

LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON

RONALD A. MARRON (SBN 175650)

ron@consumersadvocates.com

ALEXIS WOOD (SBN 270200)

alexis@consumersadvocates.com

KAS L. GALLUCCI (SBN 288709)

kas@consumersadvocates.com

651 Arroyo Drive

San Diego, CA 92103

Telephone: (619) 696-9006

Facsimile: (619) 564-6665

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through
Guardian ad Litem, LATASHA POPE,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RADY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL-SAN
DIEGO, a California Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: '21CV0114 JM RBB

CLASS ACTION

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATIONS OF:**

1. California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56 *et seq.*
2. California Consumer Records Act
3. Negligence
4. Invasion of Privacy
5. Breach of Implied Contract

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”), a minor, by and through Guardian ad Litem,
2 Latasha Pope, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and
3 through undersigned counsel, hereby brings this Class Action against Rady
4 Children’s Hospital-San Diego (“Defendant”) to, without limitation, obtain actual and
5 exemplary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, and obtain a declaration that
6 Defendant’s actions were unlawful as further set forth below. Plaintiff alleges the
7 following based upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and on
8 information and belief as to all other matters, including, *inter alia*, any investigation
9 conducted by and through his attorney.

10 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

11 1. Defendant Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego is a regionally based
12 hospital dedicated exclusively to pediatric health care. It is the largest children’s
13 hospital in California (based on admissions).

14 2. In or around the end of October 2020, Defendant announced a second
15 data breach within this year involving the private medical information of
16 approximately 19,788 of its patients disclosed to and viewed by an unauthorized
17 party between February 7, 2020 and June 4, 2020. The medical information included
18 highly valuable and protected information including patient names, addresses, dates
19 of birth, the names of patients’ physicians, and the department the patients were
20 admitted to (Private Information).

21 3. Blackbaud, Inc., the company that provides the hospital fundraising and
22 donor management software, allegedly notified Defendant of the breach at the end of
23 2020 despite announcing in May of 2020 that it had been the victim of a ransomware
24 attack and data breach, exposing the private information and even private health
25 information of its clients’ students, patients, and donors.

26 4. Upon information and belief, once Blackbaud was aware of the
27 cybercriminals, the company’s IT experts expelled the hackers from the system, but
28

1 only after the hackers were able to remove a copy of a subset of Blackbaud’s data.
2 Blackbaud was then asked for compensation with the threat of releasing the data.

3 5. Plaintiff John Doe, through his Guardian ad Litem, Latasha Pope learned
4 that his medical information was involved in the data breach after Ms. Pope received
5 a notification letter from Defendant.

6 6. Plaintiff and the other Class Members’ Private Information is now at risk
7 because of Defendant’s negligent conduct and unfair acts and practices. The Private
8 Information that Defendant collected and maintained has been placed in the hands of
9 criminal hackers. Defendant cannot reasonably maintain that the hackers destroyed
10 the Private Information.

11 7. As a provider of health care, Defendant is subject to the requirements for
12 preserving the confidentiality of medical information set forth under California’s
13 Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56 *et seq.*

14 8. Defendant has a duty to reasonably protect the confidentiality of the
15 medical information that it maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or
16 disposes of, and failure to comply with this duty exposes Defendant to liability for
17 nominal and/or actual damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36.

18 9. Defendant failed to uphold its duty under the CMIA when it allowed an
19 unauthorized party to obtain the medical information of its patients.

20 10. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this class action individually and on behalf
21 of all others similarly situated and asserts the following causes of action: violations of
22 the CMIA, California Consumer Records Act, negligence, invasion of privacy, and
23 breach of implied contract.

24 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

25 11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
26 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because at least one member of the Class, as defined below is a
27 citizen of a different state than Defendant, there are more than 100 members of the
28

1 Class, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000 exclusive of
2 interest and costs.

3 12. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant’s
4 negligent acts or omissions and violations of consumer protection statutes regarding
5 the security of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information alleged herein
6 caused injury to Plaintiff who is located in the Southern District of California.

7 13. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)
8 because the injury in this case substantially occurred in this District.

9 **PARTIES**

10 14. Plaintiff John Doe, a minor by and through Guardian Ad Litem, Latasha
11 Pope, is a resident of San Diego County, California.

12 15. Defendant Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego, is a California non-
13 profit corporation registered under entity number C0250564. Defendant’s principal
14 place of business is located at 3020 Children’s Way, San Diego, California 92123.

15 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

16 **Defendant’s Obligations under the CMIA and Applicable Federal Law**

17 16. Defendant is a regionalized pediatric center providing health care
18 services within the County of San Diego.

19 17. Defendant is a provider of health care as defined under the California
20 Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”). Cal. Civ. Code § 56.05(m).

21 18. As a provider of health care, Defendant must not disclose a patient’s
22 medical information without first obtaining an authorization. Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10.

23 19. Further, every provider of health care who creates, maintains, preserves,
24 stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information has a duty to preserve
25 the confidentiality of the information contained therein. Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a).

26 20. “Any provider of health care . . . who negligently creates, maintains,
27 preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be
28

1 subject to the remedies and penalties provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of
2 Section 56.36.” Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a).

