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13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 14 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

15 **Miles Murray,**  
 16 on behalf of himself and all others  
 17 similarly situated,

18 Plaintiff,

19 v.

20 **Phoenician Medical Center, Inc.**

21 Defendant.

Case No.

22 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

23 Plaintiff Miles Murray (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all similarly  
 24 situated persons, alleges the following against Phoenician Medical Center, Inc.  
 25 (“Phoenician Medical Center” or “Defendant”) based upon personal knowledge with  
 26 respect to himself and on information and belief derived from, among other things,  
 27 investigation by Plaintiff’s counsel and review of public documents as to all other matters:  
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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Plaintiff brings this class action against Phoenician Medical Center for its failure to properly secure and safeguard Plaintiff's and other similarly situated Phoenician Medical Center patients' personally identifiable information ("PII") and protected health information ("PHI"), including patient names, contact information, state identification, demographic information, date of birth, diagnosis and treatment information, prescription information, medical record numbers, provider name(s), date(s) of service, and health insurance information (the "Private Information"), from criminal hackers.

2. Phoenician Medical Center, based in Phoenix-Valley, is a healthcare corporation that serves tens of thousands of patients.

3. On March 31, 2023, Defendant learned of a data breach concerning its system's servers. In response, Defendant commenced an investigation which revealed that an unauthorized party had access to certain files that contained sensitive patient information (the "Data Breach").

4. On April 25, 2023, Defendant determined that protected health information relating to its current and former patients who were treated between 2016 and 2023 (including Plaintiff and Class Members) may have been accessed and acquired by the unauthorized party.

5. On or about June 30, 2023, Phoenician Medical Center sent out data breach letters (the "Notice") to individuals whose information was compromised as a result of the hacking incident.

6. Under state and federal law, organizations must report breaches involving protected health information, such as diagnosis and treatment information, prescription information, medical record numbers, provider name(s), date(s) of service, and health insurance information within at least sixty (60) days. Yet, Phoenician Medical Center waited nearly 90 days to notify the public that they were at risk.

1           7.       As a result of this delayed response, Plaintiff and “Class Members” (defined  
2 below) had no idea for 3 months that their Private Information had been compromised, and  
3 that Plaintiff and Class Members were, and continue to be, at significant risk of identity  
4 theft and various other forms of personal, social, and financial harm. The risk will remain  
5 for their respective lifetimes.

6           8.       The Private Information compromised in the Data Breach contained highly  
7 sensitive patient data, representing a gold mine for data thieves. The data included, but is  
8 not limited to, medical diagnosis and treatment information, prescription information,  
9 medical record numbers, provider name(s), date(s) of service, and health insurance  
10 information that Phoenician Medical Center collected and maintained.

11          9.       Armed with the Private Information accessed in the Data Breach (and a head  
12 start), data thieves can commit a variety of crimes, including, medical fraud and identity  
13 theft by using Class Members’ names, health insurance information, and medical record  
14 numbers to obtain medical services and/or prescription drugs.

15          10.      There has been no assurance offered by Phoenician Medical Center that all  
16 personal data or copies of data have been recovered or destroyed, or that Defendant has  
17 adequately enhanced its data security practices sufficient to avoid a similar breach of its  
18 network in the future.

19          11.      Therefore, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and are at an  
20 imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of suffering, ascertainable losses in  
21 the form of harm from medical identity theft and other fraudulent misuse of their Private  
22 Information, the loss of the benefit of their bargain, out-of-pocket expenses incurred to  
23 remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data Breach, and the value of their time reasonably  
24 incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data Breach.

25          12.      Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit to address Phoenician Medical  
26 Center’s inadequate safeguarding of Class Members’ Private Information that it collected  
27 and maintained, and its failure to provide timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff and Class  
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1 Members of the types of information that were accessed, and that such information was  
2 subject to unauthorized access by cybercriminals. .

3 13. The potential for improper disclosure and theft of Plaintiff's and Class  
4 Members' Private Information was a known risk to Phoenician Medical Center, and thus  
5 Phoenician Medical Center was on notice that failing to take necessary steps to secure the  
6 Private Information left it vulnerable to an attack.

7 14. Upon information and belief, Phoenician Medical Center and its employees  
8 failed to properly monitor and implement security practices with regard to the computer  
9 network and systems that housed the Private Information. Had Phoenician Medical Center  
10 properly monitored its networks, it would have discovered the Breach sooner.

11 15. Plaintiff's and Class Members' identities are now at risk because of  
12 Phoenician Medical Center's negligent conduct as the Private Information that Phoenician  
13 Medical Center collected and maintained is now in the hands of data thieves and other  
14 unauthorized third parties.

15 16. Plaintiff seeks to remedy this harm on behalf of himself and all similarly  
16 situated individuals whose Private Information was accessed and/or compromised during  
17 the Data Breach.

18 17. Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, asserts claims for  
19 negligence, negligence *per se*, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust  
20 enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and declaratory/injunctive  
21 relief.

## 22 II. PARTIES

23 18. Plaintiff Miles Murray, is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an  
24 individual citizen and resident of the State of Arizona.

25 19. Defendant Phoenician Medical Center is a healthcare corporation  
26 incorporated in Arizona, with its principal place of business at 1343 N Alma School Road  
27 #160, Chandler, AZ 85224 in Maricopa County.

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1 **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

2 20. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the Class  
3 Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy exceeds \$5  
4 million, exclusive of interest and costs. Upon information and belief, the number of class  
5 members is over 100, many of whom have different citizenship from Phoenician Medical  
6 Center. Thus, minimal diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).

7 21. This Court has jurisdiction over Phoenician Medical Center because  
8 Phoenician Medical Center operates in and/or is incorporated in this District.

9 22. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because a  
10 substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in this District and  
11 Phoenician Medical Center has harmed Class Members residing in this District.

12 **IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

13 ***A. Phoenician Medical Center's Business and Collection of Plaintiff's and Class***  
14 ***Members' Private Information***

15 23. Phoenician Medical Center is a healthcare corporation. Founded in 1997,  
16 Phoenician Medical Center has over 20+ locations in the United States, serving more than  
17 140,000 patients in Arizona.

18 24. As a condition of receiving healthcare related services, Phoenician Medical  
19 Center requires that its patients entrust it with highly sensitive personal and health  
20 information. In the ordinary course of receiving service from Phoenician Medical Center,  
21 Plaintiff and Class Members were required to provide their Private Information to  
22 Defendant.

23 25. In its HIPAA Notice of Privacy Practices which, upon information and belief,  
24 Phoenician Medical Center presented to all of its patients at the time of receiving healthcare  
25 services, promises its patients that it is committed to protecting its patients' personal and  
26 medical information and describes the limited specific instances when it shares patient  
27 health information with third parties (none of which are applicable here).

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1           26. Thus, due to the highly sensitive and personal nature of the information  
2 Phoenician Medical Center acquires and stores with respect to its patients, Phoenician  
3 Medical Center, upon information and belief, promises to, among other things: keep  
4 patients' Private Information private; comply with industry standards related to data  
5 security and the maintenance of its patients' Private Information; inform its patients of its  
6 legal duties relating to data security and comply with all federal and state laws protecting  
7 patients' Private Information; only use and release patients' Private Information for reasons  
8 that relate to the services it provides; and provide adequate notice to patients if their Private  
9 Information is disclosed without authorization.

10           27. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff's and  
11 Class Members' Private Information, Phoenician Medical Center assumed legal and  
12 equitable duties it owed to them and knew or should have known that it was responsible  
13 for protecting Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information from unauthorized  
14 disclosure and exfiltration.

15           28. Plaintiff and Class Members relied on Phoenician Medical Center to keep  
16 their Private Information confidential and securely maintained and to only make authorized  
17 disclosures of this Information, which Defendant ultimately failed to do.

18           ***B. The Data Breach and Defendant's Inadequate Notice to Plaintiff and Class***  
19           ***Members***

20           29. According to Defendant's Notice, it learned of unauthorized access to its  
21 computer systems on March 31, 2023.

22           30. Through the Data Breach, the unauthorized cybercriminal(s) accessed a  
23 cache of highly sensitive Private Information, including contact information, state  
24 identification, demographic information, date of birth, diagnosis and treatment  
25 information, prescription information, medical record numbers, provider name(s), date(s)  
26 of service, and health insurance information.

