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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

ROSS IMBLER, STUART and ILENE HIRSH,
KEVIN SMITH and CATHERINE BUSHMAN,
SHARIF AILEY, APRIL ALLRED, ROBERT
and THERESA FOULON, CRYSTAL HAYES,
BARBARA LYNCH, KEVIN MCLALLEN,
SURYA PRAKASH, GABRIEL and LAURA
WEBSTER, individually and on behalf of the
proposed classes,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PREMERA BLUE CROSS, a Washington
nonprofit corporation,

Defendant.

NO.
COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION
JURY DEMAND

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2 Plaintiffs Ross Imbler, Stuart and Ilene Hirsh, Kevin Smith and Catherine Bushman,
3 Sharif Ailey, April Allred, Robert and Theresa Foulon, Crystal Hayes, Barbara Lynch, Kevin
4 McLallen, Surya Prakash, Gabriel and Laura Webster, individually and on behalf of the
5 proposed Classes defined below, allege as follows upon personal knowledge, experience,
6 information and belief, including investigation conducted by their attorneys.

7 **I. NATURE OF THE CASE**

8 1. Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit against Premera because of its failure to
9 protect the confidential information of millions of consumers-including their names, dates of
10 birth, mailing addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers,
11 member identification numbers, medical claims information, financial information, and other
12 protected health information as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
13 Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) (collectively, their “Sensitive Information”).

14 2. Premera is one of the largest healthcare benefits companies in the Pacific
15 Northwest and is also a participant in the national Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (which
16 offers healthcare to consumers throughout the United States and its territories, covering more
17 than 105 million Americans). Premera’s participation in the Blue Cross Blue Shield
18 Association provides its members with access to healthcare providers throughout the country
19 and provides non-Premera Blue Cross members (referred to as “Blue members”) with access to
20 its network.

21 3. In order to become a Premera member (or, for Blue members, receive healthcare
22 services from a provider within the Premera network), an individual must give Premera his or
23 her Sensitive Information. Plaintiffs and the putative class took reasonable steps to preserve
24 the confidentiality of their Sensitive Information in many ways, including protecting the
25 Sensitive Information with confidential passwords and relying upon physician-patient privilege
26 and confidentiality. Premera maintains this Sensitive Information in a centralized database.
27

1 4. As a healthcare benefits provider, Premera is required to protect both its
2 members' and also Blue members' Sensitive Information, including by adopting and
3 implementing specific data security regulations and standards set forth under HIPAA.

4 5. In addition to its implied statutory obligation, Premera expressly promises—
5 throughout its Notice of Privacy Practices, Code of Conduct, public statements, and other
6 written assurances—to safeguard and protect Sensitive Information in accordance with HIPAA
7 regulations, federal, state and local laws, and industry standards.

8 6. Unfortunately, Premera's failure to protect the Sensitive Information in its
9 control resulted in one of the largest healthcare data breaches in history. On March 17, 2015,
10 Premera revealed that its computer network had been breached and the Sensitive Information of
11 approximately 11 million of its former and current members, Blue members, and employees
12 was compromised.

13 7. According to Premera, the breach started in May 2014 and went undetected for
14 nearly one year. Worse yet, after discovering the breach, Premera waited months before
15 notifying all affected individuals preventing Plaintiffs and the Class from taking steps to further
16 prevent the misuse of their Sensitive Information.

17 8. The breach not only revealed that Premera failed to provide the level of data
18 protection that it promised and that members paid for, it also exposed millions of individuals'
19 Sensitive Information to an increased risk of misuse by unauthorized third parties (e.g., identity
20 theft). In fact, affected individuals face a particularly real risk of misuse here (i.e., to the extent
21 their information hasn't been misused already) because their Sensitive Information was
22 specifically targeted by hackers seeking to steal consumer data. Many of the class members
23 have already suffered medical fraud, tax fraud, credit card fraud, and phishing scams, as a
24 result of Premera's illegal conduct. All class members are in real and imminent danger of the
25 same fate.

1 9. Had Premera informed Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes that it would
2 use inadequate security measures—including by using data security practices at odds with its
3 own affirmative representations—members would not have been willing to sign-up or pay for
4 Premera’s healthcare benefits at the price charged, if at all, and would not have been willing to
5 provide their Sensitive Information to Premera.

6 10. Premera’s failure to implement adequate security protocols jeopardized millions
7 of consumers’ Sensitive Information, fell well short of its statutory and professional standard
8 obligations, fell short of Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ reasonable expectations when
9 they provided their Sensitive Information to Premera, and diminished the value of the services
10 that Premera provided (in other words, because Premera failed to disclose its gross security
11 inadequacies, it delivered a fundamentally less useful and less valuable service than the one
12 members paid for).

13 11. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring suit, on behalf of themselves and all others
14 similarly situated, to seek redress for Premera’s unlawful conduct.

15 **II. PARTIES**

16 12. Plaintiff Ross Imbler is a natural person and citizen of the State of Alaska.
17 Plaintiff Imbler brings this action on behalf of himself and the Nationwide and Alaska Classes,
18 as defined below.

19 13. Plaintiffs Stuart and Ilene Hirsh are natural persons and citizens of the State of
20 Oregon. Plaintiffs Hirsh bring this action on behalf of themselves and the Nationwide and
21 Oregon Classes, as defined below.

22 14. Plaintiffs Kevin Smith and Catherine Bushman are natural persons and citizens
23 of the State of Tennessee. Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman bring this action on behalf of
24 themselves and the Nationwide and Tennessee Classes, as defined below.
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1 15. Plaintiff Sharif Ailey is a natural person and citizen of the State of Texas.
2 Plaintiff Ailey brings this action on behalf of himself and the Nationwide and Texas Classes, as
3 defined below.

4 16. Plaintiff April Allred is a natural person and citizen of the State of Washington.
5 Plaintiff Allred brings this action on behalf of herself and the Nationwide and Washington
6 Classes, as defined below.

7 17. Plaintiffs Robert & Theresa Foulon are natural persons and citizens of the State
8 of Washington. Plaintiffs Foulon bring this action on behalf of themselves and the Nationwide
9 and Washington Classes, as defined below.

10 18. Plaintiff Crystal Hayes is a natural person and citizen of the State of
11 Washington. Plaintiff Hayes brings this action on behalf of herself and the Nationwide and
12 Washington Classes, as defined below.

13 19. Plaintiff Kevin McLallen is a natural person and citizen of the State of
14 Washington. Plaintiff McLallen brings this action on behalf of himself and the Nationwide and
15 Washington Classes, as defined below.

16 20. Plaintiff Surya Prakash is a natural person and citizen of the State of
17 Washington. Plaintiff Prakash brings this action on behalf of himself and the Nationwide and
18 Washington Classes, as defined below.

19 21. Plaintiffs Gabriel & Laura Webster are natural persons and citizens of the State
20 of Washington. Plaintiffs Webster bring this action on behalf of themselves and the
21 Nationwide and Washington Classes, as defined below.

22 22. Defendant Premera Blue Cross is a healthcare benefits provider existing under
23 the laws of the State of Washington with its headquarters and principal place of business
24 located at 7001 220th Street SW, Building 1, Mountlake Terrace, Washington 98043.
25 Premera's relevant operations, including its primary marketing, administration and information
26 security operations, as well as its vital employees (such as its Chief Information Security
27

1 Officer) are all located in the State of Washington. Premera is also registered to conduct
2 business in the State of Oregon (Oregon Secretary of State Registry Number 447360-80) and
3 Alaska (Premera Blue Cross of Alaska, which is a trade name only).

4 **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

5
6 23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
7 § 1332(d)(2) because (a) at least one member of the putative Classes is a citizen of a state
8 different from Defendant, and (b) the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of
9 interest and costs.

10 24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it is registered to
11 and regularly does conduct business in this District, and the unlawful conduct alleged in this
12 Complaint occurred in, was directed to, and/or emanated, in part, from this District.

13 25. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of
14 the events or omissions giving rise to the unlawful conduct alleged in this Complaint occurred
15 in, was directed to, and/or emanated from this District. Venue is additionally proper because
16 Defendant is registered to and does conduct business in this District.

17 **IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

18 **A. Premera Had A Duty And Contractual Obligation To Protect Its Members'**
19 **Sensitive Information From Unauthorized Disclosures.**

20 26. Premera had a duty and obligation to keep confidential the Sensitive Information
21 it obtained and to protect that information from unauthorized disclosures. Premera's duty and
22 obligations are based on: 1) HIPAA; 2) industry standards; 3) specific governmental warnings
23 to Premera about its failure to meet those obligations; and 4) the promises it made to its
24 members. All Class members provided their Sensitive Information to Premera with the
25 common sense and reasonable understanding that Premera would comply with its obligations to
26 keep Sensitive Information confidential and secure from unauthorized disclosures.
27

1 27. HIPAA mandates that Premera provide to every insured and everyone whose
2 plan Premera administers a privacy notice. In its HIPAA mandated privacy notice, Premera
3 promises every insured and everyone whose plan Premera administers it will keep Sensitive
4 Information confidential and protect it from unauthorized disclosure, even beyond Premera’s
5 regulatory obligations. In its Notice of Privacy Practices effective September 23, 2013 Premera
6 promises in relevant part:

7 **THE PRIVACY OF YOUR MEDICAL AND FINANCIAL**
8 **INFORMATION IS VERY IMPORTANT TO US.**

9 At Premera Blue Cross, we are committed to maintaining the
10 confidentiality of your medical and financial information, which
11 we refer to as your “personal information,” regardless of format:
 oral, written, or electronic.

12 * * *

13 **OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT YOUR PERSONAL**
14 **INFORMATION**

15 Under both the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
16 Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Premera
17 Blue Cross must take measures to protect the privacy of your
18 personal information. In addition, other state and federal privacy
19 laws may provide additional privacy protection. Examples of
 your personal information include your name, Social Security
 number, address, telephone number, account number,
 employment, medical history, health records, claims information,
 etc.

20 We protect your personal information in a variety of ways. For
21 example, we authorize access to your personal information by our
22 employees and business associates only to the extent necessary to
23 conduct our business of serving you, such as paying your claims.
24 We take steps to secure our buildings and electronic systems
25 from unauthorized access. We train our employees on our
26 written confidentiality policy and procedures and employees are
27 subject to discipline if they violate them. Our privacy policy and
 practices apply equally to personal information about current and
 former members; we will protect the privacy of your information
 even if you no longer maintain coverage through us.

1 We are required by law to:

2 protect the privacy of your personal information; provide this
3 Notice explaining our duties and privacy practices regarding your
4 personal information; notify you following a breach of your
5 unsecured personal information; and abide by the terms of this
6 Notice.

7 28. Premera posts the same Notice of Privacy Practices on its website,
8 acknowledging its duty and promising to protect all Sensitive Information in its possession.

9 29. Premera admitted its duty and promised to keep the Sensitive Information
10 confidential and secure in other ways. For example, all individuals who register on Premera's
11 website must "accept" Premera's Terms and Conditions. These Terms and Conditions contain
12 a section entitled "Security of Your Personal Information," in which Premera promises that
13 "Premera.com takes precautions to protect users' personal information both online and offline."

14 30. Premera's policy booklets, which form its member contracts, contain a section
15 on "Privacy Policies and Practices" or a "Notice of Information Use and Disclosure," which
16 include promises such as:

17 "We protect your privacy by making sure your information stays
18 confidential. We have a company confidentiality policy and we
19 require all employees to sign it."¹

20 "To safeguard your privacy, we take care to ensure that your
21 information remains confidential by having a company
22 confidentiality policy and by requiring all employees to sign it."²

23 31. Premera's website includes its Code of Conduct, which appears to include the
24 "company confidentiality policy" referenced in the policy booklets.³ On "Customer Privacy,"
25 Premera's Code of Conduct promises:

26 We are committed to complying with federal and state privacy
27 laws, including the HIPAA privacy regulations, that protect
28 financial and health information of our customers. We use the
29 following privacy principles to guide our actions:

¹ See, e.g., PBC00044925-44926, MSP Preferred Select Bronze 5250 HAS Benefit Booklet (2014).

² See, e.g., PBC00046821, Premera Preferred Bronze 5250 HSA Benefit Booklet (2014).

³ Premera, *Code of Conduct* 12 (2016), available at <https://www.premera.com/documents/030553.pdf>.

