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13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

14 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

15 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

16 SAMANTHA HENRICHSEN, and her  
17 minor son, A.R., individually, and on  
behalf of all others similarly situated,

18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20 TANDEM DIABETES CARE, INC., a  
Delaware corporation,

21 Defendant.

Case No. '20CV0732 JM WVG

**CLASS ACTION**

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

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1 Plaintiff, SAMANTHA HENRICHSEN, and her minor son, A.R.,  
 2 (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of the general public and all others similarly  
 3 situated (the “Class members”), by and through their attorneys, upon personal  
 4 knowledge as to facts pertaining to themselves and on information and belief as to all  
 5 other matters, bring this class action against Defendant, Tandem Diabetes Care, Inc.  
 6 (“Tandem”), and respectfully state the following:

7 **NATURE OF THE CASE**

8 1. Tandem is a medical device company that designs, manufactures, sells,  
 9 and supports products for people with insulin-dependent diabetes including insulin  
 10 pumps, cartridges, and other related products. As part of its business, Tandem stores  
 11 and transmits a substantial amount of confidential and personal health information  
 12 from its customers and their health care providers.

13 2. On March 16, 2020, Tandem announced that personally identifiable  
 14 information (“PII”) and protected health information (“PHI”) (collectively,  
 15 “PII/PHI”) of approximately 140,000 of its patient customers may have been exposed  
 16 in a phishing attack between January 17 and January 20, 2020. PII/PHI exposed in the  
 17 breach included customer contact information, customer use of Tandem’s products  
 18 and services, and clinical data regarding customer diabetes therapy, and in some  
 19 limited instances customer Social Security numbers (the “Data Breach”).<sup>1</sup> Although  
 20 Defendant knew of the breach in early January 2020, or before, it waited almost three  
 21 months to notify its customers.

22 3. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiffs and Class members to maintain  
 23 reasonable and adequate security measures to secure, protect, and safeguard the  
 24 PII/PHI it collected and stored on its network. Defendant breached that duty by, *inter*  
 25 *alia*, failing to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices  
 26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
 28 <sup>1</sup> See [http://investor.tandemdiabetes.com/news-releases/news-release-details/  
 tandem-diabetes-care-announces-security-incident-five-employee](http://investor.tandemdiabetes.com/news-releases/news-release-details/tandem-diabetes-care-announces-security-incident-five-employee).

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1 to protect the PII/PHI from unauthorized access and unnecessarily storing and  
2 retaining Plaintiffs' and Class members' personal information on its inadequately  
3 protected network.

4 4. As a result of Defendant's inadequate cybersecurity, the Data Breach  
5 occurred, and Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII/PHI was accessed and disclosed.  
6 This action seeks to remedy these failings. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of  
7 themselves and all Illinois and nationwide residents whose PII/PHI was exposed as a  
8 result of the Data Breach that occurred on or around January 17 to January 20, 2020  
9 and first acknowledged by Defendant on March 16, 2020.

10 5. Plaintiffs seek, for themselves and the Class, injunctive relief, actual and  
11 other economic damages, consequential damages, nominal damages or statutory  
12 damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs.

13 **VENUE AND JURISDICTION**

14 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the Class  
15 Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because this is a class action involving  
16 more than 100 Class members, the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million  
17 exclusive of interest and costs, and many members of the Class are citizens of states  
18 different from Defendant.

19 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant  
20 is headquartered and has its principal place of business in San Diego, California.

21 8. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391  
22 because Defendant regularly conducts business in this district, unlawful acts or  
23 omissions are alleged to have occurred in this district, and Defendant is subject to  
24 personal jurisdiction in this district.

25 **PARTIES**

26 9. Plaintiff, Samantha Henrichsen, and her minor son, A.R., reside in  
27 Illinois.

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1 10. Believing Defendant would implement and maintain reasonable security  
2 procedures and practices to protect their personal information, on or about December  
3 18, 2020, Plaintiff Henrichsen, and her minor son, A.R., provided Defendant with  
4 their confidential and highly sensitive personal and private information so they could  
5 purchase an insulin pump and related products for Plaintiff A.R.—a minor. This  
6 included information such as name and contact information, clinical data regarding  
7 A.R.'s diabetes therapy, and Plaintiffs purchase and use of Tandem's insulin products  
8 and services.

9 11. Following purchase of the insulin pump, Plaintiffs continued to provide  
10 PII/PHI to Tandem as part of its training and support. Tandem required Plaintiff A.R.  
11 to participate in a test period where Tandem monitored his use of its insulin pump. As  
12 part of this monitoring, Plaintiffs forwarded to Tandem A.R.'s physician reports and  
13 tests that monitored and tracked his diabetes.

14 12. As a result of Defendant's failure to implement and maintain reasonable  
15 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the personal information  
16 it collected and maintained, Plaintiffs' PII/PHI was accessed and exfiltrated, stolen or  
17 disclosed in the Data Breach.

18 13. Tandem Diabetes Care, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of  
19 the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located at 11075 Roselle  
20 Street, San Diego, California 92121. Tandem designs, manufactures, sells and  
21 supports insulin pumps and related products, including disposable cartridges. Tandem  
22 manufactures its insulin pumps and disposable cartridges at its facility in San Diego,  
23 California.

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**FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

***PII/PHI Is a Valuable Property Right***

14. PII/PHI is a valuable property right.<sup>2</sup> In a Federal Trade Commission (“FCC”) roundtable presentation, former Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, underscored this point by observing:

Most consumers cannot begin to comprehend the types and amount of information collected by businesses, or why their information may be commercially valuable. Data is currency. The larger the data set, the greater potential for analysis – and profit.<sup>3</sup>

15. The value of PII/PHI as a commodity is measurable.<sup>4</sup> “PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”<sup>5</sup> It is so valuable to identity thieves that once PII/PHI has been disclosed, criminals often trade it on the “cyber black-market” for several years.

16. Companies recognize PII/PHI as an extremely valuable commodity akin to a form of personal property. For example, Symantec Corporation’s Norton brand has created a software application that values a person’s identity on the black market.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See John T. Soma, et al., *Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets*, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, at \*3-4 (2009) (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

<sup>3</sup> Federal Trade Commission, *Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour* (Remarks Before FTC Exploring Privacy Roundtable) (Dec. 7, 2009), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2009/12/remarks-ftc-exploring-privacy-roundtable>.

<sup>4</sup> See Robert Lowes, *Stolen EHR [Electronic Health Record] Charts Sell for \$50 Each on Black Market* (April 28, 2014), available at <http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/824192>.

<sup>5</sup> See Soma, *Corporate Privacy Trend*, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> Risk Assessment Tool, Norton 2010, [www.everyclickmatters.com/victim/assessment-tool.html](http://www.everyclickmatters.com/victim/assessment-tool.html).

