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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.

Scott Edelsberg, Esq. (CA Bar No. 330990)
1925 Century Park E #1700
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: 305-975-3320
scott@edelsberglaw.com

Counsel for Plaintiff and Proposed Class

CHRISTIAN LEMUS,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

2015 HALLADAY WELLNESS,
INC. d/b/a WEST CLINIK, a
California corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION

**COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE TELEPHONE
CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, ET SEQ.
(TCPA)**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

2 1. Plaintiff, Christian Lemus, brings this action against Defendant, 2015
3 Halladay Wellness, Inc. d/b/a West Clinic, to secure redress for violations of the
4 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.

5 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

6 2. This is a putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer
7 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.* (the “TCPA”).

8 3. Defendant is a cannabis dispensary. To promote its services, Defendant
9 engages in aggressive unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the
10 process.

11 4. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant’s
12 illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation,
13 and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory
14 damages on behalf of himself and members of the Class, and any other available legal
15 or equitable remedies.

16 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

17 5. This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this action
18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the action arises under the Telephone Consumer
19 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.* (“TCPA”).

20 6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant and venue is proper
21 in this District because Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities
22 to this District, and because Defendant’s unauthorized marketing scheme was directed
23 by Defendant to consumers in this District, including Plaintiff.

24 **PARTIES**

25 7. Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a
26 resident of Orange County, California.

1 8. Defendant is a California corporation whose principal office is located at
2 2100 S Yale Street #A, Santa Ana, CA 92704. Defendant directs, markets, and provides
3 its business activities throughout the United States, including throughout the state of
4 California.

5 9. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of Defendant's name in this
6 Complaint includes all agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs,
7 successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, vendors,
8 and insurers of Defendant.

9 **THE TCPA**

10 10. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone
11 number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's
12 prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

13 11. The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") as
14 "equipment that has the capacity - (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be
15 called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers."
16 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

17 12. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the
18 defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic
19 dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d
20 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff'd*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).

21 13. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to
22 issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings,
23 calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated
24 or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live
25 solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also
26 recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in
27 advance or after the minutes are used. *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone*

1 *Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd
2 14014 (2003).

3 14. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated
4 telemarketing calls, requiring “prior express **written** consent” for such calls to wireless
5 numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of*
6 *1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis supplied).

7 15. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant
8 must establish that it secured the plaintiff’s signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a
9 “‘clear and conspicuous disclosure’ of the consequences of providing the requested
10 consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such
11 calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates.” *In re Rules & Regulations*
12 *Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20,
13 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

14 16. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define “telemarketing”
15 as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the
16 purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services.” 47 C.F.R. §
17 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a
18 court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas*
19 *Entm’t, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

20 17. “Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations ‘require an explicit
21 mention of a good, product, or service’ where the implication of an improper purpose
22 is ‘clear from the context.’” *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918
23 (9th Cir. 2012)).

24 18. “‘Telemarketing’ occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was
25 initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or
26 services.” *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. §
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1 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act*
2 *of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

3 19. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell
4 property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re*
5 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd.
6 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to
7 purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call *or in the future*. *Id.*

8 20. In other words, offers “that are part of an overall marketing campaign to
9 sell property, goods, or services constitute” telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re*
10 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd.
11 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

12 21. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless
13 demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff’s prior express consent. *See In the Matter of*
14 *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961,
15 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent “for non-telemarketing and non-advertising
16 calls”).

17 22. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are
18 entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to
19 wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)
20 (The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of “to make any
21 call” in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); *Toney v. Quality Res., Inc.*, 2014 WL 6757978, at *3
22 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained
23 Plaintiff’s prior express consent before sending him the **text message**). (emphasis
24 added).

25 23. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
26 Circuit: “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade
27 the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation
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1 under the TCPA ‘need not allege any *additional* harm beyond the one Congress has
 2 identified.’” *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp.*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
 3 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549
 4 (2016) (emphasis original)).

