action being filed in the Eastern District removed from a New York State Court located in Nassau or Suffolk County?  Yes  No
- 2.) If you answered "no" above:
  - a) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in Nassau or Suffolk County?  Yes  No
  - b) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in the Eastern District?  Yes  No
  - c) If this is a Fair Debt Collection Practice Act case, specify the County in which the offending communication was received:

If your answer to question 2 (b) is "No," does the defendant (or a majority of the defendants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County, or, in an interpleader action, does the claimant (or a majority of the claimants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County?  Yes  No  
(Note: A corporation shall be considered a resident of the County in which it has the most significant contacts).

**BAR ADMISSION**

I am currently admitted in the Eastern District of New York and currently a member in good standing of the bar of this court.  
 Yes  No

Are you currently the subject of any disciplinary action (s) in this or any other state or federal court?  
 Yes (If yes, please explain)  No

I certify the accuracy of all information provided above.

Signature: /s/ Andrew Shamis

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AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Eastern District of New York

GINA OSTERMEIER-MCLUCAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiff(s)

v.

RITE AID CORPORATION

Defendant(s)

Civil Action No.

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) Rite Aid Corporation
c/o The Corporation Trust Company- Registered Agent
Corporation Trust Center
1209 Orange St. Wilmington
New Castle, Delaware 19801

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are:

Andrew Shamis, Esq.
Shamis & Gentile, P.A.
14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705
Miami, FL 33132

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

DOUGLAS C. PALMER
CLERK OF COURT

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

# ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Lawsuit Claims Rite Aid Charges Different Prices for Same Pain Reliever Marketed to Infants, Children](#)

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