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1 2	Lesley Weaver (Cal. Bar No.191305) Angelica M. Ornelas (Cal. Bar No. 285929) Joshua D. Samra (Cal. Bar No. 313050)	Mitchell M. Breit ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) Jason 'Jay' Barnes ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) An Truong ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought)
2	BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP 555 12 <sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 1600	Eric Johnson ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
	Oakland, CA 994607	112 Madison Avenue, 7 <sup>th</sup> Floor New York, NY 10016
4	Tel.: (415) 445-4003 Fax: (415) 445-4020	Tel.: (212) 784-6400
5	lweaver@bfalaw.com aornelas@bfalaw.com	Fax: (212) 213-5949 mbreit@simmonsfirm.com
6 7	jsamra@bfalaw.com	jaybarnes@simmonsfirm.com atruong@simmonsfirm.com ejohnson@simmonsfirm.com
8	Laurence D. King (Cal. Bar No. 206423)	David A. Straite (pro hac vice to be sought)
9	Mario Choi (Cal. Bar No. 243409) KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP	Aaron L. Schwartz ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
10	1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1560 Oakland, CA 94612	850 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022
11	Tel.: (415) 772-4700 Fax: (415) 772-4707	Tel.: (212) 687-1980 Fax: (212) 687-7715
12	lking@kaplanfox.com mchoi@kaplanfox.com	dstraite@kaplanfox.com aschwartz@kaplanfox.com
13	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
14		
15		ATES DISTRICT COURT
16		DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SE DIVISION
17		
18	PATRICK CALHOUN, ELAINE CRESPO, HADIYAH JACKSON and	No
19	CLAUDIA KINDLER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
20	Plaintiffs,	
21	v.	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
22	GOOGLE LLC,	
23	Defendant.	
24		
25		TH PLAINTIFFS' SENSITIVE PERSONAL
26	INFORMATION PROVISIONALLY R	REDACTED PENDING MOTION TO SEAL
27		
28		
		Case No.
	CLASS ACT	TION COMPLAINT

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2	EX.	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
	-	
	1	Chart of Documents Constituting the Relevant Contract by Date
	2	Google Terms of Service dated April 14, 2014
I	3	Google Terms of Service dated Oct. 25, 2017
	4	Google Terms of Service dated March 31, 2020
	5	Chrome Terms of Service dated Aug. 12, 2010
	6	Google Chrome and Chrome OS Additional Terms of Service dated March 31, 2020
	7	Google Privacy Policy dated June 28, 2016
	8	Google Privacy Policy dated Aug. 29, 2016
I	9	Google Privacy Policy dated March 1, 2017
	10	Google Privacy Policy dated April 17, 2017
I	11	Google Privacy Policy dated Oct. 2, 2017
	12	Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 18, 2017
	13	Google Privacy Policy dated May 25, 2018
	14	Google Privacy Policy dated Jan. 22, 2019
I	15	Google Privacy Policy dated Oct. 15, 2019
	16	Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 2019
	17	Chrome Privacy Notice dated June 21, 2016
	18	Chrome Privacy Notice dated August 30, 2016
	19	Chrome Privacy Notice dated Oct. 11, 2016
	20	Chrome Privacy Notice dated Nov. 30, 2016
I	21	Chrome Privacy Notice dated Jan. 24, 2017
L	22	Chrome Privacy Notice dated March 7, 2017
	23	Chrome Privacy Notice dated April 25, 2017
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- iv - C	Case No.
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT	

1	I. INTRODUCTION
2	1. This is a nationwide data privacy class action brought by and on behalf of Google
3	Chrome users who chose not to "Sync" their browsers with their Google accounts while browsing
4	the web ("Un-Synched Chrome Users") from July 27, 2016 to the present (the "Relevant Period").
5	2. Google expressly promises Chrome users that they "don't need to provide any
6	personal information to use Chrome" and that "[t]he personal information that Chrome stores won't
7	be sent to Google unless you choose to store that data in your Google Account by turning on
8	sync[.]"
9	3. Despite these express and binding promises, Google intentionally and unlawfully
10	causes Chrome to record and send users' personal information to Google <i>regardless of whether a</i>
11	user elects to Sync or even has a Google account.
12	4. Examples of personal data improperly created and sent to Google by Chrome
13	include:
14	a. IP addresses linked to user agents;
15	b. Unique, persistent cookie identifiers including the Client ID;
16	c. Unique browser identifiers called X-Client Data Headers; and
17	d. Browsing history.
18	5. This Complaint provides specific examples of the personal data flow that Chrome
19	sent from Plaintiffs' devices as they used Chrome while not Synched, demonstrating that Chrome
20	secretly sends personal information to Google even when a Chrome user does not Sync.
21	6. Google's contract with Chrome users designates California law, and consistent with
22	California law, defines "Personal Information" as "information that you provide to us which
23	personally identifies you or other data that can be reasonably linked to such information by
24	Google, such as information we associate with your Google Account."
25	7. Each category of data identified above is "personal information" because it either
26	personally identifies the user or can be reasonably linked to such information. Furthermore, Google
27	affirmatively discloses that it associates data gathered from Chrome with users. Google has
28	therefore breached its contract with Un-Synched Chrome Users.
	- 1 - Case No.

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8. The improperly collected web browsing history also consists of electronic
 communications that contain content protected by California and federal wiretap laws. Google
 collects the content contemporaneously with the communications; Google does not obtain consent
 from Un-Synched Chrome Users to intercept these communications; and Google is not a party to
 them. Google is thus violating the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and analogue
 California statutes.

9. Google's actions are a serious violation of user privacy. Google tracking code is
found on websites accounting for more than half of all internet traffic and Chrome is the dominant
web browser (used on a majority of desktop computers in the United States), giving Google
unprecedented power to surveil the lives of more than half of the online country in real time. And
because some of Google's third-party tracking cookies are disguised as first-party cookies to
facilitate cookie synching, Google is misrepresenting its privacy practices in ways that have been
successfully challenged by the FTC in the past.<sup>1</sup>

14 10. Google's extensive network of affiliates—Google Sites, Google Apps, Google
15 Account, Google Drive, Google AdWords—as well as its business partnerships means that sharing
16 information with Google feeds it into a massive interconnected database of surveillance material.
17 Google's surveillance of the Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome Users directly contradicts its
18 promises to honor users' choice not to share data. This is a serious and irreversible invasion of
19 privacy that is invisible to Google users.

11. Google's actions also constitute rank theft. Plaintiffs' PI is a form of property
recognized under California law and has economic value in the marketplace. Taking Plaintiffs' PI
from their computers without consent is larceny; any profits earned on the PI are unjustly earned at
the expense of Plaintiffs and must be disgorged. Had Google been transparent about its level of
surveillance, user engagement—a key metric for Google's sales—would have decreased.

25 12. Google's actions also constitute unlawful computer intrusion under California and
26 federal law. Google introduced computer code into Plaintiffs' computers and caused damage

 <sup>27</sup> <sup>1</sup> United States v. Google, Inc., 12-cv-4177-SI (N.D. Cal.), complaint dated Aug. 8, 2012, at ¶ 46-47.

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without authorization by turning the computers into surveillance machines that reported Plaintiffs'
 personal information, including private web browsing, to Google, in real time.

13. Plaintiffs and the other Un-Synched Chrome Users have suffered privacy harm and
economic harm as a result of Google's wrongful acts. Plaintiffs therefore bring contract, statutory,
common law and equitable claims against Google for money damages, restitution, disgorgement,
punitive damages and injunctive relief.

7

8

II.

В.

### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

A. Personal Jurisdiction

9 14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant is
10 headquartered in this District. Google also concedes personal jurisdiction in the current and prior
11 general Google Terms of Service. *See* Exhibits 2 through 4.

12

### Subject Matter Jurisdiction

15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in this action, 13 namely the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (the "Wiretap Act"), the Stored Communication 14 Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 ("SCA"), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the 15 "CFAA") and request for Declaratory Relief under 18 U.S.C. § 2201, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 16 16. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over this entire action pursuant to the 17 Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because this is a class action in which 18 the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, and at least one member of the class is a citizen of 19 a state other than California or Delaware. 20

17. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action
 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims form part of the same case or controversy
 as those that give rise to the federal claims.

24

### C. Venue

18. Venue is proper in this District because the Defendant is headquartered in this
District. In addition, in the current Google general Terms of Service and prior versions, Google
purports to bind Plaintiffs to bring disputes in this District. *See* Exhibits 2 through 4.

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III.

### THE INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

19. Assignment of this case to the San Jose Division is proper pursuant to Civil Local
Rule 3-2(c)(e) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims
occurred in Santa Clara County, California.

IV. PARTIES

6 20. Plaintiff Patrick Calhoun is an adult domiciled in Florida. Plaintiff has used the 7 Chrome browser on his personal laptop for numerous activities, including exchanging 8 communications with state government agencies

Plaintiff has also routinely used the Chrome browser to exchange communications about news,
politics, and more. Plaintiff has not enabled Sync with his Google accounts on his personal laptop
and never consented to Chrome sharing his Personal Information, including the contents of his
Internet communications, with Google. Despite his lack of consent and expressly promising
otherwise, Chrome shared Calhoun's personal information with Google, including the content of
his communications. Plaintiff has temporarily stopped using Chrome but wishes to use it again
once Google stops tracking un-synched users.

21. Plaintiff Elaine Crespo is an adult domiciled in Florida. Plaintiff has used the 16 Chrome browser on her personal laptop for numerous activities, including exchanging 17 communications relating to banking, her children's education, and for her employment. Plaintiff 18 has not enabled Sync with her Google accounts on her personal laptop and never consented to 19 Chrome share her personal information, including the contents of her Internet communications, 20 with Google. Despite her lack of consent and expressly promising otherwise, Chrome shared 21 Crespo's personal information with Google, including the contents of her communications. 22 Plaintiff has temporarily stopped using Chrome but wishes to use it again once Google stops 23 tracking un-synched users. 24

25 22. Plaintiff Hadiyah Jackson is an adult domiciled in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff and her 26 family have used the Chrome browser on her personal laptop for numerous activities, including 27 exchanging communications with state government agencies regarding an

28

Plaintiff has not enabled Sync with her Google accounts on her personal

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laptops and never consented to Chrome sharing her Personal Information, including the contents of her Internet communications, with Google. Despite her lack of consent and expressly promising otherwise, Chrome shared Jackson's personal information with Google, including the content of her communications. Plaintiff has temporarily stopped using Chrome but wishes to use it again once Google stops tracking un-synched users.