3 21. Defendant creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or
4 disposes medical information. *See Exhibit 1.*

5 22. Defendant is thus required by the CMIA to take appropriate preventative
6 actions to protect its patients’ medical information against release consistent with
7 Defendant’s obligations under Civil Code § 56.36(e)(2)(E) and the Health Insurance
8 Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-191) (HIPAA) and all
9 HIPAA Administrative Simplification Regulations in effect on January 1, 2012,
10 contained in Parts 160, 162, and 164 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
11 and Part 2 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including, but not limited
12 to, all of the following:

- 13 i. Developing and implementing security policies and procedures.
14 ii. Designating a security official who is responsible for developing
15 and implementing its security policies and procedures, including
16 educating and training the workforce.
17 iii. Encrypting the information or records and protecting against the
18 release or use of the encryption key and passwords, or transmitting
19 the information or records in a manner designed to provide equal
20 or greater protections against improper disclosures.

21 **The Data Breach**

22 23. On October 29, 2020, Defendant issued a press release on its website
23 stating that it “recently learned that one of its third-party service providers,
24 Blackbaud,” had experienced a data breach involving “information about members of
25 the Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego community” (hereinafter referred to as the
26 “Data Breach”). *See Exhibit 2.*

1 24. The press release went on to state that between February 7, 2020 and
2 June 4, 2020, “an unauthorized party had access to backup files for the Blackbaud
3 fundraising software.” *See id.*

4 25. Blackbaud supplies fundraising and donor management software to the
5 Defendant.

6 26. Defendant uses and shares certain information from its patients to
7 contact said patients or the parents/guardians of its patients in connection with
8 Defendant’s fundraising activities. This information includes patients’ names,
9 address, age, gender, date of birth, telephone number, and other contact information
10 (such as email address), dates of when patients received care at Rady Children’s, the
11 name of their treating physician, their general department of service, and health
12 insurance status. *See Exhibit 1.*

13 27. The information Defendant uses and shares in connection with its
14 fundraising activities is protected medical information as defined under Cal. Civ.
15 Code § 56.05(j).

16 28. Defendant claimed it determined the Personal Information for members
17 of its community was contained in the backup files on October 7, 2020. The personal
18 information involved names, addresses, physician, date of admission, department of
19 service, and date of birth. *See Exhibit 2.*

20 29. Due to the breach, Plaintiff and Class Members’ Private Information was
21 viewed by the unauthorized hacker.

22 30. The Personal Information involved in the Data Breach is protected
23 medical information as defined under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.05(j).

24 31. Defendant further stated in its press release that “Blackbaud has
25 represented that they are monitoring the dark web for any exchange of personal
26 information related to this incident.” *See Exhibit 2.*

27 32. However, the press release fails to mention that the attack on
28 Blackbaud’s security system involved the donor information from hundreds of

1 nonprofits and institutions. See Doug Kreitzberg, *Blackbaud Breach Leaves*
2 *Hundreds of Non-Profits Scrambling*, Designed Privacy, July 31, 2020,
3 [https://designedprivacy.com/blackbaud-](https://designedprivacy.com/blackbaud-breach/#:~:text=The%20Blackbaud%20breach%20is%20just%20the%20latest%20reminder,hackers%20stole%20a%20copy%20of%20a%20data%20set)
4 [breach/#:~:text=The%20Blackbaud%20breach%20is%20just%20the%20latest%20re-](https://designedprivacy.com/blackbaud-breach/#:~:text=The%20Blackbaud%20breach%20is%20just%20the%20latest%20reminder,hackers%20stole%20a%20copy%20of%20a%20data%20set)
5 [minder,hackers%20stole%20a%20copy%20of%20a%20data%20set](https://designedprivacy.com/blackbaud-breach/#:~:text=The%20Blackbaud%20breach%20is%20just%20the%20latest%20reminder,hackers%20stole%20a%20copy%20of%20a%20data%20set) (last visited
6 November 25, 2020).

7 33. On information and belief, Blackbaud has not provided verification or
8 further details regarding the disposition of the data to confirm that the stolen data has
9 been destroyed. Nor does Defendant or Blackbaud know whether the hackers
10 maintained the data in a sufficiently secure manner to prevent others from acquiring
11 the Private Information.

12 34. On information and belief, Plaintiff's and the other Class Members'
13 Private Information was copied multiple times by unauthorized users, not destroyed,
14 and the data has been or may be sold and misused at a later date.

15 35. On October 29, 2020, Defendant reported the Data Breach to the
16 California State Attorney General. Defendant additionally submitted a breach
17 notification sample of a letter entitled "Notice of Data Security Incident" wherein it
18 outlines the information set forth in its press release in addition to offering
19 complimentary identity monitoring services for an unspecified amount of time. See
20 **Exhibit 3.**

21 36. In reporting the Data Breach to the Attorney General, Defendant
22 effectively admits that the Data Breach involved a "breach of [its] security system."
23 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(f).

24 37. A "breach of the security of the system" is defined as the "unauthorized
25 acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or
26 integrity of personal information maintained by the person or business." Cal. Civ.
27 Code § 1798.82(g).

28

1 38. Accordingly, the Data Breach compromised the security, confidentiality,
2 or integrity of the medical information involved in the breach.

3 39. On October 30, 2020, Defendant also reported the breach to the
4 Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
5 Rights. Defendant reported that the breach affected approximately 19,788
6 individuals. *See* https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf (last visited
7 January 20, 2021).

8 40. In reporting the Data Breach to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
9 Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, Defendant effectively admits that
10 the medical information involved in the Data Breach was unsecured protected health
11 information as defined by 45 C.F.R. § 164.402. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.408.

