1 2	BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER Linda C. Hsu, California Bar No. 239880	LLP			
3	Richard Chagoury, California Bar No. 329842				
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4	Telephone: (310) 576-2100 Facsimile: (310) 576-2200				
5	Email: linda.hsu@bclplaw.com richard.chagoury@bclplaw.com				
6 7	Attorneys for Specially Appearing Defendants Ruby Corp., Ruby Life Inc., and ADL Media Inc.				
8					
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
10	SOUTHERN DISTRI	CT OF CALIFORNIA			
11	ASHLEY NICHOLS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	Case No. <b>'20CV0491 BAS KSC</b>			
12	-	CLASS ACTION			
13	Plaintiff,	(San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2019-00057112-CU-MC-			
14	V.	CTL)			
15	RUBY CORP., a Canadian corporation; RUBY LIFE INC., d/b/a	NOTICE OF REMOVAL BY			
16	AshleyMadison.com, a Canadian corporation; ADL MEDIA INC., a	DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)			
17	Defaware corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,	(CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT)			
18	Defendants.				
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NOTICE OF REMOVAL

601664433.5

1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that specially appearing Defendants Ruby Corp.,
2	Ruby Life Inc. d/b/a AshleyMadison.com, and ADL Media Inc. ("Removing
3	Defendants") <sup>1</sup> , hereby remove the state-court action entitled <i>Ashley Nichols</i> ,
1	individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Ruby Corp., et al., Case
5	No. 37-2019-00057112-CU-MC-CTL, filed in the Superior Court of California, San
5	Diego County, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
7	California. This removal is made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and
3	1453. The grounds for removal are as follows:

#### **STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION**

This is a civil action for which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, *et seq.*, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, and is one that may be removed to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and for the below reasons.

#### THE REMOVED ACTION

- 1. Plaintiff initially filed this action on October 28, 2019, on behalf of herself alone, in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego County. On February 13, 2020 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint, reclassifying the case as a class action.<sup>2</sup>
- 2. Plaintiff served ADL Media Inc. with the summons and original complaint on November 27, 2019. *See* Ex. A at p. 9. Plaintiff served Ruby Corp. with the summons and original complaint on January 15, 2020. *See* Ex. A at p. 11. Plaintiff has not filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Ruby Life Inc. *See* Ex. C. On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff sent Ruby Corp. and Ruby Corp.'s counsel the First Amended complaint by mail (*see* Ex. A at p. 13), even though

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Removing Defendants are specially appearing for removal purposes only. Removing Defendants otherwise reserve all rights, including to challenge personal jurisdiction and service of process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All references to the "Complaint" are to Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint.

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- Removing Defendants did not appear or answer the complaint in the San Diego County Superior Court prior to removal, and are not aware of further proceedings regarding this action in that court. This notice of removal is accompanied by the following documents (Ex. A-D):
  - All executed process on Removing Defendants in this case (Ex. A);
  - All pleadings asserting causes of action (i.e., the Complaint) (Ex. B);
  - The docket sheet and court documents (Ex. C); and
  - A list of all counsel of record, including address, telephone numbers, and parties represented (Ex. D).
- 3. Other than the documents attached as Exhibits, no pleadings, process, orders or other documents in the case have been served or otherwise received by Removing Defendants or, to Removing Defendants' knowledge, are presently on file in the state court. In the event that such filings come to the Removing Defendants' attention, they will immediately file copies in this Court.
- The Complaint seeks to certify a California class of "[a]ll California 4. residents who received a false or deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mail . . . which advertised ashleymadison.com, since one year prior to the filing of this Action." (Compl. ¶ 125).
- 5. The Complaint alleges such "spam" emails were unlawful solicitations of commercial e-mail in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 and seeks statutory damages of \$1,000 per email, disgorgement, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-10; 135-146; Prayer For Relief, p. 25).

#### PROCEDURAL ISSUES

6. Removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). This case was not a putative class action until Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, reclassifying the case. Plaintiff sent Ruby Corp. and Ruby Corp.'s counsel the First Amended Complaint by mail on February 13, 2020. Accordingly, this removal is timely as it is "filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,

of a copy of an amended pleading . . . from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).

- 7. The San Diego County Superior Court is located within the Southern District of California. Therefore, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(d) because it is the "district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
- 8. While the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") does not require the joinder of other defendants for removal (*see Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co.*, 443 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2006)) and, moreover, the consent of fictitious "doe" defendants is never required for removal, Removing Defendants nonetheless note that all non-fictitious defendants join this removal.

# JURISDICTION IS PROPER UNDER THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT

- 9. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 4 of CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over putative class actions with more than 100 class members where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million, and any member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant. As set forth below, this action satisfies each of the requirements of § 1332(d)(2) for original jurisdiction under CAFA.
- 10. **This is a Covered Class Action**. This action meets CAFA's definition of a class action, which is "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action." 28 U.S.C. §7 1332(d)(1)(B). Plaintiff purports to bring this action "individually and on behalf of the putative class," and identifies a putative class of "[a]ll California residents who received a false or deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mail . . . which

- 11. The Putative Class Consists of More than 100 Members. The Complaint alleges that the purported class is "so numerous that individual joinder of all members is impracticable." (Compl. ¶ 129). Further, it alleges that the putative class size is "in the thousands." (Id.) Accordingly, the Complaint alleges that the aggregate number of putative class members is greater than 100 persons, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
- 12. **The Parties are Minimally Diverse**. CAFA requires minimal diversity. That is, at least one putative class member must be a citizen of a state different from any one defendant. 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A).
- 13. Defendants Ruby Corp. and Ruby Life Inc. are organized under the laws of Canada and are headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, from where Ruby Corp. and Ruby Life Inc.'s officers direct, control, and coordinate the companies' activities. ADL Media Inc. is organized under Delaware law and has its headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, from where ADL Media's officers direct, control, and coordinate the company's activities.
- 14. The named Plaintiff, Ashley Nichols, is a citizen and resident of San Diego County, California. (Compl. ¶ 28). Further, the putative class is limited to California residents. (Compl. ¶ 125). Accordingly, the requisite diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) is met.
- 15. **The Amount in Controversy Exceeds \$5 Million**. Under CAFA, the claims of the individual class members are aggregated to determine if the amount in controversy exceeds the required "sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(6). A defendant's notice of removal "need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold." *Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens*, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).