1           31. On or about June 30, 2023, roughly 3 months after Phoenician Medical  
2 Center learned that the Class’s Private Information was first accessed by cybercriminals,  
3 Phoenician Medical Center finally began to notify patients that its investigation determined  
4 that their Private Information was accessed and acquired.

5           32. Phoenician Medical Center had obligations created by contract, industry  
6 standards, common law, and representations made to Plaintiff and Class Members to keep  
7 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information confidential and to protect it from  
8 unauthorized access and disclosure.

9           33. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to  
10 Phoenician Medical Center with the reasonable expectation and mutual understanding that  
11 Phoenician Medical Center would comply with its obligations to keep such Private  
12 Information confidential and secure from unauthorized access and to provide timely notice  
13 of any security breaches.

14           34. Phoenician Medical Center’s data security obligations were particularly  
15 important given the substantial increase in cyberattacks in recent years.

16           35. Phoenician Medical Center knew or should have known that its electronic  
17 records would be targeted by cybercriminals.

18           ***C. The Healthcare Sector is Particularly Susceptible to Data Breaches***

19           36. Phoenician Medical Center was on notice that companies in the healthcare  
20 industry are susceptible targets for data breaches.

21           37. Phoenician Medical Center was also on notice that the FBI has been  
22 concerned about data security in the healthcare industry. In August 2014, after a  
23 cyberattack on Community Health Systems, Inc., the FBI warned companies within the  
24 healthcare industry that hackers were targeting them. The warning stated that “[t]he FBI  
25 has observed malicious actors targeting healthcare related systems, perhaps for the purpose  
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1 of obtaining the Protected Healthcare Information (PHI) and/or Personally Identifiable  
2 Information (PHI).”<sup>1</sup>

3 38. The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has also warned healthcare  
4 companies about the importance of protecting their patients’ confidential information:

5  
6 Cybersecurity is not just a technical issue; it’s a patient  
7 safety issue. AMA research has revealed that 83% of  
8 physicians work in a practice that has experienced some  
9 kind of cyberattack. Unfortunately, practices are  
10 learning that cyberattacks not only threaten the privacy  
11 and security of patients’ health and financial  
12 information, but also patient access to care.<sup>2</sup>

13 39. The healthcare sector reported the second largest number of data breaches  
14 among all measured sectors in 2018, with the highest rate of exposure per breach.<sup>3</sup> In 2022,  
15 the largest growth in compromises occurred in the healthcare sector.<sup>4</sup>

16 40. Indeed, when compromised, healthcare related data is among the most  
17 sensitive and personally consequential. A report focusing on healthcare breaches found that  
18 the “average total cost to resolve an identity theft-related incident ... came to about  
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21 <sup>1</sup> Jim Finkle, *FBI Warns Healthcare Firms that they are Targeted by Hackers*, Reuters (Aug. 2014), available at  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi/fbi-warns-healthcare-firms-they-are-targeted-by-hackers-idUSKBN0GK24U20140820> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

22 <sup>2</sup> Andis Robeznieks, *Cybersecurity: Ransomware attacks shut down clinics, hospitals*, Am. Med. Ass’n. (Oct. 4,  
23 2019), available at: <https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/cybersecurity-ransomware-attacks-shut-down-clinics-hospitals> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

24 <sup>3</sup> Identity Theft Resource Center, *2018 End-of-Year Data Breach Report*, available at:  
25 <https://www.idtheftcenter.org/2018-data-breaches/> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

26 <sup>4</sup> Identity Theft Resource Center, *2022 End-of-Year Data Breach Report*, available at:  
27 [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ITRC\\_2022-Data-Breach-Report\\_Final-1.pdf](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ITRC_2022-Data-Breach-Report_Final-1.pdf) (last  
28 visited on July 27, 2023).



1 \$20,000,” and that the victims were often forced to pay out-of-pocket costs for healthcare  
2 they did not receive in order to restore coverage.<sup>5</sup>

3 41. Almost 50 percent of the victims lost their healthcare coverage as a result of  
4 the incident, while nearly 30 percent said their insurance premiums went up after the event.  
5 Forty percent of the customers were never able to resolve their identity theft at all. Data  
6 breaches and identity theft have a crippling effect on individuals and detrimentally impact  
7 the economy as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

8 42. Healthcare related breaches have continued to rapidly increase because  
9 electronic patient data is seen as a valuable asset. “Hospitals have emerged as a primary  
10 target because they sit on a gold mine of sensitive personally identifiable information for  
11 thousands of patients at any given time. From social security and insurance policies, to next  
12 of kin and credit cards, no other organization, including credit bureaus, have so much  
13 monetizable information stored in their data centers.”<sup>7</sup>

14 43. As a healthcare provider, Phoenician Medical Center knew, or should have  
15 known, the importance of safeguarding its patients’ Private Information, including PHI,  
16 entrusted to it, and of the foreseeable consequences if such data were to be disclosed. These  
17 consequences include the significant costs that would be imposed on Phoenician Medical  
18 Center’s patients as a result of a breach. Phoenician Medical Center failed, however, to  
19 take adequate cybersecurity measures to prevent the Data Breach from occurring.  
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23 <sup>5</sup> Elinor Mills, *Study: Medical identity theft is costly for victims*, CNET (March 3, 2010), available at:  
24 <https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/study-medical-identity-theft-is-costly-for-victims/> (last visited on July 27,  
2023).

25 <sup>6</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>7</sup> Inside Digital Health, *How to Safeguard Hospital Data from Email Spoofing Attacks*, April 4, 2019, available at:  
27 <https://www.chiefhealthcareexecutive.com/view/how-to-safeguard-hospital-data-from-email-spoofing-attacks> (last  
28 visited on July 27, 2023).

1           ***D. Phoenician Medical Center Failed to Comply with HIPAA***

2           44. Title II of HIPAA contains what are known as the Administration  
3 Simplification provisions. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301, *et seq.* These provisions require that the  
4 Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) create rules to streamline the  
5 standards for handling PHI similar to the data Defendant left unguarded and vulnerable to  
6 attack. The HHS has subsequently promulgated five rules under authority of the  
7 Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA.

8           45. Phoenician Medical Center’s Data Breach resulted from a combination of  
9 insufficiencies that indicate Phoenician Medical Center failed to comply with safeguards  
10 mandated by HIPAA regulations and industry standards. First, it can be inferred from  
11 Phoenician Medical Center’s Data Breach that Phoenician Medical Center either failed to  
12 implement, or inadequately implemented, information security policies or procedures to  
13 protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PHI.

14           46. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information compromised in the Data  
15 Breach included “protected health information” as defined by CFR § 160.103.

16           47. 45 CFR § 164.402 defines “breach” as “the acquisition, access, use, or  
17 disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of  
18 this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information.”

19           48. 45 CFR § 164.402 defines “unsecured protected health information” as  
20 “protected health information that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable  
21 to unauthorized persons through the use of a technology or methodology specified by the  
22 [HHS] Secretary[.]”

23           49. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information included “unsecured  
24 protected health information” as defined by 45 CFR § 164.402.

25           50. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI was acquired, accessed, used,  
26 and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E, as a result of the Data  
27 Breach.

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1           51. Based upon Defendant’s Notice to Plaintiff and Class Members, Phoenician  
2 Medical Center reasonably believes that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI has  
3 been acquired, accessed, used, and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR,  
4 Subpart E, as a result of the Data Breach.

5           52. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI that was acquired, accessed,  
6 used, and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E as a result of  
7 the Data Breach was not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized  
8 persons.

9           53. Phoenician Medical Center reasonably believes that Plaintiff’s and Class  
10 Members’ unsecured PHI that was acquired, accessed, used, and/or disclosed in a manner  
11 not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E as a result of the Data Breach was not rendered  
12 unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized persons.

13           54. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI that was acquired, accessed,  
14 used, and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E as a result of  
15 the Data Breach, and which was not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to  
16 unauthorized persons, was viewed by unauthorized persons.

17           55. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI was viewed by unauthorized  
18 persons in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E as a result of the Data Breach.

19           56. Phoenician Medical Center reasonably believes that Plaintiff’s and Class  
20 Members’ unsecured PHI was viewed by unauthorized persons in a manner not permitted  
21 under 45 CFR, Subpart E as a result of the Data Breach.