23. Plaintiff Claudia Kindler is an adult domiciled in California. Plaintiff has used the 6 Chrome browser on her personal laptop for numerous activities, including exchanging 7 communications with her banks, healthcare providers, and continuing education providers for her 8 employment. Kindler has also routinely used the Chrome browser to exchange communications 9 about politics and more. Plaintiff has not enabled Sync with her Google accounts on her personal 10 laptops and never consented to Chrome sharing her Personal Information, including the contents of 11 her Internet communications, with Google. Despite her lack of consent and expressly promising 12 otherwise, Chrome shared Kindler's personal information with Google, including the content of 13 her communications. Plaintiff has temporarily stopped using Chrome but wishes to use it again 14 once Google stops tracking un-synched users. 15

- 24. Google LLC ("Google") is a Delaware Limited Liability Company based at
  1600 Amphitheatre Way, Mountain View, California, whose memberships interests are entirely
  held by its parent holding company, Alphabet, Inc. ("Alphabet"), headquartered at the same
  address. Alphabet trades under the stock trading symbols GOOG and GOOGL. Alphabet generates
  revenues primarily by delivered targeted online advertising through the Google LLC subsidiary.
  All operations relevant to this complaint are run by Google LLC.
- 22

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25. In this Complaint, "Google" refers to Google LLC unless otherwise specified

23

24

V.

## FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS


A. Contract Formation

25 26. The current contract governing the relationship between Google and Chrome with
26 respect to Chrome consists of three documents: the Google general Terms of Service dated
27 March 31, 2020 (Exhibit 4) ("General TOS"); the Google Chrome and Chrome OS Additional

Terms of Service dated March 31, 2020 (Exhibit 6) ("Chrome TOS"); and the Chrome Privacy
 Notice dated May 20, 2020 (Exhibit 33) ("Chrome Privacy Notice").<sup>2</sup>

27. These documents are revised frequently, see chart in Exhibit 1, but the core contract
 terms relevant to this Action are the same throughout the Relevant Period.

5 28. The General TOS incorporates by reference and hyperlinks to "service-specific 6 additional terms and policies" as illustrated below and in Exhibit 4. The General TOS provides that 7 certain identified services are governed by the General TOS as well as "additional terms and 8 policies that apply to that particular service." It continues, "[t]he Terms of Service, *additional terms* 9 *and policies* define our relationship and mutual expectations as you use these services":



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1	29. The General TOS then identifies Chrome as a "service" and identifies (and
2	hyperlinks to) three documents that govern the use of Chrome and together constitute the contract:
3	
4	$\bigcirc  Chrome \text{ and } Chrome \text{ OS} \qquad \equiv 3 \qquad \land$
5	
6	
7	Terms of Service
8 9	Google Chrome and Chrome OS Additional Terms of Service
10	Google Chrome Privacy Notice 🖾
11	
12	30. The General TOS contains 15 separate references and links to the "service-specific
13	additional terms and policies." Every time this term is referenced, a hyperlink is included that
14	incorporates and links users to the "List of services & service-specific additional terms."
15	31. Prior to March 31, 2020, the Chrome TOS itself also expressly incorporated the
16	Chrome Privacy Notice as a part of the contract. The Chrome TOS dated Aug. 12, 2010 states that
17	users' "agreement with Google" includes "the terms set forth" in the General TOS as well as
18	"Google Chrome Additional Terms of Service and terms of any Legal Notices applicable to the
19	Services." See Ex. 5.
20	32. The Chrome TOS further states that "[f]or more information about Google's data
21	protection practices, please read Google's privacy policy at http://www.google.com/privacy.html
22	and at https://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/privacy/." These two URLs link to the web pages
23	where the Google Privacy Policy and the Chrome Privacy Notice were publicly available.
24	33. Finally, the General TOS specifies that "service-specific additional terms" govern
25	where there is a conflict with the General TOS:
26	
27	If these terms conflict with the service-specific additional terms, the additional terms will govern for that service.
28	
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34. At all times during the Relevant Period, therefore, the Chrome Privacy Notice was
 a part of the contract between Plaintiffs and Google and supersedes any conflicting term in the
 General TOS.
 B. Relevant Contract Terms
 35. The Chrome Privacy Notice represents that it is the place where users can "Learn to
 control the information that's collected, stored, and shared when you use the Google Chrome

7 browser[.]" *See* Ex. 33.

8 36. In the Chrome Privacy Notice, Google promised that Chrome would not send any
9 Personal Information to Google unless the Chrome User affirmatively chose to Sync the browser
10 with his or her Google Account.

37. Specifically, from June 2016 to present, all versions of the Chrome Privacy Notice
have promised that "You don't need to provide any personal information to use Chrome." *See*Exs. 17-33.

14 38. In addition, all versions of the Chrome Privacy Notice have promised that Chrome
15 will not send Personal Information to Google unless the Chrome user chooses to Sync the browser
16 with his or her Google account:

- a. From January 30, 2019 to the present, Google promises that "the personal information that Chrome stores won't be sent to Google unless you choose to store that data in your Google Account by turning on sync." *See* Exs. 28-33.
- b. From September 24, 2018 to January 30, 2019, Google promised that "the personal information that Chrome stores won't be sent to Google unless you choose to store that data in your Google Account by turning on Chrome sync." *See* Exs. 25-27.
- c. Prior to September 24, 2018, the Chrome Privacy Notice promised "The personal information that Chrome stores won't be sent to Google unless you choose to store that data in your Google Account by signing in to Chrome. Signing in enables Chrome's synchronization feature." *See* Exs. 17-24.
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1	39. The Chrome Privacy Notice has always promised that Sync will only be enabled by
2	your choice to take an affirmative act. Synching has never been a default setting during the Relevant
3	Period. For example, from September 24, 2018 to present, a Chrome user had to take the follow
4	affirmative steps to enable Sync:
5	a. On a desktop, <sup>3</sup> the user can enable Sync by taking "open[ing] Chrome,
6	clicking the "Profile" icon at the top right, signing in to the user's "Google
7	Account," clicking "Turn on sync" and then "Turn on." An example is shown
8	here:
9	Cierra in and turns an even
10	Sign in and turn on sync To turn on sync, you'll need a Google Account.
11	1. On your computer, open Chrome.
12	<ol> <li>At the top right, click Profile .</li> <li>Sign in to your Google Account.</li> </ol>
13	4. If you want to sync your info across all your devices, click <b>Turn on sync &gt; Turn on</b> .
14	b. On a mobile device, a user downloads the Chrome app, clicks the "" to the
15	right of the address bar, clicks "Settings," then clicks "Sign in to Chrome,"
16	then "Tap the account [the user] want[s] to use," tap "Continue," and then tap
17	"OK, Got it." An example of these steps for Android users is shown below: <sup>4</sup>
18	ore, Got R. Thi example of these steps for find of disers is shown below.
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25	<sup>3</sup> <i>Turning</i> sync on and off in Chrome, Google Chrome Help, https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/185277?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&oco=1
26	(last visited July 19, 2020).
27 28	<sup>4</sup> <i>Turn sync on and off in Chrome</i> , Google Chrome Help https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/185277?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&oco=1 (last visited July 19, 2020).
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1	
2	Sign in to Chrome
3	To turn on sync, you'll need a Google Account.
4	<ol> <li>On your Android phone or tablet, open the Chrome app</li></ol>
5	2. To the right of the address bar, tap More 🗄 > Settings > Sign in to Chrome.
	<ol> <li>Tap the account you want to use.</li> <li>Tap Continue &gt; OK, Got it.</li> </ol>
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9	40. Prior to September 24, 2018, the process was different but still required at least four
10	affirmative steps to enable Chrome synchronization through the Chrome sign-in feature. <sup>5</sup>
11	If you have more than one account or you share your computer with others, find out how to manage multiple people in Chrome.
12	1. Open Chrome.
13	2. In the top-right, click the button with your name or People 🔔.
	3. Click Sign in to Chrome.
14	<ul> <li>4. Sign in with your Google Account.</li> <li>5. To customise your sync settings, click More &gt; Settings &gt; Advanced sync settings. You can choose what</li> </ul>
15	information to share across other devices where you're signed in to Chrome.
16	
17	41. On mobile devices, users had to take similar steps to enable Chrome. <sup>6</sup>
18	C. Google Improperly Collects Personal Information from Un-Synched Chrome Users Without Consent and in Breach of Contract
19	1. Definition of Personal Information
20	
21	42. The contract designates California law as the governing law.
22	43. California law defines "Personal Information" as, and it is used in this Complaint to
23	mean: "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated
24	with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.
25	
26	<sup>5</sup> Sign in to Chrome, Chrome Help, https://web.archive.org/web/20170411045120
27	<ul> <li>/https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/185277 (archived on Apr. 11, 2017).</li> <li><sup>6</sup> See e.g., Travis Boylss, How to Sync Bookmarks on Chrome on iPhone or iPad, WikiHow</li> </ul>
28	(Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.wikihow.tech/Sync-Bookmarks-on-Chrome-on-iPhone-or-iPad.
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Personal information includes, but is not limited to, the following if it identifies, relates to, 1 describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked, directly 2 or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household: 3

