	Case 5:24-cv-00404 Document 1 File	d 02/21/24	Page 1 of 31	Page ID #:1
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13	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
14 15	JOSE GUZMAN, FORTINO RUTILO JIMENEZ, AND BERTHA MEZA,	C	ASE NO.: 5:	24-cv-404
16	individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	<u>C</u>	LASS ACTIO	<u>ON</u>
17	Plaintiffs,	C	OMPLAINT	FOR
18 19	V.	``````````````````````````````````````	·	f the California
20	THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY, d/	1	798.150 et seq	
21	WESTERN UNION FINANCIAL SERVI INC., MONEYGRAM INTERNATIONA	CES = C	onstitution Ar	Privacy, California t. 1, § 1.
22	INC., MONEYGRAM PAYMENT	D	EMAND FO	R JURY TRIAL
23 24	SYSTEMS, INC., and FORCEPOINT LLO Defendants.	C.		
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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
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2 Plaintiffs Jose Guzman, Fortino Rutilo Jimenez, and Bertha Meza, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by and through undersigned counsel, 3 file this Class Action Complaint against Western Union Financial Services, Inc. 4 ("Western Union"), MoneyGram International, Inc. and MoneyGram Payment 5 Systems, Inc. ("MoneyGram) (collectively, "Money Transfer Defendants"). 6 Plaintiffs Jose Guzman, Fortino Rutilo Jimenez, and Bertha Meza, on behalf of 7 themselves and all others similarly situated, also bring this Class Action Complaint 8 against Forcepoint LLC ("Forcepoint" or "Database Defendant"). 9

NEED FOR ACTION

The Money Transfer Defendants are in the business of providing money 11 1. transfer services to individual consumers, typically across international borders. As 12 part of these services, they are entrusted with the personal information of their 13 consumers. Much to their consumers' detriment, that trust is wholly unwarranted. 14 As detailed below, the Money Transfer Defendants in coordination with the 15 Database Defendant voluntarily participated and continue to participate in a massive 16 and unlawful data dragnet collection and dissemination operation that compromises 17 the personal information of millions of unsuspecting consumers. Defendants' 18 outrageous conduct is contrary to their express legal obligations and their stated 19 commitment to protecting sensitive consumer information. 20

21 2. Indeed, each Money Transfer Defendants' website emphasizes their
22 commitment to the privacy of the services they provide, stating things such as:



3. On January 15, 2023, the American Civil Liberties Union publicly released documents showing that Western Union and MoneyGram, in conjunction with state and federal actors, actively took part in a massive and unlawful dragnet data collection scheme to disclose their own consumers' personal information ("Protected Information" defined Code Personal as in Cal. Civ. 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A)) to private actors, specifically Transaction Record Analysis Center, Inc. ("TRAC") and Forcepoint.

4. This unlawful data dragnet operation swept up Protected Personal Information related to Money Transfer Defendants' consumers who sent or received \$500 or more between Arizona, California, California, New Mexico, Texas, and the country of Mexico.

- 5 1 <u>https://corporate.westernunion.com/</u> (last visited February 12, 2024).
- ² <u>https://www.moneygram.com/mgo/us/en/help/fraud-aware/fraud-prevention-information/</u> (last visited February 12, 2024).

5. The Protected Personal Information that Money Transfer Defendants collected and disclosed was never sent to law enforcement. Instead, it was sent to TRAC, an Arizona non-profit corporation whose tax filings indicate its stated mission is: "[t]o educate law enforcement and industry to money laundering technique and trends." The Protected Personal Information was sent via Forcepoint, TRAC's database vendor.

As revealed in the ACLU press release, the Money Transfer Defendants 6. 7 engaged in a years-long data dragnet collection and dissemination operation 8 premised on facially improper "administrative subpoenas" sent by the Arizona 9 Attorney General that cast an impermissible breadth and depth. In 2007, the Arizona 10 Court of Appeals found the Arizona Attorney General was improperly using the 11 administrative statute and that these types of "administrative subpoenas" were 12 invalid and illegal. These administrative subpoenas are just as invalid and illegal 13 today as they were in 2007. 14

15 7. Likewise, the Money Transfer Defendants' data dragnet collection and
16 dissemination operation was also premised upon facially improper U.S. Immigration
17 and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI") "customs
18 summonses," which HSI withdrew after Senator Ron Wyden shined light on this
19 utterly invasive surveillance sweep on unsuspecting consumers.

8. After the Money Transfer Defendants gave Plaintiffs' Protected
 Personal Information to TRAC, TRAC used its database vendor Forcepoint to allow
 law enforcement agencies around the country unfettered access to this Protected
 Personal Information without a court order, warrant, or subpoena. Upon information
 and belief, the Money Transfer Defendants' and Database Defendant's data dragnet
 operation gave unfettered access to Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to
 over 700 law enforcement entities.