12 41. Unsecured protected health information is defined as “protected health
13 information that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to
14 unauthorized persons through the use of a technology or methodology specified by
15 the Secretary.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.402.

16 42. This is not the first time Defendant has failed to reasonably protect and
17 preserve the confidentiality of medical information of its patients. Defendant was
18 previously investigated by the California Department of Public Health for a four
19 separate reported disclosures of unencrypted patient data of 20,421 of its patients
20 between June 16, 2014 and July 25, 2015. Following an investigation of the incident,
21 the California Department of Public Health found Defendant “failed to prevent
22 unlawful or unauthorized access to, or use or disclosure of, patients’ medical
23 information in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1280.15, subdivision (a).”
24 Rady Children’s Hospital – San Diego Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of
25 Correction, December 1, 2015
26 https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/LCP/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Breaches/RadyChildrensHospitalAPBreach_080011817.pdf (last visited January 20,
27 2021).
28

1 43. As a result, the California Department of Public Health fined Defendant
2 penalties of up to \$25,000 per patient whose medical information was disclosed. *See*
3 *Penalties Issued in 2016, California Department of Public Health*,
4 <https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/LCP/Pages/MedicalBreaches.aspx> (last
5 visited January 20, 2021) (lists Rady Children’s Hospital - San Diego); *see also* Rady
6 Children’s Hospital – San Diego Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction,
7 December 1, 2015
8 https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/LCP/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Breaches/RadyChildrensHospitalAPBreach_080011817.pdf (“The department, after
9 investigation, may assess an administrative penalty for a violation of [Health &
10 Safety Code § 1280.15(a)] may assess an administrative penalty of up to twenty-five
11 thousand dollars (\$25,000) per patient whose medical information was unlawfully or
12 without authorization accessed, used, or disclosed.”)

14 44. As recently as February 21, 2020, another data breach involving the
15 Defendant was reported to the California Attorney General. Defendant reported a
16 data security incident involving the radiology-related information of 2,360 patients
17 occurred between the dates of June 20, 2019 and January 5, 2020. A class action was
18 filed on July 1, 2020 by Jose Orozco under case no. 37-2020-00023102-CU-NP-CTL
19 in San Diego Superior Court. *Orozco v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego*, No. 37-
20 2020-00023102-CU-NP-CTL, Register of Actions 1, Plaintiff’s Class Action
21 Complaint, San Diego Superior Court.

22 45. The latest data breach involving approximately 19,788 individuals’
23 private medical information surpasses both of the prior data breaches, combined, and
24 is further evidence that Defendant’s conduct and practices as it relates to the
25 preserving the confidentiality of its patients’ medical information failed to reasonably
26 protect said information from unauthorized disclosure in violation of Cal. Civ. Code
27 56.101(a).

28

1 46. Defendant had the resources necessary to protect and preserve
2 confidentiality of electronic medical information of Plaintiff and the Class in its
3 possession, but neglected to adequately implement data security measures according
4 to its representations to Plaintiff and the Class and as required by the Act, despite its
5 obligation to do so. Additionally, the risk of vulnerabilities in its computer and data
6 systems of being exploited by an unauthorized third party trying to steal Plaintiff's
7 and the Class' medical information was foreseeable and/or known to Defendant.

8 47. "Healthcare organization[s] need to ensure that their systems are well
9 protected against cyberattacks, which means investing in technologies to secure the
10 network perimeter, detect intrusions, and block malware and phishing threats." *See*
11 *Cybersecurity Best Practices for Healthcare Organizations*, HIPAA Journal, Nov. 1,
12 2018, [https://www.hipaajournal.com/important-cybersecurity-best-practices-for-](https://www.hipaajournal.com/important-cybersecurity-best-practices-for-healthcare-organizations/)
13 [healthcare-organizations/](https://www.hipaajournal.com/important-cybersecurity-best-practices-for-healthcare-organizations/) (lasted visited January 20, 2021).

14 **Defendant Expressly Promised to Protect Its Patients' Medical Information**

15 48. Defendant's privacy policy states it is "committed to protecting the
16 privacy of medical information" and that it has "a duty and responsibility to
17 safeguard patient medical information." *See Exhibit 1* at pg. 4, PURPOSE OF THIS
18 NOTICE.

19 49. Notwithstanding the foregoing promises, Defendant failed to protect the
20 medical information of the patients' whose information was involved in the Data
21 Breach, as conceded in Defendant's notification letters.

22 50. If Defendant truly understood the importance of safeguarding its
23 patients' medical information, it would acknowledge its responsibility for the harm it
24 has caused, and would compensate them, provide long-term protection, agree to
25 Court-ordered and enforceable changes to its cybersecurity policies and procedures,
26 and adopt regular and intensive training to ensure that a data breach like this never
27 happens again.

28

1 51. Defendant’s data security obligations were particularly important given
2 the known substantial increase in data breaches in the healthcare industry, including
3 the recent data breaches involving the Defendant itself.

4 **Facts Specific to Plaintiff**

5 52. Plaintiff, like each member of the proposed Class, was admitted as a
6 patient for treatment and services at one of Defendant’s locations.

7 53. Plaintiff, like each member of the proposed Class, provided Defendant
8 with individually identifiable medical information as defined under Cal. Civ. Code §
9 56.05(j) when they received medical services from Defendant.

10 54. Plaintiff, like each member of the proposed Class, expected Defendant to
11 maintain the privacy of their medical information as set forth under its privacy
12 practices and state and federal law.