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- 16. Though the Complaint is silent as to the amount of damages sought, it is apparent from the allegations that, given the size of the putative class and the nature of the statutory damages sought, the amount in controversy here exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.
- The Complaint seeks to certify a statewide class of "[a]ll California 17. residents who received a false or deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mail . . . which advertised ashleymadison.com, since one year prior to the filing of this Action." (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 125).
- 18. Plaintiff and the putative class assert claims for money damages for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5, allegedly as a result of receiving unsolicited commercial e-mails from defendants, advertising ashleymadison.com. (Compl.  $\P\P$  125, 135-146).
- 19. The Complaint alleges that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 authorizes liquidated damages in the amount of \$1,000 per email received. Plaintiff individually alleges she received "at least four (4) unsolicited commercial emails," making her individual claim for damages, at minimum, \$4,000. (Compl. ¶ 6) (emphasis original).
- 20. Using Plaintiff's minimum estimate of 4 emails as a baseline, and calculating the damages at \$1,000 per email as alleged in the Complaint, the actual size of the class would only need to be 1,250 members to reach \$5,000,000.
- Here, the Complaint alleges that the size of the putative class is "in the 21. thousands," which is greater than 1,250 members. (Compl. ¶ 129).
- 22. Accordingly, the alleged statutory damages place the amount in controversy at an amount greater than \$5,000,000. This sum also does not take into account Plaintiff's purported request for disgorgement (Compl., Prayer For Relief, p. 25), which are aggregated to determine the amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and 1332(d)(6) ("In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and

costs.")

3	23. Accordingly, it is apparent from a plain reading of the Complaint that	
4	the amount in controversy here exceeds \$5,000,000.	
5	NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTY AND STATE COURT	
6	24. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Removing Defendants are serving	
7	written notification of the removal of this case on Plaintiff's counsel (identified	
8	below):	
9	Kazerouni Law Group, APC Abbas Kazerounian	
10	Clark R. Conforti	
11	245 Fischer Ave., Unit D1 Costa Mesa, CA 92626	
12	Costa 1405a, C/1 72020	
13	David J. McGlothlin, Esq. 2633 E. Indian School Rd., Ste. 460	
14	Phoenix, AZ 85016	
15	25. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Removing Defendants promptly wil	
16	file a Notification of Removal, attaching a copy of this Notice of Removal, with the	
17	Clerk of the Superior Court, San Diego County.	
18	CONCLUSION	
19	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453, Removing Defendan	
20	hereby remove this action from the Superior Court of the State of California, San	
21	Diego County, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of	
22	California.	
23	Data 1. Manual, 1.C. 2020 DDVAN CAVE I EICHTON DAIGNED I I D	
24	Dated: March 16, 2020 BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP	
25	By: <u>/s/ Linda C. Hsu</u>	
26	Zinda O. Hou	
27	Attorneys for Defendants RUBY CORP.; RUBY LIFE INC., and ADL MEDIA INC.	
28	7	
	NOTICE OF REMOVAL	
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## **EXHIBIT B**

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1	KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
2	Abbas Kazerounian, Esq. (SBN: 249203)
3	ak@kazlg.com Clark R. Conforti, Esq. (SBN: 317698)
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4	245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
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	Telephone: (800) 400-6808
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7	David J. McGlothlin, Esq. (SBN: 253265)
8	david@kazlg.com
	2633 E. Indian School Rd., Ste. 460
9	Phoenix, AZ 85016 Telephone: (602) 265-3332
10	Fax: (602) 230-4482
11	Attorneys for Plaintiff,
12	Ashley Nichols
1 4	
13	SUPERIOR COURT O
	l ser Emen cooki c

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

ASHLEY NICHOLS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUBY CORP., a Canadian corporation; RUBY LIFE INC., d/b/a AshleyMadison.com, a Canadian corporation; ADL MEDIA INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 37-2019-00057112-CL-MC-CTL

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA RESTRICTIONS ON UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAIL (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5)

[LIMITED CIVIL CASE TO BE RECLASSIFIED BY THIS PLEADING]

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

#### I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. Plaintiff ASHLEY NICHOLS ("Plaintiff") brings this Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant RUBY CORP., a Canadian corporation, RUBY LIFE INC., doing business as *AshleyMadison.com*, a Canadian corporation, and ADL MEDIA INC., a Delaware corporation and DOES 1-100 (collectively, "Defendant"), its related entities, subsidiaries and agents in knowingly, and/or willingly engaging in the unlawful practice of advertising in false and deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mails ("spams") in violation of California Business & Professions ("Bus. & Prof.) Code § 17529.5 ("Section 17529.5").
- 2. In 2003, the California Legislature found that "[r]oughly 40 percent of all e-mail traffic in the United States is comprised of unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements [] and industry experts predict that by the end of 2003 half of all e-mail traffic will be comprised of spam." *See* Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(a).
- 3. The California Legislature also found that spam e-mails do cause damage and acknowledged the cost of spam in the United States in 2003: "According to Ferris Research Inc., a San Francisco consulting group, spam will cost United States organizations more than ten billion dollars (\$10,000,000,000), including lost productivity and the additional equipment, software, and manpower needed to combat the problem. California is 12 percent of the United States population with an emphasis on technology business, and it is therefore estimated that spam costs California organizations well over 1.2 billion dollars (\$1,200,000,000)." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d).
- 4. However, since the California Legislature declared its findings regarding the cost of spam in 2003, the actual cost has increased dramatically. In 2012, the Journal of Economic Perspectives published an academic paper which estimated that e-mail spam cost American businesses and consumers roughly \$20 billion annually. *Rao, Justin M., and David H. Reiley.* 2012. "The Economics of Spam." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26 (3): 87-110.

5. As of November of 2018, spam e-mail messages accounted for 54.3 percent of the total e-mail traffic worldwide. *Symantec Corporation*, Monthly Threat Report (December 2018).