3	or indirectly, with a	particular consumer or household:
4	a.	Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique personal
5		identifier, online identifier, internet protocol address, email address, account
6		name, social security number, driver's license number, passport number, or
7		other similar identifiers;
8	b.	Any categories of personal information described in subdivision (e) of
9		Section 1798.80.
10	с.	Characteristics of protected classifications under California or federal law;
11	d.	Commercial information, including records of personal property, products
12		or services purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or
13		consuming histories or tendencies;
14	e.	Biometric information;
15	f.	Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not
16		limited to, browsing history, search history, and information regarding a
17		consumer's interaction with an internet website, application, or
18		advertisement;
19	g.	Geolocation data;
20	h.	Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information;
21	i.	Professional or employment-related information;
22	j.	Education information, defined as information that is not publicly available
23		personally identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational
24		Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. § 1232(g); 34 C.F.R. Part 99);
25	k.	Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this subdivision
26		to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer's preferences,
27		characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes,
28		intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes."
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1	Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1) (emphasis added).
2	44. The Google general Privacy Policy also expressly tracks the California statutory
3	definition of "personal information," defining it as "information that you provide to us which
4	personally identifies you, such as your name, email address, or billing information, or other data
5	that can be reasonably linked to such information by Google, such as information we associate
6	with your Google Account." See Ex. 16 (emphasis added).
7	45. The following data qualifies as personal information when Google code instructs
8	the Google Chrome browser to report it to Google:
9	a. IP addresses linked to user agent;
10	b. Session and Persistent cookie identifiers;
11	c. X-client-data headers; and
12	e. Browsing history and information regarding a consumer's interaction with
13	an Internet website.
14	46. Google is reasonably capable of linking IP addresses (including those linked to user
15	agent), persistent cookie identifiers, X-client-data headers, and web browsing history and
16	information regarding a consumer's interaction with an Internet website, and, in fact, does link such
17	information with individual consumers and their devices.
18	2. An IP Address + User Agent Is Personal Information
19	47. An IP address is a number that identifies a computer connected to the Internet.
20	48. IP addresses are used to identify and route communications on the Internet.
21	49. An IP address is not the same thing as a URL.
22	50. IP addresses of individual Internet users are used by Internet service providers,
23	websites, and tracking companies to facilitate and track Internet communications.
24	51. Google tracks IP addresses associated with specific Internet users.
25	52. Google is capable of and does in fact associate specific users with specific IP
26	addresses. For example, when a user signs into a Gmail account, Google associates the personal
27	information connected with that email account to the IP address in question.
28	
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1	53.	Even if a specific IP address is shared by multiple devices on a single network,
2	Google is cap	able of and does, in fact, associate specific users with specific IP addresses. Google
3	does so throug	gh its use of other identifiers tied to an IP address, including User-Agent, which is a
4	list of properti	ies identifying a device within a network.
5	54.	Because Google collects the IP Address and user agent information together, Google
6	can identify a	user's individual device even if more than one device shares the same IP Address.
7		3. Persistent Cookies Are Personal Information
8	55.	A cookie is a small text file that a web-server can place on a person's web browser
9	and computing	g device when that person's web browser interacts with the website server.
10	56.	Cookies can perform different functions. Eventually, some cookies were designed
11	to acquire and	record an individual Internet user's communications and activities on websites across
12	the Internet.	
13	57.	Cookies are designed to and, in fact, do operate as a means of identification for
14	Internet users.	
15	58.	In general, cookies are categorized by (1) duration and (2) party.
16	59.	There are two types of cookies classified by duration:
17		a. "Session cookies" are placed on a user's computing device only while the
18		user is navigating the website that placed and accesses the cookie during a
19		single communication session. The user's web browser deletes session
20		cookies when the user closes the browser.
21		b. "Persistent cookies" are designed to survive beyond a single Internet-
22		browsing session. The party creating the persistent cookie determines its
23		lifespan. As a result, a persistent cookie can acquire and record a user's
24		Internet communications for years and over dozens, hundreds, or thousands
25		of websites. Persistent cookies are sometimes called "tracking cookies."
26	60.	Cookies are also classified by the party that uses the collected data:
27		a. "First-party cookies" are set on a user's device by the website with which
28		the user is exchanging communications. For example, Google uses cookies
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on users' browsers when users' directly visit Google properties such as 1 Gmail. First-party cookies can be helpful to the user, server, and/or website 2 to assist with security, log-in, and functionality. 3 b. "Third-party cookies" are set on a user's device by website servers other than 4 the website or server with which the user is exchanging communications. 5 For example, the same Gmail user might also have cookies on their Chrome 6 browser that are set by Google's other services such as Google Ads or 7 Google Doubleclick. Unlike first-party cookies, third-party cookies are not 8 typically helpful to the user. Instead, third-party cookies are typically used 9 for data collection, behavioral profiling, and targeted advertising. 10 61. Google uses several cookies to identify specific Internet users and their devices, 11 including the following: 12 13 SID These cookies contain digitally signed and encrypted records of a user's 14 **HSID** Google account ID and most recent sign-in time. They are unique and persistent on a user's device for two years or more. 15 Secure-SSID These cookies are "secure" cookies that Google sets and accesses when Secure-HSID a user signs into a Gmail account and does not formally log-off even after 16 the user has left the Gmail website. They are unique and persistent on a user's device for six months or more. 17 NID The NID cookie contains a unique ID Google uses to remember user preferences and other information, including, for example, how many 18 search results they wish to have shown per page and whether they have Google's SafeSearch filter turned on. NID is also used to help customize 19 ads on Google properties, like Google search. NID is unique and persistent on a user's device for two years or more. 20 SSID These cookies are unique and persistent on a user's device for two years APISID or more. Google does not publicly state their purpose. 21 **SAPISID** These cookies are "secure" cookies that Google sets and accesses when Secure-3PSID 22 Secure-APISID a user signs into a Gmail account and does not formally log-off even after Secure-3PAPISID the user has left the Gmail website. 23 Google uses the IDE cookie for advertising. It is unique and persistent on IDE a user's device for two years or more. 24 DSID Google also uses the DSID cookie for advertising. It is unique and persistent on a user's device for two years or more. 25 26 62. Google also engages in a controversial practice known as "cookie synching" which 27 further allows Google to associate cookies with specific individuals. With cookie synching, first-28 - 14 -Case No. **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT** 

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party cookies are set by websites with which users are directly interacting, but then those first-party websites also pass that cookie values along to Google Analytics, where Google takes the personal 2 information it has about the user's particular browser and links the Google Analytics first-party 3 cookie information to Google's own third-party cookies and the user's browsing. 4

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63. Based on an Internet security policy known as the same-origin policy, web-browsers are supposed to prevent different entities from accessing each other's cookies. For example, at the San Jose Mercury News website, Google would be prevented from accessing the new site's "firstparty" cookie values. And vice-versa, the San Jose Mercury News would be prevented from accessing Google.com's third-party cookie values.

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64. However, Javascript source code running on a webpage can bypass the same origin policy protections by sending a putative 'first-party' cookie value in a tracking pixel to a third-party entity. This technique is known in the Internet advertising business as "cookie synching."

65. Cookie synching allows cooperating websites to learn each other's cookie 13 identification numbers for the same user. Once the cookie synching operation is complete, the two 14 websites exchange information that they have collected and hold about a user, further making these 15 cookies "Personal Information." 16

66. The Google cookie-synching cookie is called "cid," which is short for the "Client 17 ID" that Google assigns to a specific user. As Google admits in its Google Analytics documentation 18 for web-developers, the *cid* cookie is personal information: 19

In order for Google Analytics to determine that two distinct hits belong to the same user, a unique identifier, associated with that particular user, must be sent with each hit. The analytics is library accomplishes this via the Client ID field, a unique, randomly generated string that gets stored in the browser's cookies, so subsequent visits to the same site can be associated with the same user.<sup>7</sup>

67. Chrome shares the Client ID value with Google regardless of a user's Sync status or 24 log-in status with Google Ads, Google Doubleclick, and Google Analytics. Even worse, Chrome 25 shares Google's cid cookie value with Google even when third-party cookies are blocked. 26

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<sup>7</sup> https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/cookies-user-id.

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Disguising third-party tracking cookies as first-party cookies is a deceptive privacy practice already
 successfully challenged by the FTC when Google attempted it in 2011. United States v. Google, Inc.,
 12-cv-4177-SI (N.D. Cal.), complaint dated Aug. 8, 2012, at ¶ 46-47.

68. In addition to sending Google the "CID" cookie value, Chrome also sends cookiesynched values for Google cookies named \_gads ID, \_gcl\_au/auiddc, and \_gid to Google.

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#### 4. X-Client Data Headers Are Personal Information

69. The x-client-data header is an identifier that when combined with IP address and user-agent, uniquely identifies every individual download version of the Chrome browser.

9 70. The x-client-data identifier is sent from Chrome to Google every time users 10 exchange an Internet communication, including when users log-in to their specific Google 11 accounts, use Google services such as Google search or Google maps, and when Chrome users are 12 neither signed-in to their Google accounts nor using any Google service.

13 71. Chrome has created and sent the x-client-data identifier to Google with every
14 communication users exchange since at least March 6, 2018.

15 72. The x-client-identifier is not disclosed in any term of service or privacy policy
16 operative at any time.

17 73. It is also not hyperlinked to any of these policies and the average, reasonable
18 Chrome user had no reason to know of its existence.

19 74. Google first publicly admitted to the existence of the x-client-data identifier to the
20 tech community in a document called the Chrome Privacy White Paper, published on March 6,
21 2018. The White Paper assisted developers on the "read" side—or surveillance side—with
22 developing products that could extract this information and further pair it with existing data.

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75. The White Paper is authored by Google and makes several admissions relevant to this action, as well as furthering the impression that Chrome was not sending personal information to Google in violation of its express promises.

76. The White Paper begins by stating, "This document describes the features in
Chrome that communicate with Google, as well as with third-party services (for example, if you've
changed your default search engine)."

