UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JESSICA DIPUGLIA,
individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

CLASS ACTION

Plaintiff,

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.

US COACHWAYS, INC., a foreign corporation,

I	Defendant.	
		,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Jessica Dipuglia, brings this class action against Defendant, US Coachways, Inc., and alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by her attorneys.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. This is a putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., ("TCPA").
- 2. Defendant, a leading bus and limousine charter company, violated the TCPA by sending telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff and members of the putative class, without their prior express written consent and little regard for their privacy rights.
- 3. Defendant is no stranger to the TCPA. On March 9, 2016, Defendant agreed to a consent judgment totaling \$49,932,375.00 to resolve claims involving its transmission of approximately 391,459 unsolicited text messages in violation of the TCPA. *See Bull v. Ill. Union Ins.*

Co., No. 16 C 11446, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119479 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2017).¹

4. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of herself and members of the class, and any other available legal or equitable remedies.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiff alleges violations of a federal statute. Jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because Plaintiff alleges a national class, which will result in at least one class member belonging to a different state than that of Defendant. Plaintiff seeks up to \$1,500.00 (one-thousand-five-hundred dollars) in damages for each call in violation of the TCPA, which, when aggregated among a proposed class numbering in the tens of thousands, or more, exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 (five-million dollars) threshold for federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Therefore, both the elements of diversity jurisdiction and CAFA jurisdiction are present.
- 6. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because Defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and because Defendant provides and markets its services within this district thereby establishing sufficient contacts to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Further, Defendant's tortious conduct against Plaintiff occurred within the State of Florida and, on information and belief, Defendant has sent the same text messages complained of by Plaintiff to other individuals within this judicial district, such that some of Defendant's acts in making such calls

¹ Defendant's class settlement covered all claims arising from the illegal transmission of text messages from July 29, 2010 to the date of the settlement (March 9, 2016).

have occurred within this district, subjecting Defendant to jurisdiction in the State of Florida.

PARTIES

- 7. Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
- 8. Defendant is a New Jersey corporation whose principal office is located at 2 Tower Center Blvd, 19th Floor, Suite 19066, East Brunswick, NJ 08816. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities throughout the State of Florida. Defendant also has an office location at 1200 Brickell Ave, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33131.

THE TCPA

- 9. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).
- 10. The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") as "equipment that has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
- 11. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff'd*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).
- 12. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and

inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. *Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

- 13. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated telemarketing calls, requiring "prior express *written* consent" for such calls to wireless numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012)(emphasis supplied).
- 14. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "clear and conspicuous disclosure' of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates." *In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).
- 15. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define "telemarketing" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).
- 16. "Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations 'require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service' where the implication of an improper purpose is 'clear from the context." *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).
 - 17. "Telemarketing' occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated

and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services." *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

- 18. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call or in the future. Id.
- 19. In other words, offers "that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute" telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).
- 20. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. *See In the Matter of Rules and Regulaions Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent "for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls").
- Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of "to make any call" in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); *Toney v. Quality Res., Inc.*, 2014 WL 6757978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained Plaintiff's prior express consent before sending her the *text message*). (emphasis

added).

22. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA 'need not allege any *additional* harm beyond the one Congress has identified." *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp.*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (emphasis original)).

FACTS

- 23. On or about April 2016, Plaintiff booked a round trip charter to Key West through Defendant's on-line booking platform.
 - 24. At the time of booking the charter, Plaintiff completed the following on-line form:

*Charter Contact Phone: *Charter Mobile Phone: *Charter Mobile Phone: *Charter Mobile Phone: *U.S. Coachways will be sending you important notifications & information in regards to your charter by text message (SMS). You'll receive up to 1 message per day related to your charter. Message & data rates may apply. Text HELP for help, STOP to unsubscribe. Your information will not be sold or used for any other purpose. Please uncheck if you dont want to receive notifications. *I AGREE TO RECEIVE MESSAGES AND NOTIFICATIONS BY TEXT MESSAGE (SMS) IN REGARDS TO THIS CHARTER.

Charter Organizer or Payee (will be receiving all notifications)

- 25. In completing the above form, Plaintiff understood that she was providing her cellular telephone number for the sole purpose of receiving notifications and information about the charter she had booked, and only for that purpose.
- 26. By completing the above form, Plaintiff did not consent to receive automated telemarketing text messages from or on behalf of Defendant.