22           57. It is reasonable to infer that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unsecured PHI  
23 that was acquired, accessed, used, and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45  
24 CFR, Subpart E as a result of the Data Breach, and which was not rendered unusable,  
25 unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized persons, was viewed by unauthorized  
26 persons.

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1           58. It should be rebuttably presumed that unsecured PHI acquired, accessed,  
2 used, and/or disclosed in a manner not permitted under 45 CFR, Subpart E, and which was  
3 not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized persons, was viewed  
4 by unauthorized persons.

5           59. After receiving notice that they were victims of the Data Breach (which  
6 required the filing of a data breach report in accordance with 45 CFR § 164.408(a)), it is  
7 reasonable for recipients of that notice, including Plaintiff and Class Members in this case,  
8 to believe that future harm (including medical identity theft) is real and imminent, and to  
9 take steps necessary to mitigate that risk of future harm.

10           60. In addition, Phoenician Medical Center's Data Breach could have been  
11 prevented if Phoenician Medical Center had implemented HIPAA mandated, industry  
12 standard policies and procedures for securely disposing of PHI when it was no longer  
13 necessary and/or had honored its obligations to its patients.

14           61. Phoenician Medical Center's security failures also include, but are not  
15 limited to:

- 16           a. Failing to maintain an adequate data security system to prevent data loss;
  - 17           b. Failing to mitigate the risks of a data breach and loss of data;
  - 18           c. Failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic protected  
19           health information Phoenician Medical Center creates, receives, maintains,  
20           and transmits in violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(1);
  - 21           d. Failing to implement technical policies and procedures for electronic  
22           information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to  
23           allow access only to those persons or software programs that have been  
24           granted access rights in violation of 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1);
  - 25           e. Failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and  
26           correct security violations in violation of 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1);
  - 27           f. Failing to identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents;
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- 1           g. Failing to mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security
- 2           incidents that are known to the covered entity, in violation of 45 CFR
- 3           164.308(a)(6)(ii);
- 4           h. Failing to protect against any reasonably-anticipated threats or hazards to the
- 5           security or integrity of electronic protected health information, in violation
- 6           of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(2);
- 7           i. Failing to protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of
- 8           electronic protected health information that are not permitted under the
- 9           privacy rules regarding individually identifiable health information, in
- 10          violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(3);
- 11          j. Failing to ensure compliance with HIPAA security standard rules by
- 12          Defendant’s workforce, in violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(94); and
- 13          k. Impermissibly and improperly using and disclosing protected health
- 14          information that is and remains accessible to unauthorized persons, in
- 15          violation of 45 CFR 164.502, *et seq.*

16           62. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 CFR §§ 164.400-414 also required  
 17   Phoenician Medical Center to provide notice of the Data Breach to each affected individual  
 18   “without unreasonable delay and *in no case later than 60 days following discovery of the*  
 19   *breach*” (emphasis added).

20           63. Because Phoenician Medical Center has failed to comply with HIPAA, while  
 21   monetary relief may cure some of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ injuries, injunctive relief  
 22   is also necessary to ensure Phoenician Medical Center’s approach to information security  
 23   is adequate and appropriate going forward. Phoenician Medical Center still maintains the  
 24   PHI and other highly sensitive PII of its current and former patients, including Plaintiff and  
 25   Class Members. Without the supervision of the Court through injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s  
 26   and Class Members’ Private Information remains at risk of subsequent data breaches.

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1           ***E. Phoenician Medical Center Failed to Comply with FTC Guidelines***

2           64.     The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides  
3 for businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security  
4 practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all  
5 business decision making. Indeed, the FTC has concluded that a company’s failure to  
6 maintain reasonable and appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal  
7 information is an “unfair practice” in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade  
8 Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. *See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*,  
9 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).

10           65.     In October 2016, the FTC updated its publication, *Protecting Personal*  
11 *Information: A Guide for Business*, which established cybersecurity guidelines for  
12 businesses. The guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal customer  
13 information that they keep, properly dispose of personal information that is no longer  
14 needed, encrypt information stored on computer networks, understand their network’s  
15 vulnerabilities, and implement policies to correct any security problems. The guidelines  
16 also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as  
17 soon as it occurs, monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting  
18 to hack into the system, watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system,  
19 and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.

20           66.     The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than is  
21 needed for authorization of a transaction, limit access to sensitive data, require complex  
22 passwords to be used on networks, use industry-tested methods for security, monitor the  
23 network for suspicious activity, and verify that third-party service providers have  
24 implemented reasonable security measures.

25           67.     The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to  
26 adequately and reasonably protect customer data by treating the failure to employ  
27 reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential  
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1 consumer data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by the FTCA. Orders resulting from  
2 these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security  
3 obligations.

4 68. As evidenced by the Data Breach, Phoenician Medical Center failed to  
5 properly implement basic data security practices. Phoenician Medical Center's failure to  
6 employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to  
7 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information constitutes an unfair act or practice  
8 prohibited by Section 5 of the FTCA.

9 69. Phoenician Medical Center was at all times fully aware of its obligation to  
10 protect the Private Information of its patients yet failed to comply with such obligations.  
11 Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions that would result from its failure  
12 to do so.

13 ***F. Phoenician Medical Center Failed to Comply with Industry Standards***

14 70. As noted above, experts studying cybersecurity routinely identify businesses  
15 as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the value of the Private  
16 Information which they collect and maintain.

17 71. Some industry best practices that should be implemented by businesses  
18 dealing with sensitive PHI like Phoenician Medical Center include but are not limited to:  
19 educating all employees, strong password requirements, multilayer security including  
20 firewalls, anti-virus and anti-malware software, encryption, multi-factor authentication,  
21 backing up data, and limiting which employees can access sensitive data. As evidenced by  
22 the Data Breach, Defendant failed to follow some or all of these industry best practices.

23 72. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard in the industry include:  
24 installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting network ports;  
25 protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such  
26 as firewalls, switches, and routers; monitoring and protecting physical security systems;

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1 and training staff regarding these points. As evidenced by the Data Breach, Defendant  
2 failed to follow these cybersecurity best practices.

3 73. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following  
4 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including without limitation  
5 PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-  
6 5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the  
7 Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all  
8 established standards in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.

9 74. Defendant failed to comply with these accepted standards, thereby permitting  
10 the Data Breach to occur.

11 ***G. Phoenician Medical Center Breached its Duty to Safeguard Plaintiff's and Class***  
12 ***Members' Private Information***

13 75. In addition to its obligations under federal and state laws, Phoenician  
14 Medical Center owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to exercise reasonable care in  
15 obtaining, retaining, securing, safeguarding, deleting, and protecting the Private  
16 Information in its possession from being compromised, lost, stolen, accessed, and misused  
17 by unauthorized persons. Phoenician Medical Center owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class  
18 Members to provide reasonable security, including consistency with industry standards and  
19 requirements, and to ensure that its computer systems, networks, and protocols adequately  
20 protected the Private Information of Class Members

21 76. Phoenician Medical Center breached its obligations to Plaintiff and Class  
22 Members and/or was otherwise negligent and reckless because it failed to properly  
23 maintain and safeguard its computer systems and data. Phoenician Medical Center's  
24 unlawful conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following acts and/or omissions:

- 25 a. Failing to maintain an adequate data security system that would reduce the  
26 risk of data breaches and cyberattacks;
- 27 b. Failing to adequately protect patients' Private Information;
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- 1 c. Failing to properly monitor its own data security systems for existing
- 2 intrusions;
- 3 d. Failing to sufficiently train its employees regarding the proper handling of
- 4 its patients Private Information;
- 5 e. Failing to fully comply with FTC guidelines for cybersecurity in violation of
- 6 the FTCA;
- 7 f. Failing to adhere to HIPAA and industry standards for cybersecurity as
- 8 discussed above; and
- 9 g. Otherwise breaching its duties and obligations to protect Plaintiff's and Class
- 10 Members' Private Information.

11 77. Phoenician Medical Center negligently and unlawfully failed to safeguard  
12 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information by allowing cyberthieves to access its  
13 computer network and systems which contained unsecured and unencrypted Private  
14 Information.

15 78. Had Phoenician Medical Center remedied the deficiencies in its information  
16 storage and security systems, followed industry guidelines, and adopted security measures  
17 recommended by experts in the field, it could have prevented intrusion into its information  
18 storage and security systems and, ultimately, the theft of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
19 confidential Private Information.