1           17. As a result of its real value and the recent large-scale data breaches,  
 2 identity thieves and cyber criminals have openly posted credit card numbers, Social  
 3 Security numbers, PII and other sensitive information directly on various Internet  
 4 websites making the information publicly available. This information from various  
 5 breaches, including the information exposed in the Data Breach, can be aggregated  
 6 and become more valuable to thieves and more damaging to victims. In one study,  
 7 researchers found hundreds of websites displaying stolen PII and other sensitive  
 8 information. Strikingly, none of these websites were blocked by Google's safeguard  
 9 filtering mechanism – the "Safe Browsing list."

10           18. PHI is particularly valuable. All-inclusive health insurance dossiers  
 11 containing sensitive health insurance information, names, addresses, telephone  
 12 numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers and bank account information,  
 13 complete with account and routing numbers, can fetch up to \$1,200 to \$1,300 each on  
 14 the black market.<sup>7</sup> According to a report released by the Federal Bureau of  
 15 Investigation's ("FBI") Cyber Division, criminals can sell healthcare records for 50  
 16 times the price of a stolen social security or credit card number.<sup>8</sup>

17           19. Recognizing the high value that consumers place on their PII/PHI, some  
 18 companies now offer consumers an opportunity to sell this information to advertisers  
 19 and other third parties. The idea is to give consumers more power and control over  
 20 the type of information they share – and who ultimately receives that information. By  
 21 making the transaction transparent, consumers will make a profit from the surrender  
 22

23 <sup>7</sup> Adam Greenberg, *Health Insurance Credentials Fetch High Prices in the*  
 24 *Online Black Market* (July 16, 2013), available at  
 25 [https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/health-insurance-credentials-](https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/health-insurance-credentials-fetch-high-prices-in-the-online-black-market/)  
[fetch-high-prices-in-the-online-black-market/](https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/health-insurance-credentials-fetch-high-prices-in-the-online-black-market/).

26 <sup>8</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at*  
 27 *Risk for Increased Cyber Intrusions for Financial Gain* (April 8, 2014) available at  
 28 [https://www.illuminweb.com/wp-content/uploads/ill-mo-uploads/103/2418/health-](https://www.illuminweb.com/wp-content/uploads/ill-mo-uploads/103/2418/health-systems-cyber-intrusions.pdf)  
[systems-cyber-intrusions.pdf](https://www.illuminweb.com/wp-content/uploads/ill-mo-uploads/103/2418/health-systems-cyber-intrusions.pdf).

1 of their PII/PHI.<sup>9</sup> This business has created a new market for the sale and purchase of  
2 this valuable data.<sup>10</sup>

3 20. Consumers place a high value not only on their PII/PHI, but also on the  
4 *privacy* of that data. Researchers shed light on how much consumers value their data  
5 privacy – and the amount is considerable. Indeed, studies confirm that “when privacy  
6 information is made more salient and accessible, some consumers are willing to pay  
7 a premium to purchase from privacy protective websites.”<sup>11</sup>

8 21. One study on website privacy determined that U.S. consumers valued  
9 the restriction of improper access to their PII between \$11.33 and \$16.58 per  
10 website.<sup>12</sup>

11 22. Given these facts, any company that transacts business with a consumer  
12 and then compromises the privacy of consumers’ PII/PHI has thus deprived that  
13 consumer of the full monetary value of the consumer’s transaction with the company.

14 ***Theft of PII/PHI Has Grave and Lasting Consequences for Victims***

15 23. Theft of PII/PHI is serious. The United States Government  
16 Accountability Office noted in a June 2007 report on Data Breaches (“GAO Report”)  
17 that identity thieves use PII to take over existing financial accounts, open new  
18 financial accounts, receive government benefits and incur charges and credit in a

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>9</sup> Steve Lohr, *You Want My Personal Data? Reward Me for It*, N.Y. Times (July  
21 16, 2010) available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/18unboxed.html>.

22 <sup>10</sup> See Julia Angwin and Emil Steel, *Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy*, Wall  
23 Street Journal (Feb. 28, 2011) available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703529004576160764037920274>

24 <sup>11</sup> Janice Y. Tsai et al., *The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing*  
25 *Behavior, An Experimental Study Information Systems Research* 22(2) 254, 254  
26 (June 2011), available at [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23015560?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23015560?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

27 <sup>12</sup> II–Horn, Hann et al., *The Value of Online Information Privacy: An Empirical*  
28 *Investigation* (Mar. 2003) at table 3, available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0304001.html> (emphasis added).

1 person's name.<sup>13</sup> As the GAO Report states, this type of identity theft is so harmful  
 2 because it may take time for the victim to become aware of the theft and can adversely  
 3 impact the victim's credit rating.

4 24. In addition, the GAO Report states that victims of identity theft will face  
 5 "substantial costs and inconveniences repairing damage to their credit records ... [and  
 6 their] good name." According to the FTC, identity theft victims must spend countless  
 7 hours and large amounts of money repairing the impact to their good name and credit  
 8 record.<sup>14</sup>

9 25. Identity thieves use personal information for a variety of crimes,  
 10 including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance fraud.<sup>15</sup>  
 11 According to Experian, "[t]he research shows that personal information is valuable to  
 12 identity thieves, and if they can get access to it, they will use it" to among other things:  
 13 open a new credit card or loan; change a billing address so the victim no longer  
 14 receive bills; open new utilities; obtain a mobile phone; open a bank account and  
 15 write bad checks; use a debit card number to withdraw funds; obtain a new  
 16 driver's license or ID; use the victim's information in the event of arrest or court  
 17 action.<sup>16</sup>

18  
 19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 <sup>13</sup> See <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

21 <sup>14</sup> See FTC Identity Theft Website: <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft>.

22 <sup>15</sup> The FTC defines identity theft as "a fraud committed or attempted using the  
 23 identifying information of another person without authority." 16 C.F.R. § 603.2. The  
 24 FTC describes "identifying information" as "any name or number that may be used,  
 25 alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,"  
 26 including, among other things, "[n]ame, social security number, date of birth, official  
 27 State or government issued driver's license or identification number, alien registration  
 28 number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.  
*Id.*

<sup>16</sup> See <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-can-identity-thieves-do-with-your-personal-information-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself/>.