13 55. Defendant sent Latasha Pope, guardian of Plaintiff, a letter entitled
14 “Notice of Data Security Incident” and signed by Christina Galbo, MBA, CHC, Chief
15 Compliance and Privacy Officer, admitting and confirming that his personal medical
16 information in Defendant’s possession had been stolen.

17 56. Apart from offering complimentary identity monitoring services,
18 Defendant does nothing to mitigate the harms caused by the Data Breach.

19 57. Defendant’s offer of identity monitoring services is woefully inadequate.
20 When it comes to identity theft, there is often time a lag between when harm occurs
21 versus when it is discovered, and also between when medical information is acquired
22 and when it is used. Furthermore, identity monitoring services only alert someone to
23 the fact that they have already been the victim of identity theft, they do *not* prevent
24 identity theft. *See, e.g.,* Kayleigh Kulp, *Credit Monitoring Services May Not Be*
25 *Worth the Cost*, Nov. 30, 2017, [https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/credit-monitoring-](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/credit-monitoring-services-may-not-be-worth-the-cost.html)
26 [services-may-not-be-worth-the-cost.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/credit-monitoring-services-may-not-be-worth-the-cost.html) (last visited January 20, 2021).

27 58. As a direct and proximate result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class
28 Members have been placed at an imminent, immediate, substantial and continuing

1 increased risk of harm from fraud and identity theft. Plaintiff and Class Members
2 must now take the time and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the
3 Data Breach on their everyday lives, including placing “freezes” and “alerts” with
4 credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions and healthcare
5 providers, closing or modifying financial accounts, and closely reviewing and
6 monitoring bank accounts, credit reports, and health insurance account information
7 for unauthorized activity for years to come.

8 59. This risk is made even more concerning by the fact that members of the
9 Class, including the Plaintiff, are minors and thus stand to lose more than what is at
10 usually at stake with identity theft given their lack of credit history and the fact that
11 their information can be used to create a “clean slate identity.”

12 60. Child identity theft has become more prevalent over the years in large
13 part because the crime is more difficult to detect. “When an unauthorized person
14 uses your credit card number to make unauthorized purchases, most banks will
15 contact you the moment they suspect suspicious activity. But when an unauthorized
16 person uses your child’s name successfully to get a credit card—either by using a pre-
17 approved card offer stolen from a mailbox or by creating a synthetic identity and
18 applying for a new card—it is highly unlikely that anyone will contact you. As far as
19 the bank or credit bureau is concerned, the false identity is real because thieves use a
20 child’s clean slate to establish a new credit history.” See Brett Singer, *What Is Child*
21 *Identity Theft?*, Apr. 13, 2014, [https://www.parents.com/kids/safety/tips/what-is-](https://www.parents.com/kids/safety/tips/what-is-child-identity-theft/)
22 [child-identity-theft/](https://www.parents.com/kids/safety/tips/what-is-child-identity-theft/) (last visited January 20, 2021).

23 61. Identity theft “can wreak havoc on [] children’s credit and even leave
24 them with a massive debt before they’ve even reached voting age.” In 2017, alone,
25 more than one million children were the victims of identity fraud. See Casey Bond,
26 *How to Check Your Child’s Credit Report*, Feb. 5, 2019,
27 [https://creditcards.usnews.com/articles/how-to-check-your-childs-credit-](https://creditcards.usnews.com/articles/how-to-check-your-childs-credit-report#:~:text=%20Protecting%20Your%20Child%27s%20Credit%20%201%20Kee)
28 [report#:~:text=%20Protecting%20Your%20Child%27s%20Credit%20%201%20Kee](https://creditcards.usnews.com/articles/how-to-check-your-childs-credit-report#:~:text=%20Protecting%20Your%20Child%27s%20Credit%20%201%20Kee)

1 p,that%20contain%20your%20child%27s%20sensitive%20personal...%20More%20
2 (last visited January 20, 2021).

3 62. Plaintiff and the Class Members have suffered, continue to suffer and/or
4 will suffer, actual harms for which they are entitled to compensation, including:

- 5 a. Trespass, damage to, and theft of their personal medical information;
- 6 b. Improper disclosure of their medical information;
- 7 c. The imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential
8 fraud and identity theft posed by their medical information being placed in the hands
9 of criminals;
- 10 d. The imminent and certainly impending risk of having their medical
11 information used against them by spam callers to defraud them;
- 12 e. Loss of privacy suffered as a result of the Data Breach;
- 13 f. Ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses and the value
14 of their time reasonably expended to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data
15 Breach;
- 16 g. Ascertainable losses in the form of deprivation of the value of Plaintiff's
17 and Class Members' personal identifiable information within their medical
18 information, for which there is a well-established and quantifiable national and
19 international market;
- 20 h. Damage to their credit due to fraudulent use of their medical
21 information; and
- 22 i. Increased cost of borrowing, insurance, deposits and other items which
23 are adversely affected by a reduced credit score.

24 63. Moreover, Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in ensuring that
25 their medical information, which remains in the possession of Defendant, is protected
26 from further breaches by the implementation of security measures and safeguards.

27 64. Defendant itself acknowledged the harm caused by the Data Breach by
28 offering Plaintiff and Class Members' identity theft monitoring services. However,

1 the identity theft monitoring is woefully inadequate to protect Plaintiff and Class
2 Members from a lifetime of identity theft risk and does nothing to reimburse Plaintiff
3 and Class Members for the injuries they have already suffered.