#### II. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

- 6. Plaintiff brings this Complaint, individually and on behalf of the putative class, against Defendant for advertising in *at least* four (4) unsolicited commercial emails<sup>1</sup> (*i.e.*, "spams") sent to Plaintiff's California email address beginning on or about October 2018.
- 7. The spam e-mails sent by Defendant and Defendant's marketing agents materially violated Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 because there was materially false and deceptive information contained in or accompanying the e-mail headers, specifically the use of third-party domain names in the Sender E-mail Address of each of the spam e-mails.
- 8. Specifically, the spam e-mails violate Section 17529.5(a)(1) because they contain or are accompanied by a third-party domain name without the permission of the third party. The third-party domain names used are *wsj.com* and *target.com*.
- 9. Moreover, the spam emails violate Section 17529.5(a)(2) because the emails contain or are accompanied by falsified, misrepresented, or forged header information in violation of Section 17529.5(a)(2) because the emails were sent from a generic "From Name" (e.g., "SecretAffair", "AM Promotions", "Ashley", "Jillian"), which all have untraceable domain names, and the sender's identity is not readily ascertainable from the emails.
- 10. Further, the spam emails violate Section 17529.5(a)(3) because they contain Subject Lines that are likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the content or subject matter of the email.
- 11. While many violations are described below with specificity, this Complaint alleges violations of the statutes in their entirety.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement" means that the recipient has not provided direct consent to receive advertisements from the advertiser and does not have a preexisting or current business relationship, as defined by subdivision (*l*), with the advertiser promoting the lease, sale, rental, gift, offer or other disposition of any property, goods, services, or extension of credit. *See* Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(o)(1)-(2).

- 12. All of the offending spam e-mails were sent to a California e-mail address. <sup>2</sup>
- 13. Plaintiff never gave "direct consent" as required by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(d) to receive commercial e-mail advertisements from, or had a "preexisting or current business relationship" <sup>4</sup> pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(*l*) with Defendant.
- 14. Defendant is strictly liable for advertising in spams sent by its third-party marketing agents, as are the marketing agents themselves. Third-party marketing agents are also liable.
- 15. Spam recipients are not required to allege or prove reliance or actual damages to have standing. *See* Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(A)(iii). Nevertheless, Plaintiff did suffer damages by receiving the spams. *See*, *e.g.*, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d), (e), (g), (h). However, Plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages only and forego recovery of any actual damages. *See* Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B).
- 16. The unlawful elements of these spams represent willful acts of falsity and deception, rather than clerical errors.
- 17. This Court should award Plaintiff and the members of the proposed Class liquidated statutory damages against Defendant in the amount of \$1,000 per unlawful spam e-mail, as authorized by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii).
- 18. This Court should award Plaintiff attorneys' fees pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(C).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "California electronic mail address" or "California e-mail address" means any of the following: (1) an e-mail address furnished by an electronic mail service provider that sends bills for furnishing and maintaining that e-mail address in this state; (2) an e-mail address ordinarily accessed from a computer located in this state; or (3) an e-mail address furnished to a resident of this state. *See* Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "Direct consent" means that the recipient has expressly consented to receive e-mail advertisements *from the advertiser*, either in response to a clear and conspicuous request for the consent or at the recipient's own initiative. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(d) (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "Preexisting or current business relationship," as used in connection with the sending of a commercial e-mail advertisement, means that the recipient has made an inquiry and has provided his or her e-mail address, or has made an application, purchase, or transaction, with or without consideration, regarding products or services offered by the advertiser. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(*l*).

#### III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 19. This Court has jurisdiction over the Action because Plaintiff and the proposed class are located in California where the unlawful emails were received, and this is a civil action wherein the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds \$25,000.
- 20. This Court has jurisdiction over the Action because Plaintiff is domiciled in and a citizen of California, and Plaintiff received the unlawful spams in California.
- 21. Plaintiff is a California resident who received the emails in California and has thus been harmed in California.
- 22. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in California and throughout the United States and has created an ongoing relationship in California related to the distribution of the spam emails.
- 23. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant advertised in numerous spam emails sent to California residents, including Plaintiff.
- 24. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant hired, conspired, partnered or joint ventured with unknown third parties to send these spam emails to California residents, including Plaintiff, in order to advertise its products and/or services.
- 25. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant was aware or should have been aware that its agents, co-conspirators, partners, joint venturers were sending spam emails advertising their services to California residents.
- 26. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant created and engaged in an ongoing relationship in California related to the distribution of the spam emails.
- 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant caused to be sent numerous spam emails to the email servers of Yahoo! Inc. Yahoo! Inc. is a Delaware Corporation with email servers in Sunnyvale, California.

#### IV. PARTIES

#### A. Plaintiff ASHLEY NICHOLS

28. Plaintiff is now, and at all times relevant has been, an individual domiciled in the State of California, County of San Diego.

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- 29. Plaintiff owns and at all relevant times herein owned a computer with an Internet connection. This computer is located in the State of California.
- 30. Plaintiff ordinarily uses this computer to access Plaintiff's e-mail address anichols\*\*\*\*@yahoo.com and ashley.\*\*\*\*\*\*@yahoo.com.5
- 31. Plaintiff ordinarily accesses these e-mail accounts from California.
- 32. Plaintiff is a "recipient" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(m) of "unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(o).
- 33. Plaintiff received unlawful unsolicited commercial emails (defined above as "spams) linking to Defendant's web page at AshleyMadison.com. Plaintiff did not give direct consent to any of the Defendants to send Plaintiff any commercial email advertising.

#### B. Defendant RUBY CORP.

- 34. Defendant RUBY CORP., formerly known as Avid Life Media Inc., is a privately-held corporation with its principal place of business at 2300 Yonge St., #1400, Toronto, ON M4R 1K8.
- 35. At all times material to this Complaint, RUBY CORP. has acted as a holding company for a number of entities that operate dating websites. RUBY CORP. transacts or has transacted business in California and throughout the United States and has created an ongoing relationship in California related to the distribution of the spam emails.
- RUBY CORP. is an "advertiser" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(a) in each of 36. the e-mails received by Plaintiff.