5 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

6 24. Beginning on or about July 3, 2020, Defendant sent the following
 7 telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 2691 (the
 8 “2691 Number”):



1 25. Defendant's text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular
2 telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.

3 26. Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they
4 encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e.,
5 selling Plaintiff cannabis products.

6 27. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant's
7 various discounts and promotions, which Defendant sends to promote its business.

8 28. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and,
9 therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon
10 information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals
11 residing within this judicial district.

12 29. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express
13 written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.

14 30. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2691 Number and is
15 financially responsible for phone service to the 2691 Number.

16 31. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do not call registry since
17 May 8, 2013.

18 32. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message
19 demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. *See Jenkins*
20 *v. LL Atlanta, LLC*, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11
21 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) ("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal
22 nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an
23 inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing *Legg v. Voice Media*
24 *Grp., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to
25 infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass
26 messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); *Kramer v. Autobytel,*
27 *Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants

1 used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner
2 and sent from short code); *Hickey v. Voxernet LLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; *Robbins*
3 *v. Coca-Cola Co.*, No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL
4 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be
5 impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

6 33. The text messages originated from telephone number 714-312-7744, a
7 number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.

8 34. The number used by Defendant (714-312-7744) is known as a “long
9 code,” a standard 10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages *en*
10 *masse*, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and
11 sent from a telephone number operated by an individual.

12 35. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway
13 providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS
14 traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the
15 mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages
16 to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of
17 SMS messages to and from a long code.

18 36. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a
19 combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in
20 this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone
21 numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers
22 from a list without human intervention.

23 37. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the
24 “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text
25 messages without any human involvement.

26 38. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity
27 was in fact utilized by Defendant.

1 39. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which
2 capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

3 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which
4 capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

5 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers,
6 which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

7 42. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human
8 intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.

9 43. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future
10 transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.


11 44. To transmit the messages at issue, the Platform automatically executed the
12 following steps:

- 13 a) The Platform retrieved each telephone number from a list of numbers
14 in the sequential order the numbers were listed;
- 15 b) The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order
16 listed and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s
17 message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and
18 the message content;
- 19 c) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed to an
20 SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform,
21 mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers.
- 22 d) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each
23 packet—automatically and with no human intervention—to the
24 respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the
25 sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent
26 the message to its customer’s mobile telephone.

1 45. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no
2 human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of
3 transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not
4 less.

5 46. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages
6 depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words,
7 the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network
8 congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not
9 allow a human to control the function.

10 47. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that
11 the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and
12 without any human intervention:



18 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm,
19 including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion,
20 trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and
21 caused disruption to his daily life.

22 49. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm.
23 Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen to thirty seconds reviewing
24 each of Defendant’s unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was
25 doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the
26 message.

1 50. Next, Plaintiff wasted approximately fifteen minutes locating and
2 retaining counsel for this case in order to stop Defendant's unwanted calls.

3 51. In all, Defendant's violations of the TCPA caused Plaintiff to waste at
4 least thirty minutes of his time in addressing and attempting to stop Defendant's
5 solicitations.

6 CLASS ALLEGATIONS

7 PROPOSED CLASS

8 52. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23,
9 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

10 53. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows:

11 **No Consent Class: All persons in the United States**
12 **who, within four years prior to the filing of this**
13 **action, (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf**
14 **of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone**
15 **dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting**
16 **Defendant's goods and services, (4) without prior**
17 **express consent of the recipient, or with the same**
18 **manner of purported consent Defendant claims to**
19 **have obtained from Plaintiff, if any.**

20 **Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the**
21 **United States who from four years prior to the filing**
22 **of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on**
23 **behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within**
24 **any 12-month period; (3) where the person's**
25 **telephone number had been listed on the National**
26 **Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for**
27 **the purpose of selling Defendant's products and**
28 **services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it**
did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b)
it obtained prior express written consent in the
same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly
obtained prior express written consent to call the
Plaintiff.

54. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class.
Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class
members number in the several thousands, if not more.

NUMEROSITY

1 55. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated calls to
2 cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the
3 United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore,
4 are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

5 56. The exact number and identities of the members of the Class are unknown
6 at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class
7 members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

8 **COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT**

9 57. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of
10 the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of
11 the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class
12 are:

- 13 a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class
14 members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- 15 b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained
16 prior express written consent to make such calls;
- 17 c) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
- 18 d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such
19 damages; and
- 20 e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the
21 future.

22 58. The common questions in this case are capable of having common
23 answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to
24 telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the
25 Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and
26 administered in this case.

27 **TYPICALITY**

1 59. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they
2 are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

3 **PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS**

4 60. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect
5 the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
6 an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
7 Class.

8 **PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE**

9 61. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and
10 efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all
11 members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While
12 the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual
13 damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful
14 conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of
15 individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if
16 every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be
17 unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

18 62. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create
19 a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for
20 Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the
21 challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be
22 dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties
23 to such actions.

24 **COUNT I**
25 **Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)**
26 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

27 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set
28 forth herein.

64. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

65. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.

66. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

67. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.

68. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

69. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id.*

COUNT II
Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

1 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set
2 forth herein.

3 71. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its
4 conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

5 72. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these
6 calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.

7 73. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class
8 Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court
9 should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other
10 members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

11 74. As a result of Defendant's violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are
12 entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation,
13 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

14 **COUNT III**

15 **Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227**

16 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)**

17 75. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set
18 forth herein.

19 76. The TCPA's implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides
20 that "[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation" to "[a] residential
21 telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national
22 do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that
23 is maintained by the federal government."
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1 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable
2 to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless
3 telephone numbers.”¹

4 78. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall
5 initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless
6 such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who
7 request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.”

8 79. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any
9 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations
10 prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation
11 of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy
12 rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c).

13 80. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be
14 initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do
15 Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on
16 the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive
17 telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.

18 81. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not
19 Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made
20 by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above.
21 As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call
22 Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are
23 entitled, *inter alia*, to receive up to \$500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. §
24 64.1200.

25
26 ¹ *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report
27 and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003) Available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-153A1.pdf

1 82. To the extent Defendant's misconduct is determined to be willful and
2 knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of
3 statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class.

4 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

5 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, prays for the
6 following relief:

- 7 a) An order certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class as
8 defined above, and appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class
9 and Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel;
- 10 b) An award of actual and statutory damages for Plaintiff and each member
11 of the Class;
- 12 c) As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.*,
13 Plaintiff seeks for himself and each member of the Class \$500.00 in
14 statutory damages for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
15 277(b)(3)(B);
- 16 d) As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C.
17 §§ 227, *et seq.*, Plaintiff seeks for himself and each member of the Class
18 treble damages, as provided by statute, up to \$1,500.00 for each and every
19 violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(3)(B) and § 277(b)(3)(C);
- 20 e) An order declaring that Defendant's actions, as set out above, violate the
21 TCPA;
- 22 f) A declaratory judgment that Defendant's telephone calling equipment
23 constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA;
- 24 g) An injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited text messaging
25 activity, and to otherwise protect the interests of the Class;
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- 1 h) An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using, or contracting the use
2 of, an automatic telephone dialing system without obtaining, recipient's
3 consent to receive calls made with such equipment;
- 4 i) An award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to, *inter alia*,
5 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; and
- 6 j) Such further and other relief as the Court deems necessary.

7 **JURY DEMAND**

8 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

9
10 Dated: January 11, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

11
12 By: /s/ Scott Edelsberg

13 **EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.**

14 Scott Edelsberg, Esq. (CA Bar No. 330990)

15 1925 Century Park E #1700

16 Los Angeles, CA 90067

17 Telephone: 305-975-3320

18 scott@edelsberglaw.com

19 *Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class*

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [West Clinik Hit with Class Action Over 'Unwanted' Promotional Texts](#)