<ul> <li>77. Despite claiming the it would "describe[] the features in Chrome that communicate with Google[,]" the White Paper does not disclose that Chrome sends users' personal information to Google regardless of whether users are logged-in to their Google Sync account or not.</li> <li>78. Initially, the White Paper falsely represented that the x-client data identifier, which it called a "Chrome-Variations header" did "not contain any personally identifiable information.</li> </ul>			
to Google regardless of whether users are logged-in to their Google Sync account or not. 78. Initially, the White Paper falsely represented that the x-client data identifier, which			
78. Initially, the White Paper falsely represented that the x-client data identifier, which			
it called a "Chrome-Variations header" did "not contain any personally identifiable information			
and will only describe the state of the installation of Chrome itself, including active variations, as			
well as server-side experiments that may affect the installation."8			
79. However, on September 24, 2018, researcher and technologist Vincent Toubiana			
with ARCEP (a French Telecom regulator), who runs the blog www.unsearcher.org, took notice of			
X-client-data. What he learned alarmed him:			
"The x-client-data header			
This is probably the most problematic header and I did not see it montion ensuring and then in the whitepaper. Most users are not			
mention anywhere else than in the whitepaper. <i>Most users are not</i> <i>aware of it but this header is sent with every request sent to Google</i> <i>services</i> (and only Google services) to do A/B testing. Google			
services include most Google domains, including Doubleclick. Even when Google is a third party, the header is sent. Because it's a header and not a cookie, it is sent even when you block cookies.			
So not only does this header may [sic] have some privacy			
implications, it makes the browser not neutral as it gives more data to Google services.			
Conclusion			
by using custom headers, Google is less and less dependent on			
third party cookies. I would not be surprised if Chrome started to block third party cookies. Actually this may be in Google financial			
interest to do that. <sup>9</sup>			
<sup>8</sup> https://web.archive.org/web/20180505082442/https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitep aper.html			
<sup>9</sup> https://unsearcher.org/more-on-chrome-updates-and-headers			
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80. On January 14, 2020, Google announced that Chrome would be phasing out the use 1 of third-party cookies over two years. Google cynically claimed that its decision was driven by the 2 fact that "[u]sers are demanding greater privacy—including transparency, choice, and control over 3 how their data is used."<sup>10</sup> Left unsaid was the fact that *Chrome's x-client header can now uniquely* 4 identify a majority of web-browsers in the United States, and Google does not need tracking 5 *cookies anymore*. Now that Google controls both the online ad market and the browser market 6 simultaneously, blocking third-party cookies simply blocks competing trackers, while Google has 7 a method to continue back-door tracking through the unique browser identifier created and 8 disclosed by its browser without any notification to users. 9

- 81. In addition to uniquely identifying Plaintiffs' browsers, Google also uses the x-10 client-identifier to track them across other Google services. For example, on February 4, 2020, 11 Arnaud Granal, the developer of the Kiwi Browser (a Chromium-based alternative browser for 12 Android) discovered and disclosed that x-client-data is "a unique ID to track a specific Chrome 13 instance across all Google properties," including, in his example, YouTube and Doubleclick.<sup>11</sup> 14
- 82. Similarly, Kyle Bradshaw at www.9to5google.com explained the x-client-data 15 identifier "is sent to those Google servers regardless of whether you're logged in with your Google 16 Account or not, which could theoretically tie your logged-out browsing back to your Google 17 Account."12 18
- 83. Bradshaw further explained, "Putting it all together, the accusation being leveled 19 against Google by the tech community is that the company is making it harder for competing ad 20 networks and other third-parties to track your browsing while their own purported tracking method 21 is able to continue uninhibited." Regardless of the impact on competitors, the impact on Plaintiffs 22 and the Class is significant-they cannot escape this new and even more secretive form of 23 surveillance. 24
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- <sup>10</sup> https://blog.chromium.org/2020/01/building-more-private-web-path-towards.html
- <sup>11</sup> https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/467#issuecomment-581944600
  - $^{12}\ https://9to5google.com/2020/02/06/google-chrome-x-client-data-tracking/$

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1	84.	Following the revelations above, Google quietly amended its White Paper to remove	
2	its false representations about the x-client header. For example, on March 12, 2020, in an article		
3	called "Google Backpedals on Claim that X-Client-Data Doesn't Contain PI Information," it was		
4	reported by VPN Overview:		
5		Originally the information about the X-Client-Data header in the	
6		whitepaper was as follows: "A list of field trials that are currently active on your installation of Chrome will be included in all requests	
7		sent to Google. This Chrome variations header (X-Client-Data) will not contain any personally identifiable information, and will only describe the state of the installation of Chrome itself, including active	
8 9		variations, as well as server-side experiments that may affect the installation." In the latest version of the whitepaper, the text stating that the X-Client-Data header doesn't contain any PI information	
10	0.5	has been removed. <sup>13</sup>	
11	85.	VPN Overview further explained:	
12		The fact that Google may be tracking users through the X-Client- Data header, is in itself of concern. However, it is not the most	
13		important issue here. Google probably has other means for tracking users. <i>Of greater concern is the fact that Google did not disclose</i>	
14		what it was using the header for. Google is tracking users without their knowledge, which is a violation of users' privacy.	
15		Furthermore, the original description of the header's use was incredibly inaccurate and likely to have been in breach of legal compliance requirements.	
16		comptance requirements.	
17	86.	As of the date of filing, Google still has not fixed the Chrome Privacy Notice, the	
18	Google general Terms of Use, or the Google Privacy Policy to accurately disclose the X-Client-		
19	Data identifier and its uses.		
20		5. Browsing History is Personal Information	
21	87.	Browsing history consists of a record of a communication or communications that	
22	a user excha	anges on the Internet and includes both the content of the communication or	
23	communications and data associated with it, such as the time of the communication or		
24	communications.		
25	88.	California law defines "personal information" to include browsing history,	
26	specifically, "Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not limited		
27 28	<sup>13</sup> https://vpnoverview.com/news/google-backpedals-on-claim-that-x-client-data-doesnt-contain- pi-information/		
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1	to, browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer's interaction with an			
2	internet website, application, or advertisement." Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1)(F).			
3	89. Google also defines "personal information" to include browsing history in the			
4	Chrome Privacy Notice.			
5	D. Chrome's Promise Not To Share PI With Google if Not Synched Was Intended To Encourage, Not Diminish, User Engagement			
6	Intended To Encourage, Not Diminish, Oser Engagement			
7	90. Google's motivation to breach its privacy promises to Un-Synched Chrome Users			
8	was to increase user engagement and increase revenue for Google. Higher user engagement means			
9	more revenue in that moment for Google, and also more data about the users that can lead to more			
10	revenue. By promising more privacy, Google induces more private sharing, which is a more			
11	profitable kind of user engagement.			
12	91. "User engagement" is the degree to which users find products, services and			
13	processes interesting or useful. It is typically measured by time spent interacting with products and			
14	user satisfaction with that time spent. Engagement can be measured by a variety or combination of			
15	activities such as downloads, clicks, interactions, shares, and more.			
16	92. Examples of "engagement" data include:			
17	a. For social or traditional media sites: daily usage, views, time on page, pages			
18	per visit, ad clicks, searches, comments, or shares;			
19	b. For streaming music apps: daily usage, time spent in app, songs listened to,			
20	playlists created, friends added;			
21	c. For an e-commerce store: monthly usage, adding items to cart;			
22	d. For a personal finance app: weekly usage, sync bank accounts, create a			
23	budget, enable notifications, view dashboard; and			
24	e. Enterprise software: Monthly usage, create reports, share reports, invite			
25	users.			
26	93. Examples of specific metrics used by online entities to track this engagement include			
27	daily active users (DAU), cost-per-acquisition, and ROI. The relative value of these metrics varies			
28	by business. For example, high engagement via views or clicks might be good for a news site but			
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not for an insurance app, where more usage might suggest that a user is about to file a claim. Higher
 engagement leads to higher profits when additional activity leads to purchases, signups,
 subscriptions, ad views, or clicks.

94. Product and marketing teams typically measure user engagement to understand the
factors that contribute to higher engagement and use product analytics measure what features affect
user behavior. Product analytics and active user engagement data important selling points to
advertisers and those who will pay to influences user behavior, whether that is to purchase
something, vote or take some other action.

9 95. By inducing more personal and more active engagement, Google can therefore 10 increase its profitability. Because this is a revenue-generating exercise, analytics teams at Google 11 are incentivized to engage in detailed analysis of both how to stimulate more engagement, and also 12 the value of each kind of engagement and the data that it generates. Put differently, specific user 13 engagement are assigned economic value.

- 14 96. By analyzing user flow—where users spend time, how they interact with others,
  15 when they disengage with a site or app or maybe interested in paying more to upgrade—Google
  16 can learn valuable insights into how to influence users' choices and how to target them for Google's
  17 partners. User flow is analyzed by using precisely the metrics at issue in this action.
- 18 97. Indeed, Google was a pioneer in this field, and Google products help developers
  19 create Engagement Scores for users.<sup>14</sup> In June 2011 Google acquired PostRank, specifically
  20 because PostRank had an effective tool for measuring user engagement. According to a Google
  21 spokesperson at that time, Google is "always looking for new ways to measure and analyze data,"
  22 and PostRank would help "make this data more actionable and accountable [through] an innovative
  23 approach to measuring web engagement [that can ] help us improve our products for our users and
  24 advertisers.<sup>15</sup>
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<sup>14</sup> https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/site-engagement

<sup>15</sup> https://techcrunch.com/2011/06/03/google-acquires-postrank-an-analytics-service-for-the-social-web/

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98. As applied here, the data that Chrome has sent to Google in violation of its promises not to do so is integral to the calculation of users' engagement scores. It can also be tied to specific 2 profitability. 3

99. The most powerful of all of these may be the x-client-referrer header, described 4 above. Because it is all-pervasive and impossible to remove from users' activity, the richness of 5 the data Google collects has higher value than disconnected data points of less robust detail. 6

100. By targeting advertising at users who have a higher amount of "tracked" 7 engagement, Google can increase the profits they make from gathering that data. 8

101. An "untracked" user may only be shown generic ads. Such ads, in turn, tend to yield 9 a lower engagement rate and therefore generate less profit for Google. A "tracked" user's browsing, 10 in contrast, yields greater data for Google to target and is also a more lucrative target in its own 11 right. The more active a user is, the more vulnerable to targeting she is, and more valuable as well. 12

102. In addition, promising a user that she is free from tracking induces a different set of 13 expectations and also a different kind of engagement. Specifically, one would expect a user to 14 engage more actively and more intimately under the belief that she is untracked. She may also 15 engage with different types of content than she would if she knew she were being surveilled, 16 exposing them as relevant for further categories of valuable advertising. 17

Tracking users' engagement across Google's advertising products also allows 103. 18 greater optimization of those advertising products, with respect to those individual users, to increase 19 the likelihood of their future engagement with ads, further increasing Google's ability to generate 20 profit. 21

104. By sending to Google Un-Synced Chrome users' data reflecting their behavior, 22 Google is able to draw a more complete picture of those users, even when they had not opted-in to 23 such tracking. 24

105. All of this results in concrete, ascertainable financial gain for Google, directly 25 attributable by the increased user engagement. Those profits can be identified and quantified; 26 indeed, teams of analysts at Google are engaged in precisely this process. 27

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### How Google Instructs Chrome to Report PI to Google

106. Chrome is a web-browser—a software application that enables users to exchange electronic communications over the Internet.