1 Customers – Customers should enjoy the full array of privacy
2 protections afforded to them by law and routinely granted by their
3 providers. This is a values-based approach whereby we are
4 focused on two core values: Customer Care and Integrity.

5 * * *

6 Where appropriate, we use technical and/or physical security
7 safeguards to ensure our privacy policies are followed.

8 * * *

9 We are committed to ensuring the security of our facilities and
10 electronic systems to prevent unauthorized access to Premera's
11 and our customers' protected personal information (PPI).

12 We are expected to be aware of and follow established corporate
13 policies, processes and procedures that are designated to secure our
14 buildings and electronic systems in compliance with HIPAA
15 Security requirements.

16 32. To further protect Sensitive Information from disclosure, Premera requires all
17 vendors and contractors to sign Premera's Vendor/Contractor Privacy Basics,⁴ which states:

18 Our policies and procedures require compliance with federal and
19 state privacy laws, including HIPAA privacy and security
20 regulations. Contractors, too, must follow our policies and
21 procedures and comply with all laws and regulations to which the
22 Company is subject.

23 33. As demonstrated by these excerpts from Premera's Notice of Privacy Practices,
24 contracts with Policyholder Plaintiffs (i.e., the policy booklets), Code of Conduct, and
25 Vendor/Contractor Privacy Basics, Premera recognized the importance of keeping consumers'
26 Sensitive Information private and repeatedly promised to protect that Sensitive Information and
27 comply with the data security requirements mandated by, among other things, federal and state
privacy laws.

34. Premera's data security obligations and promises were particularly important
given the substantial increase in data breaches (particularly those in the healthcare industry) in
the time period preceding Premera's data breach. Premera's failure to comply with those

⁴ Premera, *Vendor/Contractor Privacy Basics* (2014), available at
<https://www.premera.com/documents/030628.pdf>.

1 obligations and promises was particularly egregious in light of specific governmental warnings
2 regarding the possibility of hacker attacks on companies like Premera. Such warnings further
3 established Premera's duty to keep class members' Sensitive Information private and secure.

4 35. For example, on April 8, 2014—just one month before the Premera breach
5 occurred—the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division issued a Private Industry
6 Notification to companies within the healthcare sector, stating that “the health care industry is
7 not technically prepared to combat against cyber criminals' basic cyber intrusion tactics,
8 techniques and procedures (TTPs), much less against more advanced persistent threats (APTs)”
9 and pointed out that “[t]he biggest vulnerability was the perception of IT healthcare
10 professionals' beliefs that their current perimeter defenses and compliance strategies were
11 working when clearly the data states otherwise.” The same warning specifically noted that
12 “[t]he FBI has observed malicious actors targeting healthcare related systems, perhaps for the
13 purpose of obtaining Protected Health Information (PHI) and/or Personally Identifiable
14 Information (PII).”⁵

15 36. Worse yet, a couple weeks before Premera's breach, the U.S. Office of
16 Personnel Management directly notified Premera about its network security vulnerabilities.⁶
17 The U.S. Office of Personnel Management's April 18, 2014 report revealed that Premera failed
18 to implement adequate measures to secure its network. It found “several areas of concern
19 related to Premera's network security controls” and noted that “patches are not being
20 implemented in a timely manner,” “a methodology is not in place to ensure that unsupported or
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24 ⁵ (U) *Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber Intrusions for Financial Gain* (Apr.
25 8, 2014), FBI Cyber Division Private Industry Notification, available at [http://www.aha.org/content/14/140408--
fbipin-healthsyscyberintrud.pdf](http://www.aha.org/content/14/140408--fbipin-healthsyscyberintrud.pdf).

26 ⁶ Mike Baker, *Feds Warned Premera About Security Flaws Before Breach*, Seattle Times, Mar. 18, 2015,
27 available at [http://www.seattletimes.com/business/local-business/feds-warned-premera-about-security-flaws-
before-breach/](http://www.seattletimes.com/business/local-business/feds-warned-premera-about-security-flaws-before-breach/) (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

1 out-of-date software is not utilized,” and a vulnerability scan identified “insecure server
2 configurations.”⁷

3 37. Federal auditors notified Premera weeks before the breach that its network-
4 security procedures were inadequate and informed it that some of the vulnerabilities could be
5 exploited by hackers and expose sensitive information.⁸

6 **B. Premera Failed To Properly Protect Consumers’ Sensitive Information.**

7
8 38. On May 5, 2014, hackers began the initial phase of their intrusion on Premera’s
9 servers. A “phishing” email was sent to a Premera employee falsely purporting to be from a
10 Premera Information Technology (IT) employee. The email included instructions to download
11 a “security update.” Premera’s employee downloaded this “update,” which was actually
12 malware that allowed hackers access to Premera’s servers.

13 39. Notably, various internal security assessments that Premera had undertaken prior
14 to this period confirmed that it was vulnerable to this exact type of attack.

15 40. The hackers used the domain name in their email of “premera.com” (i.e., using
16 an additional “r”). This wrong domain was visible in the email message. Around this same
17 time, another phishing domain of “premera.com” was also registered. Premera did not warn
18 employees that scam domain names had been registered that were close to “Premera.com.”

19 41. After the Premera employee downloaded the malware, hackers had access to at
20 least two of Premera’s servers for many months completely undetected.

21 42. In June of 2014, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team issued alerts
22 regarding the danger of data hacking from a malware virus known as Gameover Zeus.

23
24 ⁷ U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, Audit of Information
25 Systems General and Application Controls at Premera Blue Cross (Nov. 28, 2014),
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1688453/opm-audit.pdf>.

26 ⁸ Mike Baker, *Feds Warned Premera About Security Flaws Before Breach*, Seattle Times, available at
27 <http://www.seattletimes.com/business/local-business/feds-warned-premera-about-security-flaws-before-breach/>
(Oct. 6, 2015).

1 43. In July of 2014, an end user reported a Trojan message to Premera's IT
2 department.

3 44. In August of 2014, a Premera virus scan detected a backdoor Trojan virus.

4 45. In September of 2014, Premera's IT department indicated it was concerned
5 about a possible "Gameover Zeus" infiltration, the dangers of which the media and U.S.
6 government had been reporting on for many months.

7 46. On September 8, 2014, Premera IT employee, Gabriel Bigger, sent malware
8 byte logs to Mandiant based on these concerns over Gameover Zeus infiltration. Mandiant
9 quickly informed Premera the virus looked like Gameover Zeus on September 9, 2014.

10 47. On September 23, 2014, Premera IT informed senior executives that Premera
11 computers had been infected with a virus.

12 48. On October 10, 2014, Premera engaged Mandiant, a cyber-security firm, to
13 perform an assessment of the security of its network. Mandiant provided its Mandiant
14 Intelligent Response (MIR) agents (a tool to identify indicators of compromise and malware) to
15 install on Premera's workstations and laptops for the purposes of scanning for malware and
16 other infections.

17 49. On October 13, 2014, Jerry Vergeront provided a network status report that
18 identified deficiencies in Premera's Intrusion Detection System, a repeat deficiency initially
19 identified in 2007

20 50. The pilot phase of the Mandiant project did not begin until December 2014 and
21 continued until early January 2015. Premera did not begin searching end-user work stations
22 until January 8, 2015. Premera did not install network sensors until January 28, 2015.

23 51. On January 29, 2015, Mandiant discovered a signature for SOGU malware
24 traffic on the Premera network, confirmed infection of two servers, and confirmed that the
25 malware was "beaconing" to attacker sites. SOGU is a type of Trojan that has been around for
26
27

1 years. By January 30, 2015, Premera had finally uncovered that the SOGU malware had been
2 in its system since May 2014.

3 52. In February 2015, Mandiant continued to try to understand the full extent of the
4 breach and whether and how much information had been removed from Premera's system. At
5 this time, Premera finally agreed to deploy Mandiant's agents on all Premera servers,
6 workstations, and laptops in order to assess the scope of the breach. This installation was only
7 complete in late February, nearly a month after Mandiant first confirmed that a breach had
8 occurred.

9 53. On February 20, 2015, Premera notified the FBI of the data breach. On
10 February 25, 2015, the FBI met with Premera and Mandiant. The FBI began its own
11 investigation, as well.

12 54. Premera chose not to inform the public of the breach at this time although it had
13 sufficient knowledge of the extent and scope of the breach, deciding instead to further
14 investigate and attempt to remediate the breach before letting the public know that their
15 Sensitive Information had been stolen (and was continuing to be stolen).

16 55. Premera further waited until the weekend of March 6-8 to perform the complete
17 remediation of its network, during which time information was still being accessed and stolen.
18 Mandiant continued to monitor the network for the following week to ensure Premera had
19 completely cleansed its system.

20 56. It wasn't until March 17, 2015—over eight months after being warned of a
21 Trojan virus and 46 days after confirming the data breach—that Premera finally revealed to the
22 public and governmental authorities other than the FBI that a massive data breach had
23 occurred.

1 57. In its notice, Premera revealed that its computer network was the target of “a
2 sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to [its] Information Technology (IT) systems.”⁹
3 As a result, the Sensitive Information belonging to approximately 11 million consumers—
4 including its current and former members, employees, and other Blue members—was
5 compromised. The breach affected Premera Blue Cross, Premera Blue Cross Blue Shield of
6 Alaska, and affiliate brands Vivacity and Connexion Insurance Solutions, Inc. The breach also
7 affected members of other Blue Cross Blue Shield plans who sought treatment in Washington,
8 Oregon or Alaska.

9 58. Premera eventually acknowledged that the breach actually started in May 2014
10 and went undetected by it for nearly one year.¹⁰

11 59. One month before Premera announced the Sensitive Information had been
12 breached, another major healthcare provider reported that hackers had successfully taken
13 sensitive information of approximately eighty million consumers. Security researchers believe
14 that attackers initially gained access to the databases containing that information through
15 phishing attempts (i.e., using legitimate-looking emails or websites to trick individuals into
16 revealing confidential information, such as database login credentials) and linked malware¹¹
17 involved in those phishing attacks to Chinese hackers who authorities refer to as “Deep Panda.”

18 60. Malware thought to have been authored by Deep Panda was later discovered in
19 connection with the phishing website www.prennera.com.

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25 ⁹ *Premera Has Been The Target Of A Sophisticated Cyberattack*, Premera Blue Cross, available at
<http://premeraupdate.com/> (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

26 ¹⁰ *Id.*

27 ¹¹ “Malware” refers to malicious software designed to infiltrate and damage computers or computer systems.

1 **C. Premera Violated HIPAA, Industry Standard Data Protection Protocols,**
2 **And Its Own Representations Regarding Data Security.**

3 61. HIPAA requires that healthcare providers (like Premera) adopt administrative,
4 physical, and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of
5 consumers' Sensitive Information.

6 62. Unfortunately, Premera's data breach resulted from a variety of failures to
7 follow HIPAA mandated data-security protocols, many of which are also industry standard.
8 Among such deficient practices, Premera's breach shows that it failed to implement (or
9 inadequately implemented) information security policies or procedures such as effective
10 employee training on phishing attempts, adequate intrusion detection systems, regular reviews
11 of audit logs and authentication records, and other similar measures designed to protect the
12 confidentiality of the Sensitive Information it maintained in its data systems.

13 63. More specifically, Premera's security fiascos demonstrate that it failed to honor
14 its duties and promises by not:

- 15 a. Maintaining an adequate data security system to reduce the risk of data
16 breaches and cyber-attacks;
- 17 b. Adequately protecting Plaintiffs' and the Classes' Sensitive Information;
- 18 c. Ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of electronic protected health
19 information it created, received, maintained, and transmitted in violation of 45 C.F.R.
20 § 164.306(a)(1);
- 21 d. Implementing technical policies and procedures for electronic
22 information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only
23 to those persons or software programs that have been granted access rights in violation of
24 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1);
25

1 e. Implementing policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and
2 correct security violations in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i);

3 f. Implementing procedures to review records of information system
4 activity regularly, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking reports in
5 violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D);

6 g. Protecting against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the
7 security or integrity of electronic protected health information in violation of 45 C.F.R.
8 § 164.306(a)(2);

9 h. Protecting against reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of
10 electronic protected health information that are not permitted under the privacy rules regarding
11 individually identifiable health information in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(3);

12 i. Ensuring compliance with the HIPAA security standard rules by its
13 workforce in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(4); and

14 j. Training all members of its workforce effectively on the policies and
15 procedures with respect to protected health information as necessary and appropriate for the
16 members of its workforce to carry out their functions and to maintain security of protected
17 health information in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b).