1           26. Theft of PII is even more serious when it includes theft of PHI. Data  
2 breaches involving medical information “typically leave[] a trail of falsified  
3 information in medical records that can plague victims’ medical and financial lives  
4 for years.”<sup>17</sup> It “is also more difficult to detect, taking almost twice as long as normal  
5 identity theft.”<sup>18</sup> “A thief may use your name or health insurance numbers to see a  
6 doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance provider, or get other  
7 care. If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, your treatment, insurance  
8 and payment records, and credit report may be affected.”<sup>19</sup>

9           27. A report published by the World Privacy Form and presented at the US  
10 FTC Workshop on Informational Injury describes what medical identity theft victims  
11 may experience:

- 12           • Changes to their health care records, most often the addition of falsified  
13 information, through improper billing activity or activity by imposters.  
14 These changes can affect the healthcare a person receives if the errors are  
15 not caught and corrected.
- 16           • Significant bills for medical goods and services not sought nor received.
- 17           • Issues with insurance, co-pays, and insurance caps.
- 18           • Long-term credit problems based on problems with debt collectors  
19 reporting debt due to identity theft.
- 20           • Serious life consequences resulting from the crime; for example, victims  
21 have been falsely accused of being drug users based on falsified entries  
22 to their medical files; victims have had their children removed from them  
23 due to medical activities of the imposter; victims have been denied jobs  
24 due to incorrect information placed in their health files due to the crime.

24 <sup>17</sup> Pam Dixon, et al., *The Geography of Medical Identity Theft* (Dec. 12, 2017),  
25 [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\\_comments/2018/01/00037-142815.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/01/00037-142815.pdf).

26 <sup>18</sup> See <https://publicintelligence.net/fbi-health-care-cyber-intrusions/> (FBI, April  
27 8, 2014).

28 <sup>19</sup> See Federal Trade Commission, *Medical Identity Theft*,  
<http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical-identity-theft>.

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- As a result of improper and/or fraudulent medical debt reporting, victims may not qualify for mortgage or other loans and may experience other financial impacts.
- Phantom medical debt collection based on medical billing or other identity information.
- Sales of medical debt arising from identity theft can perpetuate a victim's debt collection and credit problems, through no fault of their own.

28. A person whose PII/PHI has been compromised may not see any signs of identity theft for years. According to the GAO Report:

“[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.”

29. For example, in 2012, hackers gained access to LinkedIn's users' passwords. However, it was not until May 2016, four years after the breach, that hackers released the stolen email and password combinations.<sup>20</sup>

30. It is within this context that Plaintiffs and thousands of Tandem diabetes customers must now live with the knowledge that their PII/PHI is forever in cyberspace and was taken by people willing to use the information for any number of improper purposes and scams, including making the information available for sale on the black-market.

***Tandem's Business***

31. Tandem designs, manufactures, and sells insulin pumps for which it provides ongoing support. Tandem also sells disposable products that are used together with its pumps and are replaced every few days, including cartridges for storing and delivering insulin, and infusion sets that connect the insulin pump to a user's body.

<sup>20</sup> See <https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/05/18/protecting-our-members>.

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1 32. Tandem sells its insulin pumps and related products directly to individual  
2 customers and through third-party distributors that resell the product to insulin-  
3 dependent diabetes customers.

4 33. Tandem generates significant revenue from ongoing purchases of  
5 disposable insulin cartridges and other supplies by its current customer base. For this  
6 reason, Tandem has developed retention programs aimed at customers, their  
7 caregivers and healthcare providers, which includes offering training specific to its  
8 products, ongoing support by sales and clinical employees, and 24/7 technical support  
9 and customer service. As existing customers approach their insurance renewal date,  
10 Tandem's internal customer sales department contacts them to aid in the renewal.

11 34. In the four-year period ending December 31, 2019, Tandem shipped  
12 approximately 142,000 insulin pumps, which is representative of its global customer  
13 base.

14 ***Tandem's Collection of Customers' PII/PHI***

15 35. Tandem admits that its business involves the storage and transmission of  
16 a substantial amount of confidential, personal, or other sensitive information,  
17 including health information and other personal information relating to its customers.

18 36. Tandem details the information it collects in its Privacy Policy.<sup>21</sup>  
19 According to its Privacy Policy, Tandem collects personal data customers voluntarily  
20 provide when interested in buying a Tandem pump. This includes customer names  
21 and contact details, insurance or other public health benefit information, and  
22 information about a customer's health and medical diagnosis and treatment. For  
23 instance, Tandem's "Health and Product Questionnaire" asks for detailed information  
24 about a prospective customer's health, including birth date, height, weight, diabetes  
25 diagnosis and medical conditions.

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<sup>21</sup> See <https://www.tandemdiabetes.com/privacy/privacy-policy>.

1           37. Tandem also collects personal information from customers after they  
2 purchase an insulin pump and sign up for a t:connect account. t:connect is a cloud-  
3 based data management application that was introduced by Tandem in 2013. It  
4 provides users, their caregivers and their healthcare providers a fast, easy and visual  
5 way to display therapy management data from Tandem's pumps and supported blood  
6 glucose meters. This application empowers people with diabetes, as well as their  
7 caregivers and healthcare providers, to quickly and easily identify meaningful insights  
8 and trends, allowing them to refine therapy and lifestyle choices for better  
9 management of their diabetes.

10           38. According to Tandem, its insulin pumps hold the data generated over a  
11 period of up to 90 days and once a user uploads their therapy management information  
12 to t:connect, the information is retained in their t:connect account. Tandem promises  
13 that t:connect maintains the highest standards of patient data privacy and is hosted on  
14 secure servers that are compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and  
15 Accountability Act of 1996, or HIPAA.


16           39. The data collected and transmitted via the t:connect applications includes  
17 customer names, email addresses and passwords, security questions, dates of birth,  
18 data obtained from insulin pumps, blood glucose information, and any personal data  
19 customers include in the notes field to share with their providers. This data is collected  
20 when customers create a t:connect account; when they upload pump data to the  
21 t:connect application; and when customers connect to their t:connect application.

22           40. The t:connect applications allow patients to track their blood sugar  
23 measurements and track goals. For instance, the t:connect web application's  
24 Dashboard gives a quick snapshot of a customer's diabetes data. The data includes:

- 25           • BG levels
- 26           • A summary of insulin usage
- 27           • BG Test Frequency
- 28           • Cartridge Change Frequency

- Infusion Set Change Frequency
- Notifications, such as whether the pump settings have been modified

41. The Dashboard looks like this:



42. Several standard reports are available to customers through Tandem’s applications and contain detailed medical information. These include:

- Dashboard – Provides a general overview including highest, lowest, and average readings, and general insulin use.
- Therapy Timeline – Shows glucose readings, basal insulin delivery, and boluses over time. Continuous Glucose Monitoring (“CGM”) data and suspension events are displayed, if available.
- BG Trends – Highlights time of day(s) of the week that blood glucose (“BG”) tends to run high or low.
- Activity Summary – Shows the breakdown of CGM values (if applicable), BG values, insulin delivery, and bolus usage summaries.
- CGM Hourly Report – Shows hourly summary of CGM readings for one or more days and a summary of CGM readings by time of day.

