# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

SETH F. MASSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

# **CLASS ACTION**

Plaintiff,

#### JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.

TALLAHASSEE DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP, LLC a Florida limited liability company,

Defendant.

#### **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff, Seth F. Masson, brings this class action against Defendant, Tallahassee Dodge Chrysler Jeep, LLC, and alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by his attorneys.

# **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1. This putative class action stems from Defendant's knowing and willfully violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., ("TCPA").

2. To market its automobile dealership, Defendant sent Plaintiff and members of the putative class automated telemarketing text messages, without their prior express written consent, and little regard for their privacy.

3. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of himself and

members of the class, and any other available legal or equitable remedies.

# JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiff alleges violations of a federal statute. Jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because Plaintiff alleges a national class, which will result in at least one class member belonging to a different state than that of Defendant. Plaintiff seeks up to \$1,500.00 (one-thousand-five-hundred dollars) in damages for each call in violation of the TCPA, which, when aggregated among a proposed class numbering in the tens of thousands, or more, exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 (five-million dollars) threshold for federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Therefore, both the elements of diversity jurisdiction and CAFA jurisdiction are present.

5. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because Defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and because Defendant provides and markets its services within this district thereby establishing sufficient contacts to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Further, Defendant's tortious conduct against Plaintiff occurred within the State of Florida and, on information and belief, Defendant has sent the same text messages complained of by Plaintiff to other individuals within this judicial district, such that some of Defendant's acts in making such calls have occurred within this district, subjecting Defendant to jurisdiction in the State of Florida.

#### **PARTIES**

6. Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

7. Defendant is a Florida limited liability company whose principal office is located at 3987 W. Tennessee Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its

business activities throughout the State of Florida.

#### THE TCPA

The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

9. The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") as "equipment that has the capacity - (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

10. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff'd*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).

11. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

12. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated telemarketing calls, requiring "prior express **written** consent" for such calls to wireless numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R.

1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012)(emphasis supplied).

13. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "'clear and conspicuous disclosure' of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates." *In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

14. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define "telemarketing" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

15. "Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations 'require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service' where the implication of an improper purpose is 'clear from the context." *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).

16. "Telemarketing' occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services." *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at \*49).

17. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003).

This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call *or in the future*. *Id*.

18. In other words, offers "that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute" telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

19. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. *See In the Matter of Rules and Regulaions Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent "for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls").

20. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of "to make any call" in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); *Toney v. Quality Res., Inc.*, 2014 WL 6757978, at \*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained Plaintiff's prior express consent before sending her the *text message*). (emphasis added).

21. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA 'need not allege any *additional* harm beyond the one Congress has identified."" *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp.*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1591, at \*12 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (emphasis original)). Case 1:17-cv-22967-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2017 Page 6 of 14

#### **FACTS**

22. On July 27, 2017, Defendant, using an automated text-messaging platform, caused the following text messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in 8419 (the "8419 Number"):



23. The above text message was transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.

24. Defendant's text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., Defendant's new and used cars.

25. The telephone number (254-236-3762) that transmitted the text message is a spoofed number operated by or on behalf of Defendant.

26. The telephone number (888-225-7841) contained in the text message is owned and operated by Defendant.

27. Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief,

Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.

28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.

29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 8419 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 8419 Number.

30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the message. *See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC*, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at \*11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016)("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing *Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); *Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); *Hickey v. Voxernet LLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; *Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co.*, No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

31. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text message at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, *en masse*, in an automated fashion without human intervention.

32. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. *See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller*, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at \*2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) ("Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.").

# CLASS ALLEGATIONS

# PROPOSED CLASS

33. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

34. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:

All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant's behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient's prior express consent.

35. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does

not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more.

# NUMEROSITY

36. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

37. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time

and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

# COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

38. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

- Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls;
- (3) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
- (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and
- (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.

39. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.

#### **TYPICALITY**

40. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

#### PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS

41. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate

representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.

#### PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE

42. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

43. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions.