Despite promising that it would not use Plaintiff's telephone number "for any other purpose," Defendant, on February 6, 2017, May 1, 2017, and August 7, 2017, sent the following telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in 8197 (the "8197 Number"):

961-67

Text Message Mon, Feb 6, 4:03 PM

USCOACH: Download USC App \$250FF Promo 'uscapp' http://usc.am/iPhone or http://usc.am/Android. Text Stop to stop or Help for help. Msg&data rates may apply.

Mon, May 1, 2:45 PM

USCOACH: Download USC App \$250FF Promo 'uscapp' http://usc.am/ iPhone or http://usc.am/ Android. Text Stop to stop or Help for help. Msg&data rates may apply.

- 28. Defendant's text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.
- 29. Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., Defendant's charter services.
 - 30. The short-code (961-67) that transmitted the text messages is operated by or on

behalf of Defendant.

- 31. The links (http://usc.am/iPhone and http://usc.am/Android) contained in the text messages are links to download Defendant's mobile application, which was developed and is operated by Defendant.
- 32. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.
- 33. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.
- 34. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 8197 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 8197 Number.
- The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message, combined with the use of a short-code, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. *See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC*, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016)("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing *Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); *Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); *Hickey v. Voxernet LLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; *Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co.*, No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013)

(observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

- 36. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, *en masse*, in an automated fashion without human intervention.
- 37. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

PROPOSED CLASS

- 38. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.
 - 39. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:

All persons within the United States who were sent a text message promoting Defendant's services, made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant's behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient's prior express written consent, from March 10, 2016 to the date of filing of this Complaint.

40. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more.

Numerosity

41. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded

calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

42. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

- 43. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:
 - (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
 - (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls;
 - (3) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
 - (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and
 - (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.
- 44. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.

TYPICALITY

45. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all

based on the same factual and legal theories.

PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS

46. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.

PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE

- A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.
- 48. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions.

COUNT I <u>Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)</u> (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

31. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

- 32. It is a violation of the TCPA to make "any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
- 33. "Automatic telephone dialing system" refers to any equipment that has the "capacity to dial numbers without human intervention." *See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc.*, No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).
- 34. Defendant or third parties directed by Defendant used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.
- 35. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.
- 36. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.
- 37. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

- 38. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id*.
- 39. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jessica Dipuglia, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- a. A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- b. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

COUNT II Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

- 40. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
- 41. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

- 42. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to send these text messages, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.
- 43. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.
- 44. As a result of Defendant's violations, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jessica Dipuglia, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- a. A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- b. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff and Class Members hereby demand a trial by jury.

DOCUMENT PRESERVATION DEMAND

Plaintiff demands that Defendant take affirmative steps to preserve all records, lists, electronic databases or other itemization of telephone numbers associated with the Defendant and the communication or transmittal of the text messages and calls as alleged herein.

Date: August 8, 2017

HIRALDO P.A.

/s/ Manuel S. Hiraldo

Manuel S. Hiraldo Florida Bar No. 030380 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

Telephone: 954.400.4713

and

SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.

/s/ Andrew J. Shamis

Andrew J. Shamis Florida Bar No. 101754

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(f) (786) 623-0915

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The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