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9. Plaintiffs were unaware that their Protected Personal Information was
 being shared with third parties TRAC and Forcepoint, who were not disclosed as
 third parties that may have access to Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information.
 Plaintiffs were likewise unaware that their Protected Personal Information was to be
 indefinitely held in a data dragnet repository to be shared with further third parties,
 including law enforcement agencies who were given access to the database without
 warrant, subpoena, or court order. Plaintiffs did not consent to any such conduct.

8 10. Such an invasion of Plaintiffs' privacy is anathema to California law,
9 policy, and equity.

10 11. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Jose Guzman, Fortino Rutilo Jimenez, and
11 Bertha Gonzalez Meza on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
12 bring this suit for statutory penalties, actual damages, and injunctive relief to avail
13 Plaintiffs and Class members of their constitutional and statutory privacy rights,
14 make Plaintiffs and Class members whole, and prevent this unconscionable conduct
15 from ever occurring again.

I. <u>PARTIES</u>

17 12. Plaintiff Jose Guzman is a natural person domiciled in California. He
18 resides in Chula Vista, California.

19 13. Plaintiff Fortino Rutilo Jimenez is a natural person domiciled in
20 California. He resides in Montebello, California.

21 14. Plaintiff Bertha Gonzalez Meza is a natural person domiciled in
22 California. She resides in Moreno Valley, California.

15. Defendant The Western Union Company also doing business as
Western Union Financial Services, Inc. ("Western Union") is a publicly-traded
Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in
Englewood, Colorado. Western Union offers and provides remittances transfers to

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consumers in 50 states, including California, and it regularly transacts and has
 transacted business in this district.

16. Defendant MoneyGram International, Inc. (MGI) is a publicly-traded
Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in Dallas,
Texas. MGI offers and provides remittance transfers to consumers in all 50 states,
including California, through its wholly-owned subsidiary MoneyGram Payment
Systems, Inc. (MPSI) (collectively, "MoneyGram"). MGI through its subsidiary
MPSI regularly transacts and has transacted business in this district.

9 17. Defendant Forcepoint LLC ("Forcepoint") is a Delaware limited
10 liability company with its headquarters and principal place of business in Austin,
11 Texas. Forcepoint is registered to do business in the state of California
12 (201607910169) with a CA Registered Corporate Agent located at 7801 Folsom
13 Boulevard #202, Sacramento CA. Forcepoint, regularly transacts business in
14 California, including in this district.

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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16 18. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million,
there are over 100 members in the proposed Class, and at least one member of the
proposed Class is a citizen of a state or country different from at least one Defendant.

19. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because each
regularly transacts business in and throughout this district, and the wrongful acts
alleged in this Complaint were committed within this district.

24 20. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a
25 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred
26 in and emanated from this district.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. How Money Transfer Services and Transactions Work

21. Western Union was founded in 1851 as a company operating primarily in telegraph services, but eventually shifted its focus to cross-border money transfers, largely marketing its services to immigrants. Similarly, MoneyGram was formed to provide money transfer services to consumers globally.

22. Undeniably, this business model is based upon a booming market.
Money transfers, or remittances as they are often called, are estimated to grow by
1.4% to \$656 billion in 2023, up from \$647 billion in 2022.³ The United States is
one of the largest remitters and, notably, Mexico received the second highest level
of remittances in 2022.

23. As providers of money transfer services, the Money Transfer 12 Defendants' consumer base includes individuals spanning many countries and 13 commonly without bank accounts. Without a bank account, many individuals cannot 14 take advantage of electronic wire transfers or electronic checking to transfer money. 15 Or as is sometimes the case, money transfer services through providers such as the 16 Money Transfer Defendants are more cost-effective. In order to send money to a 17 distant place, consumers can use a money transfer service, such as those offered by 18 the Money Transfer Defendants to quickly send money abroad. 19

20 24. To earn a profit as a money transfer service, Money Transfer
21 Defendants charge fees related to each transaction, as well as by setting exchange
22 rates above market rate.

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³ The World Bank, *Remittances Remain Resilient but Likely to Slow*, June 13, 2023,
<u>https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/13/remittances-remain-resilient-likely-to-slow</u> (last visited, February 12, 2024).

1 25. The money transfer process largely mirrors the following: (1) a sender 2 typically brings cash to a physical store where a representative of one of the Money 3 Transfer Defendants receives it and obtains information from the sender; (2) the 4 Money Transfer Defendants' representative also obtains information related to the 5 recipient of the money transfer and process the transaction; and (3) the recipient of 6 the transfer visits a physical location of the Money Transfer Defendants where the 7 money is delivered to them.

8 26. Consumers also transfer money using an online website or mobile
9 application that follows a similar process as outlined above, but done through a
10 similar online or mobile process.