#### C. Defendant RUBY LIFE INC.

Defendant RUBY LIFE INC., doing business as AshleyMadison.com, and formerly known 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Plaintiff's e-mail address has been partially redacted for privacy and will be made available to Defendant(s) when an appearance is made in this matter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "Recipient" means the addressee of an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement. If an addressee of an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement has one or more e-mail addresses to which an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement is sent, the addressee shall be deemed to be a separate recipient for each e-mail address to which the e-mail advertisement is sent. See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(m).

- as Avid Dating Life Inc., is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business at 20 Eglinton Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario M4R 1K8.
- 38. At all times material to this Complaint, RUBY LIFE INC. has owned and operated the Ashley Madison website. RUBY LIFE INC. transacts or has transacted business in California and throughout the United States and has created an ongoing relationship in California related to the distribution of the spam emails.
- 39. RUBY LIFE INC. is an "advertiser" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(a) in each of the e-mails received by Plaintiff.

#### D. Defendant ADL MEDIA INC.

- 40. Defendant ADL Media Inc. ("ADL Media") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. At all times material to this Complaint, ADL Media has collected U.S. revenue for *AshleyMadison.com* from various payment processors. ADL Media transacts or has transacted business in California and throughout the United States and has created an ongoing relationship in California related to the distribution of the spam emails.
- 41. RUBY CORP. is a privately-held holding company for various wholly-owned subsidiaries, including RUBY LIFE. INC. and ADL MEDIA INC., that together operate a number of dating websites including *AshleyMadison.com*, *CougarLife.com*, and *EstablishedMen.com*
- 42. ADL MEDIA INC. is an "advertiser" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(a) in each of the e-mails received by Plaintiff.

#### E. DOE Defendants

- 43. Plaintiff does not know the true names or legal capacities of the Defendants designated herein as DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and therefore sue said Defendants under the fictitious name of "DOE."
- 44. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible in some manner for the matters alleged in this Complaint, and is legally responsible in some manner for causing the injuries and damages of which Plaintiff complains.

45. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE Defendant was, at all times relevant to the matters alleged within this Complaint, acting in conjunction with the named Defendants, whether as a director, officer, employee, agent, affiliate, customer, participant, or co-conspirator. When the identities of DOE Defendants 1-100 are discovered, or otherwise made available, Plaintiff will seek to amend this Complaint to allege their identity and involvement with particularity.

#### IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

- 46. "A 'domain name' is defined by an 'alphanumeric designation that is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar as part of an electronic address on the Internet." 

  \*Balsam v. Trancos, Inc., 203 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1090 fn. 6 (quoting Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1 subd. (e).)
- 47. "WHOIS" refers to the means of determining the identity of a domain registrant. "Technically, WHOIS is not the database, itself, but a protocol for submitting a query to a database in order to find contact information for the owner of a domain name." Solid Host NL v. NameCheap, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 2d 1092, 1095 fn. 3 (citing Matthew Bierlin & Gregory Smith, Privacy Year in Review: Growing Problems with Spyware and Phishing, Judicial and Legislative Developments in Internet Governance, and the Impacts on Privacy, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 279, 313 (2005).)

"To secure the creation, registration, and use of a domain name, one must first assent to the registrar's contract. In addition to the payment of a small fee, the contract requires a potential registrant to agree to (1) provide and maintain current and accurate identifying information..." *In re Forchion*, 198 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1308-09 (2011).

#### V. THE UNLAWFUL SPAM E-MAILS

- 48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.
- 49. Plaintiff received *at least* four (4) spams advertising Defendant's websites at Plaintiff's California e-mail address.

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- 50. The e-mails at issue are "commercial e-mail advertisements" because they advertise Internet dating services provided by Defendant at the website AshleyMadison.com and were initiated for the purpose of advertising and promoting Defendant's products or services.
- The e-mails are "unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements" because Plaintiff never 51. gave "direct consent" to Defendant, or any of its affiliates to send commercial e-mails.
- 52. Plaintiff has never had a "preexisting or current business relationship" with Defendant, or its affiliates.
- 53. Plaintiff did not opt-in to receive e-mails from Defendant's marketing agents. Even if Plaintiff had opted in to receive e-mails from Defendant's marketing agents—which Plaintiff denies—that would not constitute *direct* consent to Defendant, the advertiser in the spams. See Balsam v. Trancos Inc., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1099-1100 (1st Dist. 2012).
- 54. Plaintiff did not consent or acquiesce to receive the spams at issue. Plaintiff did not waive any claims related to the spams at issue.
- 55. Defendant advertised in, sent, and/or conspired to send at least four (4) unlawful spams that Plaintiff received at Plaintiff's "California e-mail address."
- 56. The spams are all unlawful because the spams contain or are accompanied by materially false and deceptive information, such as the use of third-party domain names without the third party's permission, and/or falsified, misrepresented, or forged information contained in or accompanying the e-mail headers, and/or misleading Subject Lines, as described in more detail below.

## A. The Spam E-mails Contain or Are Accompanied By Third-Party Domain Names Without The Permission of the Third Party in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(1)

57. Section 17529.5(a)(1) prohibits spams containing or accompanied by a third party's domain name without the permission of the third party.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> "Commercial e-mail advertisement" means any electronic mail message initiated for the purpose of advertising or promoting the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of any property, goods, services, or extension of credit. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.1(c).