20 79. Accordingly, Plaintiff's and Class Members' lives were severely disrupted.  
21 What's more, they have been harmed as a result of the Data Breach and now face an  
22 increased risk of future harm that includes, but is not limited to, fraud and identity theft.  
23 Plaintiff and Class Members also lost the benefit of the bargain they made with Phoenician  
24 Medical Center.

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1           ***H. Phoenician Medical Center Should Have Known that Cybercriminals Target***  
2           ***PII and PHI to Carry Out Fraud and Identity Theft***

3           80.     The FTC hosted a workshop to discuss “informational injuries,” which are  
4 injuries that consumers like Plaintiff and Class Members suffer from privacy and security  
5 incidents such as data breaches or unauthorized disclosure of data.<sup>8</sup> Exposure of highly  
6 sensitive personal information that a consumer wishes to keep private may cause harm to  
7 the consumer, such as the ability to obtain or keep employment. Consumers’ loss of trust  
8 in e-commerce also deprives them of the benefits provided by the full range of goods and  
9 services available which can have negative impacts on daily life.

10          81.     Any victim of a data breach is exposed to serious ramifications regardless of  
11 the nature of the data that was breached. Indeed, the reason why criminals steal information  
12 is to monetize it. They do this by selling the spoils of their cyberattacks on the black market  
13 to identity thieves who desire to extort and harass victims or to take over victims’ identities  
14 in order to engage in illegal financial transactions under the victims’ names.

15          82.     Because a person’s identity is akin to a puzzle, the more accurate pieces of  
16 data an identity thief obtains about a person, the easier it is for the thief to take on the  
17 victim’s identity or to otherwise harass or track the victim. For example, armed with just a  
18 name and date of birth, a data thief can utilize a hacking technique referred to as “social  
19 engineering” to obtain even more information about a victim’s identity, such as a person’s  
20 login credentials or Social Security number. Social engineering is a form of hacking  
21 whereby a data thief uses previously acquired information to manipulate individuals into  
22 disclosing additional confidential or personal information through means such as spam  
23 phone calls and text messages or phishing emails.

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26           <sup>8</sup> *FTC Information Injury Workshop, BE and BCP Staff Perspective*, Federal Trade Commission, (October 2018),  
27 available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftc-informational-injury-workshop-be-bcp-staff-perspective/informational\\_injury\\_workshop\\_staff\\_report\\_-\\_oct\\_2018\\_0.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftc-informational-injury-workshop-be-bcp-staff-perspective/informational_injury_workshop_staff_report_-_oct_2018_0.pdf) (last visited on July 27, 2023).

1           83. In fact, as technology advances, computer programs may scan the Internet  
2 with a wider scope to create a mosaic of information that may be used to link compromised  
3 information to an individual in ways that were not previously possible. This is known as  
4 the “mosaic effect.” Names and dates of birth, combined with contact information like  
5 telephone numbers and email addresses, are very valuable to hackers and identity thieves  
6 as it allows them to access users’ other accounts.

7           84. Thus, even if certain information was not purportedly involved in the Data  
8 Breach, the unauthorized parties could use Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private  
9 Information to access accounts, including, but not limited to, email accounts and financial  
10 accounts, to engage in a wide variety of fraudulent activity against Plaintiff and Class  
11 Members.


12           85. For these reasons, the FTC recommends that identity theft victims take  
13 several time-consuming steps to protect their personal and financial information after a  
14 data breach, including contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud alert on their  
15 account (and an extended fraud alert that lasts for 7 years if someone steals the victim’s  
16 identity), reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent  
17 charges from their accounts, placing a freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit  
18 reports.<sup>9</sup> However, these steps do not guarantee protection from identity theft but can only  
19 mitigate identity theft’s long-lasting negative impacts.

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27 <sup>9</sup> See *IdentityTheft.gov*, Federal Trade Commission, available at <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps> (last visited  
28 July 27, 2023).

1 86. In fact, a study by the Identity Theft Resource Center<sup>10</sup> shows the multitude  
2 of harms caused by fraudulent use of PII:



11 87. PHI is also especially valuable to identity thieves. As the FTC recognizes,  
12 identity thieves can use PHI to commit an array of crimes, including identity theft and  
13 medical and financial fraud.<sup>11</sup>

14 88. Indeed, a robust cyber black market exists in which criminals openly post  
15 stolen PHI on multiple underground Internet websites, commonly referred to as the dark  
16 web.

17 89. While credit card information and associated PII can sell for as little as \$1-  
18 \$2 on the black market, protected health information can sell for as much as \$363 according  
19 to the Infosec Institute.<sup>12</sup>

20 90. PHI is particularly valuable because criminals can use it to target victims  
21 with frauds and scams that take advantage of the victim's medical conditions or victim  
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23 <sup>10</sup> Steele, Jason, *Credit Card and ID Theft Statistics*, CreditCards.com (October 23, 2017), available at <https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraud-statistics-1276/> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

24 <sup>11</sup> Federal Trade Commission, *Warning Signs of Identity Theft*, available at: <https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-identity-theft> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

25 <sup>12</sup> Center for Internet Security, *Data Breaches: In the Healthcare Sector*, available at: <https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/data-breaches-in-the-healthcare-sector> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

1 settlements. It can be used to create fake insurance claims, allowing for the purchase and  
2 resale of medical equipment, or gain access to prescriptions for illegal use or resale.

3 91. Medical identity theft can result in inaccuracies in medical records and costly  
4 false claims. It can also have life-threatening consequences. If a victim's health information  
5 is mixed with other records, it can lead to misdiagnosis or mistreatment. "Medical identity  
6 theft is a growing and dangerous crime that leaves its victims with little to no recourse for  
7 recovery," reported Pam Dixon, executive director of World Privacy Forum. "Victims  
8 often experience financial repercussions and worse yet, they frequently discover erroneous  
9 information has been added to their personal medical files due to the thief's activities."<sup>13</sup>

10 92. The ramifications of Phoenician Medical Center's failure to keep its patients'  
11 Private Information secure are long lasting and severe. Once it is stolen, fraudulent use of  
12 such and damage to victims may continue for years.

13 93. The value of both PII and PHI is axiomatic. The value of "big data" in  
14 corporate America is astronomical. The fact that identity thieves attempt to steal identities  
15 notwithstanding possible heavy prison sentences illustrates beyond a doubt that the Private  
16 Information compromised here has considerable market value.

17 94. It must also be noted that there may be a substantial time lag between when  
18 harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when PII and/or PHI is stolen and  
19 when it is misused. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which  
20 conducted a study regarding data breaches:<sup>14</sup>

21 [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen  
22 data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to  
23 commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold  
24 or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may  
continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure

25 <sup>13</sup> Michael Ollove, "The Rise of Medical Identity Theft in Healthcare," Kaiser Health News, Feb. 7, 2014, *available*  
26 *at*: <https://kffhealthnews.org/news/rise-of-identity-theft/> (last visited on July 27, 2023).

27 <sup>14</sup> *Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is*  
28 *Unknown*, GAO (June 2007), *available at* <https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/262904.html> (last visited July 27, 2023).

1 the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule  
2 out all future harm.

3 95. PII and PHI are such valuable commodities to identity thieves that once the  
4 information has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the dark web  
5 for years.

6 96. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and  
7 identity theft, including medical identity theft, for many years into the future. Thus,  
8 Plaintiff and Class Members have no choice but to vigilantly monitor their accounts for  
9 many years to come.

10 ***I. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Damages***

11 *Plaintiff Miles Murray's Experience*

12 97. When Plaintiff Murray became a patient and received medical services from  
13 Defendant, Defendant required him to provide it with substantial amounts of his PII and  
14 PHI.

15 98. On or about June 30, 2023, Plaintiff Murray received a letter which told him  
16 that his Private Information had been accessed and acquired during the Data Breach. The  
17 notice letter informed him that the Private Information stolen included his “contact  
18 information, state identification, demographic information, date of birth, diagnosis and  
19 treatment information, prescription information, medical record number, provider name(s),  
20 date(s) of service, and health insurance information.”

21 99. The notice letter offered Plaintiff Murray only one year of credit monitoring  
22 services. One year of credit monitoring is not sufficient given that Plaintiff Murray will  
23 now experience a lifetime of increased risk of identity theft, including but not limited to,  
24 potential medical fraud.