4 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

5 65. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a nationwide Class defined as follows:

7 **National Class:** All persons in the United States whose Private
8 Information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach announced
9 by Defendant on or around October 29, 2020.

10 **California Sub-Class:** All persons in California whose Private
11 Information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach announced
12 by Defendant on or around October 29, 2020.

13 66. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any judge or
14 magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant,
15 Defendant's subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, affiliated entities, and
16 any entity in which the Defendant or its parent has a controlling interest, and their
17 current or former officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a
18 timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter
19 have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff's
20 counsel and Defendant's counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and
21 assigns of such excluded persons.

22 67. Numerosity. The members in the proposed Class are approximately
23 19,788 individuals. Accordingly, individual joinder of all members is impracticable,
24 and the disposition of the claims of all Class Members in a single action will provide
25 substantial benefits to the parties and Court.

26 68. Commonality. Questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs and the
27 Class include:

- 28 a. Whether Defendant violated the laws asserted herein, including without
limitation the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act,

- 1 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56 *et seq* and the Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ.
2 Code §§ 1798.100 *et seq*.
- 3 b. Whether Defendant had a duty to use reasonable care to safeguard
4 Plaintiff and the Class Members’ medical information.
- 5 c. Whether Defendant breached its contractual promises to safeguard
6 Plaintiff and the Class Members’ medical information.
- 7 d. Whether Defendant knew or should have known about the inadequacies
8 of their data security policies and system and the dangers associated with
9 storing sensitive medical information.
- 10 e. Whether Defendant failed to use reasonable care and commercially
11 reasonable methods to safeguard and protect Plaintiffs’ and the other
12 Class Members’ medical information from unauthorized release and
13 disclosure.
- 14 f. Whether Defendant’s conduct was deceptive, unfair, unconscionable, or
15 constituted unfair competition.
- 16 g. Whether Defendant’s conduct was likely to deceive a reasonable
17 consumer.
- 18 h. Whether Defendant is liable for negligence or gross negligence.
- 19 i. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to nominal damages, actual
20 damages.
- 21 j. Whether Defendant’s conduct in regard to the Data Breach violated
22 applicable state laws.
- 23 k. Whether Plaintiff and Class were injured as a proximate cause or result
24 of the Data Breach.
- 25 l. Whether Defendant’s practices and representations related to the Data
26 Breach breached implied warranties.
- 27 m. Whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched as a result of the conduct
28 complained of herein.

1 n. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages, restitutionary,
2 injunctive, declaratory, or other relief.

3 69. Typicality. Plaintiff is a member of the Class. Plaintiff's claims are
4 typical of the claims of each Class member in that Plaintiff and Class Members
5 sustained damages arising out of Defendant's Data Breach, wrongful conduct and
6 unlawful practices, and Plaintiff and Class Members sustained similar injuries and
7 damages as a result of Defendant's uniform illegal conduct.

8 70. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative because
9 Plaintiff's interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class he seeks to
10 represent. Plaintiff's claims are common to all members of the Class, and Plaintiff
11 has a strong interest in vindicating the rights of absent Class Members. Plaintiff has
12 retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and
13 they intend to vigorously prosecute this action.

14 71. Ascertainability. Class Members can easily be identified by the
15 objective criteria set forth in the Class definition.

16 72. Predominance. The common issues of law and fact identified above
17 predominate over any other questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
18 Class issues fully predominate over any individual issue.

19 73. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the
20 fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because: (a) the joinder of all
21 individual Class Members is impracticable, cumbersome, unduly burdensome, and a
22 waste of judicial and/or litigation resources; (b) the individual claims of the Class
23 Members may be relatively modest compared with the expense of litigating the claim,
24 thereby making it impracticable, unduly burdensome, and expensive to justify
25 individual actions; (c) when Defendant's liability has been adjudicated, all Class
26 Members' claims can be determined by the Court and administered efficiently in a
27 manner far less burdensome and expensive than if it were attempted through filing,
28 discovery, and trial of all individual cases.

1 persons. Defendant breached its duty owed to Plaintiff and the Class by failing to
2 utilize a vendor with fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security
3 policies to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' medical information and
4 allowing that Private Information to be released and viewed by unauthorized persons.

5 82. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a), Defendant disclosed Plaintiff's
6 and the Class Members' Private Information (including medical information) without
7 first obtaining an authorization. The unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff's and the
8 Class Members' Private Information to unauthorized individuals in the Data Breach
9 resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have known
10 that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
11 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
12 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
13 the Class. This release of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to
14 unauthorized hackers during the Data Breach was an affirmative act in violation of
15 violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a). Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private
16 Information was viewed by the unauthorized hackers as a direct and proximate result
17 of Defendant's violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a).

18 83. In violation of the first sentence of Cal. Civ. Code § 65.101(a),
19 Defendant created, maintained, preserved, stored, abandoned, destroyed, or disposed
20 of medical information (including Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private
21 Information (including medical information) in a manner that failed to preserve and
22 breached the confidentiality of the information contained therein. This violation
23 resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have known
24 that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
25 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
26 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
27 the Class. This release of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to
28 unauthorized hackers during the Data Breach was an affirmative communicative act

1 in violation of violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a). Plaintiff's and the Class
2 Members' Private Information was viewed by the unauthorized hackers as a direct
3 and proximate result of Defendant's violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a).