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1           • Pump Settings – Displays pump settings including Personal Profiles,  
2           Alerts, and Reminders

3           43. Patients can add notes to document what happened on a specific day,  
4           which can help when interpreting data. For example, a note stating that they exercised  
5           more than usual or ate a large meal at a restaurant may help explain high or low BG  
6           readings.

7           44. Tandem also collects credit card information, including credit card  
8           number, card expiration data, and CVC code, from customers that purchase a product  
9           or accessory directly from Tandem.

10          45. Tandem collects a customer's personal data by phone, email, facsimile,  
11          online application, or post that is provided by their healthcare provider(s) or  
12          representative. This information includes prescriptions and statements of medical  
13          necessity, laboratory and chart notes, and blood glucose logs.

14          46. Customers may also receive training from Tandem, or one of its  
15          contractors, on how to use Tandem's pump systems (including the pump, continuous  
16          glucose monitoring products, insulin cartridges, and infusion sets) and other related  
17          accessories and applications. Training may be offered in-person, through online  
18          communication systems (such as Skype or Tandem's online customer portal) or  
19          through other channels. The personal information Tandem collects from customers  
20          during training events may include a customer's name, date of birth, pump serial  
21          number, healthcare provider name, information about their current health and health  
22          history, date of training, and information about their t:connect account.

23          47. From time to time, Tandem may send customers an electronic survey or  
24          questionnaire about topics relating to their current health and health history, personal  
25          preferences, or personal experiences using Tandem products or services, including its  
26          pump systems and related accessories and applications.

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***Tandem Promises to Safeguard Customer PII/PHI***

1  
2 48. Tandem promises customers that it is firmly committed to their privacy  
3 and has implemented policies and practices that protect their PII/PHI.

4 49. Tandem claims to have implemented physical, administrative, and  
5 technical safeguards as recommended in the Health Insurance Portability and  
6 Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules to ensure customer  
7 PHI is kept safe and secure in Tandem's systems. It says by doing that, "we seek to  
8 protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy of your data while  
9 keeping your data free from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,  
10 unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized access."

11 50. According to Tandem, the information it collects from customers is  
12 stored in its virtual and physical databases, on its workforce's mobile electronic  
13 devices (such as cell phones, laptops, or tablets), and may be archived on physical  
14 media (such as tape).

15 51. Tandem promises that its servers on which it stores patient data are  
16 highly secure and are designed to comply with HIPAA, as well as applicable U.S state  
17 privacy laws (including, but not limited to, the California Consumer Privacy Act). It  
18 also assures customers that it strives to maintain and regularly update reasonable  
19 security measures, and to respond quickly and effectively if and when data security  
20 incidents do occur.

21 52. Despite its promises, Tandem's 10-K for fiscal year ended December  
22 31, 2019, acknowledges that "[f]rom time to time" it has experienced various threats  
23 to its information technology systems, and that it was "currently investigating the  
24 extent of unauthorized access to data on our networks following a recent phishing  
25 attack. As a result of the ongoing investigation we may determine that substantial  
26 confidential, personal or other sensitive information was compromised, and in that  
27 case we may be subject to regulatory proceedings and substantial fines, penalties and  
28 expenses, as well as significant reputational harm, which may have a material adverse

1 impact on us. We are unable to predict the direct or indirect impact of any such  
2 incidents to our business.”

3 53. Tandem acknowledges that its information technology systems,  
4 including those that support t:connect, its mobile applications, and its Tandem Device  
5 Updater, are vulnerable to damage or interruption from among other things hackers,  
6 malware, ransomware or other destructive software, and cyberattacks. It further  
7 recognizes, that should any of those risks occur, “it could adversely impact the  
8 availability, confidentiality and integrity of information assets contained in those  
9 systems.”

### 10 *The Data Breach*

11 54. On March 16, 2020, Tandem reported on its website and to the California  
12 Attorney General a data breach. According to Tandem, on January 17, 2020, it  
13 discovered that an unauthorized person had gained access to an employee’s email  
14 account through a phishing incident. After an investigation, the manufacturer  
15 determined that the unauthorized person had access to five employee email accounts  
16 between January 17 and January 20, 2020.

17 55. Tandem’s notice of the data breach fails to provide any detail about what  
18 PII/PHI was accessed and by who. Tandem states only that its investigation  
19 determined that some customer information was contained within these email  
20 accounts, including customer contact information, information related to the use of  
21 Tandem’s products or services, and/or clinical data regarding customer diabetes  
22 therapy, and in some very limited instances, customer Social Security numbers.

23 56. Although Tandem’s notice indicates it first learned of the data breach on  
24 January 17, 2020, Tandem’s 10-K for fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, says that  
25 it was “currently investigating the extent of unauthorized access to data on our  
26 networks following a recent phishing attack.”

27 57. Tandem offers its customers nothing to assist them with any fall-out from  
28 the breach or to advise them of the potential threat they face as a result of their



1 sensitive PII/PHI being in the hands of criminals. Instead, Tandem “recommends that  
2 customers review billing statements from their healthcare providers and contact the  
3 provider if they are asked to pay for services not received. For those customers  
4 whose Social Security numbers were involved, the Company is offering a  
5 complimentary membership of credit monitoring and identity protection services.”

6 58. In response to the data breach, Tandem’s president and CEO stated that  
7 Tandem “take[s] the protection of our customer data very seriously, and regrettably,  
8 we did not meet the high standard we set to prevent this type of phishing attack from  
9 occurring.” He promised, albeit after the breach, that Tandem is “continuing to invest  
10 in cyber security and data protection safeguards. In addition, we are implementing  
11 additional email security controls and strengthening our user authorization and  
12 authentication processes.”

13 ***Tandem Knew or Should Have Known PII/PHI Are High Risk Targets***

14 59. Tandem knew or should have known that PII, and in particular, PHI, are  
15 high risk targets for identity thieves. In 2014, the FBI informed that “[c]yber actors  
16 will likely increase cyber intrusions against healthcare systems” and warned that the  
17 “healthcare industry is not technically prepared to combat against cyber criminals’  
18 basic cyber intrusion tactics, techniques and procedures[.]”<sup>22</sup>

19 60. The Identity Theft Resource Center reported that the Medical/Healthcare  
20 sector had the second largest number of breaches in 2018 and the highest rate of  
21 exposure per breach. According to the ITRC this sector suffered 363 data breaches  
22 exposing over 9 million records in 2018.<sup>23</sup> These included Blue Cross Blue Shield of  
23 Michigan (15K records exposed), Atrium Health (over 2M records exposed),  
24

25 <sup>22</sup> See <https://publicintelligence.net/fbi-health-care-cyber-intrusions/> (FBI, April  
26 8, 2014).

