

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SHMUEL GLICK on behalf of himself and  
all other similarly situated consumers

Plaintiff,

-against-

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC,  
AND ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

Defendants.

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## **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

### **INTRODUCTION**

1. Plaintiff, Shmuel Glick, brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, by way of this Class Action Complaint for the illegal practices of Defendant, Midland Credit Management, Inc., Midland Funding, LLC, and Encore Capital Group, Inc. who, inter alia, used false, deceptive, and misleading practices, and other illegal practices, in connection with its attempts to collect an alleged debt from the Plaintiff and others.
2. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' collection practices violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"). Such collection practices include, inter alia:
  - (a) Leaving messages for consumers, which fail to provide meaningful disclosure of Defendants' identity;

- (b) Leaving messages for consumers, which fail to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and
  - (c) Leaving messages for consumers, which fail to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication (i.e. an attempt to collect a debt).
- 3. The FDCPA regulates the behavior of collection agencies attempting to collect a debt on behalf of another. The United States Congress has found abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors, and has determined that abusive debt collection practices contribute to a number of personal bankruptcies, marital instability, loss of jobs, and invasions of individual privacy. Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote uniform State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) - (e).
- 4. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, which provides for actual or statutory damages upon the showing of one violation. The Second Circuit has held that whether a debt collector's conduct violates the FDCPA should be judged from the standpoint of the "least sophisticated consumer."<sup>1</sup>
- 5. To prohibit harassment and abuses by debt collectors, the FDCPA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, provides that a debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt and names a non-exhaustive list of certain per se violations of harassing and abusive collection conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1)-(6). Among the per se violations prohibited by

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<sup>1</sup> Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).

that section are the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6).

6. To prohibit deceptive practices, the FDCPA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, outlaws the use of false, deceptive, and misleading collection practices and names a non-exhaustive list of certain per se violations of false and deceptive collection conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)-(16). Among the per se violations prohibited by that section are: using any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10); the failure by debt collectors to disclose in initial oral communications that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11); and the failure by debt collectors to disclose in subsequent oral communications that the communication is from a debt collector, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).<sup>2</sup>

### **PARTIES**

7. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of New York who resides within this District.
8. Plaintiff is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3) of the FDCPA.
9. The alleged debt that Defendants sought to collect from the Plaintiff involves a consumer debt.
10. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendants' principal place of business was located within San Diego, California.
11. Defendants are regularly engaged upon, for profit, in the collection of allegedly owed consumer debts.

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<sup>2</sup> *Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs.*, 163 F.3d 111, 119, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30906 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1998) (The FDCPA defines "communication" very broadly as "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.")

12. Defendants are a “debt collector” as specifically defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).

### **JURISDICTION & VENUE**

13. Jurisdiction of this Court arises under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
14. Venue is appropriate in this federal district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims of Plaintiff occurred within this federal judicial district.

### **FACTS PARTICULAR TO SHMUEL GLICK**

15. Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendants, Defendants began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff.
16. Within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, the Defendants attempted to contact the Plaintiff on multiple occasions via telephone and left numerous messages in an attempt to collect the alleged obligation.
17. The following is an example of one such message that Plaintiff received on or about May 24, 2016:  
  
Name is Ellen Chase; calling from MCM; callback number is 18002658825, Ext. 58670.
18. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, he did not know the identity of the callers.
19. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, he did not know that the call concerned the collection of a debt.
20. Each of the messages is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).<sup>3</sup>
21. Each of the above messages uniformly failed to identify the callers as debt collectors

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<sup>3</sup> See, Dauval v. MRS BPO, L.L.C., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189109, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 47 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2013); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F.Supp.2d 643, 655–56 (S.D.N.Y.2006). (holding that a message with enough information to entice a return call being left with a third party or on a voice mail is a “communication” under the FDCPA).