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- 58. Two of the four spam e-mails received by Plaintiff contain third-party domain names in the From field of the spam e-mails. These From fields were all forged to falsely include the third-party domain names in the Sender E-mail Addresses. The forged Sender E-mail Addresses are *orders@oe.target.com* and *access@interactive.wsj.com*.
- 59. These third-party domain names were contained in the Sender E-mail Address field in each of the spam e-mail headers.
- 60. The "From" line field is part of e-mail headers. The From line has two distinctive parts: (1) the From Name, and (2) the Sender E-mail Address. For example, if an e-mail's "From" 'line states: "John Doe <johndoe@yahoo.com>", the From Name is "John Doe" and the Sender E-mail Address is "<johndoe@yahoo.com>."
- 61. The From Name in an e-mail's header is designed to identify who the e-mail is from. The Internet Engineering Task Force created a collection of "Requests for Comment" ("RFCs") that define the rules and standard protocols that enable e-mail to work. According to RFC 5322 at ¶ 3.6.2 (emphasis in original):

The "From:" field specifies the author(s) of the message, that is, the mailbox(es) of the person(s) or system(s) responsible for the writing of the message. . . . In all cases, the "From:" field SHOULD NOT contain any mailbox that does not belong to the author(s) of the message.

- 62. The only content of a "From" line visible before an e-mail is opened is the "From Name." Therefore, a From Name that misrepresents who a spam is from is a deliberate and material misrepresentation of the most important part of the e-mail header—not a mere clerical error.
- 63. Although Plaintiff does not bring any claims under the federal CAN-SPAM Act, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") identified the From Name as the first item in misleading header information in its guide to CAN-SPAM compliance when it stated: "Don't use false or misleading header information. Your "From," "To," "Reply-To," and routing information – including the originating domain name and e-mail address – must be

- accurate and identify the person or business who initiated the message." Federal Trade Commission, CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business (emphasis added).<sup>8</sup>
- 64. Plaintiff does not insist on any particular label (*e.g.*, "Ashley Madison," "Ruby Life," "Ruby Corp.," etc.) in the From Name field. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the text of a From Name field, whatever it is, cannot misrepresent *who* the e-mails are from.
- 65. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the emails at issue here falsely list domain names owned by third parties without the permission of the third parties.
- 66. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant uses third-party domain names to deceive recipients into believing that these third parties have endorsed or approved of Defendant's products and/or services.
- 67. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant uses these third-party domain names to use the good will of these third parties to trick the recipients into opening the emails and purchasing Defendant's products and/or services.
- 68. The third-party domain name *target.com* is contained in one of the spam e-mails at issue. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that third party Target Brands Inc. is the true owner of the domain name and did not give permission for its domain to appear in or accompany any of the spams at issue in this complaint.
- 69. The third-party domain name *wsj.com* is contained in one of the spam e-mails at issue. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that third party Dow Jones & Company, Inc. is the true owner of the domain name and did not give permission for its domain to appear in or accompany any of the spams at issue in this complaint.
- 70. Plaintiff could see the third parties' domain names when Plaintiff viewed the spam e-mails on Plaintiff's computer.
- 71. There is no readily discernible connection between the above entities and Defendant and no evidence that these entities consented to Defendant's use of their domain names in connection with the sending of the emails at issue, in violation of Section 17529.5(a)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus61-can-spam-act-compliance-guide-business.

- Nothing indicates that these third parties use affiliate marketers or have an affiliate program for advertising business for other websites, such as Defendant's websites.
- 72. Such unauthorized use of third parties' domain names without permission is materially false and deceptive. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant and/or its marketing agents included the third-party domain names in order to: falsely lend an air of legitimacy to the spams by leveraging the brand equity of legitimate advertisers, making the recipients believe that the third-party endorses Defendant; and trick recipients and e-mail filters as to the source of the spam e-mails. If Defendant and its marketing agents used their own domain names, it would be more likely that spam filters and recipients would be able to identify the domain names as being associated with spammers, and block or disregard the spams. On the other hand, e-mails purportedly sent by the third party are more likely to be treated as legitimate e-mails and not spams, and therefore not blocked by e-mail filters or disregarded by recipients.
- 73. The unsolicited commercial emails Plaintiff received from Defendant violate Section 17529.5(a)(1) because the e-mail advertisements contain or are accompanied by a third-party's domain name without the permission of the third party, which misrepresents the identity of the sender, misappropriates the identity of the true owner of the third-party domain name, and falsely represents that the sender has a legitimate relationship with the third-party domain name's true owner.
- 74. Moreover, the emails Plaintiff received did not actually come from the purported domain names, and thus contain materially false, forged, deceptive, or misleading information in violation of Section 17529.5. *See Silverstein v. Keynetics, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180174 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
- 75. The emails Plaintiff received were also materially false and deceptive because they were falsified, forged, or misrepresented to indicate that the sender was an actual person or entity known to Plaintiff, when the emails were, in fact, nothing but advertisements sent by Defendant or its agents. *See Hoang v. Reunion.com, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34466 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

- 76. Furthermore, since these spam e-mails were not actually sent from the domain names that appear in the Sender E-mail Addresses, the spam e-mails misrepresented the sender of the spam e-mails through the use of falsified and forged information.
  - B. The Spam E-mails Contain Header Information That Is Materially Falsified or Misrepresented Because They Use Sender Domain Names That Neither Identify the Actual Sender Nor Are Readily Traceable to the Sender in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(2)
- 77. In addition to the two emails that contained forged third-party domain names that misrepresented the sender of the spam emails, the spam emails Plaintiff received included e-mail advertisements that contained or were accompanied by materially falsified, misrepresented, or forged header information in violation of Section 17529.5(a)(2) because they include a generic From Name, an untraceable sending domain name, and no information in the body which could be used to identify the sender or advertiser.
- 78. Plaintiff received spam e-mails from sender domain names that did not identify the actual sender and which were not readily traceable to the sender from the body of the spam e-mails or by using a publicly available online database, such as WHOIS.
- 79. Defendant engaged in acts of material falsity and deception by deliberately using untraceable, privately and/or "proxy" registered domain names to conceal its identity from the recipients of its spams.
- 80. The senders of the spam e-mails deliberately registered the domain names in a manner that prevents recipients from identifying who actually sent the e-mail, and are materially false and deceptive.
- 81. Thus, the untraceable domain names used in the spam e-mails advertising Defendant affirmatively and falsely represent both the identity of the sender and that the sender has no connection to Defendant. *See Balsam v. Trancos, Inc.*, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1098.
- 82. Furthermore, since these spam e-mails were not actually sent from the domain names that appear in the Sender E-mail Addresses, the spam e-mails misrepresented the sender of the spam e-mails through the use of falsified, misrepresented, and forged information.