27 <sup>23</sup> Identity Theft Resource Center, *2018 End-of-Year Data Breach Report*,  
28 available at [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC\\_2018-End-of-Year-Aftermath\\_FINAL\\_V2\\_combinedWEB.pdf](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf).

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1 UnityPoint Health (over 1M records), LifeBridge Health (over 500K), FastHealth  
2 Corporation (over 600K records), among others.

3 61. Tandem acknowledges that “[f]rom time to time” it has “experienced  
4 various threats to our information technology system[.]”

5 62. As such, Tandem was aware that PHI is at high risk of theft, and  
6 consequently should have but did not take appropriate and standard measures to  
7 protect Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII/PHI against cyber-security attacks that  
8 Tandem should have anticipated and guarded against.

9 **CLASS DEFINITION AND ALLEGATIONS**

10 63. Plaintiffs bring all claims as class claims under Federal Rule of Civil  
11 Procedure 23(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4).

12 64. Plaintiffs bring all claims on behalf of a proposed Nationwide Class and  
13 Illinois Sub-Class, defined as follows:

14 Nationwide Class: All persons in the United States whose PII/PHI was  
15 accessed by and disclosed to unauthorized persons in the Data Breach.

16 Illinois Sub-Class: All persons in the State of Illinois whose PII/PHI  
17 was accessed by and disclosed to unauthorized persons in the Data  
18 Breach.

19 65. Excluded from the Class/Sub-Class are: (1) Defendant and its officers,  
20 directors, employees, principals, affiliated entities, controlling entities, agents, and  
21 other affiliates; (2) the agents, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, attorneys at law,  
22 attorneys in fact, or assignees of such persons or entities described herein; and (3) the  
23 Judge(s) assigned to this case and any members of their immediate families.

24 66. **Numerosity.** While the exact number of Class/Sub-Class members is  
25 unknown, Defendant acknowledges the Data Breach, which included PII/PHI  
26 information of Defendant’s customers including Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class  
27 members. Tandem estimates a U.S. customer base of approximately 142,000 people.  
28 Plaintiffs therefore believe that the Class/Sub-Class is so numerous that joinder of all  
members is impractical.

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1           67.    **Typicality.** Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class/Sub-  
2 Class. Plaintiffs, like all proposed members of the Class/Sub-Class, had their PII/PHI  
3 compromised in the Data Breach. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members were  
4 injured by the same wrongful acts, practices, and omissions committed by Defendant,  
5 as described herein. Plaintiffs’ claims therefore arise from the same practices or  
6 course of conduct that give rise to the claims of all Class/Sub-Class members.

7           68.    **Commonality.** Common questions of law and fact exist as to all  
8 Class/Sub-Class members and predominate over any individual questions. Such  
9 common questions include, but are not limited to:

10                   (a)   Whether Defendant had a duty to implement and maintain  
11 reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the PII/PHI  
12 it collected from Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members;

13                   (b)   Whether Defendant breached its duties to protect the PII/PHI of  
14 Plaintiffs and each Class/Sub-Class member; and

15                   (c)   Whether Plaintiffs and each Class/Sub-Class member are entitled  
16 to statutory damages, actual damages, and other equitable relief.

17           69.    **Adequacy.** Plaintiff, Samantha Henrichsen, will fairly and adequately  
18 protect the interests of the Class/Sub-Class members. Plaintiff Henrichsen is an  
19 adequate representative of the Class/Sub-Class in that she has no interests adverse  
20 to or that conflict with the Class/Sub-Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has  
21 retained counsel with substantial experience and success in the prosecution of  
22 complex consumer protection class actions of this nature.

23           70.    **Superiority.** A class action is superior to any other available method for  
24 the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since individual joinder of all  
25 Class/Sub-Class members is impractical. Furthermore, the expenses and burden of  
26 individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for the individual members  
27 of the Class/Sub-Class to redress the wrongs done to them, especially given that the  
28 damages or injuries suffered by each individual member of the Class/Sub-Class may

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1 be relatively small. Even if the Class/Sub-Class members could afford individualized  
2 litigation, the cost to the court system would be substantial and individual actions  
3 would also present the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. By  
4 contrast, a class action presents fewer management difficulties and provides the  
5 benefits of single adjudication and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

6 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Violation of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act**  
8 **(Civil Code §§ 56, et seq.)**

9 **(Plaintiffs and Nationwide Class Against Defendant)**

10 71. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
11 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

12 72. Section 56.10(a) of the California Civil Code provides that “[a] provider  
13 of health care, health care service plan, or contractor shall not disclose medical  
14 information regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or  
15 subscriber of a health care service plan without first obtaining an authorization[.]”

16 73. Tandem is a “contractor” within the meaning of Civil Code § 56.05(d)  
17 and/or “provider of health care” within the meaning of Civil Code § 56.06 and/or a  
18 “business organized for the purpose of maintaining medical information” and/or a  
19 “business that offers software or hardware to consumers . . . that is designed to  
20 maintain medical information” within the meaning of Civil Code § 56.06(a) and (b),  
21 and maintained and continues to maintain “medical information,” within the meaning  
22 of Civil Code § 56.05(j), for “patients” of Defendant, within the meaning of Civil  
23 Code § 56.05(k).

24 74. Plaintiff A.R. and all members of the Nationwide Class are “patients”  
25 within the meaning of Civil Code § 56.05(k) and are “endanger[ed]” within the  
26 meaning of Civil Code § 56.05(e) because Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class fear  
27 that disclosure of their medical information could subject them to harassment or  
28 abuse.

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1 75. Plaintiffs A.R. and Nationwide Class members, as patients, had their  
2 individually identifiable “medical information,” within the meaning of Civil Code  
3 § 56.05(j), created, maintained, preserved, and stored on Defendant’s computer  
4 network at the time of the breach.

5 76. Defendant, through inadequate security, allowed an unauthorized third  
6 party to gain access to Plaintiff’s and each Nationwide Class members’ medical  
7 information, without the prior written authorization of Plaintiff and the Nationwide  
8 Class, as required by Civil Code § 56.10 of the CMIA.

9 77. Defendant violated Civil Code § 56.101 of the CMIA through its failure  
10 to maintain and preserve the confidentiality of the medical information of Plaintiff  
11 A.R. and the Nationwide Class.

12 78. As a result of Defendant’s above-described conduct, Plaintiff A.R. and  
13 the Nationwide Class have suffered damages from the unauthorized release of their  
14 individual identifiable “medical information” made unlawful by Civil Code §§ 56.10,  
15 56.101.