18 64. Likewise, Premera's security lapses demonstrate that it failed to follow through
19 on its own representations about its data security practices, including those discussed above.

20 Specifically, Premera did not:

21 a. Take precautions to protect users information, whether online or offline;

22 b. Maintain the confidentiality or privacy of the personal information—as
23 defined by its Notice of Privacy Practices—in its control, specifically including information
24 stored in electronic form;

25 c. Take steps to secure its electronic systems from unauthorized access;

26

27

1 d. Train its employees on Premera’s confidentiality policy and procedures
2 and did not enforce its policy and procedures;

3 e. Timely or reasonably notify affected individuals following the breach of
4 their personal information;

5 f. Protect individuals’ privacy by making sure their information stayed
6 confidential, including by failing to enforce or monitor employee compliance with its
7 confidentiality policy or practices;

8 g. Ensure the security of its facilities and electronic systems to prevent
9 unauthorized access to Premera’s and its customers’ protected personal information (PPI); and

10 h. Remain aware of or follow corporate policies, processes and procedures
11 designated to secure electronic systems in compliance with HIPAA Security requirements.

12 65. Had Premera implemented the above-described data security protocols or
13 policies, the consequences of the data breach could have been avoided, or at least significantly
14 reduced (as the breach could have been detected nearly one year earlier, the amount of
15 Sensitive Information compromised could have been greatly reduced or avoided entirely, and
16 affected consumers could have been notified—and taken protective/mitigating actions—much
17 sooner). For instance, had Premera (i) adequately trained its employees to protect themselves
18 against phishing attempts (like those attempts described above), (ii) implemented adequate
19 security protocols to detect breaches (i.e., detecting unauthorized access to its databases), or
20 (iii) adequately reviewed authentication logs for anomalies (e.g., detecting abnormal access to
21 its databases from unknown locations, or accessing or transferring large amounts of Sensitive
22 Information), the breach could have been identified and thwarted before considerable amounts
23 of Sensitive Information were compromised.

24 66. As discussed above, major healthcare entities (like Premera) have been targeted
25 in damaging hacking attempts in recent years, and Premera was specifically warned that its
26 network-security procedures were inadequate and that some of the vulnerabilities could be
27

1 exploited by hackers to expose sensitive information (as described above). Premera thus knew
2 or should have known that a data breach would likely result from its deficient security and
3 privacy practices described above. Despite these warnings—and Premera’s own knowledge
4 about the significant holes in its data security regime—Premera continued to assure its
5 customers (and potential customers) that its data security systems were secure, including by
6 making the express representations discussed above.

7 67. Even though Premera promised its members and Blue members the above-
8 described security measures (i.e., that Premera’s promises, as well as HIPAA-mandated and
9 industry standards would be used to protect their Sensitive Information), they were not
10 adequately implemented (if at all), which resulted in the unauthorized release of Sensitive
11 Information.

12 **D. It Is Well Established That Security Breaches Lead To Instances Of**
13 **Identity Theft.**

14 68. The United States Government Accountability Office noted in a June 2007
15 report on Data Breaches (“GAO Report”) that identity thieves use identifying data such as
16 SSNs to open financial accounts, receive government benefits and incur charges and credit in a
17 person’s name.¹² As the GAO Report states, this type of identity theft is the most harmful
18 because it may take some time for the victim to become aware of the theft, and the theft can
19 impact the victim’s credit rating adversely.

20 69. In addition, the GAO Report states that victims of identity theft will face
21 “substantial costs and inconveniences repairing damage to their credit records” and their “good
22 name.”¹³
23

24
25 ¹² See *Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown* (June 2007), United States Government Accountability Office, available at
26 <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

27 ¹³ *Id.*

1 70. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), identity theft victims
2 must often spend countless hours and large amounts of money repairing the impact to their
3 credit.¹⁴ Identity thieves use stolen personal information such as SSNs for a variety of crimes,
4 including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance fraud.¹⁵

5 71. With access to an individual’s Sensitive Information, criminals can do more than
6 just empty a victim’s bank account—they can also commit various types of fraud, including:
7 obtaining a driver’s license or official identification card in the victim’s name but with the
8 thief’s picture; using the victim’s name and SSN to obtain government benefits; or, filing a
9 fraudulent tax return using the victim’s information. In addition, identity thieves may obtain a
10 job using the victim’s SSN, rent a house or receive medical services, prescription drugs and
11 goods, and fraudulent medical billing in the victim’s name, and may even give the victim’s
12 personal information to police during an arrest resulting in an arrest warrant being issued in the
13 victim’s name.¹⁶ Further, loss of private and personal health information can expose the victim
14 to loss of reputation, loss of job employment, blackmail and other negative effects.

15 72. Sensitive Information is such a valuable commodity to identity thieves that once
16 the information has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the “cyber
17 black-market” for years. As a result of recent large-scale data breaches, identity thieves and
18 cyber criminals have openly posted stolen credit card numbers, SSNs, and other Sensitive
19 Information directly on various Internet websites making the information publicly available. In
20

21 _____
22 ¹⁴ See *Identity Theft*, Federal Trade Commission, <http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft>
(last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

23 ¹⁵ The FTC defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another
24 person without authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201. The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or
25 number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,”
including, among other things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued
26 driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or
27 taxpayer identification number.” *Id.*

¹⁶ See *Identity Theft*, Federal Trade Commission, *available at* <http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft>
(last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

1 one study, researchers found hundreds of websites displaying stolen Sensitive Information.

2 The study concluded:

3 It is clear from the current state of the credit card black-market that
4 cyber criminals can operate much too easily on the Internet. They
5 are not afraid to put out their email addresses, in some cases phone
6 numbers and other credentials in their advertisements. It seems
7 that the black market for cyber criminals is not underground at all.
8 In fact, it's very "in your face."¹⁷

9 73. A study by Experian found that the "average total cost" of medical identity theft
10 to an individual is "about \$20,000" per incident, and that a majority of victims of medical
11 identity theft were forced to pay out-of-pocket costs for healthcare they did not receive in order
12 to restore coverage.¹⁸ Almost half of medical identity theft victims lose their healthcare
13 coverage as a result of the incident, while nearly one-third saw their insurance premiums rise,
14 and forty percent were never able to resolve their identity theft at all.¹⁹ Indeed, data breaches
15 and identity theft have a crippling effect on individuals and detrimentally impact the entire
16 economy as a whole.

17 74. Further, medical databases are particularly high value targets for identity
18 thieves. According to a 2012 Nationwide Insurance report, "[a] stolen medical identity has a
19 \$50 street value – whereas a stolen social security number, on the other hand, only sells for
20 \$1."²⁰ In fact, the medical industry has experienced disproportionately higher instances of
21 computer theft than any other industry.

22
23 ¹⁷ See *The Underground Credit Card Blackmarket*, StopTheHacker, available at
<http://www.stopthehacker.com/2010/03/03/the-underground-credit-card-blackmarket/> (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

24 ¹⁸ See Elinor Mills, *Study: Medical identity theft is costly for victims*, CNET (Mar. 3, 2010),
25 http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10460902-245.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

26 ¹⁹ *Id.*

27 ²⁰ See *Study: Few Aware of Medical Identity Theft Risk*, Claims Journal,
<http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2012/06/14/208510.htm> (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

1 75. In fact, individuals whose information was compromised in a similar data breach
2 by the same hackers—Deep Panda—have already fallen victims to identity theft, such as tax
3 return fraud.²¹

4 76. Indeed, Premera’s own data breach notification statements recognize the long-
5 lasting harmful effects of its misconduct and recommends that affected individuals remain
6 vigilant to the possibility of fraud and identity theft by indefinitely reviewing their credit card,
7 bank, and other financial statements for unauthorized activity.

8 **E. Plaintiffs’ Experiences Underscore The Fact That All Class Members Are**
9 **In Imminent Danger Of Identity Theft.**

10 **ALASKA**

11 77. Plaintiff Ross Imbler is a resident of Fairbanks, Alaska and was an Alaska
12 resident during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff Imbler has been a Premera
13 policyholder since 2011 and makes partial premium payments through his employer. In or
14 around March 2015, Plaintiff Imbler received three letters from Premera indicating that his, his
15 wife’s, and his then 2-year-old daughter’s personal information may be compromised. Plaintiff
16 Imbler is especially concerned about the long-term threat of identity theft to his daughter, as
17 well as the immediate threat of fraud and identity theft for him and his wife. Plaintiff Imbler
18 has spent about six hours to date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach.

19 **OREGON**

20 78. Plaintiffs Stuart and Ilene Hirsh are residents of Salem, Oregon and were
21 Oregon residents during the period of the Premera Breach. Mr. Hirsh was a Premera
22 policyholder, with Mrs. Hirsh as a dependent insured, from approximately 1999 to 2006 and
23 made partial premium payments through his employer. In or around March 2015, Mr. and
24 Mrs. Hirsh received letters from Premera notifying them that their personal information may
25

26 ²¹ See Jose Pagliery, *A Hacker Stole Our \$3,500 Tax Refund*, CNN Money (Apr. 15, 2015),
27 <http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/15/technology/tax-hacker/> (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).

1 have been compromised. Mr. and Mrs. Hirsh have spent about six hours to date addressing
2 issues arising from the Premera Breach, including monitoring their credit reports for fraudulent
3 activity.

4 TENNESSEE

5 79. Plaintiffs Kevin Smith and Catherine Bushman, husband and wife, are residents
6 of Franklin, Tennessee and were Tennessee residents during the period of the Premera Breach.
7 Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman were both Premera policyholders at various times from
8 approximately 2005 to 2010, then approximately 2011 to 2013, and each made partial premium
9 payments through their employer. In or around March 2015, Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman
10 received letters from Premera notifying them that their personal information may have been
11 compromised. Also in and around March 2015, Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman received a large
12 IRS tax refund check despite having not yet filed their 2014 tax return. After contacting the
13 IRS, they discovered that someone had filed a fraudulent tax return using their names and
14 Social Security numbers. Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman then filed identity theft affidavits with
15 the IRS and the FTC, a police report, and sought a credit watch with one of the credit bureaus.
16 At an in-person appointment with the IRS in Nashville, they were informed that, going
17 forward, they will have to manually submit their tax returns with a security PIN. The
18 processing of their 2014 tax return and refund was delayed approximately four months. In or
19 around July of 2015, a criminal attempted to fraudulently open a credit card in both of their
20 names, but the bank called Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman and they were able to confirm the
21 fraud and cancel the account. Plaintiffs Smith and Bushman have spent about 30 hours each to
22 date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach.

23 TEXAS

24 80. Plaintiff Sharif Ailey is a resident of Keller, Texas and was a Texas resident
25 during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff Ailey has been a Premera policyholder since
26 November 2011 and makes partial premium payments through his employer. In or around
27

1 March 2015, Plaintiff Ailey received a letter from Premera notifying him that his personal
2 information may have been compromised. In or around June 2015, Plaintiff Ailey discovered
3 fraudulent credit accounts were being opened in his name. He has spent approximately \$100
4 requesting credit reports, freezing his credit report, and attempting to remove the fraudulent
5 activity from his credit report. As a result of these credit issues caused by the Premera Breach,
6 Plaintiff Ailey was unable to refinance the mortgage on his house. Plaintiff Ailey has spent
7 about 25 hours to date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach.

8 WASHINGTON

9 81. Plaintiff April Allred is a resident of Washington and was a Washington resident
10 during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff Allred and her son were Premera insureds
11 from 2007 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2012, and her husband, the policyholder, made partial
12 premium payments through his employer. In or around March 2015, Plaintiff Allred received a
13 letter from Premera notifying her that her and her family's personal information may have been
14 compromised. On or about April 15, 2015, Plaintiff Allred's 2014 income tax return was
15 rejected due to the use of her son's Social Security number in another fraudulently filed return.
16 Plaintiff Allred had to take additional trips to her accountant's office, submit her tax return
17 manually by mail, and wait several weeks longer to receive her tax refund. Plaintiff Allred has
18 spent about 25 hours to date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach, including
19 monitoring her credit report and bank accounts for fraudulent activity.