Every website is hosted by a computer server through which the entity or person in 107. charge of the website exchanges communications with Internet users via users' web-browsers.

108. The process through which Chrome transmits communications between users and the first-party websites with which users are communications is called packet-switching.<sup>16</sup>

109. The prior technology through which phone communications were transmitted was 8 called circuit-switching. With circuit-switching, the service provider would establish a single 9 pathway (or circuit) through which the content of a communication would flow between the parties 10 to the communication. The problem with circuit-switching is that, if the single path becomes 11 blocked, the communication fails. 12

Enter packet-switching. With packet-switching, there is no single, dedicated path 110. 13 through which the contents of a communication flow. Instead, the contents of a communication are 14 broken down into dozens, hundreds, or thousands of packets—each of which is routed over a 15 network with different paths to the destination. Each packet contains part of the content and 16 information about its destination. Each packet travels independently to the destination and every 17 packet may travel by a different route to the destination. As the packets arrive, they are arranged 18 by the device to which they are sent. Only at the end are they put both together and the 19 communication formed. The path of each packet, and the order in which each packet arrives, is not 20 relevant to the ultimate success of a communication. Some packets may get stopped in the 21 process—in which case they are resent down a different path. 22

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111. Packet-switching is now ubiquitous. For example, all 4G and 5G voice or data communications are made via packet-switching technology.

Thus, although common imagination may suppose that a modern cellphone call or

25 internet communication involves a direct line of communication between the participants to the

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<sup>16</sup> Packet-switching is also explained in U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2010).

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communication, that is not true at all. Through packet-switching, the contents of the communication 1 are broken down into dozens, hundreds, or thousands of different packets that are exchanged 2 through separate pathways between the parties to the communication. 3 On the Internet, when a user begins a communication with a website, the user's 113. 4 browser starts and continues several processes all at once. These simultaneous processes include: 5 sending contents of the users' side of the communication to the website; a. 6 b. receiving and rendering the website's side of the communication; 7 placing the content of the communication in temporary and intermediate c. 8 9 storage, and; d. in some cases, re-directing the contents of the communication to third-parties; 10 114. The basic commands that Chrome uses to send the users' side of a communication 11 are called GET and POST requests. 12 115. When a user types https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-13 tips-for-handling-the-pandemic/ into her browser (or takes the technological shortcut of clicking a 14 hyperlink), Chrome contacts the website hosting the Mercury News and sends the following 15 communication: "GET 2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-tips-for-handling-the-pandemic/". 16 If instead the user were filling out a form on that website and clicks a button to 116. 17 submit the information in the form, Chrome similarly makes connection with the website server 18 but instead sends a "POST" request that includes the specific content that the user placed in the 19 form. 20 117. When a user clicks a hyperlink or hits ENTER to send a communication, Chrome 21 determines whether it is a GET or POST request based on the source code within the browser or 22 the current website with which the user is communicating. The browser then simultaneously: 23 Places the contents of the GET or POST request in storage in the browser's a. 24 web-browsing history and short-term memory; and 25 Connects to and begins a back-and-forth the two-way communication b. 26 exchange between the user and the website. 27 118. Chrome stores the contents of the communication for at least two purposes: 28 - 24 -Case No. **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT** 

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	<ul> <li>a. content is placed in the browser's short-term memory so that, if the user's web-browser crashes unexpectedly, when the user re-starts their browser, the browser will be able to offer the user the ability to return to their last communications prior to the browser's crash; and</li> <li>b. The content is placed in the user's browsing history and the user's future reference for 90 days.</li> <li>119. For short-term memory, if Chrome crashes unexpectedly and the user re-opens it,</li> </ul>				
8	Chrome provides the user with the following options at the upper right-hand side of the screen:				
9					
10 11	Restore pages?				
12	Chrome didn't shut down correctly.				
13	chrome didir t shut down conrectly.				
14	Restore				
15					
16					
17	120. This short-term storage is for purposes of back-up protection.				
18	121. The storage for 90 days in the user's browsing history is temporary, intermediate				
19	storage incidental to the contemporaneous transmission of the communication.				
20	122. In response to receiving a GET or POST request from a user, the server for the				
21	website with which the user is exchanging a communication will send a set of instructions to				
22	Chrome, commanding Chrome with source code on:				
23	a. How to render the website's portion of the communication; and				
24	b. In some cases (up to 86 percent of popular websites), using source code				
25	provided by Google and specifically designed to command the Chrome to				
26	contemporaneously re-direct the precise content of the GET or POST part of				
27	the communication to Google and its various entities attached to personal				
28					
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information and other browser-generated data about the content of the website's portion of the communication.

123. Google instructs developers to place its source code that commands Chrome to
contemporaneously re-direct the contents of the communication exchanged between the user and
the website to Google in the website's header—i.e., before the website's instructions regarding the
contents of its side of the communication. For example, for Google Tag Manager, Google instructs
developers to place its code "as close to the opening <head> tag as possible on every page of your
website[.]"<sup>17</sup>

9 124. Google's placement is designed to put priority on the re-directions of content and
10 user personal information from Chrome to Google. By placing the re-direction commands first,
11 Google ensures that the re-direction will occur as soon as possible so that Google will be able to
12 collect the contents and personal information even if the user quickly changes their mind or the
13 browser unexpectedly shuts down before the communication transmissions are complete.

14 125. The transmission process between Chrome and the website server is not discrete,
15 but instead involves a series of rapid, continuing, simultaneous data exchanges between Chrome
16 and the website server with data flowing both ways throughout the process and through dozens,
17 hundreds, or even thousands of different paths to reach their destination at the user or website.<sup>18</sup>

18 126. The data and content exchanges between Chrome and the website server continue
19 even after it appears that the website's portion of the communication has been fully rendered on
20 the user's screen.

127. At the same time that the transmission and content exchange of the communication
is happening between the user's browser and the website server (i.e. the devices), the contents of
the communication (including the user's specific request and information about the substance of
website's side of the communication) are re-directed to third-parties.

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<sup>17</sup> See https://developers.google.com/tag-manager/quickstart

<sup>18</sup> In one example of which counsel is aware, a recording of a single 288 second communication resulted in 22,779 separate packet transmissions—or 79 data packet transmissions per second.

1	128. The Google and Chrome browser-generated redirections of the contents of the		
2	communication occur:		
3	a. Without any further action of the user;		
4	b. While connections and the contents of the communication are still being		
5	exchanged between the user and the website; and		
6	c. Without exception, while the connection between and the communication		
7	between the user and the website is still occurring.		
8	129. Google is the most frequent third-party recipient of browser-redirected		
9	communications.		
10	130. The Google source code and Chrome browser-generated re-directions of		
11	communications content and personal information from Chrome to Google occurs through a		
12	combination placement of web-bugs or tracking pixels and iframes.		
13	131. A web-bug or tracking pixel is a 1x1 pixel that is placed on the screen. It is tiny and		
14	purposefully designed to remain invisible to the user. The web-bug is a tiny, invisible window		
15	through which Google surveils Internet users.		
16	132. An iframe is a container in which a web-developer can place content, or, in the case		
17	of Google's source code and surveillance tools, can place source code for web-bugs or tracking		
18	pixels. In many cases, Google's source code and Chrome browser-generated re-directions are		
19	funneled first through an iframe designed by Google through a service called Google Tag Manager.		
20	The source code for Google Tag Manager instructs Chrome to make certain that the surveillance		
21	tool is invisible, literally stating that the Google Tag Manager iframe should hidden. For example,		
22	here is the Google Tag Manager source code crafted by Google for The Mercury News:		
23	Google Tag Manager (noscript)		
24	<pre><noscript><iframe height="0" src="https://www.googletagmanager.com/ns.html?id=GTM-TLFP4R" style="display:none;visibility:hidden" width="0"></iframe></noscript> <!-- End Google Tag Manager (noscript)--></pre>		
25			
26	133. Google writes the source code for web-developers to deploy for its invisible web-		
27	bugs and tracking pixels, and for Google Tag Manager, a vessel Google developed to make it even		
28	easier for websites to deploy its surveillance tools. Then, having designed the source code to		
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command the contemporaneous re-direction of the contents of communications and user personal
 information to itself, Google then designed Chrome to send the personal information to Google
 *regardless of whether the user is logged-in to Google Sync,* in violation of Chrome's express
 promises to users.
 134. Chrome sends the following personal information to Google when a user exchanges

134. Chrome sends the following personal information to Google when a user exchanges
 communications with any website that includes Google surveillance source code—again,
 *regardless of whether a user is logged-in to Google Sync or not*:

- a. The user's unique, persistent cookie identifiers;
- b. The user's browsing history in the form of the contents of the users' GET
  requests and information relating to the substance, purport, or meaning of the
  website's portion of the communication with the user;
  - c. In many cases, the contents of the users' POST communications;
  - d. The user's IP address and User-Agent information about their device; and
  - e. The user's x-client-data identifier.