25 100. Plaintiff Murray suffered actual injury in the form of time spent dealing with  
26 the Data Breach and the increased risk of fraud resulting from the Data Breach and/or  
27 monitoring his accounts for fraud.

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1           101. Plaintiff Murray would not have provided his Private Information to  
2 Defendant had Defendant timely disclosed that its systems lacked adequate computer and  
3 data security practices to safeguard its patients' personal and health information from theft,  
4 and that those systems were subject to a data breach.

5           102. Plaintiff Murray suffered actual injury in the form of having his Private  
6 Information compromised and stolen as a result of the Data Breach.

7           103. Plaintiff Murray suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and  
8 diminution in the value of his personal, health, and health insurance information – a form  
9 of intangible property that Plaintiff Murray entrusted to Defendant for the purpose of  
10 receiving healthcare services from Defendant and which was compromised in, and as a  
11 result of, the Data Breach.

12           104. Plaintiff Murray suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the  
13 substantially increased risk of future medical fraud, identity theft, and misuse posed by his  
14 Private Information being placed in the hands of criminals.

15           105. Plaintiff Murray has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private  
16 Information, which remains in the possession of Defendant, is protected and safeguarded  
17 from future breaches.

18           106. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Murray made reasonable efforts to  
19 mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including but not limited to researching the Data  
20 Breach, reviewing financial and insurance accounts/explanations of benefits for any  
21 indications of actual or attempted identity theft or fraud, and researching the credit  
22 monitoring offered by Defendant. Plaintiff Murray has spent several hours dealing with the  
23 Data Breach – valuable time he otherwise would have spent on other activities.

24           107. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Murray has suffered anxiety as a  
25 result of the release of his Private Information, which he believed would be protected from  
26 unauthorized access and disclosure. These feelings include anxiety about unauthorized  
27 parties viewing, selling, and/or using his Private Information for purposes of committing  
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1 cyber and other crimes against him including, but not limited to, fraud and identity theft.  
2 Plaintiff Murray is very concerned about this increased, substantial, and continuing risk, as  
3 well as the consequences that identity theft and fraud resulting from the Data Breach would  
4 have on his life.

5 108. Plaintiff Murray also suffered actual injury from having his Private  
6 Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach in the form of (a) damage to and  
7 diminution in the value of his PII and PHI, a form of property that Defendant obtained from  
8 Plaintiff Murray; (b) violation of his privacy rights; and (c) present, imminent, and  
9 impending injury arising from the increased risk of identity theft, and fraud he now faces.

10 109. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Murray anticipates spending  
11 considerable time and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address the many  
12 harms caused by the Data Breach.

13 110. In sum, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged by the compromise  
14 of their Private Information in the Data Breach.

15 111. Plaintiff and Class Members entrusted their Private Information to Defendant  
16 in order to receive Defendant's services.

17 112. Their Private Information was subsequently compromised as a direct and  
18 proximate result of the Data Breach, which Data Breach resulted from Defendant's  
19 inadequate data security practices.

20 113. As a direct and proximate result of Phoenician Medical Center's actions and  
21 omissions, Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed and are at an imminent,  
22 immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm, including but not limited to, having  
23 medical services billed in their names, along with other forms of medical or other identity  
24 theft.

25 114. Further, and as set forth above, as a direct and proximate result of  
26 Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have also been forced to take the time  
27 and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the data breach on their everyday  
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1 lives, including placing “freezes” and “alerts” with credit reporting agencies, contacting  
2 their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, and/or closely  
3 reviewing and monitoring accounts and credit reports for unauthorized activity for years to  
4 come.

5 115. Plaintiff and Class Members may also incur out-of-pocket costs for  
6 protective measures such as credit monitoring fees, credit report fees, credit freeze fees,  
7 and similar costs directly or indirectly related to the Data Breach.

8 116. Plaintiff and Class Members also face a substantial risk of being targeted in  
9 future phishing, data intrusion, and other illegal schemes through the misuse of their Private  
10 Information, since potential fraudsters will likely use such Private Information to carry out  
11 such targeted schemes against Plaintiff and Class Members.

12 117. The Private Information maintained by and stolen from Defendant’s systems,  
13 combined with publicly available information, allows nefarious actors to assemble a  
14 detailed mosaic of Plaintiff and Class Members, which can also be used to carry out  
15 targeted fraudulent schemes against Plaintiff and Class Members.

16 118. Plaintiff and Class Members also lost the benefit of the bargain they made  
17 with Phoenician Medical Center. Plaintiff and Class Members overpaid for services that  
18 were intended to be accompanied by adequate data security but were not. Indeed, part of  
19 the price Plaintiff and Class Members paid to Phoenician Medical Center (or which was  
20 paid on their behalf) was intended to be used by Phoenician Medical Center to fund  
21 adequate security of Phoenician Medical Center’s system and protect Plaintiff’s and Class  
22 Members’ Private Information. Thus, Plaintiff and the Class did not receive the benefit of  
23 the bargain.

24 119. Additionally, Plaintiff and Class Members also suffered a loss of value of  
25 their PII and PHI when it was acquired by cyber thieves in the Data Breach. Numerous  
26 courts have recognized the propriety of loss of value damages in related cases. An active  
27 and robust legitimate marketplace for Private Information also exists. In 2019, the data  
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1 brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.<sup>15</sup> In fact, the data marketplace is so  
2 sophisticated that consumers can sell their non-public information directly to a data broker  
3 who in turn aggregates the information and provides it to other companies.<sup>16</sup> Consumers  
4 who agree to provide their web browsing history to the Nielsen Corporation can in turn  
5 receive up to \$50 a year.<sup>17</sup>

6       120. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
7 Information, which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and illegal markets, has  
8 been harmed and diminished due to its acquisition by cybercriminals. This transfer of  
9 valuable information happened with no consideration paid to Plaintiff or Class Members  
10 for their property, resulting in an economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is  
11 apparently readily available to others, and the rarity of the Private Information has been  
12 destroyed because it is no longer only held by Plaintiff and the Class Members, and because  
13 that data no longer necessarily correlates only with activities undertaken by Plaintiff and  
14 the Class Members, thereby causing additional loss of value.

15       121. Finally, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered or will suffer actual  
16 injury as a direct and proximate result of the Data Breach in the form of out-of-pocket  
17 expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects  
18 of the Data Breach.

19       122. Moreover, Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in ensuring that their  
20 Private Information, which is believed to still be in the possession of Phoenician Medical  
21 Center, is protected from future breaches by the implementation of more adequate data  
22 security measures and safeguards, including but not limited to, ensuring that the storage of  
23 data or documents containing highly sensitive personal and health information of its  
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25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>15</sup> See Data Coup, <https://datacoup.com/>.

27 <sup>16</sup> *What is digi.me?*, DIGI.ME, <https://digi.me/what-is-digime/> (last visited July 27, 2023).

28 <sup>17</sup> *Frequently Asked Questions*, Nielsen Computer & Mobile Panel, <https://computermobilepanel.nielsen.com/ui/US/en/faqen.html> (last visited July 27, 2023).

1 patients is not accessible online, that access to such data is password-protected, and that  
2 such data is properly encrypted.

3 123. As a direct and proximate result of Phoenician Medical Center’s actions and  
4 inactions, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered a loss of privacy and have suffered  
5 cognizable harm, including an imminent and substantial future risk of harm, in the forms  
6 set forth above.

7 **V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

8 124. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons  
9 similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2),  
10 and 23(b)(3).

11 125. Specifically, Plaintiff proposes the following Nationwide Class, (also  
12 referred to herein as the “Class”), subject to amendment as appropriate:

13 **Nationwide Class**

14 All individuals in the United States whose Private Information  
15 was impacted as a result of the Data Breach, including all who  
16 were sent a notice of the Data Breach.

17 126. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its parents or subsidiaries, any  
18 entities in which it has a controlling interest, as well as its officers, directors, affiliates,  
19 legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns. Also excluded is any  
20 Judge to whom this case is assigned as well as their judicial staff and immediate family  
21 members.

22 127. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definitions of the proposed  
23 Nationwide Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate.

24 128. The proposed Class meets the criteria for certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.  
25 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3).

26 129. Numerosity. The Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members  
27 is impracticable. Though the exact number and identities of Class Members are unknown  
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1 at this time, based on information and belief, the Class consists of tens of thousands of  
2 patients of Phoenician Medical Center whose data was compromised in the Data Breach.  
3 The identities of Class Members are ascertainable through Phoenician Medical Center's  
4 records, Class Members' records, publication notice, self-identification, and other means.