20 82. Plaintiffs Robert and Theresa Foulon are residents of Bellevue, Washington and
21 were Washington residents during the period of the Premera Breach. Mr. Foulon has been a
22 Premera policyholder, with Mrs. Foulon and their children as dependent insureds, from
23 approximately 1992 to 2009, then 2010 to present. Mr. Foulon now makes premium payments
24 through his self-employment; prior to 2009 he made partial premium payments through his
25 employer. In or around March 2015, the Foulons received letters from Premera notifying them
26 that their and their children's personal information may have been compromised. In or around
27

1 April 2015, they then received a letter from the IRS indicating that their \$9,539 tax refund was
2 processing even though they had not yet filed a return. After logging into his tax account and
3 seeing the bank account destination for the direct deposit was not theirs, Mr. Foulon contacted
4 the IRS and reported that the tax return was fraudulent. The Foulons had to fill out the
5 necessary forms to report the fraud and file their actual tax return manually, which they will
6 always have to do going forward. On or about September 14, 2015, they received another letter
7 from the IRS verifying that the prior return was fraudulent and providing a PIN for future
8 filings. Mr. Foulon is still attempting to sort out his family's 2014 tax return due to this
9 attempted identity theft. The Foulons have spent about 30 hours to date addressing issues
10 arising from the Premera Breach, including monitoring their credit reports for additional
11 fraudulent activity.

12 83. Plaintiff Crystal Hayes is a resident of Lynnwood, Washington and was a
13 Washington resident during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff Hayes has been a
14 Premera policyholder since 2012 and makes partial premium payments through her employer.
15 In or around March 2015, Plaintiff Hayes received a letter from Premera notifying her that her
16 personal information may have been compromised. Soon after the breach notification, her
17 credit cards were cancelled and reissued due to fraudulent activity, but Plaintiff Hayes was
18 unaware of the cancellation and her cards were declined when she attempted to use them. She
19 had to reset her automatic bill payments with the reissued card information as well. Plaintiff
20 Hayes has spent about five hours to date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach,
21 including requesting and checking her credit report and bank statements for fraudulent activity.

22 84. Plaintiff Kevin McLallen is a resident of Covington, Washington and was a
23 Washington resident during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff McLallen has been a
24 Premera policyholder since approximately 2011 and makes partial premium payments through
25 his employer (and now through COBRA). In or around March 2015, Plaintiff McLallen
26 received a letter from Premera notifying him that his personal information may have been
27

1 compromised. In or around April 2015, fraudulent charges appeared on Plaintiff McLallen's
2 credit and debit cards for small charges in New Jersey and Michigan. Even more recently,
3 Plaintiff McLallen has received phishing calls where the criminals already have many of his
4 personal identifying information. Plaintiff McLallen has spent about ten hours to date
5 addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach, including pulling credit reports and
6 purchasing his credit scores - and unreimbursed expense - to ensure they were accurate. He
7 also spent time calling his banks to notify them of the fraudulent activity and researching
8 additional credit security services.

9 85. Plaintiff Surya Prakash is a resident of Seattle, Washington and was a
10 Washington resident during the period of the Premera Breach. Plaintiff Prakash was a Premera
11 policyholder from 2005 to 2012 and made partial premium payments through his employer. In
12 or around December 2014, approximately \$3,500 in fraudulent charges appeared on his bank
13 account. Plaintiff Prakash immediately notified the bank and canceled the account, but was
14 without access to the stolen funds for two weeks until reimbursement. In or around February
15 2015, he again experienced fraudulent activity totaling approximately \$250 on different bank
16 accounts. Again, Plaintiff Prakash canceled the cards and had to wait a few weeks for
17 reimbursement of the stolen funds. In or around March 2015, Plaintiff Prakash received a letter
18 from Premera notifying him that his personal information may have been compromised. In or
19 around August 2015, Plaintiff Prakash received a letter from a collections company indicating
20 he purchased over \$2,000 in plane tickets that he never purchased. He has contacted all three
21 credit bureaus to place alerts and freezes on his credit report. Plaintiff Prakash has spent about
22 five hours to date addressing issues arising from the Premera Breach, including monitoring his
23 bank accounts and credit report for additional fraud.

24 86. Plaintiffs Gabriel and Laura Webster are residents of Seattle, Washington and
25 were Washington residents during the period of the Premera Breach. Mr. Webster has been a
26 Group Health and Regence Blue Cross policyholder, with Mrs. Webster and their 12-year-old
27

1 son as dependent insureds, from approximately 2009 to 2011 and 2012 to present, respectively.
2 Mr. Webster made premium payments on these policies through his employer, and the
3 Websters all received medical treatment in Washington State from 2009 to present. In or
4 around November 2014, Mr. Webster had fraudulent charges on his credit card. Although
5 these charges were ultimately reimbursed, he temporarily lost access to his line of credit. In or
6 around February 2015, the Websters attempted to file their 2014 tax return but were prevented
7 from doing so due to a fraudulent return already filed in their names. They had to pay their
8 accountant an extra fee to submit an amended filing and had to manually file the tax return.
9 Going forward, the Websters will have to file their taxes using a new security PIN provided to
10 them by the IRS every year. In or around March 2015, the Websters received letters from
11 Premera notifying them that their and their son's personal information may have been
12 compromised. The Websters have spent about 25 hours to date addressing issues arising from
13 the Premera Breach, including numerous hours on the telephone attempting to resolve the
14 fraudulent tax return.

15 **V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

16 **A. Nationwide Data Breach Class**

17 87. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), Plaintiffs assert statutory
18 claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (First Claim for Relief) and the
19 Washington data breach notification statute (Second Claim for Relief), and common law claims
20 for negligence (Third Claim for Relief), contract implied-in-fact (Fifth Claim for Relief) and
21 misrepresentation by omission (Ninth Claim for Relief) on behalf of a nationwide class defined
22 as follows:

23 **Nationwide Data Breach Class:** All persons in the United States
24 whose Sensitive Information was maintained on Premera's
25 database and compromised as a result of the breach announced by
26 Premera on or around March 17, 2015.
27

1 **1. Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass**

2 88. Plaintiffs Ross Imbler, Sharif Ailey, Robert and Theresa Foulon, Crystal Hayes,
3 Barbara Lynch, Kevin McLallen, Gabriel and Laura Webster assert their common law claims
4 for breach of express contract (Fourth Claim for Relief), breach of implied contract (Fifth
5 Claim for Relief), and unjust enrichment (Sixth Claim for Relief) on behalf of a nationwide
6 subclass defined as follows:

7 **Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration**
8 **Subclass:** All Nationwide Data Breach Class members who paid
9 money to Premera prior to March 17, 2015 in exchange for health
insurance or plan administration.

10 89. As alleged herein, Premera’s headquarters are in Mountlake Terrace,
11 Washington, its data centers and servers are located in Washington, and the Premera employees
12 responsible for making decisions with respect to data security are based in Washington.
13 Premera’s conduct resulting in the data breach took place exclusively, or primarily, in
14 Washington. Premera, being headquartered in Washington, would reasonably expect to be
15 bound by the laws of Washington. Furthermore, the majority of the Nationwide Data Breach
16 Class members are residents of the state of Washington. Accordingly, applying Washington
17 law to the claims of the Nationwide Data Breach Class and Nationwide Premera Policyholder
18 and Plan Administration Subclass is appropriate.

19 **B. Alternate Statewide Common Law Classes**

20 90. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), and in the alternative to
21 the common law claim for negligence asserted on behalf of the Nationwide Data Breach Class,

22 91. Plaintiffs assert their common law claim for negligence (Third Claim for Relief)
23 on behalf of separate statewide classes defined as follows:

24 **Statewide [name of State] Common Law Classes:** All residents
25 of [name of State] whose Sensitive Information was maintained on
26 Premera’s database and compromised as a result of the breach
27 announced by Premera on or around March 17, 2015.

1 **1. Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses**

2 92. Plaintiffs Imbler, Ailey, Foulon, McLallen, and Webster, assert their common
3 law claims for breach of contract (Fourth Claim for Relief), breach of implied contract (Fifth
4 Claim for Relief), unjust enrichment (Sixth Claim for Relief), and misrepresentation by
5 omission (Ninth Claim for Relief) on behalf of separate statewide subclasses defined as
6 follows:

7 **Statewide [name of State] Premera Policyholder and Plan**
8 **Administration Subclasses:** All residents of [name of State]
9 whose Sensitive Information was maintained on Premera's
10 database and compromised as a result of the breach announced by
11 Premera on or around March 17, 2015, and who paid money to
12 Premera prior to March 17, 2015 in exchange for health insurance
13 or plan administration.

11 **C. Alternate Statewide Statutory Classes**

12 93. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), and in the alternative to
13 the statutory claims asserted on behalf of the Nationwide Data Breach Class, Plaintiffs Imbler,
14 Hirsh, Smith, Bushman, Ailey, Allred, Foulon, McLallen, Prakash, and Webster assert
15 statutory claims for violation of state consumer protection statutes (Seventh Claim for Relief)
16 and state data breach notification statutes (Eighth Claim for Relief) on behalf of separate
17 statewide classes, defined as follows:

18 **Statewide [name of State] Statutory Classes:** All residents of
19 [name of State] whose Sensitive Information was maintained on
20 Premera's database and compromised as a result of the breach
21 announced by Premera on or around March 17, 2015.

22 94. Plaintiffs Imbler, Hirsh, Ailey, Allred, Foulon, McLallen, Prakash, and Webster
23 assert the state consumer protection statute claims (Seventh Claim for Relief) under the
24 consumer protection laws of the following states: Alaska, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.

25 95. Plaintiffs Smith, Bushman, Ailey, Allred, Foulon, Hayes, McLallen, Prakash,
26 and Webster assert the state data breach notification law claims (Eighth Claim for Relief) on
27

1 behalf of separate statewide classes in and under the respective data breach statutes of the
2 following states: Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.

3 96. Excluded from the Classes and Subclass are: (1) Defendant, any entity or
4 division in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers,
5 directors, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge's
6 staff; and (3) governmental entities. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class definitions
7 if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded, divided into
8 further subclasses or modified in any other way.

9 **D. Certification Of The Proposed Classes And Subclasses Is Appropriate.**

10 97. Each of the proposed classes and subclasses meet the requirements for
11 certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).

12 98. **Numerosity:** The exact number of members of the Classes is unknown to
13 Plaintiffs at this time, but on information and belief, there are approximately 11 million
14 individuals in the Classes, making joinder of each individual member impracticable.
15 Ultimately, members of the Classes will be easily identified through Premera's records.

16 99. **Commonality and Predominance:** There are many questions of law and fact
17 common to the claims of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Classes, and those questions
18 predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common
19 questions for the Classes include:

20 a. Whether Defendant failed to safeguard Plaintiffs' and the Classes'
21 Sensitive Information adequately;

22 b. Whether Defendant failed to protect or otherwise keep Plaintiffs' and the
23 Classes' Sensitive Information secure, as promised;

24 c. Whether Defendant's storage of Plaintiffs' and the Classes' Sensitive
25 Information in the manner alleged violated HIPAA, federal, state and local laws, or industry
26 standards;
27

1 d. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive practices by failing to
2 safeguard Plaintiffs' and the Classes' Sensitive Information properly as promised;

3 e. Whether Defendant violated the consumer protection statutes applicable
4 to Plaintiffs and each of the Classes;

5 f. Whether Defendant failed to notify Plaintiffs and members of the Classes
6 about the security breach as soon as practical and without delay after the breach was
7 discovered;

8 g. Whether Defendant acted negligently in failing to safeguard Plaintiffs'
9 and the Classes' Sensitive Information;

10 h. Whether Defendant violated the California Confidential Medical
11 Information Act;

12 i. Whether contracts existed between Defendant, on the one hand, and
13 Plaintiffs and the members of the each of the Classes, on the other;

14 j. Whether Defendant's conduct described herein constitutes a breach of its
15 contracts with Plaintiffs and the members of each of the Classes;

16 k. Whether Defendant should retain the money paid by Plaintiffs and
17 members of each of the Classes to protect their Sensitive Information; and

18 l. Whether Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes are entitled to
19 damages as a result of Defendant's conduct.