16 79. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s above-described  
17 wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and  
18 proximately caused the Data Breach, and violation of the CMIA, Plaintiff A.R. and  
19 Nationwide Class members have suffered (and will continue to suffer) economic  
20 damages and other injury and actual harm in the form of, *inter alia*, (i) an imminent,  
21 immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud and  
22 medical fraud – risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for  
23 which they are entitled to compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of the  
24 confidentiality of their PII/PHI, (iv) statutory damages under the California CMIA,  
25 (v) deprivation of the value of their PII/PHI, for which there is a well-established  
26 national and international market, and/or (vi) the financial and temporal cost of  
27 monitoring their credit, monitoring their financial accounts, and mitigating their  
28 damages.

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1 80. Plaintiffs, individually and for each member of the Nationwide Class,  
2 seeks nominal damages of one thousand dollars (\$1,000) for each violation under  
3 Civil Code § 56.36(b)(1), and actual damages suffered, if any, pursuant to Civil Code  
4 § 56.36(b)(2), injunctive relief, as well as punitive damages of up to \$3,000 per  
5 Plaintiff and each Nationwide Class member, and attorneys' fees, litigation expenses  
6 and court costs, pursuant to Civil Code § 56.35

7 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

8 **Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and**  
9 **Deceptive Business Practices Act**  
10 **815 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 505/1, et seq. ("Illinois CFA")**  
11 **(Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-Class Against Defendant)**

12 81. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
13 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

14 82. Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class are "consumers" as that term is  
15 defined in 815 ILCS § 505/1(e). Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class and Tandem  
16 are "persons" as that term is defined in 815 ILCS § 505/1(c).

17 83. Tandem is engaged in "trade" or "commerce," including provision of  
18 services, as those terms are defined under 815 ILCS § 505/1(f).

19 84. Tandem engages in the "sale" of "merchandise" (including services)  
20 as defined by 815 ILCS § 505/1(b) and (d).

21 85. Tandem engaged in deceptive and unfair acts and practices,  
22 misrepresentation, and the concealment, suppression, and omission of material  
23 facts in connection with the sale and advertisement of "merchandise" (as defined  
24 in the Illinois CFA) in violation of the Illinois CFA, including but not limited to  
25 the following:

- 26 • failing to maintain sufficient security to prevent Plaintiffs' and  
27 Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI from being hacked and stolen;
- 28 • misrepresenting material facts to Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class  
members' in connection with the sale of goods and services, by

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representing that it would maintain adequate data privacy and security practices and procedures to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI from unauthorized disclosure, release, data breaches, and theft;

- misrepresenting material facts to Plaintiffs' and the Illinois Sub-Class, in connection with sale of goods and services, by representing that Tandem did and would comply with the requirements of relevant federal and state laws pertaining to the privacy and security of Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI; and
- failing to take proper action following the Data Breach to enact adequate privacy and security measures and protect Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI and other personal information from further unauthorized disclosure, release, data breaches, and theft.

86. In addition, Tandem intended that Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class rely on its deceptive and unfair acts and practices, misrepresentations, and the concealment, suppression, and omission of material facts, in connection with Tandem's offering of goods and services and incorporating Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI on its servers, in violation of the Illinois CFA.

87. Tandem also engaged in unfair acts and practices by failing to maintain the privacy and security of Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members' PII/PHI, in violation of duties imposed by and public policies reflected in applicable federal and state laws, resulting in the data breach. These unfair acts and practices violated duties imposed by laws including the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules and similar state laws.

88. Tandem's wrongful practices occurred in the course of trade or commerce.

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89. Tandem’s wrongful practices were and are injurious to the public interest because those practices were part of a generalized course of conduct on the part of Tandem that applied to Plaintiffs and all Illinois Sub-Class members and were repeated continuously before and after Tandem obtained PII/PHI from Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-Class members. All Class members have been adversely affected by Tandem’s conduct and the public was and is at risk as a result thereof.

90. Tandem also violated 815 ILCS § 505/2 by failing to immediately notify affected customers of the nature and extent of the Data Breach pursuant to the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act (“Illinois PIPA”), 815 ILCS §§ 530/1, *et. seq.*, which provides, at Section 10:

Notice of Breach.

(a) Any data collector that owns or licenses personal information concerning an Illinois resident shall notify the resident at no charge that there has been a breach of the security of the system data following discovery or notification of the breach. The disclosure notification shall be made in the most expedient time to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity, security and confidentiality of the data system.

91. 815 ILCS § 530/20 provides that a violation of 815 ILCS § 530/10 “constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.”

92. As a result of Tandem’s wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-Class members were injured in that they never would have allowed their PII/PHI – the value of which Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-Class members no long have control – to be provided to Tandem if they had been told or knew that Tandem failed to maintain sufficient security to keep such data from being hacked and taken by others.

93. Tandem’s unfair and/or deceptive conduct proximately caused Plaintiffs’ and Illinois Sub-Class members’ injuries because, had Tandem



1 maintained customer PII/PHI with adequate security, Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-  
2 Class members would not have lost it.

3 94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's above-described  
4 wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and  
5 proximately caused the Data Breach and its violations of the Illinois CFA, Plaintiffs  
6 and Illinois Sub-Class members have suffered (and will continue to suffer) economic  
7 damages and other injury and actual harm in the form of, *inter alia*, (i) an imminent,  
8 immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity and medical theft and identity  
9 and medical fraud – risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services  
10 for which they are entitled to compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of  
11 the confidentiality of their PII/PHI, (iv) statutory damages under the Illinois CFA and  
12 PIPA, (v) deprivation of the value of their PII/PHI, for which there is a well-  
13 established national and international market, and/or (vi) the financial and temporal  
14 cost of monitoring their credit, monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating  
15 damages.

16 95. Pursuant to 815 ILCS § 505/10a(a), Plaintiffs seek actual,  
17 compensatory, and punitive damages (pursuant to 815 ILCS § 505/10a(c)),  
18 injunctive relief, and court costs and attorneys' fees as a result of Tandem's  
19 violations of the Illinois CFA.

### 20 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

#### 21 **Violations of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act** 22 **815 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 510/1, *et seq.* ("Illinois DTPA")**

#### 23 **(Plaintiffs and Illinois Sub-Class Against Defendant)**

24 96. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
25 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

26 97. Plaintiffs, the Illinois Sub-Class, and Tandem are "persons" as defined  
27 in 815 ILCS § 510/1(5).

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1 98. The Illinois DTPA broadly prohibits deceptive trade practices. As set  
2 forth herein, Tandem failed to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Illinois Sub-Class members'  
3 PII/PHI. Accordingly, Tandem has engaged in deceptive trade practices as defined in  
4 815 ILCS § 510/2.

5 99. Tandem's actions as set forth above occurred in the conduct of trade or  
6 commerce.

7 100. Tandem knew or should have known that its conduct violated the Illinois  
8 DTPA.

9 101. Tandem's conduct was material to Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class.