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B. Western Union Cooperates With Unlawful Data Dragnet Operation

In 2006, the Arizona Attorney General served administrative subpoenas 13 27. under Arizona Revised Statute § 12-2315 and § 6-1242 seeking bulk transaction 14 data related to money transfers conducted through Western Union by its consumers. 15 The facially improper subpoenas sought data relating to every send and each receive 16 transaction of \$300 and greater received in the state of Sonora, Mexico, on a weekly 17 basis as each week becomes available, beginning with January 1, 2004 and ending 18 with December 31, 2006. The subpoena sought 49 separate data fields worth of 19 information for every \$300 or greater transaction over this two-year time period. 20

21 28. Western Union initially fought the enforcement of the subpoenas
22 against them, taking the enforceability question to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

23 29. A year later, in *State ex rel. Goddard v. Western Union Fin. Servs., Inc.*,
24 216 Ariz. 361 (App. 2007) the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the Attorney
25 General's subpoenas were unenforceable as a matter of law. The court found the
26 breadth of the subpoenas was impermissible and not reasonably articulated. In short,

the subpoenas violated the clear and well-defined principles of Fourth Amendment
 particularity requirements, as well as similar requirements under Arizona law.

3 30. The Arizona Attorney General then brought suit against Western Union
4 under a state anti-money laundering law.

31. To settle the suit with the Arizona Attorney General, in 2010 Western Union agreed to voluntarily produce, on an ongoing basis, its consumers' personal identifying information (the "Western Union Settlement").

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1. Western Union Funds TRAC's Unlawful Data Dragnet Operation

32. In 2014, the Western Union Settlement was amended and expanded as follows:

a. First, Western Union was required to deliver full transaction data relating to all transactions sent to or from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and the country of Mexico. Western Union was required to continue sending this information over the next five years until June 30, 2019.

b. Second, Western Union was required to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to establish and monetarily supplement the Transaction Record Analysis Center, Inc. ("TRAC"), which would house the data sent from Western Union. In fact, Western Union was required to pay TRAC \$150,000 per month and also make a one-time payment of \$250,000.00 to fund privacy, confidentiality, and information security measures.

33. While early court records surrounding the Western Union Settlement refer to TRAC as the "State Center," the incorporation, tax records, and funding by Western Union state otherwise.

1 34. TRAC is not a governmental entity. Per its bylaws, TRAC was 2 incorporated in 2014 under the laws of Arizona as a non-profit corporation with the 3 purpose of promoting education, research, and training activities in the field of anti-4 money laundering. Further, the bylaws hold that TRAC would receive funds and 5 research, train, and educate law enforcement agencies nationwide in the area of anti-6 money laundering.

35. TRAC's tax filings confirm it is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, not a government agency.

2. TRAC Retains Forcepoint To Host Unlawful Data Dragnet Operation

36. According to a 2015 TRAC Data Policy, TRAC provides analytical and data-related assistance to "need-to-know investigators, analysts, and prosecutors in their efforts to disrupt criminal organizations and dismantle their operations by providing resources, expertise, meaningful data analysis, training, and organizational collaboration." Moreover, TRAC provides law enforcement with analytical and technical training regarding access to and the use of the TRAC system.

37. As an entity, TRAC maintains an electronic database of all the Protected Personal Information it receives from Money Transfer Defendants. To maintain the database, TRAC outsources its database software to Forcepoint and other software database and/or cloud data service providers. Once users receive training by TRAC, they have access to its database and requisite software interface.

38. Forcepoint is TRAC's principal software interface provider and describes the TRAC system as "a centralized searchable database of the financial

transactions of global money services business [MSBs]."⁴ In providing this system,
 Forcepoint acknowledges:

TRAC now serves as the intelligence component for [Arizona Financial Crimes Task Force] and is staffed by analyst and law enforcement professionals recognized as experts in money laundering activity. The TRAC provides data, meaningful data analysis, collaboration and training to investigators, analysts and prosecutors nationwide in their efforts to disrupt criminal organizations and dismantle their operations.⁵

39. Tellingly, Forcepoint acknowledges the TRAC system is designed to
allow law enforcement agencies to circumvent ordinary constitutional protections
because the database contains "*more relevant data than what would be obtained in a traditional subpoena process*" and is specifically designed to enable investigators
to avoid "*the usual subpoena process*."⁶

²³ ⁴ Forcepoint, *Case Study – Arizona Financial Crimes Task Force*,
 ²⁴ <u>https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/case_study_downloads/casestudy_arizona_financial_crimes_en_0.pdf</u> (last visited on February 12, 2024).

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 25 \\ 26 \end{array} \right|^{5} Id.$

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
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 $27 \int 6 Id.$

Simply put, the TRAC system allows law enforcement to circumvent 40. due process by collecting the Protected Personal Information of Plaintiffs and other innocent civilians to provide "visibility" into all monetary transactions worldwide:



41. In sum, TRAC, in association with Forcepoint, uses Protected Personal Information to create a database-to-software interface that operates much like a Google search: type in your relevant facts and return hits from consumers' Protected Personal Information at the click of a button-no need to bother with the "lengthy delays in the usual subpoena process."