20 100. **Typicality:** Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the
21 Classes. Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes sustained damages as a result of
22 Defendant's uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with them.

23 101. **Adequacy:** Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the
24 interests of the Classes, and have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex
25 litigation and class actions. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and
26 Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to
27

1 prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the members of the proposed Classes, and have
2 the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest adverse
3 to those of the other members of the Classes.

4 102. **Risks of Prosecuting Separate Actions:** This case is appropriate for
5 certification because prosecution of separate actions would risk either inconsistent
6 adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant or
7 would be dispositive of the interests of members of the proposed Classes.

8 103. **Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes:** This class action is appropriate
9 for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
10 to the Plaintiffs and proposed Classes as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of
11 uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct towards members of the Classes, and
12 making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the proposed Classes as a whole.
13 Defendant's practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Classes
14 uniformly, and Plaintiffs' challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant's conduct with
15 respect to the proposed Classes as a whole, not on individual facts or law applicable only to
16 Plaintiffs.

17 104. **Superiority:** This case is also appropriate for certification because class
18 proceedings are superior to all other available means of fair and efficient adjudication of the
19 claims of Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes. The injuries suffered by each individual
20 member of the Classes are relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of
21 individual prosecution of the litigation necessitated by Defendant's conduct. Absent a class
22 action, it would be virtually impossible for individual members of the Classes to obtain
23 effective relief from Defendant. Even if members of the Classes could sustain individual
24 litigation, it would not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would
25 increase the delay and expense to all parties, including the Court, and would require duplicative
26 consideration of the legal and factual issues presented here. By contrast, a class action presents
27

1 far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies
2 of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court.

3 **VI. CAUSES OF ACTION**

4 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

5 **Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act**
6 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Data Breach Class,**
7 **and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass)**

8 105. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

9 106. Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class are current and former
10 members of Premera or those who received services from healthcare providers in the Premera
11 network and who provided Premera with their Sensitive Information.

12 107. Defendant is headquartered in Washington; its strategies, decision-making, and
13 commercial transactions originate in Washington; most of its key operations and employees
14 reside, work, and make company decisions (including data security decisions) in Washington;
15 and Defendant and many of its employees are part of the people of the State of Washington.
16 The conduct that Plaintiffs challenge directly affects the people of the State of Washington.

17 108. Washington's Consumer Protection Act, RCW §§ 19.86.010, *et seq.* ("CPA"),
18 protects both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets
19 for goods and services.

20 109. To achieve that goal, the CPA prohibits any person from using "unfair methods
21 of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
22 commerce. . . ." RCW § 19.86.020.

23 110. Defendant expressly represented-including in its Notice of Privacy Practices,
24 Code of Conduct, public statements, and other consumer-facing representations-that it would
25 safeguard and protect Sensitive Information, including in accordance with HIPAA regulations,
26 federal, state and local laws, and industry standards. Premera's specific representations are set
27 forth above in paragraphs 27-33. Premera made these representations available to the

1 Nationwide Data Breach Class at all times (including through its website) and at the time that
2 Class Members received services from its healthcare facilities. These representations were
3 made to the Nationwide Premera Policy Holder and administration Subclass in the enrollment
4 process.

5 111. Consistent with its representations, Defendant accepted responsibility for
6 securing Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide Data Breach Class's Sensitive Information. Given that
7 it was Defendant's responsibility for creating, overseeing, maintaining, and otherwise
8 implementing its own data security practices, Defendant knew (or should have known) that it
9 was not adequately protecting Plaintiffs' or the Nationwide Data Breach Class's Sensitive
10 Information in accordance with its express guarantees. This is particularly true given the many
11 warning signs that Premera's systems were at risk of a breach-including those affecting the
12 larger healthcare industry (e.g., the many other medical data breaches and warning of the
13 Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division) and those relating to Premera's own security
14 (e.g., the findings of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management investigation of Premera's own
15 systems). See especially paragraphs 35-37 *infra*.

16 112. Despite this knowledge, Defendant failed to disclose that its data security
17 systems and practices did not comport with the express representations set forth above in
18 paragraph 27-33, and otherwise described herein. In sum, and as set forth specifically above in
19 paragraphs 54-57, Defendant did not disclose that it did not take appropriate steps to secure
20 electronic systems from unauthorized use, did not ensure that authorized personal had access to
21 Sensitive Information only to the extent necessary to conduct their business, and did not meet
22 its obligations under HIPAA and other state, local, and federal laws. Instead, Defendant
23 continued to represent that its data security system was secure, even though it knew (or should
24 have known) that it was not.

25 113. Premera's conduct was deceptive. By failing to honestly disclose its true data
26 security practices at the time that it accepted and maintained the Sensitive Information of
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1 Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class, Premera made affirmative
2 misrepresentations and, thus, engaged in deceptive acts or practices.

3 114. Given that Defendant alone knew about the true state of its data security and
4 privacy practices and Defendant also knew that no reasonable consumer would purchase
5 insecure health insurance services (i.e., services that did not comport with a provider's own
6 representations about its data security, or its other duties to comply with applicable law and/or
7 industry standards), Defendant purposefully used its inflated representations of data security
8 and privacy protocols, which it knew were false at the time they were made to consumers, to
9 mislead Plaintiffs into using and/or paying for its insecure services. Premera's conduct
10 therefore had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.

11 115. Prior to the Premera's public announcement of the data breach, neither
12 Plaintiffs, nor members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class, nor the general public could have
13 known that Defendant was not implementing the data security and privacy protocols in
14 accordance with its own consumer-facing representations and applicable duties. Defendant
15 knew that Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class would not allow Defendant access
16 to their Sensitive Information-and thereby not give Defendant their business-if they knew
17 Defendant could not and would not protect their Sensitive Information as it represented. And
18 rather than implement the data security and privacy protocols it promised-including by timely
19 notifying Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class promptly about the data breach-
20 Defendant actively concealed its true practices and protocols (which were of material concern
21 to all of its customers) in order to lead consumers to give Defendant access to their Sensitive
22 Data, while at the same time expressly promising that Sensitive Information would be protected
23 as described above.

24 116. Premera's conduct was also unfair. By failing to disclose its compliance with its
25 own data security representations and other obligations, Premera engaged in unfair acts or
26 practices. Premera made the data security representations discussed above to attract
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1 consumers-including Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class-who were
2 concerned about the privacy and security of their Sensitive Information.

3 117. Premera, however, failed to make good on its promises of data security by not
4 investing the necessary resources in its cybersecurity program, not promptly notifying Plaintiffs
5 and the Nationwide Data Breach Class promptly about the data breach, and otherwise not living
6 up to the specific representations and obligations set forth above in paragraphs 27-33. Given
7 the known risk of maintaining Sensitive Information with lax cybersecurity practices,
8 Premera's conduct was likely to cause substantial injuries to consumers.

9 118. As set out above, because only Premera knew (or should have known) that it
10 was not complying with its own data security representations and obligations, there was no way
11 for members of the public, including Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Data Breach
12 Class, to avoid the injury caused by Premera's conduct. Further, Premera's failure to live up to
13 its data security representations and obligations did not create any countervailing benefits.

14 119. Consumers-like Plaintiffs and members of the Classes-value their privacy.
15 Companies (such as health insurers) that offer adequate data security protections are more
16 valuable to consumers than those with substandard security practices. As such, consumers will,
17 if given the choice between two otherwise identical services, choose one with adequate security
18 practices over one with substandard security practices.

19 120. Because of this consumer preference for data security, a healthcare benefits
20 company safeguarding and protecting Sensitive Information in accordance with HIPAA
21 regulations, federal, state and local laws, and industry standards-in addition with its own
22 affirmative representations of its data security practices-commands a higher market price for its
23 coverage than a provider with substandard security.

24 121. Based on the representations made by Defendant, Plaintiffs and the Nationwide
25 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass believed Defendant would adequately
26 protect their Sensitive Information, those security protections were valuable to them, and the
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1 protections formed the basis of their bargain inasmuch as Plaintiffs and the Nationwide
2 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass would not have purchased healthcare
3 benefits from Defendant at the prices charged (if at all) had Defendant disclosed its substandard
4 security practices. Accordingly, Defendant's omission regarding its true protection practices
5 was material.

6 122. To Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
7 Subclass, Defendant's as-promised healthcare benefits offered significantly more utility or
8 value than what was delivered, which lacked meaningful security protections. Thus, to
9 Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass,
10 Defendant's secured healthcare benefits-as promised and paid-for-was substantially more
11 valuable than the unsecure insurance received.

12 123. Accordingly, had Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera
13 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass known that Defendant did not actually
14 implement its promised data security and privacy protocols, they would not have been willing
15 to purchase its healthcare benefits at the prices charged, if they would have paid money at all.

16 124. Likewise, had Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class
17 known that Defendant did not actually implement its promised data security and privacy
18 protocols, they would not have been willing to provide Defendant with their Sensitive
19 Information.

20 125. Defendant's failure to disclose its actual (and substandard) security practices
21 substantially injured the public because it caused millions of consumers to enter into
22 transactions they otherwise would not have, and because it compromised the integrity of
23 Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide Class's Sensitive Information. Further, Defendant's use of
24 substandard security did not create any benefits sufficient to outweigh the harm it caused.

25 126. Defendant's deceptive and unfair acts or practices occurred in its trade or
26 business and has proximately caused injury to Plaintiffs and the putative Nationwide Class.
27

1 Defendant's general course of conduct is injurious to the public interest, and such acts are
2 ongoing and/or have a substantial likelihood of being repeated inasmuch as the long-lasting
3 harmful effects of its misconduct may last for years (e.g., affected individuals could experience
4 identity theft for years). As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unfair acts, Plaintiffs
5 and members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class have suffered actual injuries, including
6 without limitation investing substantial time or money in monitoring and remediating the harm
7 inflicted upon them.

8 127. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
9 Data Breach Class have suffered actual damages, including the lost value of their privacy, the
10 lost value of their personal data and lost property in the form of their breached and
11 compromised Sensitive Information (which is of great value to third parties); ongoing,
12 imminent, certainly impending threat of identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in
13 monetary loss and economic harm; actual identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in
14 monetary loss and economic harm; loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the
15 illegal sale of the compromised data on the deep web black market; expenses and/or time spent
16 on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements,
17 credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts;
18 decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and other economic and non-economic
19 harm.

20 128. Further, as a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the
21 Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass have suffered actual
22 damages in an amount equal to the difference in the market value of the secure healthcare
23 benefits they paid for and the unsecured healthcare benefits they received.

24 129. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Nationwide
25 Data Breach Class and Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass,
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1 seek to enjoin further violation and recover actual damages and treble damages (where
2 applicable), together with the costs of bringing this suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

3 130. With respect to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
4 members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class and Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan
5 Administration_Subclass, seek an Order requiring Premera to: (1) engage third-party security
6 auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to conduct testing, including
7 simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits on Premera's systems on a periodic basis, and
8 ordering Premera to correct any problems or issues detected by such third-party security
9 auditors promptly; (2) engage third-party security auditors and internal personnel to run
10 automated security monitoring; (3) audit, test, and train its security personnel regarding any
11 new or modified procedures; (4) segment data by, among other things, creating firewalls and
12 access controls so that if one area of Premera's network is compromised, hackers cannot gain
13 access to other portions of Premera; (5) curing checks; (6) routinely and continually conduct
14 internal training and education to inform internal security personnel how to identify and contain
15 a breach when it occurs and what to do in response to a breach; and (7) meaningfully educate
16 all class members about the threats they face as a result of the loss of their confidential
17 financial, personal, and health information to third parties, as well as the steps affected
18 individuals must take to protect themselves.

19 **SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

20 **Violation of Washington Data Breach Disclosure Law** 21 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class)**

22 131. Plaintiffs incorporate all the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth
23 herein.

24 132. Plaintiffs allege additionally and alternatively that RCW § 19.255.010(2)
25 provides that "[a]ny person or business that maintains computerized data that includes personal
26 information that the person or business does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the
27

1 information of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the
2 personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
3 person.” *See* RCW § 19.255.010(2) (2005).