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i.	The Spam E-mails Contain or Are Accompanied By Generic or False "From		
	Names" That Do Not Identify the Sender and Misrepresent Who Is Advertising in		
	the Spams in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(2)		

- 83. Section 17529.5(a)(2) prohibits spams containing or accompanied by falsified, misrepresented, or forged header information.
- 84. All of the spam e-mails that Plaintiff received advertising Defendant's websites contained forged, falsified, or misrepresented header information and had From Names that misrepresented who the spams were from, and therefore violated Section 17529.5(a)(2).
- 85. Here, all the spam emails at issue include generic From Names (e.g. "SecretAffair", "AM Promotions", "Jillian", and "Ashley"). These generic From Names misrepresent who is advertising in the email, and therefore violate Section 17529.5(a)(2).
- 86. The use of these generic From Names is false and misleading because they do not identify the sending party or advertiser and cannot be readily traced back to the true owner/sender. The use of these From Names is also intended to prevent recipients from being able to identify Defendant as the true source of the emails.
- 87. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant knowingly choose to advertise using generic From Names precisely so the recipients will not know who the emails are really from when viewing the spams in the inbox view. This forces recipients to open the emails to see if the emails might actually be from someone with whom the recipient has had dealings, or if the emails are in fact, as is the case here, nothing but spams.
- 88. Defendant intentionally used privately registered, proxy-registered, or fraudulently registered domain names in order to prevent spam e-mail recipients from being able to identify Defendant as the sender or to contact Defendant regarding the unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements.
- 89. There is no way that ordinary, reasonable consumers, looking at the same or similar emails, could readily associate them with Defendant, the true advertiser and beneficiary of the spam emails, and the sender's identity is not readily ascertainable from the body or content

- 90. These generic, forged, falsified, or misrepresented From Names are utterly ambiguous as to *who* the spam e-mails are from, and contain misrepresented information because the spams are not from these purported senders. In fact, the spams could just as easily have come from Defendant's competitors or some other entity or individual.
- 91. In *Rosolowski v. Guthy-Renker LLC*, the court permitted From Names that were not the sender's official corporate name as long as the identity of the sender was readily ascertainable in the body. 230 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1407, 1416 (2d Dist. 2014). However, the From Names in that case (Proactiv and Wen Hair Care) were the advertiser's fanciful trademarks and well-known brands with their own websites. But here, unlike the spams in *Rosolowski*, the From Names are generic and are not well-known trademarks or brands readily associated with Defendant. There is no way an ordinary consumer, looking at the same or similar email From Name in their inbox, could readily associate them with Defendant.

# ii. The Spam E-mails Contain or Are Accompanied By Generic or False "From Names" That Do Not Identify the Sender and Misrepresent Who Is Advertising in the Spams in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(2)

- 92. Section 17529.5(a)(2) prohibits falsified, misrepresented, or forged information contained in or accompanying e-mail headers.
- 93. Registration information for the domain names used to send spams is information contained in or accompanying e-mail headers.
- 94. "[H]eader information in a commercial e-mail is falsified or misrepresented for purposes of Section 17529.5(a)(2) when it uses a sender domain name that *neither* identifies the actual sender on its face *nor* is readily traceable to the sender using a publicly available online database such as WHOIS" and the sender's identity is not readily ascertainable from the body of the e-mail. *See Balsam*, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1101 (emphasis in original); *Rosolowski*, 230 Cal. App. 4th at 1417.

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- 95. All of the spams that Plaintiff received advertising Defendant were sent from domain names that were "proxy" registered, fraudulently registered, or unregistered, and thus were not readily traceable to the sender by querying the WHOIS database, in violation of Section 17529.5. See Balsam, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1097-1101.
- 96. Plaintiff could not identify Defendant or its spamming affiliates who sent the spams at issue by querying the WHOIS database for the domain names used to send the spam e-mails at issue.
- 97. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that there is no database online where an email recipient could find any Defendant by searching for or tracing the From Names.
- 98. Thus, the spam e-mails received by Plaintiff advertising Defendant were not readily traceable to the sender by querying the WHOIS database, in violation of Section 17529.5. Balsam, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1097-1101.
- 99. Here, the From Name fields in the headers of the spam e-mails contained or were accompanied by generic From Names that neither disclose the true sender's identity nor permit the recipient to readily identify the sender. Therefore, such header information is deceptive and *does* constitute a falsification or misrepresentation of the sender's identity in violation of Section 17529.5(a)(2). See Balsam, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1097.

### C. The Spam Emails Have Subject Lines That Are Materially Misleading Relative to the Contents of the Emails in Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17529.5(a)(3)

- 100. Section 17529.5(a)(3) prohibits Subject Lines that are likely to mislead a reasonable recipient relative to the contents or subject matter of the e-mails.
- 101. Defendant advertised in spam e-mails that had Subject Lines that are likely to mislead a recipient acting reasonably under the circumstances about a material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the e-mails.
- 102. All of the spams that Plaintiff received contain misleading Subject Lines. Examples include: "Talk to bored women who want to meet!"; "send me a message if u want to hangout..."; "Hey! are u still looking for a f\*ckbuddy?"; and "You have been given something special". These Subject Lines were misleading relative to the subject matter of