15 135. Each category of personal information that Chrome sends to Google is a separate
 violation of Chrome's Terms of Service and an invasion of users' privacy. And the aggregate
 impact of these takings effectively puts users *who opted not to Sync* under Google's surveillance.

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F. A Sample Visit to The San Jose Mercury News Website Using Chrome – Comparison Between a "Synched" Session and "Un-synched" Session

136. Suppose a Chrome user wished to access an article on mental health during the Covid-19 pandemic and saw the link below to a relevant article on the San Jose Mercury News, and clicked it:

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- **Q&A: Mental health tips for handling the pandemic** By Louis Hansen
- May 24, 2020 at 7:00 a.m.
- 137. Immediately upon clicking the link, Chrome places the content of the user's part of
- 28 the communication in temporary storage, as described above.

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138. Chrome also immediately communicates a GET request on behalf of the user to The Mercury News at www.mercurynews.com requesting that The Mercury News exchange its part of 2 the communication by sending a specific article: "Q&A: Mental health tips for handling the pandemic." 4

> 139. The specific GET request sent from Chrome to The Mercury News is:

6 :authority: www.mercurynews.com 7 :method: GET

:path: /2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-tips-for-handling-the-pandemic/

140. The user's simple act of clicking a mouse to begin the communication with The 10 Mercury News about Mental Health Tips for Handling the Pandemic triggers a set of 11 contemporaneous, ongoing connections between Chrome and The Mercury News-and the 12 contemporaneous redirection of the contents of the communication between the user and The 13 Mercury News to various Google properties. 14

141. Google's source code and the Chrome browser then immediately re-direct the 15 content of the user's side of the communication and The Mercury News response to Google Tag 16 Manager, Google Ads, Google DoubleClick, Google Analytics, and Google Captcha. 17

142. Each re-direction of data from Chrome to Google includes one or more of the 18 following: content of the communication, IP address, user-agent information, x-client-data 19 identifier, and various unique, persistent cookies identified herein. 20

143. On July 21, 2020, counsel for the Plaintiffs employed an expert to record data 21 transmissions from the Chrome browser to Google in each of three different browser-states for the 22 example GET request to The Mercury News for the mental health article discussed above. The 23 browser-states tested were: (1) Sync mode where the Google test account had logged-in to Google 24 Sync; (2) Basic-browser mode where the Google test account had not logged-in to Google Sync 25 but was logged into a Google account (here, Gmail); and (3) Basic-browser mode where the Google 26 test account was not logged-in to Google Sync and also not logged into any other Google account. 27

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1	144. The following charts compare the PI that Chrome sends to Google when the browser			
2	is one of three states: first, when the user has affirmatively synched with another Google Account			
3	(called "synched" below); second, when the user is not synched, but logged into another Google			
4	service such as Gmail ("un-synched, with Gmail log-in"); and third, when the user is neither			
5	synched nor logged into any other Google account ("un-synched, logged out"). As the test results			
6	below confirm, Google causes Chrome to send PI to itself even when a Chrome user has not			
7	authorized the data collection by synching.			
8	145. Chrome copies and re-directs the content of the user's GET request (the one asking			
9	for the article on mental health) to Google Ads, Google DoubleClick, and Google Analytics in			
10	identical fashion regardless of whether the user is synched.			
11				
12	PERSONAL INFORMATION CHROME SENDS TO ALL GOOGLE CONTENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE MERCURY NEWS			
	Identical for All Browser-States and All Google Entity Recipients			
13	Synched 2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-tips-for-handling-the-pandemic			
	Un-Synched, Gmail Login 2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-tips-for-handling-the-pandemic			
14	Un-Synched, no Gmail Login 2020/05/24/qa-mental-health-tips-for-handling-the-pandemic.html			
15	146. Similarly, the x-client-data header Chrome sends to Google Ads, Google			
16	DoubleClick, and Google Analytics is identical regardless of whether the user is synched:			
17	PERSONAL INFORMATION CHROME SENDS TO GOOGLE			
	X-CLIENT-DATA-HEADER			
18	Identical for All Browser-States and All Google Entity Recipients Except Analytics			
	Synched CKy1yQEIkbbJAQimtskBCMS2yQEIqZ3KAQjnyMoBCLTLygE=			
19	Un-Synched, Gmail Login CKy1yQEIkbbJAQimtskBCMS2yQEIqZ3KAQjnyMoBCLTLygE=			
20	Un-Synched, no Gmail Login CKy1yQEIkbbJAQimtskBCMS2yQEIqZ3KAQjnyMoBCLTLygE=			
21	147. Similarly, the IP address and User-Agent data Chrome sends to Google Ads, Google			
22	DoubleClick, and Google Analytics is identical <i>regardless of whether the user is synched</i> .			
23	148. Similarly, the Google Analytics "cid" cookie or "Client ID" that Chrome sends to			
24	Google is identical <i>regardless of whether the user is synched</i> :			
25	PERSONAL INFORMATION CHROME SENDS TO ALL GOOGLE			
26	"CID" – "CLIENT ID" COOKIE VALUE			
20	Identical for All Browser-States and All Google Entity Recipients			
27	Synched cid=2007029474.1595353114			
27	Un-Synched, Gmail Login cid=2007029474.1595353114			
20	Un-Synched, no Gmail Login cid=2007029474.1595353114			
28				
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149. The third-party cookie data Chrome sends to Google Ads is identical for at least 11
 different persistent, unique cookies for Un-Synched Chrome users regardless of whether signed
 into Gmail, but not transmitted to Google if the Un-Synched Chrome user is not also logged into
 Gmail:

5				
_		FORMATION CHROME SENDS TO GOOGLE ADS		
6	UNIQUE, PERSISTENT THIRD-PARTY COOKIE VALUES Identical for Synched and Un-Synched w/ Gmail Login			
7	Synched	SID=zQfoZ_zUnJr9Gm_IL2u7ticWDqZNymdEgeQPEJdMF0tShKy		
	5	XCg_BgOS7PQHBWgLiW71F4Q.		
8		Secure-3PSID=zQfoZ_zUnJr9Gm_IL2u7ticWDqZNymdEge		
9		QPEJdMF0tShKyXryW3ljJQRAkrQ 0hbzqbBHg.		
,		HSID=AFuEZ4mCJy32UrJK7		
10		SSID=Aw06H6mNsRcQYQjqA		
		APISID=U1WjkuS385Vfizcg/AXMK-fI2Ee2PZnjSB		
11		SAPISID=tVrmANaeRR3mDV/ABTnEns79q7apJgjE		
12		Secure-HSID=AFuEZ4mCJy32UrJK7 Secure-SSID=Aw06H6mNsRcQYQjqA		
12		Secure-SSID_AwoononivskeqTQjqA Secure-APISID=U1WjkuS385Vfizcg/AXMK-fI2Ee2PZnjSB		
13		Secure-3PAPISID=tVrmANaeRR3mDV/ABTnEns79q7ap		
		JgjENID=204=Yc40KkubQ69v_6cmRVkl6eEK6FPzgNcuct		
14		N7ndjgcsBeMwUO4uxFOCBmFTLG0HNLk7p13a0Le2tnE		
15		gjOllwZi62Jh4f4fjKFXMR8pL0Z4GqbjlUtejOv3Nvhtf1D n63dABgRTnJIRXPklAsY5hCMQfLCHCAKIrg01U		
15		p3q7q2fFN3Aj8lXaT9g12rT5QtcNgJAZP8dKmLevACA		
16		L. J. J		
17	Un-Synched, Gmail Login	SID=zQfoZ_zUnJr9Gm_IL2u7ticWDqZNymdEgeQPEJdMF0tShKy		
17		XCg_BgOS7PQHBWgLiW71F4Q.		
18		Secure-3PSID=zQfoZ_zUnJr9Gm_IL2u7ticWDqZNymdEge QPEJdMF0tShKyXryW3ljJQRAkrQ		
		OhbzqbBHg.		
19		HSID=AFuEZ4mCJy32UrJK7		
20		SSID=Aw06H6mNsRcQYQjqA		
20		APISID=U1WjkuS385Vfizcg/AXMK-fI2Ee2PZnjSB		
21		SAPISID=tVrmANaeRR3mDV/ABTnEns79q7apJgjE Secure-HSID=AFuEZ4mCJy32UrJK7		
		Secure-SSID=Aw06H6mNsRcQYQjqA		
22		Secure-APISID=U1WjkuS385Vfizcg/AXMK-fI2Ee2PZnjSB		
23		Secure-3PAPISID=tVrmANaeRR3mDV/ABTnEns79q7ap		
23		JgjENID=204=Yc40KkubQ69v_6cmRVkl6eEK6FPzgNcuct N7ndjgcsBeMwUO4uxFOCBmFTLG0HNLk7p13a0Le2tnE		
24		gjOllwZi62Jh4f4fjKFXMR8pL0Z4GqbjlUtejOv3Nvhtf1D		
		n63dABgRTnJIRXPklAsY5hCMQfLCHCAKIrg01U		
25		p3q7q2fFN3Aj8lXaT9g12rT5QtcNgJAZP8dKmLevACA		
26	Un Synchod no Creail Login			
20	Un-Synched, no Gmail Login	none		
27				
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"				


1 150. Despite Google's demonstrated ability above to block the transmission of some
 cookies, it still causes others to be transmitted, as noted below, *regardless of whether the user is synched*:


, 5

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### PERSONAL INFORMATION CHROME SENDS TO GOOGLE DOUBLECLICK THIRD-PARTY COOKIES – IDE identical for all browser states