4 133. The data breach described in Section II resulted in an “unauthorized acquisition
5 of computerized data that compromise[d] the security, confidentiality, [and] integrity of
6 personal information maintained by” Defendant and, therefore, experienced a “breach of [its]
7 security of [its] system”, as defined by RCW § 19.255.010(4) (2005).

8 134. Defendant failed to disclose the breach of its network immediately, after
9 discovering the breach. Instead, it waited months before notifying all affected individuals.
10 Defendant unreasonably delayed informing Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Data
11 Breach Class about the data breach after it knew or should have known that the data breach had
12 occurred.

13 135. Defendant’s failure to provide notice immediately after discovering the breach is
14 a violation of RCW § 19.255.010.

15 **THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

16 **Negligence**

17 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class**
18 **or, alternatively, the Statewide Common Law Classes)**

19 136. Plaintiffs incorporate all the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth
20 herein.

21 137. Plaintiffs allege additionally and alternatively that Premera required Plaintiffs
22 and Nationwide Data Breach Class members or alternatively, members of the Statewide
23 Common Law Classes, to submit Sensitive non-public personal health and financial
24 information in order to obtain coverage under a health insurance policy and/or receive
25 treatment in the Blue Cross Blue Shield network.

26 138. By collecting and storing this data, Premera had a duty of care to use reasonable
27 means to secure and safeguard this personal and health information, to prevent disclosure of the

1 information, and to guard the information from theft. Premera's duty included a responsibility
2 to implement a process by which it could detect a breach of its security systems in a reasonably
3 expeditious period of time and to give immediate notice in the case of a data breach.

4 139. Furthermore, given the other major data breaches affecting the healthcare
5 industry and the warnings provided by federal auditors that Premera's network-security
6 procedures were inadequate and that the vulnerabilities could be exploited by hackers and
7 expose sensitive information (as described above), Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach
8 Class members or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, are part of a
9 well-defined, foreseeable, finite, and discernible group that was at high risk of having their
10 Sensitive Information stolen.

11 140. Premera owed a duty to Plaintiff and members of the Nationwide Data Breach
12 Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, to provide security
13 consistent with industry standards, statutory requirements, and the other requirements discussed
14 herein, and to ensure that its systems and networks—and the personnel responsible for them—
15 adequately protected its consumers' Sensitive Information.

16 141. Premera admitted and assumed its duty to implement reasonable security
17 measures as a result of its general conduct, internal policies and procedures, its Privacy Policy,
18 and its Code of Conduct, in which Premera states that it is "committed to ensuring the security
19 of our facilities and electronic systems to prevent unauthorized access to Premera's and our
20 customers' personal protected information (PPI)." Through these and other statements,
21 Premera specifically assumed the duty to comply with industry standards and HIPAA in
22 protecting confidential information.

23 142. Premera's duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the
24 special relationship that existed between Premera and the Plaintiffs and the members of the
25 Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law
26 Classes. The special relationship arose because Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide
27

1 Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, entrusted
2 Defendant with their confidential data, as part of the health treatment process. Only Premera
3 was in a position to ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the harm to
4 Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of
5 the Statewide Common Law Classes, from a data breach.

6 143. Premera's duty to use reasonable security measures also arose under HIPAA,
7 pursuant to which Premera is required to "reasonably protect" confidential data from "any
8 intentional or unintentional use or disclosure" and to "have in place appropriate administrative,
9 technical, and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information."
10 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1). The confidential data at issue in this case constitutes "protected
11 health information" within the meaning of HIPAA.

12 144. In addition, Premera had a duty to use reasonable security measures under
13 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits "unfair . . .
14 practices in or affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the
15 unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data by healthcare
16 benefit providers like Defendant. The FTC publications and data security breach orders
17 described above further form the basis of Premera's duty.

18 145. Premera's duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not
19 only as a result of the common law and the statutes and regulations described above, but also
20 because it was bound by, and had committed to comply with, industry standards for the
21 protection of confidential Sensitive Information.

22 146. Premera breached its common law, statutory and other duties—and thus, was
23 negligent—by failing to use reasonable measures to protect consumers' confidential data from
24 hackers and by failing to provide timely notice of the at-issue breach. The specific negligent
25 acts and omissions committed by Premera include, but are not limited to, the following:
26
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1 a. Failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to
2 safeguard Plaintiffs' and proposed Nationwide Data Breach Class members' or alternatively,
3 members of the Statewide Common Law Classes', confidential data;

4 b. Failing to monitor the security of its networks adequately;

5 c. Allowing unauthorized access to Plaintiffs' and the proposed Nationwide
6 Data Breach Class members' or, alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law
7 Classes', confidential data;

8 d. Failing to recognize in a timely manner that Plaintiffs' and proposed
9 Nationwide Data Breach Class members' or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common
10 Law Classes', confidential data had been compromised; and

11 e. Failing to warn Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed Nationwide
12 Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, in a
13 timely manner that their Sensitive Information was likely to be and had been compromised.

14 147. It was foreseeable that Premera's failure to use reasonable measures to protect
15 confidential data, to disclose to Plaintiffs its inadequate security system, and to provide timely
16 notice of a breach of such data would result in injury to Plaintiffs and the members of the
17 Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law
18 Classes. Further, the breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiffs
19 and the members of the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the
20 Statewide Common Law Classes were reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of the other
21 major data breaches affecting the healthcare industry and the warning provided by federal
22 auditors (described in Section I, above) that Premera's network-security procedures were
23 inadequate and that the vulnerabilities could be exploited by hackers and expose sensitive
24 information.

25 148. It was therefore reasonably foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard
26 confidential data would result in one or more of the following injuries to Plaintiffs and the
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1 members of the proposed Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the
 2 Statewide Common Law Classes: ongoing, imminent, certainly impending threat of identity
 3 theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; actual identity
 4 theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; loss of the value
 5 of their privacy and the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the illegal sale of the
 6 compromised data on the deep web black market; expenses and/or time spent on credit
 7 monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements, credit card
 8 statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts; decreased
 9 credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and other economic and non-economic harm.

10 149. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Nationwide
 11 Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, seek an
 12 order declaring that Defendant's conduct constitutes negligence, and awarding them damages
 13 in an amount to be determined at trial.

14 150. Washington law should apply to the negligence claim of the Nationwide Class,
 15 or, alternatively, the negligence claims of the Statewide Common Law Classes should be
 16 governed by the law of each state in which such state specific claims are brought.

17 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

18 **Breach of Express Contract**

19 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan**
 20 **Administration Subclass or, alternatively, the Statewide Premera and Plan**
 21 **Administration_Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses)**

22 151. Plaintiffs incorporate all foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein.

23 152. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan
 24 Administration_Subclass or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and
 25 Plan Administration_Subclasses, allege additionally and alternatively that they entered into
 26 valid and enforceable contracts with Defendant whereby Defendant promised to provide
 27 healthcare and to protect their Sensitive information. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide

1 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration_Subclass or alternatively, members of the
2 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration_Subclasses, agreed to, among other
3 things, pay money in consideration for such services.

4 153. Both the provision of healthcare and the protection of Plaintiffs' Sensitive
5 Information were material aspects of Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and
6 Plan Administration_Subclass members' or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera
7 Policyholder and Plan Administration_Subclasses', agreements with Defendant.

8 154. As alleged in Paragraphs 27-34, above, Premera sends its Notice of Privacy
9 Policy and its policy booklets to all members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan
10 Administration_Subclass, forming an express contract requiring Premera to implement data
11 security adequate to safeguard and protect the confidentiality of Sensitive Information.

12 155. Premera's policy booklets incorporate by reference Premera's company
13 confidentiality policy, Code of Conduct, and Vendor/Contractor Privacy Basics in each of
14 which, as alleged in Paragraphs 27-34, above, Premera explicitly promised to implement data
15 security that would comply with federal and state laws, as well as industry standards, and that
16 would safeguard and protect the confidentiality of Sensitive Information.

17 156. Alternatively, the express contracts between Premera and Plaintiffs and
18 members of Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration_Subclass (or
19 alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
20 Subclasses) included implied terms requiring Premera to implement data security adequate to
21 safeguard and protect the confidentiality of their Sensitive Information, including in accordance
22 with HIPAA regulations, federal, state and local laws, and industry standards. No member of
23 the Subclass would have entered into contracts with Premera without understanding that their
24 Sensitive Information would be safeguarded and protected; stated otherwise, data security—as
25 set forth in Premera's Notice of Privacy Practices, Code of Conduct, and Vendor/Contractor
26 Privacy Basics—was an essential implied term of the Parties' express contract.
27

1 157. These contracts required that Defendant protect Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide
2 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass members' or alternatively, members of
3 the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses', Sensitive
4 Information and to prevent unauthorized access to such information.

5 158. Unfortunately, Defendant did not safeguard Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide
6 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass members' or alternatively, members of
7 the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses', Sensitive
8 Information. Specifically, Defendant did not comply with its promises to abide by HIPAA,
9 federal, state and local laws, or industry standards, or otherwise protect individuals' Sensitive
10 Information, as set forth above in paragraphs 62-67.

11 159. The failure to meet these promises and obligations constitutes a breach of
12 express contract.

13 160. Because Defendant allowed unauthorized access to Plaintiffs' and the
14 Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass members' or alternatively,
15 members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder
16 and Plan Administration Subclasses', Sensitive Information and otherwise failed to safeguard it
17 as promised, Defendant breached its contracts with Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
18 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration
19 Subclass (or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
20 Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses).

21 161. A meeting of the minds occurred, as Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
22 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration
23 Subclass or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
24 Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, agreed to, among
25 other things, provide Defendant with their accurate and complete information (including their
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1 Sensitive Information) and to pay Defendant in exchange for its agreement to, among other
2 things, protect their Sensitive Information.

3 162. Defendant breached these contracts by failing to implement (or adequately
4 implement) sufficient security measures to protect Plaintiffs' and the Nationwide Premera
5 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass
6 members' or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
7 Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses', Sensitive
8 Information.

9 163. Defendant's failure to fulfill its data security and management promises resulted
10 in Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
11 Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the
12 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan
13 Administration Subclasses, receiving healthcare benefits that was of less value than they paid
14 for (i.e., healthcare benefits coverage without adequate protection of Plaintiffs Sensitive
15 Information).

16 164. Defendant's failure to fulfill its data security and management promises resulted
17 in Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
18 Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the
19 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan
20 Administration Subclasses, losing the value of their privacy.

21 165. Stated otherwise, because Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera
22 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass
23 or alternatively, members of the Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
24 Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, paid for privacy protections (as part
25 of, among other things, their premiums) they did not receive what they paid for— even though
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1 such protections were a material part of their contracts with Defendant— i.e. the full benefit of
2 their bargain.

3 166. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
4 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration
5 Subclass or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
6 Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, have suffered
7 damages because they did not get the benefit of the bargain, including but not limited to the
8 difference in the value of the secure healthcare benefits they paid for and the insecure
9 healthcare benefits they received.

10 167. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
11 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration
12 Subclass or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
13 Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, have suffered actual
14 damages in an amount equal to the value of their privacy.

15 168. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the other members of the
16 Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan
17 Administration Subclass, or alternatively, the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan
18 Administration SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, seek an order
19 declaring that Defendant’s conduct constitutes breach of express contract, and awarding them
20 damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

**Breach of Contract Implied-In-Fact
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class, or in the alternative, the
Statewide Common Law Subclasses) (Plead in the Alternative to the Fourth Claim for
Relief on Behalf of the Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration
SubclassPolicyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses)**

169. Plaintiffs incorporate all the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein.

170. In order to procure Defendant’s health insurance and/or other benefits, Plaintiffs and all Class members provided Defendant with their Sensitive Information.

171. By providing their Sensitive Information, and upon Defendant’s acceptance of such information, Plaintiffs and all Class members, on one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand, entered into implied-in-fact contracts for the provision of data security, separate and apart from any express contracts concerning health insurance or other benefits that such Plaintiffs or Class members may have had with Defendant.

172. These implied contracts between Defendant and all Class members obligated Defendant to take reasonable steps to secure and safeguard Class members’ Sensitive Information. The terms of these implied contracts are further described in the federal laws, state law, local laws, and industry standards alleged above, and Defendant expressly assented to these terms in its Notice of Privacy Practices, Code of Conduct, and public statements, also alleged above.