3. **HSI Joins TRAC's Unlawful Data Dragnet Operation**

Once the Western Union Settlement ended in 2019, HSI began issuing 42. customs summons requesting Western Union transmit and disclose the Protected Personal Information data of its consumers directly to TRAC.

43. Based upon its litigation against the Arizona Attorney General, Western
 Union was well aware that these types of data dragnet surveillance sweeps were
 facially unlawful. The breadth of time range, number of data fields, and sheer
 number of impacted consumers lacks articulation and specificity on its face. Indeed,
 the Arizona Court of Appeals held as much.

44. Moreover, Western Union, as a sophisticated entity trading on the New
York Stock Exchange, knew or should have known the subpoenas from HSI were
patently violative of particularity requirements and unenforceable as a matter of law.

9 45. Nevertheless, Western Union voluntarily collected, compiled,
10 transmitted, and disclosed Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information directly to
11 TRAC and/or Forcepoint in response to HSI's facially invalid customs summonses.

46. From 2019 to January 2022, HSI received 6,211,000 records from
Western Union and Maxi, another money transfer company.

14 47. In early 2022 after Senator Ron Wyden brought to light HSI's improper
15 use of customs summonses, HSI promptly withdrew them.

48. On information and belief, from 2019 to 2022 Western Union disclosed
Protected Personal Information of its consumers to the Database Defendant, with
categories similar to those requested from the Arizona Attorney General, including,
but not limited to, the following information for each send and receive transaction
over \$500 to or from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and the country of
Mexico:

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a. (1) sender and receiver name, (2) sender and receiver address, (3) sender and receiver city, (4) sender and receiver state, (5) sender and receiver zip, (6) sender and receiver phone number, (7) sender and receiver date of birth, (8) sender and receiver occupation, (9) sender and receiver identification type, (10) sender and receiver identification type description, (11) sender and receiver identification issuer, (12)

sender and receiver identification number, (13) sender and receiver social security number;

For web based transfers: (1) Sender Internet Protocol Address b. used during web account creation, (2) Sender Internet Protocol Address used to send transaction, (3) send email address used to create web based account, (4) sender email address used to send transaction, (5) sender source account number, (6) sender name on web based account, (7) sender included reasons for transaction.

On information and belief, Western Union continues to improperly 49. disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to the Database Defendant.

Therefore, the Database Defendant continues to have access to 50. Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information, causing Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to be subject to disclosure to each and every law enforcement agency, or any other person or entity, with access to the TRAC/Forcepoint system.

In voluntarily transmitting, transferring, and disclosing Plaintiffs' 51. Protected Personal Information to the Database Defendant, Western Union failed to implement, uphold, or maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information.

At no point did Western Union disclose to Plaintiffs that it would 52. collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information based upon unlawful requests or facially invalid subpoenas or summonses. Nor did Plaintiffs consent to any such conduct.

At no point did Western Union disclose to Plaintiffs that it would 53. collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to a third party non-profit named TRAC or Forcepoint. Nor did Plaintiffs consent to any such conduct.

54. At no point did Western Union disclose to Plaintiffs that it had an
 ongoing relationship with TRAC or Forcepoint, nor did Plaintiffs acknowledge or
 consent to such relationship.

4 55. At no point did Western Union disclose to Plaintiffs that it would
5 collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to
6 undisclosed third parties or that the undisclosed third parties would permit an
7 additional subsequent disclosure to hundreds of law enforcement agencies without
8 any associated lawful request from such agencies. Nor did Plaintiffs consent to any
9 such conduct.

C. MoneyGram Joins TRAC's Unlawful Data Dragnet Operation

56. In 2019, while Western Union was turning over its own consumers Protected Personal Information to the Database Defendant in conjunction with HSI summonses, MoneyGram was regularly sent subpoenas from the Arizona Attorney General under Arizona Revised Statute § 13–2315 seeking a trove of data related to each money transfer. 57. An examplar MoneyGram subpoena demonstrates the breadth of the information sought:

STATE OF ARIZONA **OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL** 2005 North Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85004 (602) 542-8431 **REQUEST TO PRODUCE RECORDS** TO: MoneyGram Payment Systems Attn: Melissa Grant ref. Law Enforcement Subpoena Compliance 1550 Utica Avenue South, Ste. 100 Minneapolis, MN 55416-5312 YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-2315, to produce for examination and copying by the Attorney General of the State of Arizona the following described records: Data, including the data fields described on the attached Data Appendix, relating to each send and each receive transaction of \$500 and greater, sent to or from the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas and to or from the country of Mexico. on a bi-weekly schedule as each such period becomes available, beginning with July 1, 2021 and ending with June 30, 2022. (PLEASE INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL DATA FIELD FOR THE SUBPOENA IDENTIFICATION NUMBER. FOR THIS DATA FIELD PLEASE INCLUDE REFERENCE NUMBER: AZAG2021RTP2) The data is to be delivered electronically to the Arizona Attorney General's Office by delivery to its "SFTP" (Secure File Transfer Protocol) site in a delimited text files format. Please contact the Arizona Attorney General's Office through its investigator Chad Brink at chad.brink@azag.gov for any questions regarding production of this request and through its agent Mike Robinson at mike.robinson@forcepoint.com for the secure VPN address, and to define a new CSV standard if necessary, for the data delivery. Shawn Steinberg Assistant Attorney General Arizona Attorney General's Office 15 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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58. The Arizona Attorney General continued to send these administrative subpoenas to various money transfer entities from 2019 through at least 2022.

59. Notably, as shown above, these subpoenas from the Arizona Attorney General required MoneyGram to remit the requested Protected Personal Information directly to Forcepoint (TRAC's vendor), not the Arizona Attorney General.

6 60. From 2019 through 2022, MoneyGram received these subpoenas
7 requesting bulk transaction data for <u>all</u> transactions \$500 or greater that they serviced
8 between California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and the country of Mexico for 6–
9 12 month periods, to be renewed with forthcoming subpoenas.

61. The subpoenas sought the following information:

a. (1) sender and receiver name, (2) sender and receiver address, (3) sender and receiver city, (4) sender and receiver state, (5) sender and receiver zip, (6) sender and receiver phone number, (7) sender and receiver date of birth, (8) sender and receiver occupation, (9) sender and receiver identification type, (10) sender and receiver identification type description, (11) sender and receiver identification issuer, (12) sender and receiver identification number, (13) sender and receiver social security number;

b. For web based transfers: (1) Sender Internet Protocol Address used during web account creation, (2) Sender Internet Protocol Address used to send transaction, (3) send email address used to create web based account, (4) sender email address used to send transaction, (5) sender source account number, (6) sender name on web based account, (7) sender included reasons for transaction.

62. To be clear, the Protected Personal Information was not sent by
 MoneyGram to law enforcement. Instead, it was sent to Forcepoint, a vendor of
 TRAC.

63. Neither TRAC nor Forcepoint are government entities.

64. As a sophisticated entity, MoneyGram knew or should have known that
the Arizona Attorney General's subpoenas were patently and facially unenforceable
as demonstrated by the prior Arizona Court of Appeals opinion on virtually identical
facts.

9 65. Nevertheless, MoneyGram disclosed the requested Protected Personal
10 Information to the Database Defendant, from 2019 through at least 2022.

66. On information and belief, MoneyGram continues to disclose
Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to the Database Defendant. Accordingly,
the Database Defendant continues to have access to Plaintiffs' Protected Personal
Information.

67. Because the Database Defendant has access to Plaintiffs' Protected
Personal Information, Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information is subject to
subsequent disclosure to each and every law enforcement agency, or other person,
with access to the TRAC/Forcepoint system.

68. In voluntarily collecting, compiling, transmitting, and disclosing
Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information, MoneyGram failed to implement,
uphold, or maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information.

69. At no point did MoneyGram disclose to Plaintiffs that they would
collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information
based upon unlawful requests or facially invalid subpoenas or summonses. Nor did
Plaintiffs consent to any such conduct.

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70. At no point did MoneyGram disclose to Plaintiffs that they would
 collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to
 a third party non-profit named TRAC or Forcepoint. Nor did Plaintiffs consent to
 any such conduct.

71. At no point did MoneyGram disclose to Plaintiffs that they had an
ongoing relationship with TRAC or Forcepoint, nor did Plaintiffs acknowledge or
consent to such relationship.

8 72. At no point did MoneyGram disclose to Plaintiffs that they would 9 collect, compile, transmit, or disclose Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information to 10 undisclosed third parties or that the undisclosed third parties would permit an 11 additional subsequent disclosure to hundreds of law enforcement agencies without 12 any associated lawful request from such agencies. Nor did Plaintiffs consent to any 13 such conduct.

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IV. TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

76. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class had neither actual nor
constructive knowledge of the facts constituting their claim for relief. They did not
discover, nor could they have discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the existence of Money Transfer Defendants' and Database Defendant's
conduct until shortly before filing this Complaint.

The Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant failed to 20 77. reveal facts sufficient to put Plaintiffs and the other Class members on notice. Money 21 Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant did not and do not inform their 22 consumers that their consumers' Protected Personal Information would be sent to 23 TRAC or Forcepoint, nor that subsequent parties would have access to such 24 Protected Personal Information. Rather, Defendants give consumers false and 25 misleading impressions of security, safety, and privacy as mentioned in their 26 marketing. 27

78. At no point did Money Transfer Defendants or the Database Defendant
 disclose to Plaintiffs that each would collect, compile, transmit, or disclose
 Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information as alleged herein. Nor did Plaintiffs
 consent to any such conduct.