5 130. Commonality. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class  
6 which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These  
7 common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:

- 8 a. Whether Phoenician Medical Center engaged in the conduct alleged  
9 herein;
  - 10 b. Whether Phoenician Medical Center's conduct violated the FTCA and  
11 HIPAA;
  - 12 c. When Phoenician Medical Center learned of the Data Breach
  - 13 d. Whether Phoenician Medical Center's response to the Data Breach  
14 was adequate;
  - 15 e. Whether Phoenician Medical Center unlawfully lost or disclosed  
16 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information;
  - 17 f. Whether Phoenician Medical Center failed to implement and maintain  
18 reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature  
19 and scope of the Private Information compromised in the Data  
20 Breach;
  - 21 g. Whether Phoenician Medical Center's data security systems prior to  
22 and during the Data Breach complied with applicable data security  
23 laws and regulations;
  - 24 h. Whether Phoenician Medical Center's data security systems prior to  
25 and during the Data Breach were consistent with industry standards;
  - 26 i. Whether Phoenician Medical Center owed a duty to Class Members  
27 to safeguard their Private Information;
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- j. Whether Phoenician Medical Center breached its duty to Class Members to safeguard their Private Information;
- k. Whether hackers obtained Class Members’ Private Information via the Data Breach;
- l. Whether Phoenician Medical Center had a legal duty to provide timely and accurate notice of the Data Breach to Plaintiff and the Class Members;
- m. Whether Phoenician Medical Center breached its duty to provide timely and accurate notice of the Data Breach to Plaintiff and Class Members;
- n. Whether Phoenician Medical Center knew or should have known that its data security systems and monitoring processes were deficient;
- o. What damages Plaintiff and Class Members suffered as a result of Phoenician Medical Center’s misconduct;
- p. Whether Phoenician Medical Center’s conduct was negligent;
- q. Whether Phoenician Medical Center’s conduct was *per se* negligent;
- r. Whether Phoenician Medical Center was unjustly enriched;
- s. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual and/or statutory damages;
- t. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to additional credit or identity monitoring and monetary relief; and
- u. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to equitable relief, including injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement, and/or the establishment of a constructive trust.

131. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of other Class Members because Plaintiff’s Private Information, like that of every other Class Member, was compromised in the Data Breach. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the other Class

1 Members because, *inter alia*, all Class Members were injured through the common  
2 misconduct of Phoenician Medical Center. Plaintiff are advancing the same claims and  
3 legal theories on behalf of himself and all other Class Members, and there are no defenses  
4 that are unique to Plaintiff. The claims of Plaintiff and those of Class Members arise from  
5 the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories.

6 132. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent  
7 and protect the interests of Class Members. Plaintiff's counsel is competent and  
8 experienced in litigating class actions, including data privacy litigation of this kind.

9 133. Predominance. Phoenician Medical Center has engaged in a common course  
10 of conduct toward Plaintiff and Class Members in that all of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
11 data was stored on the same computer systems and unlawfully accessed and exfiltrated in  
12 the same way. The common issues arising from Phoenician Medical Center's conduct  
13 affecting Class Members set out above predominate over any individualized issues.  
14 Adjudication of these common issues in a single action has important and desirable  
15 advantages of judicial economy.

16 134. Superiority. A Class action is superior to other available methods for the fair  
17 and efficient adjudication of this controversy and no unusual difficulties are likely to be  
18 encountered in the management of this class action. Class treatment of common questions  
19 of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation. Absent a  
20 Class action, most Class Members would likely find that the cost of litigating their  
21 individual claims is prohibitively high and would therefore have no effective remedy. The  
22 prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create a risk of  
23 inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class Members, which  
24 would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Phoenician Medical Center. In  
25 contrast, conducting this action as a class action presents far fewer management  
26 difficulties, conserves judicial resources and the parties' resources, and protects the rights  
27 of each Class Member.

1 135. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  
2 Phoenician Medical Center has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable  
3 to the Class such that final injunctive relief and/or corresponding declaratory relief is  
4 appropriate as to the Class as a whole.

5 136. Finally, all members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable.  
6 Phoenician Medical Center has access to the names and addresses and/or email addresses  
7 of Class Members affected by the Data Breach. Class Members have already been  
8 preliminarily identified and sent notice of the Data Breach by Phoenician Medical Center.

9 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

10 **COUNT I**  
11 **NEGLIGENCE**

12 **(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CLASS)**

13 137. Plaintiff restates and realleges all of the allegations stated above as if fully  
14 set forth herein.

15 138. Phoenician Medical Center knowingly collected, came into possession of,  
16 and maintained Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, and had a duty to  
17 exercise reasonable care in safeguarding, securing, and protecting such Information from  
18 being disclosed, compromised, lost, stolen, and misused by unauthorized parties.

19 139. Phoenician Medical Center’s duty also included a responsibility to  
20 implement processes by which it could detect and analyze a breach of its security systems  
21 quickly and to give prompt notice to those affected in the case of a cyberattack.

22 140. Phoenician Medical Center knew or should have known of the risks inherent  
23 in collecting the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and the importance of  
24 adequate security. Phoenician Medical Center was on notice because, on information and  
25 belief, it knew or should have known that it would be an attractive target for cyberattacks.

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1           141. Phoenician Medical Center owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class  
2 Members whose Private Information was entrusted to it. Phoenician Medical Center’s  
3 duties included, but were not limited to, the following:

- 4           a. To exercise reasonable care in obtaining, retaining, securing,  
5           safeguarding, deleting, and protecting Private Information in its  
6           possession;
- 7           b. To protect patients’ Private Information using reasonable and adequate  
8           security procedures and systems compliant with industry standards;
- 9           c. To have procedures in place to prevent the loss or unauthorized  
10          dissemination of Private Information in its possession;
- 11          d. To employ reasonable security measures and otherwise protect the  
12          Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members pursuant to HIPAA  
13          and FTCA;
- 14          e. To implement processes to quickly detect a data breach and to timely act  
15          on warnings about data breaches; and
- 16          f. To promptly notify Plaintiff and Class Members of the Data Breach, and  
17          to precisely disclose the type(s) of information compromised.

18           142. Phoenician Medical Center’s duty to employ reasonable data security  
19 measures arose, in part, under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.  
20 § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,” including, as  
21 interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice of failing to use reasonable  
22 measures to protect confidential data.

23           143. Phoenician Medical Center’s duty also arose because it was bound by  
24 industry standards to protect its patients’ confidential Private Information.

25           144. Plaintiff and Class Members were foreseeable victims of any inadequate  
26 security practices on the part of Defendant, and Phoenician Medical Center owed them a  
27 duty of care to not subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm.

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1           145. Phoenician Medical Center, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully  
2 breached its duty to Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to exercise reasonable care in  
3 protecting and safeguarding Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information within  
4 Phoenician Medical Center's possession.

5           146. Phoenician Medical Center, by its actions and/or omissions, breached its duty  
6 of care by failing to provide, or acting with reckless disregard for, fair, reasonable, or  
7 adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard the Private Information  
8 of Plaintiff and Class Members.

9           147. Phoenician Medical Center, by its actions and/or omissions, breached its duty  
10 of care by failing to promptly identify the Data Breach and then failing to provide prompt  
11 notice of the Data Breach to the persons whose Private Information was compromised.

12           148. Phoenician Medical Center breached its duties, and thus was negligent, by  
13 failing to use reasonable measures to protect Class Members' Private Information. The  
14 specific negligent acts and omissions committed by Defendant include, but are not limited  
15 to, the following:

- 16           a. Failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to  
17           safeguard Class Members' Private Information;
  - 18           b. Failing to adequately monitor the security of its networks and systems;
  - 19           c. Failing to periodically ensure that its email system maintained reasonable  
20           data security safeguards;
  - 21           d. Allowing unauthorized access to Class Members' Private Information;
  - 22           e. Failing to comply with the FTCA;
  - 23           f. Failing to detect in a timely manner that Class Members' Private Information  
24           had been compromised; and
  - 25           g. Failing to timely notify Class Members about the Data Breach so that they  
26           could take appropriate steps to mitigate the potential for identity theft and  
27           other damages.
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1           149. Phoenician Medical Center acted with reckless disregard for the rights of  
2 Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to provide prompt and adequate individual notice  
3 of the Data Breach such that Plaintiff and Class Members could take measures to protect  
4 himself from damages caused by the fraudulent use of the Private Information  
5 compromised in the Data Breach.