173. Under these implied contracts for data security, Defendant was further obligated to provide Plaintiffs and all Class members, with prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their Sensitive Information.

174. Without such implied contracts, Plaintiffs and all Class members would not have provided their Sensitive Information to Defendant.

175. As described throughout, Defendant did not take reasonable steps to safeguard Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ Sensitive Information.

1 176. Because Defendant allowed unauthorized access to Plaintiffs' Sensitive
2 Information and failed to take reasonable steps to safeguard that information, Defendant
3 breached its implied contracts with Plaintiffs and all Class members.

4 177. Plaintiffs and all Class members suffered damages as a result of Defendant's
5 breach of its implied contracts in the amount of the value of the privacy that was lost in
6 Plaintiffs' and other Class members' Sensitive Information, which amount will be determined
7 at trial.

8 178. With regard to members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan
9 Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass, members of the
10 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan
11 Administration Subclasses, and any other Class members who paid Defendant for health
12 benefits, Defendant's failure to fulfill its data security and management promises also resulted
13 in such Plaintiffs and Class members receiving less than the benefit of their bargain (e.g.,
14 treatment without adequate data security and management practices).

15 179. Stated otherwise, because such Plaintiffs paid for privacy protections (as part of,
16 among other things, premiums or other payments for health treatment) they did not receive
17 what they paid for—even though such protections were a material part of their contracts with
18 Defendant—i.e. the full benefit of their bargain.

19 180. As a result of Defendant's conduct, members of the Nationwide Premera
20 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass,
21 members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, and any
22 other Class members who paid Defendant for healthcare, suffered damages because they did
23 not get the benefit of their bargain, including but not limited to the difference in the value of
24 the secure health benefits for which they paid and the insecure health benefits they received.

25 181. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
26 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the
27

1 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, have suffered actual
2 damages in an amount equal to the value of their privacy.

3 182. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all Class members, seek an
4 order declaring that Defendant's conduct constitutes breach of contract implied-in-fact, and
5 awarding them damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

6 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

7 **Quasi-Contract/Restitution/Unjust Enrichment**
8 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan**
9 **Administration Subclass or, alternatively, the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan**
10 **Administration Subclasses)**

11 183. Plaintiffs incorporate all foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein.

12 184. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan
13 Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and
14 Plan Administration Subclasses, allege additionally and alternatively that they conferred a
15 monetary benefit on Defendant in the form of fees paid for healthcare benefits. Defendant
16 appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiffs and members of
17 the Nationwide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively,
18 members of the Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses.

19 185. The fees for healthcare benefits that Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
20 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the
21 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, paid (directly or
22 indirectly) to Defendant were supposed to be used by Defendant, in part, to pay for the
23 administrative costs of data management and security.

24 186. Defendant did not use such fees to pay for the administrative costs of data
25 management and security.

26 187. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide
27 Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass or alternatively, members of the

1 Statewide Premera Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, suffered actual damages
2 in an amount equal to the difference in the free-market value of the secure healthcare benefits
3 for which they paid and the insecure healthcare benefits they received.

4 188. Under principals of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be
5 permitted to retain the money belonging to Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Premera
6 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclass, or alternatively, the Statewide Premera
7 Policyholder and Plan Administration Subclasses, because Defendant failed to implement (or
8 adequately implement) the data management and security measures that they paid for and that
9 were otherwise mandated by HIPAA regulations, federal, state and local laws, and industry
10 standards.

11 **SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

12 **Violation of State Consumer Protection Laws**

13 *(In the Alternative to Count I)*

14 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes)**

15 189. Plaintiffs incorporate all the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

16 190. Plaintiffs allege additionally and alternatively that the consumer protection laws
17 listed below were enacted to protect consumers by promoting fair competition in commercial
18 markets for goods and services. Specifically, they prohibit unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or
19 fraudulent business acts or practices.

20 191. As described herein, Defendant has engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive
21 business acts or practices.

22 192. Based on its statutory and common law obligations, and as admitted and
23 assumed by its own statements, Defendant had a duty to safeguard and protect Sensitive
24 Information. Defendant expressly represented—including in its Notice of Privacy Practices,
25 Code of Conduct, public statements, and other consumer-facing representations—that it would
26 safeguard and protect Sensitive Information in accordance with HIPAA regulations, federal,
27 state and local laws, and industry standards. Premera's specific representations are set forth

1 above in paragraphs 27-34. Defendant made these misrepresentations to Plaintiffs and the
2 Statewide Statutory Subclasses when they enrolled in Defendant's health plans or agreed to
3 provide Sensitive Information to Premera in exchange for coverage of healthcare services.

4 193. Consistent with its representations, Defendant accepted responsibility for
5 securing Plaintiffs' and the Statewide Statutory Classes' Sensitive Information. Given that it
6 was Defendant's responsibility for creating, overseeing, maintaining, and otherwise
7 implementing its own data security practices, Defendant knew (or should have known) that it
8 was not adequately protecting Plaintiffs' or the Statewide Statutory Classes' Sensitive
9 Information in accordance with its express guarantees. This is particularly true given the many
10 warning signs that Premera's systems were at risk of a breach—including those affecting the
11 larger healthcare industry (e.g., the many other medical data breaches and warning of the
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division) and those relating to Premera's own security
13 (e.g., the findings of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management investigation of Premera's own
14 systems).

15 194. In particular, Defendant failed to disclose that its data security systems and
16 practices did not comport with the express representations set forth above in paragraph 27-34,
17 and otherwise described herein. As set forth specifically above in paragraphs 62-67, Defendant
18 did not disclose that it did not take appropriate steps to secure electronic systems from
19 unauthorized use, did not ensure that authorized personal had access to Sensitive Information
20 only to the extent necessary to conduct their business, and did not meet its obligations under
21 HIPAA and other state, local, and federal laws. In other words, Premera's data security
22 representations amounted to affirmative misrepresentations or, at least, were misleading
23 because of Premera's failure to disclose its actual data security practices. Its conduct was
24 therefore unlawful.

25 195. Consistent with its representations, Defendant accepted responsibility for
26 securing Plaintiffs' and the Statewide Statutory Classes' Sensitive Information. Given that it
27

1 was Defendant's responsibility for creating, overseeing, maintaining, and otherwise
2 implementing its own data security practices, Defendant knew (or should have known) that it
3 was not adequately protecting Plaintiffs' or the Statewide Statutory Classes' Sensitive
4 Information in accordance with its express guarantees.

5 196. By failing to disclose its compliance with its own data security representations
6 and other obligations, Premera engaged in unfair acts or practices. Premera made the data
7 security representations discussed above to attract consumers—including Plaintiffs and
8 members of the Statewide Statutory Classes—who were concerned about the privacy and
9 security of their Sensitive Information.

10 197. Premera, however, failed to make good on its promises of data security by not
11 investing the necessary resources in its cybersecurity program, not promptly notifying Plaintiffs
12 and the Statewide Statutory Classes promptly about the data breach, and otherwise not living
13 up to the specific representations and obligations set forth above in paragraphs 27-34. Given
14 the known risk of maintaining Sensitive Information with lax cybersecurity practices,
15 Premera's conduct was likely to cause substantial injuries to consumers.

16 198. As set out above, because only Premera knew (or should have known) that it
17 was not complying with its own data security representations and obligations, there was no way
18 for members of the public, including Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Classes,
19 to avoid the injury caused by Premera's conduct. Further, Premera's failure to live up to its
20 data security representations and obligations did not create any countervailing benefits.

21 199. Consumers—like Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Classes—
22 value their privacy. Services (including healthcare benefits) that offer greater data security
23 protections are more valuable to consumers than those with substandard security practices.
24 Consumers will, if given the choice between two otherwise identical services, choose one with
25 adequate security practices over one with substandard security practices.
26
27

1 200. Because of this consumer preference for data security, a healthcare benefits
2 company safeguarding and protecting Sensitive Information in accordance with HIPAA
3 regulations, federal, state and local laws, and industry standards commands a higher market
4 price for its coverage than a provider with substandard security.

5 201. Prior to the breach, neither Plaintiffs, nor members of the Statewide Statutory
6 Classes, nor the general public knew that Defendant was not implementing data security and
7 privacy protocols in accordance with its own consumer-facing representations and applicable
8 duties. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes would not allow
9 Defendant access to their Sensitive Information—and thereby not give Defendant their
10 business—if they knew Defendant could not and would not protect their Sensitive Information
11 as it represented. And rather than implement the data security and privacy protocols it
12 promised, Defendant actively concealed its true practices and protocols (which were of material
13 concern to all of its customers) in order to lead consumers to give Defendant access to their
14 Sensitive Data, while at the same time expressly promising that Sensitive Information would be
15 protected as described above.

16 202. Based on the representations made by Defendant, Plaintiffs and the Statewide
17 Statutory Classes believed Defendant would adequately protect their Sensitive Information,
18 those security protections were valuable to them, and the protections formed the basis of their
19 bargain inasmuch as Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes would not have purchased
20 healthcare benefits from Defendant at the prices charged (if at all) had Defendant disclosed its
21 substandard security practices. Accordingly, Defendant's omission regarding the true
22 protection standard was material.

23 203. To Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes, Defendant's as-promised
24 healthcare benefits offered significantly more utility or value than what was delivered, which
25 lacked meaningful security protections. Thus, to Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes,
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1 Defendant's secured healthcare benefits—as promised and paid-for—was substantially more
2 valuable than the unsecure insurance received.

3 204. Accordingly, had Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Classes
4 known that Defendant did *not* actually implement its promised data security and privacy
5 protocols, they would not have been willing to purchase its healthcare benefits at the prices
6 charged, if they would have paid money at all.

7 205. Likewise, had Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Classes known
8 that Defendant did *not* actually implement its promised data security and privacy protocols,
9 they would not have been willing to provide Defendant with their Sensitive Information.

10 206. Defendant's failure to disclose its substandard security practices substantially
11 injured the public because it caused millions of consumers to enter into transactions they
12 otherwise would not have, and because it compromised the integrity of Plaintiffs' and the
13 Statewide Statutory Classes' Sensitive Information. Further, Defendant's use of substandard
14 security did not create any benefits sufficient to outweigh the harm it caused.

15 207. Defendant's unfair acts or practices occurred in its trade or business and have
16 injured a substantial portion of the public. Defendant's general course of conduct is injurious
17 to the public interest, and such acts are ongoing and/or have a substantial likelihood of being
18 repeated inasmuch as the long-lasting harmful effects of its misconduct may last for years (e.g.,
19 affected individuals could experience identity theft years later). As a direct and proximate
20 result of Defendant's unfair acts, Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Classes
21 have suffered and will suffer actual injuries. Accordingly, Defendant's inadequate data
22 security measure practices and/or omissions regarding its data security and privacy-related
23 practices constitutes unlawful, deceptive, and unfair conduct in violation of the following State-
24 specific consumer protection laws:

25 a. Oregon Unfair Trade Practices Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.608(1)(E), (G),
26 and (U);
27

1 b. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. &
2 Com. Code Ann. § 17.46(A), (B)(5) and (7);

3 c. Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code RCW
4 §§ 19.86.010, *et seq.*;

5 208. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide
6 Statutory Classes have suffered actual damages, including from the lost value of their privacy,
7 the lost value of their personal data and lost property in the form of their breached and
8 compromised Sensitive Information (which is of great value to third parties); ongoing,
9 imminent, certainly impending threat of identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in
10 monetary loss and economic harm; actual identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in
11 monetary loss and economic harm; loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the
12 illegal sale of the compromised data on the deep web black market; expenses and/or time spent
13 on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements,
14 credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts;
15 decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and other economic and non-economic
16 harm. Plaintiffs also suffered damages because, among other things, Premera promised them
17 one thing (health care with adequate identity protection), but provided them a different, less
18 valuable thing (health care without it).

19 209. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Statewide
20 Statutory Classes, seek to enjoin further violation and recover actual damages (and treble
21 damages where applicable).