4 84. In violation of the second sentence of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a),
5 Defendant negligently Defendant created, maintained, preserved, stored, abandoned,
6 destroyed, or disposed of medical information (including Plaintiff's and the Class
7 Members' Private Information (including medical information). This violation
8 resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have known
9 that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
10 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
11 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
12 the Class. This release of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to
13 unauthorized hackers during the Data Breach was an affirmative communicative act
14 in violation of violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a). Plaintiff's and the Class
15 Members' Private Information was viewed by the unauthorized hackers as a direct
16 and proximate result of Defendant's violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a).

17 85. The Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information that was
18 subject to the Data Breach included "electronic medical records" or "electronic health
19 records" as referenced by Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(c) and defined by 42 U.S.C. §
20 17921(5).

21 86. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(b)(1)(A), Defendant's electronic
22 health record system or electronic medical record system failed to protect and
23 preserve the integrity of electronic medical information (including Plaintiff's and
24 Class Members' Private Information). This violation resulted from the affirmative
25 actions of Defendant who knew or should have known that its vendor had inadequate
26 computer systems and data security practices to safeguard such information, and
27 Defendant knew or should have known of the risks inherent in collecting and storing
28 the protected medical information of Plaintiff and the Class. This release of

1 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to unauthorized hackers during
2 the Data Breach was an affirmative communicative act in violation of violation of
3 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff's and the Class Members Private
4 Information was viewed by the unauthorized hackers as a direct and proximate result
5 of Defendant's violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(b)(1)(A).

6 87. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(b)(1)(B), Defendant's electronic
7 health record system or electronic medical record system failed to automatically
8 record and preserve any change or deletion of any electronically stored medical
9 information (including Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information). This
10 violation resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have
11 known that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
12 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
13 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
14 the Class.

15 88. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(b)(1)(B), Defendant's electronic
16 health record system or electronic medical record system failed to record the identity
17 of persons who accessed and changed medical information (including Plaintiff's and
18 the Class Member's Private Information), failed to record the date and time medical
19 information was accessed (including Plaintiff's and the Class Member's Private
20 Information), and failed to record changes that were made to medical information
21 (including Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information). This violation
22 resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have known
23 that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
24 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
25 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
26 the Class.

27 89. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b) Defendant negligently released
28 confidential information or records concerning Plaintiff's and Class Members'

1 (including Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information). This negligent
2 release of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to unauthorized
3 hackers during the Data Breach was an affirmative communicative act in violation of
4 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b). Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information
5 was viewed by the unauthorized hackers as a direct and proximate result of
6 Defendant's violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b).

7 90. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(e), Defendant disclosed Plaintiff's
8 and Class Members' Private Information to persons or entities not engaged in
9 providing direct health care services to Plaintiff or Class Members or their providers
10 of health care or health care service plans or insurers or self-insured employers. This
11 violation resulted from the affirmative actions of Defendant who knew or should have
12 known that its vendor had inadequate computer systems and data security practices to
13 safeguard such information, and Defendant knew or should have known of the risks
14 inherent in collecting and storing the protected medical information of Plaintiff and
15 the Class.

16 91. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and the Class was the
17 reasonably foreseeable result of Defendant's breach of its duties. Defendant knew or
18 should have known that it was failing to meet its duties and its breach would cause
19 Plaintiff and the Class to suffer the foreseeable harms associated with the exposure of
20 their medical information.

21 92. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligent conduct,
22 Plaintiff and the Class now face an increased risk of future harm.

23 93. Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56.35 and 56.36, Plaintiff and each
24 member of the Class seek relief including actual damages, nominal statutory damages
25 of \$1,000, punitive damages of \$3,000, injunctive relief, and attorney fees, expenses
26 and costs. A recovery of nominal damages does not require that the plaintiff have
27 suffered or have been threatened with actual damages.

28

1 94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Cal. Civ.
2 Code § 56 *et seq.*, Plaintiff and Class Members now face an increased risk of future
3 harm.

4 95. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Cal. Civ.
5 Code § 56 *et seq.*, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injury and are entitled
6 to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

7 96. Plaintiff and Class Members suffered a privacy injury by having their
8 sensitive medical information disclosed, irrespective of whether or not they
9 subsequently suffered identity fraud or incurred any mitigation damages. Medical
10 information has been recognized a private sensitive information in common law and
11 federal and state statutory schemes and the disclosure of such information resulted in
12 cognizable injury to Plaintiff and Class Members.

13 **COUNT TWO**

14 **California Consumer Records Act**

15 97. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as
16 if fully set forth herein.

17 98. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of all Classes, or in
18 the alternative, the California Sub-Class.

19 99. Section 1798.2 of the California Civil Code requires any “person or
20 business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized
21 data that includes personal information” to “disclose any breach of the security of the
22 system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to
23 any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is
24 reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person,” Under
25 section 1798.82, the disclosure “shall be made in the most expedient time possible
26 and without unreasonably delay...”

27 100. The CCRA further provides: “Any person or business that maintains
28 computerized data that includes personal information that the person or business does

1 not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any breach of the
2 security of the data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was,
3 or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.” Cal.
4 Civ. Code § 1798.82(b).