10 102. As set forth herein, Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class suffered  
11 ascertainable loss caused by Tandem's violations of the Illinois DTPA, which  
12 proximately caused injuries to Plaintiffs and the other class members.

13 103. Pursuant to 815 ILCS § 510/3, Plaintiffs and the Illinois Sub-Class are  
14 entitled to an award of injunctive relief to prevent Tandem's deceptive trade practices  
15 and, because Tandem's conduct was willful, an award of reasonable attorneys' fees.

16 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

17 **Negligence**

18 **(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

19 104. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
20 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

21 105. Defendant has (and continues to have) a duty to Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-  
22 Class members to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting their  
23 PII/PHI.

24 106. Defendant also had (and continues to have) a duty to use ordinary care  
25 in activities from which harm might be reasonably anticipated (such as in the storage  
26 and protection of private, non-public PII/PHI within their possession, custody and  
27 control). Such affirmative duties also are expressly imposed upon Defendant from  
28 other sources enumerated herein.

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1 107. Defendant’s duties arise from, *inter alia*, the California CMIA, the  
2 Illinois CFA, PIPA, DTPA, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule (“Standards for Privacy of  
3 Individually Identifiable Health Information”), 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164,  
4 Subparts A and E, and the HIPAA Security Rule (“Security Standards for the  
5 Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information”), 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part  
6 164, Subparts A and C (collectively, “HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules”).

7 108. The above-outlined standards and duties exist for the express purpose of  
8 protecting Plaintiffs, Class/Sub-Class members and their PII/PHI.

9 109. Defendant violated these standards and duties by failing to exercise  
10 reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class/Sub-Class  
11 members’ PII/PHI by failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,  
12 manage, monitor, and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies,  
13 procedures, protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect  
14 PII/PHI entrusted to it – including Plaintiffs’ and Class/Sub-Class members’ PII/PHI.

15 110. It was reasonably foreseeable to Defendant that its failure to exercise  
16 reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class/Sub-Class  
17 members’ PII/PHI by failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,  
18 manage, monitor, and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies,  
19 procedures, protocols, and software and hardware systems would result in the  
20 unauthorized release, disclosure, and dissemination of Plaintiffs’ and Class/Sub-Class  
21 members’ PII/PHI for no lawful purpose.

22 111. Defendant, by and through its above negligent or grossly negligent  
23 actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care, unlawfully breached its duties  
24 to Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members by, among other things, failing to exercise  
25 reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class/Sub-Class  
26 members’ PII/PHI within its possession, custody and control. Defendant, by and  
27 through its above negligent or grossly actions, inactions, omissions, and want of  
28 ordinary care, further breached its duties to Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members

1 by failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee, manage, monitor and  
 2 audit its processes, controls, policies, procedures, protocols, and software and  
 3 hardware systems for complying with the applicable laws and safeguarding and  
 4 protecting its customers' PII/PHI.

5 112. But for Defendant's negligent or grossly negligent breach of the above-  
 6 described duties owed to Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members, their PII/PHI  
 7 would not have been released, disclosed, and disseminated—without their  
 8 authorization—and compromised.

9 113. Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' PII/PHI was transferred, sold,  
 10 opened, viewed, mined and otherwise released, disclosed, and disseminated to  
 11 unauthorized persons without their authorization as the direct and proximate result of  
 12 Defendant's failure to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee, manage,  
 13 monitor and audit its processes, controls, policies, procedures and protocols for  
 14 complying with applicable laws and safeguarding and protecting Plaintiffs' and  
 15 Class/Sub-Class members' PII/PHI.

16 114. Defendant's above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and  
 17 want of ordinary care that directly and proximately caused the Data Breach constitute  
 18 negligence, gross negligence, and negligence *per se* under Illinois common law.

19 115. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's above-described  
 20 wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and  
 21 proximately caused the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members have  
 22 suffered (and will continue to suffer) economic damages and other injury and actual  
 23 harm in the form of, *inter alia*, (i) an imminent, immediate and the continuing  
 24 increased risk of identity and medical theft, and identity and medical fraud—risks  
 25 justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for which they are entitled  
 26 to compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of the confidentiality of their  
 27 PII/PHI, (iv) statutory damages under the California CMIA and the Illinois CFA,  
 28 PIPA, DTPA, (v) deprivation of the value of their PII/PHI, for which there is a well-

1 established national and international market, and/or (vi) the financial and temporal  
2 cost of monitoring their credit, monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating  
3 damages.

4 **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

5 **Invasion of Privacy**

6 **(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

7 116. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
8 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

9 117. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members have a legally protected  
10 privacy interest in their PII/PHI that Defendant required them to provide and  
11 allow it to store.

12 118. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members reasonably expected that their  
13 PII/PHI would be protected and secured from unauthorized parties, would not be  
14 disclosed to any unauthorized parties or disclosed for any improper purpose.

15 119. Defendant unlawfully invaded the privacy rights of Plaintiffs and  
16 Class/Sub-Class members by (a) failing to adequately secure their PII/PHI from  
17 disclosure to unauthorized parties for improper purposes; (b) disclosing their  
18 PII/PHI to unauthorized parties in a manner that is highly offensive to a  
19 reasonable person; and (c) disclosing their PII/PHI to unauthorized parties  
20 without the informed and clear consent of Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members.  
21 This invasion into the privacy interest of Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members  
22 is serious and substantial.

23 120. In failing to adequately secure Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class  
24 members' PII/PHI, Defendant acted in reckless disregard of their privacy rights.  
25 Defendant knew or should have known that its substandard data security measures  
26 are highly offensive to a reasonable person in the same position as Plaintiffs and  
27 Class/Sub-Class members.

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1 121. Defendant violated Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' right to  
2 privacy under the common law as well as under state and federal law.

3 122. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful invasions  
4 of privacy, Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' PII/PHI has been viewed or  
5 is at imminent risk of being viewed, and their reasonable expectations of privacy  
6 have been intruded upon and frustrated. Plaintiffs and the proposed Class/Sub-  
7 Class members have suffered injury as a result of Defendant's unlawful invasions  
8 of privacy and are entitled to appropriate relief.

9 **SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

10 **Breach of Contract**

11 **(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

12 123. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
13 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

14 124. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members, upon information and belief,  
15 entered into express contracts with Defendant that included Defendant's promise to  
16 protect nonpublic personal information given to Defendant or that Defendant gathered  
17 on its own, from disclosure.

18 125. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members performed their obligations  
19 under the contracts when they provided their PII/PHI to Defendant in relation to their  
20 purchase of its insulin pumps and related products and services.

21 126. Defendant breached its contractual obligation to protect the nonpublic  
22 personal information Defendant gathered when the information was exposed as part  
23 of the Data Breach.