79. Moreover, an ordinary person acting reasonably diligent would not
have had the time, resources, or specialized training to uncover the misconduct that
Money Transfer Defendants or the Database Defendant engaged in here.

8 80. Indeed, Plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence to protect their
9 Protected Personal Information from interception, exfiltration, or disclosure. To be
10 sure, that is precisely why Plaintiffs used Money Transfer Defendants' services—
11 fast, safe, and (allegedly) secure means of transmitting money to consumers abroad.

81. Due to the Money Transfer Defendants' and the Database Defendant's
fraudulent concealment of their wrongful conduct, the running of the statute of
limitations has been tolled and suspended with respect to the claims and rights of
action of Plaintiffs and the other Class members as a result of such conduct.

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V. <u>FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFFS</u>

Plaintiff Jose Guzman ("Guzman") regularly used Western Union to 82. 17 send money from California to Mexico in 2020, including in excess of \$500. 18 Guzman was never informed his Protected Personal Information would be disclosed 19 upon an unlawful request nor that Guzman's Protected Personal Information would 20 be disclosed to an unidentified third party named TRAC or Forcepoint. Guzman was 21 never informed his Protected Personal Information would remain in a mass database 22 accessible by hundreds of government agencies or others. Guzman never consented 23 to any such disclosure of his Protected Personal Information. If Guzman had known 24 about this invasion of his privacy, he would not have paid Western Union to process 25 the transaction, and would instead have searched for alternative options for sending 26 his money. Guzman is disturbed that his Protected Personal Information, along with 27

information about friends abroad, was disclosed to the Database Defendant and
 ultimately hundreds of law enforcement agencies without his knowledge. Guzman
 seeks the full statutory and actual damages allowable under law.

Plaintiff Bertha Meza ("Meza") regularly used Western Union to send 4 83. money from California to Mexico in 2022, including in excess of \$500. Meza was 5 never informed her Protected Personal Information would be disclosed upon an 6 unlawful request nor that Meza's Protected Personal Information would be disclosed 7 to an unidentified third party named TRAC or Forcepoint. Meza was never informed 8 her Protected Personal Information would remain in a mass database accessible by 9 hundreds of government agencies or others. Meza never consented to any such 10 disclosure of her Protected Personal Information. If Meza had known about this 11 invasion of her privacy, she would not have paid Western Union to process the 12 transaction, and would instead have searched for alternative options for sending her 13 money. Meza is disturbed that her Protected Personal Information, was disclosed to 14 the Database Defendant and ultimately hundreds of law enforcement agencies 15 without her knowledge. Meza seeks the full statutory and actual damages allowable 16 under law. 17

84. Plaintiff Fortino Rutilo Jimenez ("Jimenez") regularly 18 used MoneyGram to send money from California to Mexico in 2022, including in excess 19 of \$500. Jimenez was never informed his Protected Personal Information would be 20 disclosed upon an unlawful request nor that Jimenez's Protected Personal 21 Information would be disclosed to an unidentified third party named TRAC or 22 Forcepoint. Jimenez was never informed his Protected Personal Information would 23 remain in a mass database accessible by hundreds of government agencies or others. 24 Jimenez never consented to any such disclosure of his Protected Personal 25 Information. If Jimenez had known about this invasion of his privacy, he would not 26 have paid MoneyGram to process the transaction, and would instead have searched 27

for alternative options for sending his money. Jimenez is disturbed that his Protected
 Personal Information was disclosed to the Database Defendant and ultimately,
 hundreds of law enforcement agencies without his knowledge. Jimenez seeks the
 full statutory and actual damages allowable under law.

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VI. <u>CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS</u>

85. **Class and Subclass Definitions:** Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and a Class and Subclass of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows:

All California residents who used the services of any Money Transfer Defendant or Money Transfer Defendants' subsidiaries or affiliates and such residents' Protected Personal Information was sent to TRAC and/or Forcepoint ("the Class").

All California residents whose Protected Personal Information was sent to TRAC and/or Forcepoint and subsequently disclosed or accessed. ("Database Defendant subclass").

The following people are also excluded from the Class and Subclass: (1) any Judge 14 or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Money 15 Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant, as well as Money Transfer 16 Defendants' and Database Defendant's subsidiaries, parents, successors, 17 predecessors, and any entity in which the Money Transfer Defendants or Database 18 Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest, and their current or former 19 officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for 2021 exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiffs' counsel and 22 Defendants' counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any 23 such excluded persons. 24

86. Numerosity: On information and belief, the proposed Class includes
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. Members of the Class can be
identified through Money Transfer Defendants' and Database Defendant's records.

87. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law
 and fact common to Plaintiffs' and each Class members' claims, and those questions
 predominate over any questions that may affect individual class members. Common
 questions include but are not limited to the following:

- a. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are "consumers" under the California Consumer Privacy Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq.;
- b. Whether Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant are "businesses" under the California Consumer Privacy Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq.;
- c. Whether the Money Transfer Defendants and Database
 Defendant violated § 1798.150 of the California Consumer
 Privacy Rights Act;
- d. Whether the Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant violated Plaintiffs' and Class members' privacy rights in violation of the California Constitution;
- e. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to injunctive relief, statutory damages, actual damages, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees from Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant;
 - f. Whether Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future; and
 - g. The extent and form of any preliminary or equitable relief that the Court determines appropriate.

88. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of other
members of the Class and Subclass in that Plaintiffs and the members of the Class

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and Subclass were harmed, continue to be harmed, and Money Transfer Defendants'
 and the Database Defendant's conduct gave rise to the claims of Plaintiffs, the Class,
 and the Subclass.

89. Adequate Representation: Consistent with Rule 23(a)(4), Plaintiffs 4 are adequate representatives of the Class because Plaintiffs are members of the Class 5 and committed to pursuing this matter against Money Transfer Defendants and the 6 Database Defendant to obtain relief for the Class. Plaintiffs have no conflicts of 7 interest with the Class. Plaintiffs' counsel are competent and experienced in 8 litigating class actions, including extensive experience in litigating consumer claims. 9 Plaintiffs intend to vigorously prosecute this case and will fairly and adequately 10 protect the interests of the Class. 11

Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is 12 90. appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted on grounds generally 13 applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of 14 uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the 15 Class and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a 16 whole. The policies that Plaintiffs challenge apply to and affect members of the Class 17 uniformly, and Plaintiffs' challenge of these policies hinges on Money Transfer 18 Defendants' and the Database Defendant's conduct with respect to the Class and 19 Subclass as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiffs. The factual and 20 legal bases of Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant liability to 21 Plaintiffs and to the other members of the Class and Subclass are the same. 22

91. Predominance and Superiority: Consistent with Rule 23(b)(3) the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, a class action is superior to any other available
means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual
difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The

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purpose of the class action mechanism is to permit litigation against wrongdoers 1 even when damages to individual plaintiffs and class members may not be sufficient 2 to justify individual litigation. Here, the damages suffered by Plaintiffs, the Class, 3 and Subclass members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense 4 required to individually litigate their claims against Money Transfer Defendants and 5 the Database Defendant, and thus, individual litigation to redress Money Transfer 6 and the Database Defendant's wrongful conduct would be Defendants' 7 impracticable. Individual litigation by each Class member and Subclass member 8 would also strain the court system. Moreover, individual litigation creates the 9 potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and 10 expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device 11 presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single 12 adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 13

14 92. Injunctive and/or Declaratory Relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
15 Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant through their uniform
16 conduct, acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a
17 whole, making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate.

93. Plaintiffs anticipate the issuance of notice, setting forth the subject and
nature of the instant action, to the proposed Class members. Upon information and
belief, Defendants' own business records, other available records, and/or electronic
media can be utilized for the contemplated notices. To the extent that any further
notices may be required, Plaintiffs anticipate the use of additional media and/or
mailings.

24 94. Plaintiffs reserve the right to revise each of the foregoing allegations
25 based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery.

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VII. <u>CAUSES OF ACTION</u>

COUNT 1

Violation of the California Consumer Privacy Rights Act § 1798.150 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiffs, the Class, and Subclass against All Defendants)

95. Plaintiffs and Class members incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

96. Plaintiffs bring this count on behalf of themselves and the Class.

8 97. The California Consumer Privacy Rights Act, § 1798.100, et seq.
9 ("CCPA") is a comprehensive statutory scheme that is to be liberally construed to
10 empower and entitle Californians to know what personal information is collected
11 about them and whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom.

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98. Plaintiffs are "consumers" as defined by the CCPA.

13 99. The Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant are
14 "businesses" as defined by the CCPA and therefore subject to liability thereunder.

15 100. The Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant
16 compiled, held, and stored Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information as defined in
17 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A), including but not limited to Plaintiffs' first and
18 last names, government identification, account numbers, and/or credit or debit card
19 numbers.

101. Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information was voluntarily collected,
stored, transmitted, and/or disclosed by Money Transfer Defendants and the
Database Defendant in a nonencrypted and nonredacted form, or in some other form
that permitted unauthorized individuals to access that information in violation of the
CCPA.

102. Through this voluntary disclosure, Money Transfer Defendants and the
Database Defendant breached their duty to implement, uphold, or maintain

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reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of Plaintiffs' 1 Protected Personal Information. 2

103. As a direct and proximate result of Money Transfer Defendants' and 3 the Database Defendant's failure to implement, uphold, or maintain reasonable 4 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of Plaintiffs' Protected 5 Personal Information, Plaintiffs suffered unauthorized access, exfiltration, and 6 disclosure of Plaintiffs' Protected Personal Information.