#### COUNT I <u>Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)</u> (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

31. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

32. It is a violation of the TCPA to make "any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service ...." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

33. "Automatic telephone dialing system" refers to any equipment that has the "capacity to dial numbers without human intervention." *See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc.*, No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at \*4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).

34. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.

35. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

36. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.

37. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

38. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id*.

39. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, Seth F. Masson, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

# COUNT II <u>Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)</u> (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

40. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

41. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

42. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to send these text messages, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.

43. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

44. As a result of Defendant's violations, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, Seth F. Masson, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

#### JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff and Class Members hereby demand a trial by jury.

#### **DOCUMENT PRESERVATION DEMAND**

Plaintiff demands that Defendant take affirmative steps to preserve all records, lists, electronic databases or other itemization of telephone numbers associated with the Defendant and the communication or transmittal of the text messages and calls as alleged herein.

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Date: August 4, 2017

# HIRALDO P.A.

/s/ Manuel S. Hiraldo

Manuel S. Hiraldo Florida Bar No. 030380 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com Telephone: 954.400.4713

# SJS 44 (ReCase 1:17-cv-22967-FAM Document11CIO VER Schope FLSD Docket 08/04/2017 Page 1 of 2

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

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I. (a) PLAINTIFFS				DEFENDANTS				
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VIII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:		CHECK IF THIS IS UNDER F.R.C.P. 2	S A CLASS ACTION 23	N D	EMAND \$	CHECK YES only JURY DEMAND	if demanded in complaint: : భ Yes □ No	
ABOVE INFORMATION IS THE BEST OF MY KNOW		& CORRECT TO	signature of A Manuel	S.	of record Hiraldo	DATE August 4	4, 2017	
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#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

#### Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

**I.** (a) **Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.

(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)

(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".

(d) Choose one County where Action Arose.

**II.** Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.C.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.

United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.

United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.

Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.

Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.)

**III.** Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.

**IV.** Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is sufficient to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerks in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than one nature of suit, select the most definitive.

V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.

Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States District Courts.

Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.

Refiled (3) Attach copy of Order for Dismissal of Previous case. Also complete VI.

Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.

Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.

Multidistrict Litigation. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407. When this box is checked, do not check (5) above.

Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment. (7) Check this box for an appeal from a magistrate judge's decision.

VI. Related/Refiled Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases or re-filed cases. Insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judges name for such cases.

 

 VII.
 Cause of Action.
 Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause.
 Do not cite jurisdictional statutes

 unless diversity.
 Example:
 U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service

VIII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.

Demand. In this space enter the dollar amount (in thousands of dollars) being demanded or indicate other demand such as a preliminary injunction.

Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

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AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Southern District of Florida

SETH F. MASSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	) ) ) )
Plaintiff(s)	- )
V.	
TALLAHASSEE DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP, LLC a Florida limited liability company,	) ) )
Defendant(s)	- )

Civil Action No.

#### SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) Tallahassee Dodge Chrysler Jeep, LLC

Registered Agent: Michael G. Little 911 Chestnut Street Clearwater, FL 33756

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: Manuel S. Hiraldo

Hiraldo P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Blvd, Ste. 1400 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 954-400-4713 mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No.

# **PROOF OF SERVICE**

# (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

	This summons for (nam	e of individual and title, if any)	)							
was re	ceived by me on (date)									
	□ I personally served	the summons on the indiv	ridual at <i>(place)</i>							
			on (date)	; or						
	$\Box$ I left the summons a	at the individual's residen	ce or usual place of abode with (name)							
		, a	person of suitable age and discretion who res	sides there,						
	on <i>(date)</i> , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or									
	$\Box$ I served the summor	ns on (name of individual)		, who is						
	designated by law to a	ccept service of process of	on behalf of (name of organization)							
			on (date)	; or						
	$\Box$ I returned the summ	ions unexecuted because		; or						
	□ Other (specify):									
	My fees are \$	for travel and \$	for services, for a total of \$	0.00 -						
	I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.									
Date:										
			Server's signature							
			Printed name and title							

Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

# **ClassAction.org**

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Tallahassee Dodge Chrysler Jeep Facing Suit Over Telemarketing Texts</u>