- attempting to collect a debt.
22. The messages left by Defendants were deceptive and harassing per se in that they secreted the identity of the Defendants in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6).
  23. Upon information and belief, it is the regular practice of the Defendants to leave messages to be conveyed to 'consumers' which do not meaningfully identify themselves, and/or do not identify themselves as a debt collector.
  24. The only way for Plaintiff and/or any least sophisticated consumer to obtain the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages, was to place a return call to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with a debt collector employed by Defendants, and to provide the debt collector with personal information.
  25. The Defendants intended that the messages have the effect of causing Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, to place return calls to the telephone number provided in the messages and to speak with their debt collectors, and then provide those debt collectors with their personal information, as the sole means of obtaining the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages.
  26. Scores of federal court decisions – including the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and all the District Courts that have considered the issue within the State of New York – (17 decisions to date) uniformly hold that the FDCPA requires debt collectors to provide meaningful identification of itself in messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the name of the debt collection company and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See, Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., (2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006).) (The court followed *Foti*, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 655-56 and *West v. Nationwide Credit*, 998 F. Supp. 642, 644 (W.D.N.C. 1998) in finding that a phone call to a debtor's neighbor

27. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were aware of the substantial weight of legal authority requiring it to provide meaningful identification of itself in messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.<sup>5</sup>
28. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants willfully, deliberately, and intentionally chose not to provide meaningful identification of itself in the messages they left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.
29. The Defendants' act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff is conduct the natural consequences of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA.
30. The Defendants' act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff constitutes the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA.
31. The FDCPA secures a consumer's right to have a debt collector cease further communications with the consumer. By failing to meaningfully identify itself, disclose

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that the defendant had a "very important" matter to address was "regarding a debt" because the content of the phone call was "with respect to" the Defendant's efforts to collect on plaintiff's alleged arrearage and since a phone message that "advised the debtor that the matter required immediate attention, and provided a specific number to call to discuss the matter" was a communication under the FDCPA "given that the obvious purpose of the message was to provide the debtor with enough information to entice a return call. The court noted "Were this Court to determine that [the debt collectors] Messages did not constitute communications "regarding [Plaintiff's] debt", the Court would be creating an exception to swallow the rule. Under such an exception, debt collectors would be able to abuse and harass consumers with phone calls and other forms of correspondence so long as there is no express mention of the consumers' debts. The court also found: **"A message left by a debt collector which does not state that it pertains to a financial matter could reasonably pertain to a host of issues - including family or medical matters - which may be viewed by a consumer as much more pressing, than a debt owed. The apparent purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent."** (emphasis added)

<sup>5</sup> See. *Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs.*, 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006). ("[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing debtors, it is logical for debt collectors repeat players likely to be acquainted with the legal standards governing their industry to bear the brunt of the risk."); *Russell v. Equifax A.R.S.*, 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As the Supreme Court has held in the general context of consumer protection—of which the [FDCPA] is a part—it does not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.") (quoting *FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 380 U.S. 374, 393, 85 S. Ct. 1035, 13 L. Ed. 2d 904 (1965)).

the purpose of its call and state that Defendants are a debt collector in a manner understandable to the least sophisticated consumer, the Defendants has engaged in conduct designed to deprive consumers of their right to have a debt collector cease further communications.

32. It is Defendants' policy and practice to leave messages for consumers with third parties, such as the above said messages, that violate the FDCPA by, inter alia:
  - (a) Failing to provide meaningful disclosure of Defendants' identity;
  - (b) Failing to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and
  - (c) Failing to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication, i.e. an attempt to collect a debt.
33. Upon information and belief, such messages, as alleged in this complaint, number at least in the hundreds.
34. Upon information and belief, the purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. A message left by a debt collector which does not state that it pertains to collection of a debt could reasonably pertain to a host of issues - including family or medical matters – which may be viewed by a consumer as much more pressing, than a debt owed. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent.
35. A message leaving any information concerning a debt is a "communication." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). "Any information" is construed broadly in favor of consumers and includes a

callback number or a reference number.<sup>6</sup>

36. It is a communication whether it is from a conversation directly between a consumer and a debt collector or indirectly, such as by a message left on a telephone answering device, or with a third party.<sup>7</sup>
37. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), namely, by failing to advise Plaintiff that the communication was from a debt collector or that the Defendants were attempting to collect a debt.<sup>8</sup>
38. Defendants have engaged in a pattern of leaving messages without disclosing that the communication is from a debt collector.
39. The said telephone messages are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10) and 1692e(11) for failing to indicate that the messages were from a debt collector which constitutes a deceptive practice.
40. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact by being subjected to unfair and abusive practices of the Defendants.
41. Plaintiff suffered actual harm by being the target of the Defendants' misleading debt collection communications.
42. Defendants violated the Plaintiff's right not to be the target of misleading debt collection communications.
43. Defendants violated the Plaintiff's right to a truthful and fair debt collection process.