22 210. With respect to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and
23 members of the Statewide Statutory Classes, seek an Order requiring Premera to: (1) engage
24 third-party security auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to conduct
25 testing, including simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits on Premera's systems on a
26 periodic basis, and ordering Premera to promptly correct any problems or issues detected by
27

1 such third-party security auditors; (2) engage third-party security auditors and internal
2 personnel to run automated security monitoring; (3) audit, test, and train its security personnel
3 regarding any new or modified procedures; (4) segment data by, among other things, creating
4 firewalls and access controls so that if one area of Premera's network is compromised, hackers
5 cannot gain access to other portions of Premera's systems; (5) purge, delete, and destroy in a
6 reasonably secure manner Sensitive Information not necessary for its provisions of services;
7 (6) conduct regular database scanning and securing checks; (7) routinely and continually
8 conduct internal training and education to inform internal security personnel how to identify
9 and contain a breach when it occurs and what to do in response to a breach; and
10 (8) meaningfully educate all class members about the threats they face as a result of the loss of
11 their confidential financial, personal, and health information to third parties, as well as the steps
12 affected individuals must take to protect themselves.

13 **EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

14 **Violation of State Data Breach Notification Laws**
15 ***(In the alternative to Second Claim for Relief)***
16 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Classes)**

17 211. Plaintiffs incorporate all the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth
18 herein.

19 212. Plaintiffs allege additionally and alternatively that the data breach notification
20 laws listed below were enacted to protect (or at least mitigate damage for) consumers from the
21 consequences associated with data breaches. In relevant part, those laws require that
22 businesses that maintain consumer data (including Sensitive Information) notify the owner of
23 any breach of that data in the most expedient time and manner possible and without
24 unreasonable delay.

25 213. The data breach described in Section II resulted in a breach of Plaintiffs' and the
26 Statewide Statutory Class Members' Sensitive Information.
27

1 214. Defendant failed to disclose the breach of Plaintiffs' and the Statewide Statutory
2 Class members' Sensitive Information in the most expedient time possible inasmuch as, after
3 discovering the breach, it waited months before notifying all affected individuals. Defendant
4 unreasonably delayed informing Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide Statutory Class about
5 the data breach after it knew or should have known that the data breach had occurred.

6 215. Defendant's failure to provide timely notice of the data breach violated the
7 following State-specific data breach notification laws:

- 8 a. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2107, *et seq.*;
- 9 b. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 521.053, *et seq.*; and
- 10 c. Wash. Rev. Code RCW §§ 19.86.010, *et seq.*

11 216. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Statewide
12 Statutory Class have suffered actual damages, including from the lost value of their personal
13 data and lost property in the form of their breached and compromised Sensitive Information
14 (which is of great value to third parties); ongoing, imminent, certainly impending threat of
15 identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; actual
16 identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; loss of
17 the value of their privacy and loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the
18 illegal sale of the compromised data on the deep web black market; expenses and/or time spent
19 on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements,
20 credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts;
21 decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and other economic and non-economic
22 harm.

23 217. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Statewide
24 Statutory Class, seek all remedies available under their state data breach statute, including but
25 not limited to (a) damages suffered by Plaintiffs and the Statewide Statutory Class members as
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1 alleged above, (b) equitable relief, including injunctive relief, and (c) reasonable attorney fees
2 and costs, as provided by law.

3 **NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

4 **Misrepresentation by Omission**
5 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Data Breach Class or, alternatively, the**
6 **Statewide Common Law Classes)**

7 218. Plaintiffs incorporate all foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein.

8 219. Premera knew or should have known that it failed to use sufficient measures to
9 protect consumers' confidential data from hackers as described above.

10 220. Premera fraudulently, negligently, or recklessly concealed from, or failed to
11 disclose to, the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide
12 Common Law Classes, the fact that the measures it employed to protect consumers'
13 confidential data from hackers were insufficient because they did not comport with its
14 affirmative representations and other legal obligations (specifically set out in ¶¶ 27-34) in the
15 manner set forth above (specifically set out in ¶¶ 62-67).

16 221. Premera was under a duty to the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively,
17 members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, to disclose the insufficient nature of its
18 security measures because: Premera was in a superior position to know the true state of the
19 facts about the design of its security measures because the design of such security measures is
20 not public and Premera made partial representations and disclosures about maintaining the
21 confidentiality of confidential data without revealing that it had taken insufficient and
22 incomplete measures to protect that information from hackers.

23 222. The facts not disclosed to the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively,
24 members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, are material facts in that a reasonable person
25 would have considered those facts to be important in deciding whether or not to purchase
26 insurance through Premera or otherwise allow Premera access to their Sensitive Information.
27 Had the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common

1 Law Classes, known the insufficient nature of Premera's security measures, they would not
2 have purchased insurance through Premera, would have paid less for it, or would not have
3 permitted Premera to access their Sensitive Information in the first instance.

4 223. Premera intentionally, recklessly, or negligently concealed or failed to disclose
5 the insufficient nature of its security measures for the purpose of inducing the Nationwide Data
6 Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, to act thereon,
7 and the Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common
8 Law Classes, justifiably relied to their detriment upon the truth and completeness of Premera's
9 representations, including those set forth above in paragraphs 27-34. This is evidenced by the
10 Nationwide Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law
11 Classes, purchase of insurance through Premera and their willingness to let their Sensitive
12 Information enter Premera's systems.

13 224. In order to prevent its statements from being misleading or from being a half-
14 truth, Defendant should have disclosed its true practices with regard to storing and safeguarding
15 the Sensitive Information in its control. Specifically, Premera should have disclosed that it did
16 not implement industry-standard access controls, that it did not fix known vulnerabilities in its
17 electronic security protocols, failed to protect against reasonably anticipated threats, and
18 otherwise did not comport with its public-facing representations and legal obligations as set
19 forth above in paragraphs 62-67. Thus, even if Premera was in compliance with certain
20 HIPAA regulations; applicable state, federal, and local laws; or representations it made to
21 consumers and customers, including those described above in paragraphs 27-34, it still should
22 have disclosed to consumers those regulations, laws, and representations that it did not follow
23 or comply with, whether in whole or in part.

24 225. As a direct and proximate cause of Premera's misconduct, the Nationwide Data
25 Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, have suffered
26 and will continue to suffer actual damages in ongoing, imminent, certainly impending threat of
27

1 identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; actual
2 identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; loss of
3 the value of their privacy and loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the
4 illegal sale of the compromised data on the deep web black market; expenses and/or time spent
5 on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements,
6 credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts;
7 decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and the difference in the free-market value
8 of the secure healthcare benefits for which they paid and the insecure healthcare benefits they
9 received.

10 226. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and members of the Nationwide
11 Data Breach Class or alternatively, members of the Statewide Common Law Classes, seek an
12 order declaring that Defendant's conduct constitutes a misrepresentation, and awarding them
13 damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

14 227. Washington law should apply to the misrepresentation claim of the Nationwide
15 Class, or, alternatively, the claims of the Statewide Common Law Classes should be governed
16 by the law of each state in which such state specific claims are brought.

17 **VII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

18 Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Classes, respectfully request that this Court
19 enter an Order:

20 1. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Classes
21 defined above, appointing Plaintiffs as representatives of their respective Classes, and
22 appointing Interim Lead Counsel as Class Counsel;

23 2. Declaring that Premera's actions, as described above, constitute violations of the
24 Washington Consumer Protection Act and the Washington Data Breach Disclosure law;
25 Negligence; Breach of Express Contract; Breach of Implied Contract; Restitution/Unjust
26
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1 Enrichment; violations of the consumer protection laws of Oregon, and Texas; violations of the
2 data breach notification laws of Tennessee, and Texas.

3 3. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the
4 interests of the Classes, including an order (i) prohibiting Premera from engaging in the
5 wrongful and unlawful acts described herein, and (ii) requiring Premera to protect all data
6 collected through the course of its business in accordance with HIPAA regulations, federal,
7 state and local laws, and industry standards; (iii) requiring Premera to engage third-party
8 security auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to conduct testing,
9 including simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits on Premera's systems on a periodic
10 basis, and ordering Premera to promptly correct any problems or issues detected by such third-
11 party security auditors; (iv) requiring Premera to engage third-party security auditors and
12 internal personnel to run automated security monitoring; (v) requiring Premera to audit, test,
13 and train its security personnel regarding any new or modified procedures; (vi) requiring
14 Premera to segment data by, among other things, creating firewalls and access controls so that
15 if one area of Premera's network is compromised, hackers cannot gain access to other portions
16 of Premera's systems; (vii) requiring Premera to purge, delete, and destroy in a reasonably
17 secure manner Sensitive Information not necessary for its provisions of services;
18 (viii) requiring Premera to conduct regular database scanning and securing checks;
19 (ix) requiring Premera to routinely and continually conduct internal training and education to
20 inform internal security personnel how to identify and contain a breach when it occurs and
21 what to do in response to a breach; and (x) requiring Premera to meaningfully educate all class
22 members about the threats they face as a result of the loss of their confidential financial,
23 personal, and health information to third parties, as well as the steps affected individuals must
24 take to protect themselves.

25 4. Awarding actual, statutory, exemplary and punitive damages to Plaintiffs and
26 the Classes, where applicable, in an amount to be determined at trial;
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1 5. Awarding restitution to Plaintiffs and the Classes in an amount to be determined
2 at trial;

3 6. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Classes their reasonable litigation expenses and
4 attorneys' fees;

5 7. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Classes pre- and post-judgment interest, to the
6 extent allowable;

7 8. Permitting Plaintiffs and the Classes to amend their pleadings to conform to the
8 evidence produced at trial; and

9 9. Awarding such other and further relief as equity and justice may require.

10 **VIII. JURY DEMAND**

11 Plaintiffs request a trial by jury.

12 DATED this 21st day of July, 2017.

13 TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC

14 By: s/ Kim D. Stephens
15 Kim D. Stephens, #11984

16 By: s/ Christopher I. Brain
17 Christopher I. Brain #05054

18 By: s/ Jason T. Dennett
19 Jason T. Dennett #30686

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

Ross Imbler, Stuart & Ilene Hirsh, et al.

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Fairbanks, Alaska (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Tousley Brain Stephens, 1700 7th Ave., #2200, Seattle, WA 98101 (206) 682-5600

DEFENDANTS

Premera Blue Cross, a Washington nonprofit corporation

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant King County, Washington (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff, 2 U.S. Government Defendant, 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party), 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

Table with columns for Plaintiff (PTF) and Defendant (DEF) citizenship and business location (Citizen of This State, Citizen of Another State, Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country, Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State, Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State, Foreign Nation).

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Large table with categories: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, CIVIL RIGHTS, TORTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes sub-sections like PERSONAL INJURY, REAL PROPERTY, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding, 2 Removed from State Court, 3 Remanded from Appellate Court, 4 Reinstated or Reopened, 5 Transferred from Another District (specify), 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer, 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)

Brief description of cause: Class Action for data breach

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions):

JUDGE Michael Simon DOCKET NUMBER 3:15-md-2633-SI

DATE 07/21/2017 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD s/ Kim D. Stephens

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

- I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.
- (b) County of Residence.** For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
- (c) Attorneys.** Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
- II. Jurisdiction.** The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
 United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
 United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
 Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
 Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; **NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.**)
- III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties.** This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
- IV. Nature of Suit.** Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions](#).
- V. Origin.** Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.
 Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
 Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
 Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.
 Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
 Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.
 Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
 Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statute.
- VI. Cause of Action.** Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. **Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.** Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
- VII. Requested in Complaint.** Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
 Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
 Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
- VIII. Related Cases.** This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Western District of Washington

ROSS IMBLER, STUART and ILENE HIRSH, KEVIN SMITH and CATHERINE BUSHMAN, SHARIF AILEY, APRIL ALLRED, ROBERT and THERESA FOULON, CRYSTAL HAYES, et al.

Plaintiff(s)

v.

PREMERA BLUE CROSS, a Washington nonprofit corporation,

Defendant(s)

Civil Action No.

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) PREMERA BLUE CROSS, a Washington nonprofit corporation c/o CT Corporation, Registered Agent 711 Capitol Way S., Ste 204 Olympia, WA 98501

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are:

Kim D. Stephens TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC 1700 7th Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date: _____

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

Civil Action No. _____

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* _____
was received by me on *(date)* _____ .

I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____
_____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____
_____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

I served the summons on *(name of individual)* _____ , who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* _____
_____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

Other *(specify)*:

My fees are \$ _____ for travel and \$ _____ for services, for a total of \$ _____ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: _____

Server's signature

Printed name and title

Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Consumers Blame Identity Theft on Premera Data Breach](#)