6           150. Phoenician Medical Center had a special relationship with Plaintiff and Class  
7 Members. Plaintiff's and Class Members' willingness to entrust Phoenician Medical  
8 Center with their Private Information, including highly sensitive PHI, was predicated on  
9 the understanding that Phoenician Medical Center would take adequate security  
10 precautions. Moreover, only Phoenician Medical Center had the ability to protect its  
11 systems (and the Private Information that it stored on them) from attack.

12           151. Phoenician Medical Center's breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and Class  
13 Members caused Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to be compromised,  
14 exfiltrated, and acquired as alleged herein.

15           152. As a result of Phoenician Medical Center's ongoing failure to notify Plaintiff  
16 and Class Members regarding exactly what Private Information has been compromised,  
17 Plaintiff and Class Members have been unable to take the necessary precautions to prevent  
18 future fraud and mitigate damages.

19           153. Phoenician Medical Center's breaches of duty also caused a substantial,  
20 imminent risk to Plaintiff and Class Members of identity theft, loss of control over their  
21 Private Information, and/or loss of time and money to monitor their accounts for fraud.

22           154. As a result of Phoenician Medical Center's negligence in breach of its duties  
23 owed to Plaintiff and Class Members, Plaintiff and Class Members are in danger of  
24 imminent harm in that their Private Information, which is still in the possession of third  
25 parties, will be used for fraudulent purposes.

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1 individuals by “the use of an algorithmic process to transform data into a form in which  
2 there is a low probability of assigning meaning without the use of a confidential process or  
3 key.” *See* definition of “encryption” at 45 C.F.R. § 164.304.

4       164. Phoenician Medical Center breached its duties to Plaintiff and Class  
5 Members under the FTCA and HIPAA by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate  
6 computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’  
7 Private Information.

8       165. Specifically, Phoenician Medical Center breached its duties by failing to  
9 employ industry-standard cybersecurity measures in order to comply with the FTCA,  
10 including but not limited to proper segregation, access controls, password protection,  
11 encryption, intrusion detection, secure destruction of unnecessary data, and penetration  
12 testing.

13       166. The FTCA prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,”  
14 including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice of failing to  
15 use reasonable measures to protect PII and PHI (such as the Private Information  
16 compromised in the Data Breach). The FTC rulings and publications described above,  
17 together with the industry-standard cybersecurity measures set forth herein, form part of  
18 the basis of Phoenician Medical Center’s duty in this regard.

19       167. Phoenician Medical Center also violated the FTCA and HIPAA by failing to  
20 use reasonable measures to protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class and  
21 by not complying with applicable industry standards, as described herein.

22       168. It was reasonably foreseeable, particularly given the growing number of data  
23 breaches of Private Information, that the failure to reasonably protect and secure Plaintiff’s  
24 and Class Members’ Private Information in compliance with applicable laws would result  
25 in an unauthorized third-party gaining access to Phoenician Medical Center’s networks,  
26 databases, and computers that stored Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unencrypted Private  
27 Information.

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1           176. Phoenician Medical Center’s Privacy Policy memorialized the rights and  
2 obligations of Phoenician Medical Center and its patients. This document was, upon  
3 information and belief, provided to Plaintiff and Class Members in a manner in which it  
4 became part of the agreement for services.

5           177. In the Privacy Policy, Phoenician Medical Center commits to protecting the  
6 privacy and security of private information and promises to never share Plaintiff’s and  
7 Class Members’ Private Information except under certain limited circumstances.

8           178. Plaintiff and Class Members fully performed their obligations under their  
9 contracts with Phoenician Medical Center.

10           179. However, Phoenician Medical Center did not secure, safeguard, and/or keep  
11 private Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, and therefore Phoenician  
12 Medical Center breached its contracts with Plaintiff and Class Members.

13           180. Phoenician Medical Center allowed third parties to access, copy, and/or  
14 exfiltrate Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information without permission.  
15 Therefore, Phoenician Medical Center breached the Privacy Policy with Plaintiff and Class  
16 Members.

17           181. Phoenician Medical Center’s failure to satisfy its confidentiality and privacy  
18 obligations, specifically those arising under the FTCA, HIPAA, and applicable industry  
19 standards, resulted in Phoenician Medical Center providing services to Plaintiff and Class  
20 Members that were of a diminished value.

21           182. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed, damaged, and/or  
22 injured as described herein, including in Defendant’s failure to fully perform its part of the  
23 bargain with Plaintiff and Class Members.

24           183. As a direct and proximate result of Phoenician Medical Center’s conduct,  
25 Plaintiff and Class Members suffered and will continue to suffer damages in an amount to  
26 be proven at trial.

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1           191. In paying Defendant and/or providing their valuable Private Information to  
2 Defendant in exchange for Defendant's services, Plaintiff and Class Members intended and  
3 understood that Phoenician Medical Center would adequately safeguard the Private  
4 Information as part of those services.

5           192. Defendant's implied promises to Plaintiff and Class Members include, but  
6 are not limited to, (1) taking steps to ensure that anyone who is granted access to Private  
7 Information also protect the confidentiality of that data; (2) taking steps to ensure that the  
8 Private Information that is placed in the control of its employees is restricted and limited  
9 to achieve an authorized business purpose; (3) restricting access to qualified and trained  
10 employees and/or agents; (4) designing and implementing appropriate retention policies to  
11 protect the Private Information against criminal data breaches; (5) applying or requiring  
12 proper encryption; (6) implementing multifactor authentication for access; (7) complying  
13 with HIPAA standards to make sure that Plaintiff's and Class Members' PHI would remain  
14 protected; and (8) taking other steps to protect against foreseeable data breaches.

15           193. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private  
16 Information to Phoenician Medical Center in the absence of such an implied contract.

17           194. Had Phoenician Medical Center disclosed to Plaintiff and the Class that it did  
18 not have adequate computer systems and security practices to secure sensitive data,  
19 Plaintiff and Class Members would not have provided their Private Information to  
20 Phoenician Medical Center.

21           195. As a provider of healthcare, Phoenician Medical Center recognized (or  
22 should have recognized) that Plaintiff's and Class Member's Private Information is highly  
23 sensitive and must be protected, and that this protection was of material importance as part  
24 of the bargain with Plaintiff and the other Class Members.

25           196. Phoenician Medical Center violated these implied contracts by failing to  
26 employ reasonable and adequate security measures to secure Plaintiff's and Class  
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1 Members' Private Information. Phoenician Medical Center further breached these implied  
2 contracts by failing to comply with its promise to abide by HIPAA.

3 197. Additionally, Phoenician Medical Center breached the implied contracts  
4 with Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of  
5 electronic protected health information it created, received, maintained, and transmitted, in  
6 violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(1).

7 198. Phoenician Medical Center also breached the implied contracts with Plaintiff  
8 and Class Members by failing to implement technical policies and procedures for electronic  
9 systems that maintain electronic PHI to allow access only to those persons or software  
10 programs that have been granted access rights, in violation of 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1).

11 199. Phoenician Medical Center further breached the implied contracts with  
12 Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent,  
13 detect, contain, and correct security violations, in violation of 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1).

14 200. Phoenician Medical Center further breached the implied contracts with  
15 Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to identify and respond to suspected or known  
16 security incidents; mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents  
17 that are known to the covered entity, in violation of 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6)(ii).

18 201. Phoenician Medical Center further breached the implied contracts with  
19 Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to protect against any reasonably anticipated threats  
20 or hazards to the security or integrity of electronic protected health information, in violation  
21 of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(2).

22 202. Phoenician Medical Center further breached the implied contracts with  
23 Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to protect against any reasonably anticipated uses  
24 or disclosures of electronic protected health information that are not permitted under the  
25 privacy rules regarding individually identifiable health information, in violation of 45 CFR  
26 164.306(a)(3).

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1           211. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on Phoenician Medical  
2 Center by turning over their Private Information to Defendant and by paying for medical  
3 services that should have included cybersecurity protection to protect their Private  
4 Information. Plaintiff and Class Members did not receive such protection.

5           212. Upon information and belief, Phoenician Medical Center funds its data  
6 security measures entirely from its general revenue, including from payments made to it  
7 by Plaintiff and Class Members.