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<sup>6</sup> Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2008). aff'd by Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22500, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 179 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009). Stinson v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42266, \*7 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642, 643 (W.D. N.C. 1998); Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). (infra); Wideman v. Monterey Fin. Srvs., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38824 (W.D.Pa May 7, 2009); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47953, 2006 WL 1992410, 5 (M.D.Fla., 2006).

<sup>8</sup> See Sclafani v. BC Servs., Inc., No. 10-61360-CIV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115330, 2010 WL 4116471, at \*3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010.) ("If [the defendant] could not leave voice messages that simultaneously complied with the multiple applicable provisions of FDCPA, it should not have left the offending voice messages.")



44. Defendants used materially false, deceptive, misleading representations and means in their attempted collection of Plaintiff's alleged debt.
45. Defendants' communications were designed to cause the debtor to suffer a harmful disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to Defendants' collection efforts.
46. The FDCPA ensures that consumers are fully and truthfully apprised of the facts and of their rights, the act enables them to understand, make informed decisions about, and participate fully and meaningfully in the debt collection process. The purpose of the FDCPA is to provide information that helps consumers to choose intelligently. The Defendants' false representations misled the Plaintiff in a manner that deprived him of his right to enjoy these benefits, these materially misleading statements trigger liability under section 1692e of the Act.
47. These deceptive communications additionally violated the FDCPA since they frustrate the consumer's ability to intelligently choose his or her response.
48. Plaintiff seeks to end these violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff has suffered damages including but not limited to, fear, stress, mental anguish, emotional stress and acute embarrassment. Plaintiff and putative class members are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, declaratory relief, and damages.

#### **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

49. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
50. With respect to the Plaintiff's Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of: (a) all persons in the State of New York; (b) for whom Defendants left a message, (c) that did

not identify that the call was for collection purposes; (d) made in connection with Defendants' attempt to collect a debt; (e) which the said messages violate the FDCPA; (f) during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this initial action and ending 21 days after the service of the initial complaint filed in this action.

51. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts.
52. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Defendants, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families.
53. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendants' messages, such as the above said messages, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11).
54. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories.
55. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.

56. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation:

- (a) **Numerosity:** The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical.
- (b) **Common Questions Predominate:** Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The single issue of whether class members received phone messages that lacked information required by the FDCPA is common to the class members and predominates over any individual issue. The exact script of the messages need not be common to the class members, since it is the lack of information that is relevant.<sup>9</sup> The principal issues are whether the Defendants' messages, such as the above said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11).
- (c) **Typicality:** The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.
- (d) **Adequacy:** The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating

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<sup>9</sup> See. Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 5479111, at \*7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2008).

this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.

- (e) **Superiority:** A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America.
57. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and/or 1692e(11) is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination.
58. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a

class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

59. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

### **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

#### **Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendants.**

60. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through fifty nine (59) herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.
61. Defendants violated the FDCPA. Defendants' violations with respect to the above said messages include, but are not limited to, the following:
- (a) Engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d;
  - (b) Placing telephone calls without providing meaningful disclosure of Defendants' identity as the caller, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6);
  - (c) Leaving messages which fail to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication (i.e., an attempt to collect a debt), in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6);
  - (d) Using a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10);

- (e) Failing to disclose in its initial communication with the consumer, when that communication is oral, that Defendants are attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11); and
- (f) Failing to disclose in all oral communications that Defendants are debt collectors, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, respectfully requests that this Court enter a judgment in Plaintiff's favor as against the Defendants and award damages as follows:

- (a) Statutory and actual damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k);
- (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and
- (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York  
May 22, 2017

/s/ Maxim Maximov  
Maxim Maximov, Esq.  
Attorneys for the Plaintiff  
Maxim Maximov, LLP  
1701 Avenue P  
Brooklyn, New York 11229  
Office: (718) 395-3459  
Facsimile: (718) 408-9570  
E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com

Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable.