5 101. Any person or business that is required to issue a security breach
6 notification under the CCRA shall meet all the following requirements:

- 7 a. The security breach notification shall be written in plain language;
8 b. The security breach notification shall include, at a minimum, the
9 following information:

- 10 i. The name and contact information of the reporting person or
11 business subject to this section;
12 ii. A list of the types of personal information that were or are
13 reasonably believed to have been the subject of a breach;
14 iii. If the information is possible to determine at the time the notice is
15 provided, then any of the follow:
16 1. The date of the breach;
17 2. The estimated date of the breach; or
18 3. The date range within which the breach occurred. The
19 notification shall also include the date of the notice.
20 iv. Whether notification was delayed as a result of a law enforcement
21 investigation, if that information is possible to determine at the
22 time the notice is provided;
23 v. A general description of the breach incident, if that information is
24 possible to determine at the time the notice is provided; and
25 vi. The toll-free telephone number and addresses of the major credit
26 reporting agencies if the breach exposed a Social Security number
27 or a driver’s license or California identification card number.
28

1 102. The Data Breach described herein constituted a “breach of the security
2 system” of Defendant.

3 103. Blackbaud announced in May of 2020 that it had been the victim of a
4 ransomware attack and data breach, exposing the private information and even
5 private health information of its clients’ students, patients, and donors. However,
6 Defendant did not inform Plaintiff and Class Members about the Data Breach,
7 affecting their Private Information, under the end of October of 2020.

8 104. Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members, without
9 unreasonable delay and in the most expedient time possible, the breach of security of
10 their unencrypted, or not properly and securely encrypted, Private Information, when
11 Defendant knew or reasonably believed such information had been compromised.

12 105. Defendant’s ongoing business interests gave Defendant incentive to
13 conceal the Data Breach from the public to ensure continued revenue.

14 106. Upon information and belief, no law enforcement agency instructed
15 Defendant that timely notification to Plaintiff and Class Members would impede its
16 investigation.

17 107. As a result of Defendant’s violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(b),
18 Plaintiff and Class Members were deprived of prompt notice of the Data Brach and
19 were thus prevented from taking appropriate protective measures, such as securing
20 identity theft protection. These measures could have prevented some of the damages
21 suffered by Plaintiff and Class Members because their Private Information would
22 have had less value to identity thieves.

23 108. As a result of Defendant’s violation Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(b),
24 Plaintiff and Class Members suffered incrementally increased damages separate and
25 distinct from those simply caused by the Data Breach itself.

26 109. Plaintiff and Class Member seek all remedies available under Cal. Civ.
27 Code § 1798.82(b), including but not limited to the damages suffered by Plaintiff and
28 Class Members as alleged above and equitable relief.

1 110. Defendant’s misconduct as alleged herein is fraud under Cal. Civ. Code
2 § 3294(c)(3) in that it was deceit or concealment of a material fact known to the
3 Defendant conducted with the intent on the part of Defendant of depriving Plaintiff
4 and Class Members of “legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” In addition,
5 Defendant’s misconduct as alleged herein is malice or oppression under Cal. Civ.
6 Code § 3294(c)(1) and (c) in that it was despicable conduct carried on by Defendant
7 with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiff and Class
8 Members and despicable conduct that has subjected Plaintiff and Class Members to
9 cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights. As a result, Plaintiff
10 and Class Members are entitled to punitive damages against Defendant under Cal.
11 Civ. Code § 3294(a).

12 **COUNT THREE**

13 **Negligence**

14 111. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as
15 if fully set forth herein.

16 112. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of all the Classes.

17 113. Plaintiff and Class Members entrusted their medical information to
18 Defendant. Defendant owed to Plaintiff and the other Class Members a duty to
19 exercise reasonable care in handling and using their medical information in its care
20 and custody, including implementing industry-standard security procedures sufficient
21 to reasonably protect the information from the data breaches, theft, and unauthorized
22 use, and to promptly detect attempts at unauthorized access.

23 114. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members because
24 Plaintiff and Class Members were foreseeable and probable victims of Defendant's
25 failure to secure their medical information. Defendant acted with wanton and
26 reckless disregard for the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and Class
27 Members’ medical information by disclosing and providing access to this information
28

1 to unauthorized third parties and by failing to properly supervise the manner in which
2 the medical information was stored, used, and exchanged.

3 115. Defendant had a “special relationship” with Plaintiff and Class
4 Members. The willingness to share and entrust Plaintiff and Class Member’s Private
5 Information with Defendant as predicated on the understanding that Defendant would
6 take adequate security precautions.

7 116. The risk that unauthorized persons would attempt to gain access to the
8 medical information and misuse was foreseeable. As the holder of vast amounts of
9 medical information, it was inevitable that unauthorized individuals would attempt to
10 access Defendant’s databases containing the medical information.

11 117. Such information is highly valuable, and Defendant is aware of other
12 instances when criminals have attempted to access, and in fact have accessed medical
13 information from Defendant, its affiliates, and others. Defendant has been targeted
14 by criminals successfully in the past by such attempts. Defendant knew, or should
15 have known, the risk in obtaining, using, handling, emailing, and storing the medical
16 information of Plaintiff and the other Class Members, and the importance of
17 exercising reasonable care in handling it.

18 118. Defendant breached its duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in
19 supervising its agents, contractors, vendors, and suppliers, and in handling and
20 securing the personal information and medical information of Plaintiff and the other
21 Class Members which actually and proximately caused the Data Breach and
22 Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ injuries. As a direct and traceable result of
23 Defendant’s negligence and/or negligent supervision, Plaintiff and Class Members
24 have suffered or will suffer damages.