8           213. As such, a portion of the payments made by Plaintiff and Class Members is  
9 to be used to provide a reasonable and adequate level of data security that is in compliance  
10 with applicable state and federal regulations and industry standards, and the amount of the  
11 portion of each payment made that is allocated to data security is known to Phoenician  
12 Medical Center.

13           214. Phoenician Medical Center has retained the benefits of its unlawful conduct,  
14 including the amounts of payment received from Plaintiff and Class Members (or made on  
15 their behalf) that should have been used for adequate cybersecurity practices that it failed  
16 to provide.

17           215. Phoenician Medical Center knew that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred  
18 a benefit upon it, which Phoenician Medical Center accepted. Phoenician Medical Center  
19 profited from these transactions and the resulting possession and control it had over  
20 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information and used the Private Information of  
21 Plaintiff and Class Members for business purposes, while failing to use the payments it  
22 received therefrom for adequate data security measures that would have secured Plaintiff's  
23 and Class Members' Private Information and prevented the Data Breach.

24           216. If Plaintiff and Class Members had known that Phoenician Medical Center  
25 had not adequately secured their Private Information, they would not have agreed to  
26 provide such Private Information to Defendant.

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1           217. Due to Phoenician Medical Center’s conduct alleged herein, it would be  
2 unjust and inequitable under the circumstances for Phoenician Medical Center to be  
3 permitted to retain the benefit of its wrongful conduct.

4           218. As a direct and proximate result of Phoenician Medical Center’s conduct,  
5 Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered, and/or are at a continued, imminent risk of  
6 suffering, injury that includes but is not limited to the following: (i) actual identity theft;  
7 (ii) the loss of the opportunity to control how their Private Information is used; (iii) the  
8 compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Private Information; (iv) out-of-pocket  
9 expenses associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, and/or  
10 unauthorized use of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with  
11 effort expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the  
12 actual and future consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts  
13 spent researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from identity theft; (vi) the  
14 continued risk to their Private Information, which remains in Phoenician Medical Center’s  
15 possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Phoenician Medical  
16 Center fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect Private Information  
17 in its continued possession; and (vii) future costs in terms of time, effort, and money that  
18 will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the Private  
19 Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of  
20 Plaintiff and Class Members.

21           219. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to full refunds, restitution, and/or  
22 damages from Phoenician Medical Center and/or an order proportionally disgorging all  
23 profits, benefits, and other compensation obtained by Phoenician Medical Center from its  
24 wrongful conduct. This can be accomplished by establishing a constructive trust from  
25 which the Plaintiff and Class Members may seek restitution or compensation.



1 Phoenician Medical Center created, received, maintained, and transmitted, in violation of  
2 45 CFR 164.306(a)(1).

3 227. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
4 Class Members by failing to implement technical policies and procedures for electronic  
5 information systems that maintain electronic PHI to allow access only to those persons or  
6 software programs that have been granted access rights, in violation of 45 CFR  
7 164.312(a)(1).

8 228. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
9 Class Members by failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain,  
10 and correct security violations, in violation of 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1).

11 229. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
12 Class Members by failing to identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents;  
13 mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to  
14 the covered entity, in violation of 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6)(ii).

15 230. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
16 Class Members by failing to protect against any reasonably-anticipated threats or hazards  
17 to the security or integrity of electronic PHI, in violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(2).

18 231. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
19 Class Members by failing to protect against any reasonably-anticipated uses or disclosures  
20 of electronic PHI that are not permitted under the privacy rules regarding individually  
21 identifiable health information, in violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(3).

22 232. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
23 Class Members by failing to ensure compliance with the HIPAA security standard rules by  
24 its workforce, in violation of 45 CFR 164.306(a)(94).

25 233. Phoenician Medical Center breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and  
26 Class Members by impermissibly and improperly using and disclosing PHI that is and  
27 remains accessible to unauthorized persons, in violation of 45 CFR 164.502, *et seq.*  
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- 1           b. Phoenician Medical Center’s existing security measures do not comply with
- 2           its explicit or implicit contractual obligations and duties of care to provide
- 3           reasonable security procedures and practices that are appropriate to protect
- 4           patients’ Private Information; and
- 5           c. Phoenician Medical Center continues to breach this legal duty by failing to
- 6           employ reasonable measures to secure patients’ Private Information.

7           241. This Court should also issue corresponding prospective injunctive relief  
 8 requiring Phoenician Medical Center to employ adequate security protocols consistent with  
 9 legal and industry standards to protect patients’ Private Information, including the  
 10 following:

- 11           a. Order Phoenician Medical Center to provide lifetime credit monitoring and
- 12           identity theft insurance to Plaintiff and Class Members.
- 13           b. Order that, to comply with Defendant’s explicit or implicit contractual
- 14           obligations and duties of care, Phoenician Medical Center must implement
- 15           and maintain reasonable security measures, including, but not limited to:
  - 16           i.           engaging third-party security auditors/penetration testers as well as
  - 17           internal security personnel to conduct testing, including simulated
  - 18           attacks, penetration tests, and audits on Phoenician Medical Center’s
  - 19           systems on a periodic basis, and ordering Phoenician Medical Center
  - 20           to promptly correct any problems or issues detected by such third-
  - 21           party security auditors;
  - 22           ii.          engaging third-party security auditors and internal personnel to run
  - 23           automated security monitoring;
  - 24           iii.         auditing, testing, and training its security personnel regarding any new
  - 25           or modified procedures;
  - 26           iv.         segmenting its user applications by, among other things, creating
  - 27           firewalls and access controls so that if one area is compromised,
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- 1 hackers cannot gain access to other portions of Phoenician Medical  
2 Center's systems;
- 3 v. conducting regular database scanning and security checks;
- 4 vi. routinely and continually conducting internal training and education  
5 to inform internal security personnel how to identify and contain a  
6 breach when it occurs and what to do in response to a breach; and
- 7 vii. meaningfully educating its patients about the threats they face with  
8 regard to the security of their Private Information, as well as the steps  
9 they should take to protect themselves.

10 242. If an injunction is not issued, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury and will  
11 lack an adequate legal remedy to prevent another data breach at Phoenician Medical  
12 Center. The risk of another such breach is real, immediate, and substantial. If another  
13 breach at Phoenician Medical Center occurs, Plaintiff will not have an adequate remedy at  
14 law because many of the resulting injuries are not readily quantifiable.

15 243. The hardship to Plaintiff if an injunction does not issue exceeds the hardship  
16 to Phoenician Medical Center if an injunction is issued. Plaintiff will likely be subjected to  
17 substantial, continued identity theft and other related damages if an injunction is not issued.  
18 On the other hand, the cost of Phoenician Medical Center's compliance with an injunction  
19 requiring reasonable prospective data security measures is relatively minimal, and  
20 Phoenician Medical Center has a pre-existing legal obligation to employ such measures.

21 244. Issuance of the requested injunction will not disserve the public interest. To  
22 the contrary, such an injunction would benefit the public by preventing a subsequent data  
23 breach at Phoenician Medical Center, thus preventing future injury to Plaintiff and other  
24 patients whose Private Information would be further compromised.

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**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class described above, seek the following relief:

- a. An order certifying this action as a Class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, defining the Class as requested herein, appointing the undersigned as Class counsel, and finding that Plaintiff is the proper representative of the Class and requested herein;
- b. Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and Class Members awarding them appropriate monetary relief, including actual damages, statutory damages, equitable relief, restitution, disgorgement, and statutory costs;
- c. An order providing injunctive and other equitable relief as necessary to protect the interests of the Class as requested herein;
- d. An order instructing Phoenician Medical Center to purchase or provide funds for lifetime credit monitoring and identity theft insurance to Plaintiff and Class Members;
- e. An order requiring Phoenician Medical Center to pay the costs involved in notifying Class Members about the judgment and administering the claims process;
- f. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff and Class Members awarding them prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses as allowable by law; and
- g. An award of such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

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**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all triable issues.

DATED: July 27, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

*/s/ Daisy Mazoff*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Daisy Mazoff (Bar No. 028804)  
Mason A. Barney (*pro hac vice* to be filed)  
Tyler J. Bean (*pro hac vice* to be filed)  
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# ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Phoenician Medical Center Hit with Class Action Over March 2023 Data Breach](#)

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