- 103. The spams received by Plaintiff are materially false and likely to mislead a recipient into believing that an actual person sent the spams, when they are nothing but commercial advertisements sent by Defendant and/or its marketing affiliates.
- 104. The Subject Line "send me a message if u want to hangout..." is found in one of the spam e-mails. The completely blank body of the same e-mail contains no visible text or remote image. This Subject Line is materially misleading because it is written in the first person—inferring that a person desires to "hangout" with the e-mail recipient and that all the recipient must do to "hangout" is to send a message. However, the truth is that the sender is a marketing agent that is not sending the recipient a friendly message to which the recipient could respond—but rather attempting to drive internet traffic to Defendants' website with a motive to make a profit.
- 105. The Subject Line "You have been given something special" is found in one of the spam e-mails. Additionally, the only text found in the e-mail body is "Browse and meet new women right now!". No remote image is visible in the e-mail body. This Subject Line is materially misleading because it implies that the sender knows the recipient personally—which the sender does not. Further, the Subject Line implies that a free gift or special offer is available to the recipient, however nothing special has been given or offered to the recipient—at least nothing that the sender is aware of. Additionally, when the hyperlinked text is clicked and followed to the Defendants' website, there is no "special" gift offer.
- 106. The Subject Line "You have been given something special" implies that the recipient has received a gift or promotion when no such offer actually exists.
- 107. The Subject Line "Hey!\_are\_u\_still\_looking\_for\_a\_f\*ckbuddy?" and "send me a message if u want to hangout..." implies that Plaintiff has submitted a request when no such submission or relationship ever existed and no such solicitation was ever made by Plaintiff. Moreover, these emails were not sent by actual women seeking relationships with Plaintiff, but rather were sent by Defendant and/or its marketing affiliates.
- 108. Thus, each of the Subject Lines, even when viewed in conjunction with the body of the e-

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mail, is materially false and deceptive and likely to mislead a recipient acting reasonably about a material fact regarding the content or subject matter of the message.

#### D. Defendant is Strictly Liable for the Spam E-mails Sent By its Marketing Agents

- 109. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant contracted with thirdparty advertising networks and affiliates to advertise its websites for the purpose of selling products and services for a profit.
- 110. Defendant knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily chose to outsource their advertising to third-party spam networks and spammers.
- Advertisers are liable for advertising in spam e-mails, even if third parties sent the e-mails: 111.

"There is a need to regulate the advertisers who use spam, as well as the actual spammers because the actual spammers can be difficult to track down due to some return addresses that show up on the display as 'unknown' and many others being obvious fakes and they are often located offshore. The true beneficiaries of spam are the advertisers who benefit from the marketing derived from the advertisements." (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(j)(k).) "It is unlawful [] to advertise in a commercial e-mail advertisement [] under any of the following circumstances..."

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 (emphasis added). Thus, Defendant's agents are also liable for sending the unlawful spams.

- 112. Section 17529.5(a) "makes an entity strictly liable for advertising in a commercial e-mail ... regardless of whether the entity knew that such e-mails had been sent or had any intent to deceive the recipient." Hypertouch Inc. v. ValueClick Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 805, 820-21 (2011) (emphasis added).
- 113. In fact, in Hypertouch, the court of appeal held that advertisers are strictly liable for advertising in false and deceptive spams, even if the spams were sent by third-parties.

[S]ection 17529.5 makes it unlawful for a person or entity "to advertise in a commercial e-mail advertisement" that contains any of the deceptive statements described in *subdivisions* (a)(1)-(3). Thus, by its plain terms, the statute is not limited to entities that actually send or initiate a deceptive commercial e-mail, but applies more broadly to any entity that advertises in those e-mails.

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Thus, like other California statutes prohibiting false or misleading business practices, the statute makes an entity *strictly liable* for advertising in a commercial e-mail that violates the substantive provisions described in section 17529.5, subdivision (a) *regardless* of whether the entity knew that such e-mails had been sent or had any intent to deceive the recipient.

- *Id.* at 820-21. The court did not find that this was an arbitrary requirement; rather, the court identified sound policy reasons behind the Legislature's decision to create a strict liability statute. *Id.* at 829.
- 114. Moreover, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant and/or Defendant's affiliates and/or Defendant's marketing agents intended to deceive recipients of their spam messages through the use of falsified, misrepresented, and/or misleading information in third-party domain names, From Names, domain name registrations, and Subject Lines, as described herein.
- 115. Forged Sender E-mail Addresses do not write themselves. The false and misrepresented information contained in and accompanying the e-mail headers are not "clerical errors." Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant and/or Defendant's affiliates and/or Defendant's marketing agents went to great lengths to create falsified and misrepresented information contained in and accompanying the e-mail headers in order to materially deceive recipients, Internet Service Providers, and spam filters.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant has knowledge that its affiliates/marketing agents engage in the sending of false and deceptive spam.
- 117. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant and its marketing agents intended to profit, actually profited, and continue to profit, and were unjustly enriched by, their wrongful conduct as described herein.

# D. No Proof of Reliance or Actual Damages is Necessary Because Plaintiff Sues for Statutory <u>Liquidated Damages</u>

- 118. The California Legislature set liquidated damages as \$1,000 per spam. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii).
- 119. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the \$1,000 per spam figure is

- comparable with damages in other areas of consumer protection law, e.g., \$500-\$1,500 statutory damages per junk fax, pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17538.43(b).
- 120. Plaintiff's rightful and lawful demand for liquidated damages in the amount of \$1,000 per e-mail is necessary to further the California Legislature's objective of protecting California residents from unlawful spam.
- 121. Section 17529.5 does not require Plaintiff to quantify their actual damages, allege or prove reliance on the advertisements contained in the spams, or purchase the goods and services advertised in the spams. Recipients of unlawful spam have standing to sue and recover liquidated damages. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(A)(iii); *Hypertouch*, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 820, 822-23, 828.
- 122. However, Plaintiff did suffer damages by receiving the unlawful spams advertising Defendant's products and services in the state of California, at their California e-mail addresses. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d), (e), (g), (h). Regardless, Plaintiff does not seek actual damages in this Action, only liquidated damages. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B).
- 123. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant has not established and implemented, with due care, practices and procedures reasonably designed to effectively prevent unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements that are in violation of Section 17529.5.

#### VI. <u>CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS</u>

- 124. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.
- 125. Plaintiff bring this action for statutory liquidated damages on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff seek to represent a statewide Class defined as follows:

All California residents who received a false or deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mail that (1) contains or is accompanied by a third-party domain name without the third-party's permission, (2) contains or is accompanied by falsified, misrepresented, or forged header information, or (3) has a subject line likely to mislead a recipient, which advertised ashleymadison.com, since one year prior to the filing of this Action.