/s/ Maxim Maximov  
Maxim Maximov, Esq.

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

SHMUEL GLICK

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff KINGS (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) MAXIM MAXIMOV, LLP OFFICE: (718) 395-3459 1701 AVENUE P FAX: (718) 408-9570 BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11229 E-MAIL: M@MAXIMOV.LAW.COM

DEFENDANTS

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, & ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC. County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff, 2 U.S. Government Defendant, 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party), 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

Table with columns for Plaintiff (PTF) and Defendant (DEF) citizenship: Citizen of This State, Citizen of Another State, Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country, Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State, Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State, Foreign Nation.

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Large table with categories: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, TORTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding, 2 Removed from State Court, 3 Remanded from Appellate Court, 4 Reinstated or Reopened, 5 Transferred from Another District, 6 Multidistrict Litigation

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 15 U.S.C. SECTION 1692 -- FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) Brief description of cause: UNLAWFUL AND DECEITFUL DEBT COLLECTION BUSINESS PRACTICES

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE 05/22/2017 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /S/ MAXIM MAXIMOV, ESQ.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

Local Arbitration Rule 83.10 provides that with certain exceptions, actions seeking money damages only in an amount not in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs, are eligible for compulsory arbitration. The amount of damages is presumed to be below the threshold amount unless a certification to the contrary is filed.

I, N/A, counsel for \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby certify that the above captioned civil action is ineligible for compulsory arbitration for the following reason(s):

- monetary damages sought are in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
- the complaint seeks injunctive relief,
- the matter is otherwise ineligible for the following reason

**DISCLOSURE STATEMENT - FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE 7.1**

Identify any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stocks:

N/A

**RELATED CASE STATEMENT (Section VIII on the Front of this Form)**

Please list all cases that are arguably related pursuant to Division of Business Rule 50.3.1 in Section VIII on the front of this form. Rule 50.3.1 (a) provides that "A civil case is "related" to another civil case for purposes of this guideline when, because of the similarity of facts and legal issues or because the cases arise from the same transactions or events, a substantial saving of judicial resources is likely to result from assigning both cases to the same judge and magistrate judge." Rule 50.3.1 (b) provides that " A civil case shall not be deemed "related" to another civil case merely because the civil case: (A) involves identical legal issues, or (B) involves the same parties." Rule 50.3.1 (c) further provides that "Presumptively, and subject to the power of a judge to determine otherwise pursuant to paragraph (d), civil cases shall not be deemed to be "related" unless both cases are still pending before the court."

**NY-E DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 50.1(d)(2)**

- 1.) Is the civil action being filed in the Eastern District removed from a New York State Court located in Nassau or Suffolk County? NO
- 2.) If you answered "no" above:
  - a) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in Nassau or Suffolk County? NO
  - b) Did the events of omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in the Eastern District? YES

If your answer to question 2 (b) is "No," does the defendant (or a majority of the defendants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County, or, in an interpleader action, does the claimant (or a majority of the claimants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County? \_\_\_\_\_

(Note: A corporation shall be considered a resident of the County in which it has the most significant contacts).

**BAR ADMISSION**

I am currently admitted in the Eastern District of New York and currently a member in good standing of the bar of this court.

Yes  No

Are you currently the subject of any disciplinary action (s) in this or any other state or federal court?

Yes (If yes, please explain)  No

I certify the accuracy of all information provided above.

Signature: /S/ MAXIM MAXIMOV, ESQ.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SHMUEL GLICK on behalf of himself and  
all other similarly situated consumers

Plaintiff,

-against-

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC,  
AND ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

Defendants.

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**SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION**

TO: MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.      MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC  
2365 NORTHSIDE DRIVE, #300                      2365 NORTHSIDE DRIVE, #300  
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92108                      SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92108

ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.  
2365 NORTHSIDE DRIVE, #300  
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92108

**YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED** and required to file with the Clerk of this Court  
and serve upon PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:

MAXIM MAXIMOV, ESQ.  
MAXIM MAXIMOV, LLP  
1701 AVENUE P  
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11229

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, with **21** days after service of this  
summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will  
be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

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CLERK

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DATE

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BY DEPUTY CLERK