- 5 IDE=AHWqTUluD72jj7k5Rr5ipWiIeEiyaUdEyFm-Synched 6 N1x6ZCPzZOfbTN0bUarkMjwuYJMV IDE=AHWqTUluD72jj7k5Rr5ipWiIeEiyaUdEyFm-Un-Synched, Gmail Login 7 N1x6ZCPzZOfbTN0bUarkMjwuYJMV IDE=AHWqTUluD72jj7k5Rr5ipWiIeEiyaUdEyFm-Un-Synched, no Gmail Login 8 N1x6ZCPzZOfbTN0bUarkMjwuYJMV 9 Finally, Chrome sends other third-party cookie personal identifiers that qualify as 151. 10 personal information, *regardless of whether the user is synched*. These other cookies have values 11 that change based on log-in status, but which are associated with the cookie values that are identical 12 across all browser-states, making them reasonably capable of being associated with specific users: 13 PERSONAL INFORMATION CHROME SENDS TO GOOGLE DOUBLECLICK **COOKIE SYNCHING** 14 **Identical for All Browser-States** Synched ID=8067c38bf1d71e0f:T=1595353118:S=ALNI MacZyW8MLDn-15 omh5WOAbbL6y\_qlGA ID=8067c38bf1d71e0f:T=1595353118:S=ALNI\_MacZyW8MLDn-Un-Synched, Gmail Login 16 omh5WOAbbL6y\_qlGA ID=8067c38bf1d71e0f:T=1595353118:S=ALNI MacZyW8MLDn-Un-Synched, no Gmail 17 Login omh5WOAbbL6y\_qlGA 18 152. Combined, the data that Google causes Chrome to send to itself (illustrated above) 19 demonstrates that Google has designed Chrome to collect massive amounts of user personal 20 information and linked to websites visited, regardless whether the Chrome user synched.
- 153. Even worse, most of the PI is collected in forms other than cookies (for example, IP
  address + user-agent data and the x-client-data identifier) meaning that Chrome will still transmit
  the data even if the user is using cookie blockers.





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18	
19 20	160. In addition to Calhoun's personal information about his
20 21	communication with the second
21	date and time of every time Calhoun went to this website.
22	161. For the article of political interest, Chrome sent the following information to
23 24	Google.com even though Calhoun was not logged-in to Sync:
24 25	Google.com even though Cambun was not logged-in to Syne.
23 26	
20 27	
28	
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	Headers TextView SyntaxView WebForms HexView Auth Cookies Raw JSON XML
1	Reguest Headers GET Client
2	Accept: "/" Accept-Encoding: gtp, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-US.enca=0.9 User-Agent:
3	Cookies □ Cookie 19_JAR=2020-07-17-21 ANID →
4	ND  2014 Miscellaneous Referent: https://www X-Gient-Data:
5	X-Omnibusa. X-Omnibus.On-Device-Suggestions: Control_V2 Security Sec-Fetch-Desit: script Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
6	Sec-Fetch-Ster cross-ste Transport Connection: keep-alwe Note: adservice.google.com
7	
8	162. The X-Client-Data identifier, IP address, User-Agent, and NID cookie sent to
9	Google for this communication is identical to the PI Chrome sent to Google following Calhoun's
10	visit to the prior website (allowing his web browsing history to be comprehensively monitored),
11	except here, the content of the communication in the URL is different.
12	163. Chrome also improperly sent the following PI to Google DoubleClick:
13	Request Headers [Bary], [Reader Estimational]
14	Client Accept: "/" Accept:Encoding: gdp, deflate, br Accept:Language: en:US,en;q=1.9
15	User-Agent: Cooldes □ Coolde □ DSD=N0_DATA □DE-■
16	Entity Content-Length: 0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Miscellancous Referen
17	X-Clent Data: Security Origin: https://www.aol.com Sec-FetchDest: empty
18	Sec-Fetch-Mode : no-cors Sec-Fetch-Ste: cross-ste Transport Connection: keep-alve Host: coopleadd4.g.doubleclck.eet
19	164. Once again, the X-Client-Data identifier, IP address, and User-Agent sent to Google
20	DoubleClick for this communication is identical to the personal information Chrome sent to Google
21	at the prior website, allowing for association of multiple websites with the same person.
22	165. In addition, the IDE cookie identifier is identical to the IDE cookie identifier that
23	Chrome would share with Google DoubleClick for communication with a communication
24	exchanged with a website that has deployed Google's DoubleClick source code.
25	166. Further, Chrome disclosed an "adsid" cookie synching value that would be identical
26	if Calhoun had actually been logged-in to Google Sync.
27	
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1	167. Despite its promises to the contrary, Google combined Plaintiff Calhoun's personal						
2	information that it obtained when he was not logged-in to Google Sync with other data it has about						
3	him, and will use that data to place Calhoun in advertising categories from which Google will profit						
4	from targeted advertising to him based on data that it did not have the right to obtain-including						
5	but not limited to recordings captured and detailed herein, that Calhoun communicates with the						
6	and that he						
7	reads political articles with						
8	Plaintiff Elaine Crespo						
9	168. On Friday, July 17, 2020, Plaintiff Elaine Crespo used Fiddler to recreate and record						
10	data transmissions that Chrome sent from her personal computing device to Google related to						
11	websites she had visited earlier in the Relevant Period.						
12	169. Plaintiff Crespo recorded that, per her usual practice, she was not logged-in to						
13	Google Sync at the time of the recording:						
14 15	New Tab $x + - \sigma \times + \circ C$ G Search Google or type a URL $2$						
16	III Apps 🕨 Pandora 🤄 ITCS WebClock 9.01 🛕 Employee Portal 📙 Sunbiz 🚱 UCC Search 🧃 Storage Schedule ( % Percentage Calculat 🛸 Self Storage in Kissi 🔶						
17	아 문 9						
18	Google Turn on sync						
19	G Manage your Google Account						
20	Q Search Google or type a URL Sign out						
21	Cither people 🗘						
22	Storage Sched Pandora Amazon.com Netflix Self Storage i						
23	🖽 🔺 📽 +						
24	Hibbett Sports Employee Por AdventHealth Bailes Propert Add shortcut						
25	How one Nigerian team uses Google Maps to save lives						
26	How one Nigerian team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize         Image: Comparison team uses Google Maps to save lives       Customize						
27							
28							
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
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170. Plaintiff Crespo then recorded data transmissions that Chrome sent to Google when
 she exchanged Internet communications with her bank. She recorded that Chrome sent the
 following personal information to Google even though Crespo was not logged-in to Sync:


4	
5	Request Headers     [Raw] [Header Definitions]       GET
6	Cache cache-control: no-cache
7	pragma: no-cache Client
8	accept: image/webp,image/apng,image/*,*/*;q=0.8 accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, br accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9,es-US;q=0.8,es;q=0.7
	user-agent: Cookies
9	cookieSecure-3PAPISID=Secure-3PSID=
10	Secure-APISID= Secure-HSID=
11	Secure-SSID= ANID=
12	CONSENT=YES+US.en+202005
13	Miscellaneous referer:
14	x-client-data: Security sec-fetch-dest: image
15	sec-fetch-mode: no-cors sec-fetch-site: cross-site
16	Transport Host: www.google.com
17	171. Google also caused Chrome to send the following to Google:
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
20 27	
28	
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1	Headers         TextView         SyntaxView         WebForms         HexView         Auth         Cookies         Raw         JSON         XML           Request Headers         [Raw.]         [Header Definitions]         [Raw.]         [Header Definitions]
1	GET
2	
3	Cache cache-control: no-cache
	pragma: no-cache Client
4	accept: image/webp,image/apng,image/*,*/*;q=0.8 accept-encoding: gzip, defiate, br
5	accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9,es-US;q=0.8,es;q=0.7 user-agent:
6	Cookies  Cookie Cookie
0	IDE=  Miscellaneous
7	referer: https:// x-client-data:
8	Security sec-fetch-dest: image
0	sec-fetch-mode: no-cors sec-fetch-site: cross-site
9	Transport Host: ad.doubleclick.net
10	
11	Request Headers [Raw] [Header Definitions]
	GET
12	Cache cache-control: no-cache
13	pragma: no-cache Client
14	accept: image/webp,image/apng,image/*,*/*;q=0.8
14	accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, br accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9,es-US;q=0.8,es;q=0.7
15	user-agent: Cookies
16	⊡ cookie IDE=
17	Miscellaneous referer: https://
17	x-client-data: Security
18	sec-fetch-dest: image sec-fetch-mode: no-cors
19	sec-fetch-site: cross-site Transport
	Host: googleads.g.doubleclick.net
20	
21	
22	172. When Crespo logged-out of her bank account, Google knew, at the exact moment it
	happened, because Chrome improperly shared this fact and other PI with Google Ads and Google
23	
24	DoubleClick.
25	
26	
27	
28	
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
1	Plaintiff Hadiy	ah Jackson				
2	174. On Thursday, July 16, 2020, Plaintiff Hadiyah Jackson used Fiddler to recreate and					
3	record data transmissions that Chrome sent from h	er personal computing device to Google related				
4	to websites she had visited earlier in the Relevant I	Period.				
5	175. Plaintiff Jackson recorded that, per	t her usual practice, she was not logged-in to				
6	Google Sync at the time of the recording:					
7						
8	× +					
9	Burst or type a URL	1 🛪 💏 :				
10	ur default browser Set as default	dee				
11						
12	M					
13						
14	Inbox (36,529) Web Store	or ⊟ 9				
15						
16		Sync is off				
17		Tum on sync				
18						
19		G Manage your Google Account Sign out				
20		E Signour				
21		Other people 🏚 app?				
22	webex.exe	Person 1				
23		Guest v				
24	176. Plaintiff Jackson then recorded data	transmissions that Chrome sent to Google with				
25 26	the exchange of communications with	government.				
26	177. For the government communication	ions, Chrome sent the following personal				
27	information to Google even though Jackson was no	ot logged-in to Sync:				
28						
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
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I