25 119. Defendant’s breach of its common law duties to exercise reasonable care
26 and it’s failures and negligence actually and proximately caused the Plaintiff and
27 other Class Members actual, tangible injury-in-fact, and damages, including without
28 limitation the theft of their medical information by criminals, improper disclosure of

1 their medical information, lost value of their personal information, and lost time and
2 money incurred to mitigate and remediate the effects of the Data Breach that resulted
3 and was caused by Defendant's negligence, which injury-in-fact and damages are
4 ongoing, imminent, immediate, and which they continue to face.

5 **COUNT FOUR**

6 **Invasion of Privacy and Violation of the California Constitution, Art. 1, § 1**

7 120. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as
8 if fully set forth herein.

9 121. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of all the Classes.

10 122. California established the right to privacy in Article 1, Section 1 of the
11 California Constitution.

12 123. The State of California recognizes the tort of Intrusion into Private
13 Affairs, and adopts the formulation of that tort found in the Restatement (Second) of
14 Torts which states: One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
15 solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
16 to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
17 reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).

18 124. Plaintiff and Class Members had a legitimate and reasonable expectation
19 of privacy with respect to their medical information and were accordingly entitled to
20 the protection of this information against disclosure to and acquisition by
21 unauthorized third parties.

22 125. Defendant published private details and facts not generally known to the
23 public, not publicly available, and not of legitimate public concern about Plaintiff and
24 Class Members by disclosing and exposing Plaintiff's and Class Members' medical
25 information to an unauthorized third-party through its negligent security practices,
26 thereby making it reasonably likely that such information will become known to the
27 public, including without limitation on the dark web and elsewhere.

28

1 126. The intrusion was into a place or thing, which was private and is entitled
2 to be private. Plaintiff and Class Members disclosed their medical information to
3 Defendant as part of their use of Defendant’s services, but privately, with the
4 intention that the medical information would be kept confidential and protected from
5 unauthorized access, acquisition, appropriation, disclosure, encumbrance, exfiltration,
6 release, theft, use, and/or viewing. Plaintiff and Class Members were reasonable in
7 their belief that such information would be kept private and would not be disclosed
8 without their authorization.

9 127. The Data Breach constitutes an intentional interference with Plaintiff’s
10 and Class Members’ interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to their persons or as to
11 their private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a
12 reasonable person.

13 128. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when it permitted the
14 Data Breach because it knew its information security practices were inadequate.

15 129. Acting with knowledge, Defendant had notice and knew that its
16 inadequate cybersecurity practices would cause injury to Plaintiff and Class
17 Members.

18 130. As a proximate result of Defendant’s acts and omissions, Plaintiff’s and
19 Class Members’ medical information was accessed by, acquired by, appropriated by,
20 disclosed to, encumbered by, exfiltrated by, released to, stolen by, used by, and/or
21 viewed by third parties without authorization, causing Plaintiff and Class Members to
22 suffer damages.

23 131. Unless and until enjoined, and restrained by order of this Court,
24 Defendant’s wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to
25 Plaintiff and Class Members in that the medical information maintained by Defendant
26 can be accessed, acquired by, appropriated by, disclosed to, encumbered by,
27 exfiltrated by, released to, stolen by, used by, and/or viewed by unauthorized persons.
28

1 132. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law for these
2 injuries in that a judgment for monetary damages will not end the invasion of privacy
3 for Plaintiff and the Class.

4 **COUNT FIVE**

5 **Breach of Implied Contract**

6 133. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as
7 if fully set forth herein.

8 134. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of all the Classes.

9 135. When Plaintiff and the Class Members provided their medical
10 information to Defendant, they entered into implied contracts in which Defendant
11 agreed to comply with its statutory and common law duties and industry standards to
12 protect their medical information.

13 136. Based on the implicit understanding, Plaintiff and Class Members
14 accepted Defendant's offers of health services and provided Defendant with their
15 medical information.

16 137. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have provided their medical
17 information to Defendant had they known that Defendant would not safeguard their
18 medical information as promised.

19 138. Plaintiff and Class Members fully performed their obligations under the
20 implied contracts with Defendant.

21 139. Defendant breached the implied contracts by failing to safeguard
22 Plaintiff's and Class Members' medical information.

23 140. The losses and damages Plaintiff and Class Members sustained (as
24 described above) were the direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the
25 implied contract with Plaintiff and Class Members.

26
27
28

1 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

2 141. Wherefore, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
3 situated, prays for judgment against Defendant as to each and every cause of action,
4 and the following remedies:

- 5 a. An Order declaring this action to be a proper class action, appointing
6 Plaintiff as class representatives, and appointing their undersigned
7 counsel as class counsel;
- 8 b. An Order awarding Plaintiff and Class Members appropriate monetary
9 relief, including actual damages, punitive damages, treble damages,
10 statutory damages, exemplary damages, equitable relief, restitution and
11 disgorgement;
- 12 c. Award injunctive relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiff
13 and the Class;
- 14 d. An award of attorneys' fees and costs, as allowed by law; and
- 15 e. Any other or further relief as may be appropriate under the
16 circumstances.

17 **JURY DEMAND**

18 142. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

19
20 Date: January 20, 2021

**LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A.
MARRON**

21
22 By: /s/ Ronald A. Marron

23
24 RONALD A. MARRON
25 ALEXIS M. WOOD
26 KAS L. GALLUCCI
27 651 Arroyo Drive
28 San Diego, California 92103
Telephone: (619) 696-9006
Facsimile: (619) 564-6665

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Rady Children's Hospital Hit with Class Action Over 2020 Blackbaud Data Breach](#)