104. As a direct and proximate result of Money Transfer Defendants' and the Database Defendant's unauthorized disclosure of Protected Personal Information, Plaintiffs were injured and suffered violation of statutory privacy interests.

105. In accordance with Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(b), prior to initiating this suit, Plaintiffs' counsel served Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant with proper notice of these CCPA violation via Federal Express.

106. Plaintiffs seek actual damages, statutory damages, costs, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.

COUNT 2

Invasion of Privacy Under California Constitution Art. 1, § 1 (On behalf of Plaintiffs, the Class, and Subclass against All Defendants)

107. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

108. Plaintiffs bring this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Class and Subclass against the Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant.

109. Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Protected Personal Information that Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant disclosed without authorization.

1 110. Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members have a strong interest
 in: (1) precluding the dissemination or misuse of their sensitive Protected Personal
 Information and related data; and (2) making personal decisions regarding the use
 of their Protected Personal Information and related data, including the right to know
 how such data may be used and to whom such data may be sent.

111. Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant wrongfully intruded upon Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' seclusion in violation of California law. Plaintiffs' and Class members reasonably expected that the Protected Personal Information and related data that they entrusted to Money Transfer Defendants would be kept private and secure and would not be disclosed to any unauthorized third party or for any improper purpose.

112. Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant intentionally
invaded Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' privacy rights under
the California Constitution by:

- a. obtaining, storing, remitting, and disclosing remitting Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' Protected Personal Information and related data to TRAC and Forcepoint, both unauthorized, undisclosed third parties;
 - b. obtaining, storing, remitting, and disclosing Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' Protected Personal Information and related data to unauthorized, undisclosed third parties, to wit: law enforcement;
 - c. enabling the disclosure of Protected Personal Information and related data about Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person; and

d. enabling the disclosure of Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' Protected Personal Information and related data without their informed, voluntary, affirmative, and clear consent.

113. A reasonable person would find it highly offensive that Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant intentionally remitted Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' Protected Personal Information and related data to TRAC, Forcepoint, or any unauthorized third party without notice or consent to do so.

114. Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members did not consent to any of Money Transfer Defendants' and the Database Defendant's alleged misconduct, including any transfer or remittance of Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' Protected Personal Information to TRAC or Forcepoint, unauthorized and undisclosed third parties, or to any party thereafter following Money Transfer Defendants' improper disclosures to TRAC and/or Forcepoint.

115. Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant acted knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that a reasonable person in Plaintiffs', Class members', and Subclass members' position would consider all Defendants' actions highly offensive.

116. Money Transfer Defendants and the Database Defendant were aware that they were disclosing, transferring, or remitting Protected Personal Information to unauthorized, undisclosed third parties and that doing so was not in response to a lawful legal request.

117. Money Transfer Defendants' and the Database Defendant's unlawful invasions of privacy damaged Plaintiffs and Class members. As a direct and proximate result of these invasions, Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members suffered mental distress, and their reasonable expectations of privacy were frustrated and defeated.

118. This invasion of privacy is serious in nature, scope, and impact.

119. This invasion of privacy constitutes an egregious breach of social
norms underlying the right to privacy.

120. Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members therefore seek all relief available for such invasion of privacy in violation of Article 1, § 1 of California's Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs Jose Guzman, Fortino Rutilo Jimenez, and Bertha Meza, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court enter an Order:

a) Certifying the Class under Rule 23 and naming the aforementioned Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class and respective Subclasses and Plaintiffs' attorneys as Class Counsel;

b) Declaring that Money Transfer Defendants' and Database Defendant's conduct violates the laws and standards referenced above;

c) Finding in favor of Plaintiffs, the Class, and Subclass on all counts asserted herein;

d) Enjoining Money Transfer Defendants and Database Defendant from continuing to provide access to or copies of Plaintiffs', Class members', or Subclass members Protected Personal Information, or otherwise not complying with the CCPA.

e) Awarding Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members statutory damages for each violation of the CCPA;

f) Awarding Plaintiffs, Class members, and Subclass members actual damages for each violation of the CCPA;

g) Awarding Plaintiffs, the Class, and the Subclass their reasonable

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1	attorney's fees, expenses, a	nd cost of suit;			
2	h) Awarding pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable;				
3	i) Requiring further injunctive and/or declaratory relief as necessary to				
4	protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class; and				
5	j) Awarding such other and further relief as equity and justice require.				
6	JURY DEMAND				
7	Plaintiffs request a trial by jury of all claims that can be so tried.				
8	Dated: February 21, 2024	Respectfully submitted,			
9 10		By: /s/ Taras Kick			
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This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Western Union, MoneyGram Lawsuit Says</u> <u>Cos. Shared Money Transfer Data with Law Enforcement Group</u>