- 126. Excluded from the Class are (1) Defendant's officers, directors, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns; and (2) any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff.
- 127. **Ascertainability.** At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the Class, but believes that there are thousands of members of the Class within the State of California.
- 128. Upon information and belief, Defendant and Defendant's agents/affiliates maintain records of the e-mails they send and the Internet traffic derived from the e-mail advertising at issue. Moreover, members of the Class who received e-mails with the alleged advertisements may be self-identified through their own e-mail records. Thus, the members of the Class are ascertainable through Defendant's records and/or the records of Defendant's agents/affiliates, as well as through public notice. This matter should therefore be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.
- Numerosity. The proposed Class is so numerous that individual joinder of all its members is impracticable. Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, however, Plaintiff believes that the total number of the members of the Class is in the thousands. Members of the Class are numerous and geographically dispersed across the state of California. While the exact number and identities of the Class's members are unknown at this time, such information can be ascertained through appropriate investigation and discovery.
- 130. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the Class and these common questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual Class members. Common questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - a. Whether Class members received unsolicited commercial e-mail advertising the website *ashleymadison.com*.

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- b. Whether Defendant obtained direct consent to send commercial e-mail to Class members.
- Whether Defendant had no preexisting or current business relationship with Class members.
- Whether the unsolicited commercial e-mails received by Class members contain or are accompanied by a third-party domain name without the permission of the third party.
- Whether the unsolicited commercial e-mails received by Class members contain or are accompanied by falsified, forged, or misrepresented header information.
- Whether the manner in which the domain names used to send the emails received by Class Members prevents members of the public from knowing the true ownership of the domain.
- Whether the unsolicited commercial e-mails received by Class members have subject lines likely to mislead a recipient acting reasonably under the circumstances.
- Whether the information contained in the e-mail received by Class members is forged, falsified, misrepresented, deceptive, or misleading in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5.
- Whether Defendant is liable under Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5 for the actions of its affiliates, advertisers, employees or agents, who sent unlawful spams advertising ashleymadison.com.
- 131. **Typicality.** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been similarly affected by Defendant's common course of conduct since they all received unlawful, unsolicited spam e-mails that contain thirdparty domain names without the third party's permission and advertise ashleymadison.com.
- 132. **Adequacy.** Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests adverse to that of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in handling complex class action litigation and prosecuting actions related to consumer protection—including anti-spam litigation.

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- **Superiority.** A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy. Individual joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Even if individual Class members had the resources to pursue individual litigation, it would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which the individual litigation would proceed. Individual litigation magnifies the delay and expense to all parties in the court system of resolving the controversies engendered by Defendant's common course of conduct. The class action device allows a single court to provide the benefits of unitary adjudication, judicial economy, and the fair and efficient handling of all Class members' claims in a single forum. The conduct of this action as a class action conserves the resources of the parties and of the judicial system and protects the rights of the Class members. Furthermore, for many, if not most, a class action is the only feasible mechanism that allows an opportunity for legal redress and justice. Adjudication of individual Class members' claims with respect to the Defendant would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication, and could substantially impair or impede the ability of other Class members to protect their interests.
- 134. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that are generally applicable to the Class so that relief is appropriate to the Class as a whole, making class certification appropriate pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Violations of California Restrictions on Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, California Business & Professions Code § 17529.5 (Against All Defendants)

- Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though set forth in full herein. 135.
- 136. Plaintiff received the spam e-mails within one year prior to filing this Complaint.
- 137. Defendant advertised in, sent, assisted others in sending, conspired to send, contracted with others to send, and/or otherwise caused to be sent at least four (4) unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements to Plaintiff's California electronic mail addresses and California Class members' e-mail addresses that had materially falsified, forged and/or misrepresented information contained in or accompanying the e-mail headers, and third-

- party domain names without the permission of the third party, in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5.
- 138. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that all of the emails use hypertext markup language ("HTML") in the body which reference remote images, which are not part of the email body but rather a link to a web server that could be anywhere on the Internet and controlled by any unknown third party. Many email clients automatically block remote images preventing recipients from seeing the sender upon initially opening the email.
- 139. Remote images are not actually part of the email body, but rather a link to a web server that could be anywhere on the Internet and controlled by Defendant or an unknown third party. *See ZooBuh, Inc. v. Better Broadcasting, LLC* 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77033 \*22 n. 29 (D. Utah 2013).
- 140. Some spammers use remote hosted images to detect when emails are opened to detect active email addresses so that the spammer can either resell the email address and/or direct more emails to active email addresses which open emails.
- 141. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that most email clients, including Plaintiff's, automatically block remote hosted images in spam as a security measure to prevent spammers from detecting active email addresses.
- 142. The use of remote hosted images permits the senders to make the emails "self-destructing" in order to hide the identities of the Defendant and to avoid responsibility for Defendant's deliberately misleading unsolicited email advertisements and illegal activities.
- 143. The unlawful elements of these spam e-mails represent willful acts of falsity and deception, rather than clerical errors.
- 144. The California Legislature set liquidated damages at One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000) per e-mail.
- 145. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as authorized by Section 17529.5(b)(1)(C).

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146. The attorneys' fees provision for a prevailing spam recipient is typical of consumer protection statutes and supported by Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. By prosecuting this action, Plaintiff expect to enforce an important right affecting the public interest and thereby confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. The necessity and financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make the award appropriate, and the attorneys' fees should not, in the interest of justice, be paid out of the recovery of damages.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for:

- An Order from this Court declaring that Defendant violated Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5, by advertising in and sending unlawful spam e-mails.
- Liquidated damages against Defendant in the amount of \$1,000 per unlawful spam e-mail, as authorized by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii) for each unlawful email received by Plaintiff and members of the Class.
- Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as authorized by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.5(b)(1)(C).
- Disgorgement of all profits derived from unlawful spams directed to California residents; monies to be turned over to the Unfair Competition Law Fund and used by the California Attorney General to support investigations and prosecutions of California's consumer protection laws.
- Costs of suit.
- Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

#### **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

147. Pursuant to the California Constitution and California Code of Civil Procedure § 631, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury.

## **ClassAction.org**

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>AshleyMadison.com Operators Hit with Class Action Over Alleged Spam Emails</u>