the civil docket sheet. (SEE IN	STRUCTIONS ON TH	E REVERSE OF THE FORM.)					
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS			DEFENDANTS				
Jessica Dipuglia				US Coachways, Inc.			
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Miami-Dade County, FL (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)			
(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Ad					CONDEMNATION CASES, USINVOLVED.	E THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT	
Hiraldo P.A., 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1400, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301, 954-400-4713				Attorneys (If Known)			
(d) Check County Where Action	n Arose: 🖊 MIAMI-	DADE	WARD	□ PALM BEACH □ MA	RTIN ST. LUCIE I INDIA	AN RIVER OKEECHOBEE HIGHLANDS	
II. BASIS OF JURISD	ICTION (Place	an "X" in One Box Only)			RINCIPAL PARTIES	(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff	
□ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	✓□ 3 Federal Quest (U.S. Gove	tion rnment Not a Party)		(For Diversity Cases Only) Pen of This State	TF DEF 1	*	
☐ 2 U.S. Government ☐ 4 Diversity Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)		Citize	en of Another State 🛛	2	-		
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IV. NATURE OF SUIT	(Place an "X" in One	Box Only) TORTS		FEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES	
□ 110 Insurance □ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY □ 210 Land Condemnation □ 220 Foreclosure □ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment □ 240 Torts to Land □ 245 Tort Product Liability □ 290 All Other Real Property	PERSONAL INJU 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Productiability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employ Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury CIVIL RIGHTS 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing Accommodations 444 Welfare 445 Amer. w/Disa Employment 446 Amer. w/Disa Other 440 Other Civil Rig	362 Personal Injury Med. Malpractice 365 Personal Injury Product Liability Product Liability PERSONAL PROPER 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal Property Damage 385 Property Damage 385 Property Damage 510 Motions to Vaca Sentence Habeas Corpus: 530 General 535 Death Penalty 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 550 Civil Rights 550 Civil Rights 561 Personal 5550 Civil Rights 562 Personal 5550 Civil Rights 563 Personal 5550 Civil Rights 563 Personal 5550 Civil Rights 564 Personal 5550 Civil Rights 5550 Civil Rights 565 Personal 565 Personal	- 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	s10 Agriculture 520 Other Food & Drug 525 Drug Related Seizure 520 Other Food & Drug 525 Drug Related Seizure 520 Drug Related Seizure 530 Liquor Laws 530 Liquor Laws 530 Airline Regs. 530 Occupational Safety/Health 590 Other LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards Act 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 730 Labor/Mgmt.Reporting 8 Disclosure Act 740 Railway Labor Act 740 Railway Labor Act 750 Other Labor Litigation 751 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security 762 Naturalization 763 Habeas Corpus-Alien 764 Other Immigration 765 Other Immigration 765 Other Immigration 765 Other Immigration	□ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 □ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS □ 820 Copyrights □ 830 Patent □ 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY □ 861 HIA (1395ff) □ 862 Black Lung (923) □ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) □ 864 SSID Title XVI □ 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS □ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) □ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit 490 Cable/Sat TV 810 Selective Service 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 892 Economic Stabilization Act 893 Environmental Matters 894 Energy Allocation Act 900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes	
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VI. RELATED/RE-FII CASE(S).	(See instruction second page):		YES 🚜	NO b) Relat	ed Cases □ YES ৢ NO DOCKET NUMBER		
VII. CAUSE OF ACTI	diversity): ON Telephone (LENGTH OF 1		t, 47 U.	S.C. § 227 et seq.	e)		
VIII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:	CHECK IF UNDER F.	THIS IS A CLASS ACTION R.C.P. 23	D	EMAND \$	CHECK YES only JURY DEMAND	if demanded in complaint: ∴ ✓ Yes □ No	
ABOVE INFORMATION IS THE BEST OF MY KNOWI		CT TO SIGNATURE OF A			date August 8	3, 2017	
				FOR OF	FICE USE ONLY		

AMOUNT

RECEIPT #

IFP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Southern District of Florida

JESSICA DIPUGLIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,)))
Plaintiff(s))
v.	Civil Action No.
US COACHWAYS, INC.,)
a foreign corporation,)
))
Defendant(s))
SUMMONS IN	N A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address) US Coachways, Inc. 2 Tower Center Blvd 19th Floor, Suite 19066 East Brunswick, NJ 0881	6
A lawsuit has been filed against you.	
are the United States or a United States agency, or an offi	e. 1400 11
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be You also must file your answer or motion with the court.	e entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
	CLERK OF COURT
Date:	Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1))

	This summons for (no	ame of individual and title, if any)							
was re	ceived by me on (date)								
	☐ I personally serve	ed the summons on the indivi	idual at <i>(place)</i>						
			on (date)	; or					
	☐ I left the summon	s at the individual's residence	ce or usual place of abode with (name)						
		, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,							
	on (date)	, and mailed a cop	py to the individual's last known address; or						
	☐ I served the summ	nons on (name of individual)		, wh	no is				
	designated by law to	accept service of process or	n behalf of (name of organization)						
			on (date)	; or					
	☐ I returned the sum	nmons unexecuted because			; or				
	☐ Other (specify):								
	My fees are \$	for travel and \$	for services, for a total of \$	0.00					
	I declare under penal	lty of perjury that this inform	nation is true.						
Date:									
2000			Server's signature						
			Printed name and title						
			Server's address						

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Lawsuit: US Coachways Sends Illegal Text Advertisements</u>