24 127. As a direct and proximate result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and  
25 Class/Sub-Class members have been harmed and have suffered, and will continue to  
26 suffer, damages and injuries.

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**SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Breach of Implied Contract**

**(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

128. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

129. Defendant provided Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members with an implied contract to protect and keep their PII/PHI private.

130. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members would not have provided their PII/PHI to Defendant or its subsidiaries or contractors, but for Defendant's implied promises to safeguard and protect their information.

131. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members performed their obligations under the implied contract when they provided their PII/PHI to Defendant for its insulin pump and related products and services.

132. Defendant breached the implied contract with Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members by failing to protect and keep private their PII/PHI.

133. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its implied contract, Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members have been harmed and have suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages and injuries.

**EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Unjust Enrichment**

**(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

134. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

135. This claim is plead in the alternative to the above implied contract claim.

136. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members conferred a monetary benefit upon Tandem in the form of monies paid for the purchase of medical supplies and services.

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1 137. Tandem appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits conferred upon it  
2 by Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members. Tandem also benefited from the receipt  
3 of Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' PII/PHI, as this was utilized by Tandem  
4 to provide services and facilitate payment to it.

5 138. The monies that Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members paid to Tandem  
6 were supposed to be used by Tandem, in part, to pay for the administrative costs of  
7 reasonable data privacy and security practices and procedures.

8 139. As a result of Tandem's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class  
9 members suffered actual damages in an amount equal to the difference in value  
10 between their purchases made with reasonable data privacy and security practices and  
11 procedures that Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members paid for, and those purchases  
12 without unreasonable data privacy and security practices and procedures that they  
13 received.

14 140. Under principals of equity and good conscience, Tandem should not be  
15 permitted to retain the money belonging to Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members  
16 because Tandem failed to implement (or adequately implement) the data privacy and  
17 security practices and procedures that Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members paid  
18 for and that were otherwise mandated by federal, state, and local laws and industry  
19 standards.

20 141. Tandem should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund for the  
21 benefit of Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members all unlawful or inequitable  
22 proceeds received by it as a result of the conduct and Data Breach alleged herein.

23 **NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

24 **Declaratory Relief**

25 **(Plaintiffs and All Classes Against Defendant)**

26 142. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding  
27 paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.  
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1 143. An actual controversy has arisen in the wake of the Data Breach  
2 regarding Defendant's duties to safeguard and protect Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class  
3 members' PII/PHI. Defendant's PII/PHI security measures were (and continue to be)  
4 woefully inadequate. Defendant disputes these contentions and contends that its  
5 security measures are appropriate.

6 144. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members continue to suffer damages,  
7 other injury or harm as additional identity and financial theft and fraud occurs.

8 145. Therefore, Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members request a judicial  
9 determination of their rights and duties, and ask the Court to enter a judgment  
10 declaring, *inter alia*, (i) Defendant owed (and continues to owe) a legal duty to  
11 safeguard and protect Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' confidential and  
12 sensitive personal information, and timely notify them about the Data Breach,  
13 (ii) Defendant breached (and continues to breach) such legal duties by failing to  
14 safeguard and protect Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' personal information,  
15 and (iii) Defendant's breach of its legal duties directly and proximately caused the  
16 Data Breach, and the resulting damages, injury, or harm suffered by Plaintiffs and  
17 Class/Sub-Class members. A declaration from the Court ordering Defendant to stop  
18 its illegal practices is required. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members will otherwise  
19 continue to suffer harm as alleged above.

20 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

21 146. **Damages.** As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful  
22 actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and proximately  
23 caused the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members suffered (and will  
24 continue to suffer) actual and statutory damages and other injury and harm in the form  
25 of, *inter alia*, (i) an imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity  
26 theft and fraud – risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for  
27 which they are entitled to compensation, (ii) invasion of privacy, (iii) breach of the  
28 confidentiality of their PII/PHI, (iv) statutory damages under the California CMIA

1 and the Illinois CFA, PIPA, DTPA, (v) deprivation of the value of their PII/PHI, for  
2 which there is a well-established national and international market, and/or (vi) the  
3 financial and temporal cost of monitoring their credit, monitoring financial accounts,  
4 and mitigating damages. Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members also are entitled to  
5 equitable relief, including, without limitation, restitution. Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-  
6 Class members' damages were foreseeable by Defendant and exceed the minimum  
7 jurisdictional limits of this Court. All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs' and  
8 Class/Sub-Class members' claims have been performed and occurred.

9       147. **Punitive Damages.** Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members also are  
10 entitled to punitive damages from Defendant, as punishment and to deter such  
11 wrongful conduct in the future, pursuant to, *inter alia*, 815 ILCS § 505/10a and Illinois  
12 common law. All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members'  
13 claims have been performed and occurred.

14       148. **Injunctive Relief.** Pursuant to, *inter alia*, the Illinois CFA and DTPA,  
15 Plaintiffs and Class/Sub-Class members also are entitled to injunctive relief in  
16 multiple forms including, without limitation, (i) credit monitoring, (ii) Internet  
17 monitoring, (iii) identity theft insurance, (iv) prohibiting Defendant from continuing  
18 its above-described wrongful conduct, (v) requiring Defendant to modify its corporate  
19 culture and implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to  
20 safeguard and protect the PII/PHI entrusted to it, (vi) periodic compliance audits by a  
21 third party to ensure that Defendant is properly safeguarding and protecting the  
22 PII/PHI in its possession, custody and control, and (vii) clear and effective notice to  
23 Class/Sub-Class members about the serious risks posed by the exposure of the  
24 personal information and the precise steps that must be taken to protect themselves.  
25 All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs' and Class/Sub-Class members' claims for relief  
26 have been performed and occurred.

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1 149. **Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs.** Plaintiffs and  
2 Class/Sub-Class members also are entitled to recover their attorneys' fees, litigation  
3 expenses and court costs in prosecuting this action.

4 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all members of the  
5 Class/Sub-Class respectfully request that (i) this action be certified as a class action,  
6 (ii) Plaintiff Henrichsen be designated representative of the Class/Sub-Class and  
7 (iii) Plaintiffs' counsel be appointed as counsel for the Class/Sub-Class. Plaintiffs, on  
8 behalf of themselves and members of the Class/Sub-Class further request that upon  
9 final trial or hearing, judgment be awarded against Defendant for:

- 10 (i) actual and punitive damages to be determined by the trier of fact;
- 11 (ii) statutory damages;
- 12 (iii) equitable relief, including restitution;
- 13 (iv) pre- and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rates  
14 applicable;
- 15 (v) appropriate injunctive relief;
- 16 (vi) attorneys' fees and litigation expenses;
- 17 (vii) costs of suit; and
- 18 (viii) such other and further relief the Court deems just and proper.

19 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

20 Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

21  
22 Dated: April 16, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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