Headers		View	SyntaxView	WebForms	HexView	Auth	Cookies	Raw	JSON	XML	
QueryStrin			Value								
Name			1								
_v			183								
a			1								
t			pageview								
_s			1								
dl											
ul			en-us								
de			UTF-8								
dt											
sd			24-bit								
sr			1366x768								
vp			811x632								
je			0								
_u iid				200							
gjid											
cid											
tid											
_gid											
_1			1								
gtm											
z											
1	79.	Desp	ite its prom	ises to the o	contrary, C	boogle o	combined	l Plaint	iff Jack	son's p	oerso
informati	on th	atito	btained whe	n she was n	ot logged-	in to Go	ogle Svn	e inch	iding co	mmun	icati
momun		ut n o	otamed whe	n she was h	01105500		logic syn	e, men			ICuti
relating t	0					w	ith other	data it l	has abou	ıt her,	and v
use that d	lata to	o place	e Jackson in	advertising	categorie	s from v	which Go	ogle w	ill profi	t from	targe
		-	ased on data	_	-			-	1		C
auverusi	ig io	ner ua	iseu on uata			le fight	to obtain	•			
				Plaint	iff Claudid	ı Kindle	er				
1	80.	On S	Sunday, July	19, 2020,	Plaintiff	Claudia	Kindler	used s	pecial s	oftwar	e cal
Fiddler to	o reci	reate a	and record o	lata transm	issions tha	t Chro	ne sent f	rom he	er perso	nal con	nput
			hile visiting						-		-
		-	0								
13	81.	Plam	tiff Kindler	recorded	that, per 1	er usua	al practic	e, she	was no	t logg	ed-m
Google S	ync a	at the	time of the 1	recording:							
					- 43 -				Case		



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
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
		2	
		QueryString Name	Value
1		v	1
		_v	
2		aip	1
		a t	event
3		_5	1
		dl	
4		ul	en-us
		de	UTF-8
5		dt sd	24-bit
		sr	1920×1080
6		vp	1920x969
		je	0
7		ec	Conversion Action
		el	
8		_u	
		jid	
9		gjid	
		cid tid	
10		_gid	
		3	1
11		cd43	
		cd47 cm46	
12		Z	
13			
14		187. Chro	and also contemporance with sort the following PL to Google Double Click:
		107. Cillo	ome also contemporaneously sent the following PI to Google DoubleClick:
15			
16	Headers		ntaxView WebForms HexView Auth Cookies Raw JSON XML
	and the second se	t Headers	[Raw] [Header D
17	GET		
	Client		
18	Acce	ept: image/webp,im	age/apng,image/*,*/*;q=0.8
	Acce	ept-Encoding: gzip,	deflate, br
19	Acce	ept-Lan <u>guage: en-U</u> r-Agent:	S.en;0=0.9
	Cookie		
20	E Cool		
~ ~		DE= aneous	
21		erer: https://www	
22	Securit	y	
22		Fetch-Dest: image	
22		Fetch-Mode: no-con Fetch-Site: cross-sit	
23	Transp		
24		nection: keep-alive	
24	Host	: stats.g.doubleclic	.net
25		188. Whe	en she visited her bank's website, Chrome improperly sent the following
25		100. Wile	in she visited her bank is website, Chrome improperty sent the following
26	porcor	al informatic	on to Google even though Kindler was not logged-in to Sync:
20	persor		in to Google even mough Kindler was not logged-in to Sync.
27			
~ '			
28			
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	•		

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	Request Headers [Raw] [Header Definitions]
1	GET
1	Client Accept: image/webp,image/apng,image/*,*/*;q=0.8
2	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
2	Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 User-Agent:
3	Cookies
4	Secure-3PAPI
	Secure-3PSID Secure-3PSID
5	Secure-APISIE Secure-HSID=
6	Secure-SSID=
Ŭ	1P_1AR=2020-07-19-21 ANID
7	APIS DV=
8	
Ŭ	20
9	OGPC OTZ=
10	SAPIS SID=1
	SID: SSID:
11	Miscellaneous
12	Referer: https://www. X-Clent-Data
12	Security Sec-Fetch-Dest: image
13	Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
14	Transport
14	Connection: keep-alive Host: www.google.com
15	
16	
17	189. When Kindler logged-out of her banking account, Chrome even informed Google
10	of this fact:
18	
19	Headers TextView SyntaxView WebForms HexView Auth Cookies Raw JSON XML
	Headers         TextView         SyntaxView         WebForms         HexView         Auth         Cookies         Raw         JSON         XML           Request Headers         [Header Definitions]         [Header Definitions]         [Header Definitions]         [Header Definitions]
20	GET
21	Client Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
22	User-Agent: Cookies
23	Cookie
	IDE= Miscellaneous
24	Referer: http X-Client-Data
25	Security Sec-Fetch-D
	Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
26	Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
77	Transport Connection: keep-alive
27	Host: 1359940.fls.doubleclick.net
28	
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190. When she visited the website of her continuing education provider, once again
 Google was her uninvited guest, monitoring every step and improperly collecting the following PI
 despite the fact that Kindler was not Synched with any Google account:





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about her and will use that data to place Kindler in advertising categories from which Google will profit from targeted advertising to her based on data that it did not have the right to obtain.

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#### **H.** Google's Improper Collection of PI from Plaintiffs and Other Un-Synched Chrome Users is a Serious Invasion of the Privacy and is Highly Offensive

5 194. Chrome is now the most widely used browser in the world and is used by 59 percent
6 of all desktop computers in the United States.<sup>19</sup>

7 195. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All people are by nature free
8 and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
9 liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
10 happiness, *and privacy*." The phrase "*and privacy*" was added by the "Privacy Initiative" adopted
11 by California voters in 1972.

12 196. The right to privacy in California's constitution creates a right of action against
private as well as government entities.

14 197. The principal purpose of this constitutional right was to protect against unnecessary
 15 information gathering, use and dissemination by public and private entities, including computer 16 stored and generated dossiers and cradle-to-grave profiles on every American.

17 198. In its public statements, Google pays lip-service to the need to protect the privacy
18 of Internet communications. For example, On June 6, 2016, a coalition of technology companies
19 and privacy advocates came together to oppose Congressional efforts to expand government
20 surveillance of online activities through the Senate's Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
21 2017 and Senator Cornyn's proposed amendments to the ECPA.

199. The joint letter, signed by the ACLU, Amnesty International and others *was also signed by Google*. These organizations and companies argued (correctly) that obtaining sensitive
information about Americans' online activities without court oversight was an unacceptable
privacy harm because it "would paint an incredibly intimate picture of an individual's life" if it

26

27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Browser Market Share United States of America: May 2019 – May 2020, GlobalStats, https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/all/united-states-of-america (last visited June 19, 2020).

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included "browsing history, email metadata, location information, and the exact date and time a 1 person signs in or out of a particular online account." 2

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The letter further posited that the proposed online surveillance could "reveal details 200. about a person's political affiliations, medical conditions, religion, substance abuse history, sexual orientation" and even physical movements. The letter concluded that online surveillance raises "civil liberties and human rights concerns."

201. Google has also publicly declared that non-consensual electronic surveillance is 7 "dishonest" behavior. For example, earlier this month, Google announced an update to its 8 "Enabling Dishonest Behavior Policy" (effective August 11, 2020) restricting advertising for 9 spyware and surveillance technology. The new policy, without any hint of irony, will now "prohibit 10 the promotion of products or services that are marketed or targeted with the express purpose of 11 tracking or monitoring another person or their activities without their authorization." 12

202. Through this new amendment to Google's pre-existing policy, Google now 13 explicitly takes the position that nonconsensual surveillance of "browsing history" is "dishonest 14 behavior." 15

203. Google has also publicly declared privacy to be a human right. In 2004 in a letter 16 from Google's founders to shareholders at the IPO (included with the Company's S-1 Registration 17 Statement filed with the SEC), Google declared its goal to "improve the lives of as many people as 18 possible." This letter appears today on Google's website on a page touting the company's 19 commitment to be guided by "internationally recognized human rights standards," including 20 specifically the human rights enumerated in three documents: The Universal Declaration of Human 21 Rights; the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; and the Global 22 Network Initiative ("GNI") Principles. 23

24

All three of these documents confirm that privacy is a human right and a violation 204. of privacy rights is a violation of human rights. 25

For example, the Universal Declaration declares that no one should be subject to 205. 26 arbitrary interference with privacy, and even declares the right to the protection of laws against 27 such interference. 28

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206. Similarly, the UN Guiding Principles for business identify privacy as a human right. 1 207. The third document, the GNI Principles, has an entire section dedicated to privacy 2 that begins: "Privacy is a human right and guarantor of human dignity. Privacy is important to 3 maintaining personal security, protecting identity and promoting freedom of expression in the 4 digital age." 5 208. Finally, although not mentioned on Google's website, in 1992 the United States 6 ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a human rights treaty that 7 guarantees privacy rights in Article 17. 8 9 I. Plaintiffs' PI Is Property Owned by the Plaintiffs and Has Economic Value 209. The value of personal data is well understood and generally accepted as a form of 10 currency. 11 It is by now incontrovertible that a robust market for this data undergirds the tech 210. 12 economy. 13 The robust market for user data has been analogized to the "oil" of the tech 211. 14 industry.<sup>20</sup> A 2015 article from TechCrunch accurately noted that "Data has become a strategic 15 asset that allows companies to acquire or maintain a competitive edge."<sup>21</sup> That article noted that 16 the value of a single Internet user—or really, a single user's data—varied from about \$15 to more 17 than \$40. 18 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") itself has 212. 19 published numerous volumes discussing how to value data such as that which is the subject matter 20 of this Complaint, including as early as 2013, with its publication "Exploring the Economic of 21 22 23 24 20 The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, The Economist (May 6, 2017), 25 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-

27 <sup>21</sup> Pauline Glickman and Nicolas Glady, *What's the Value of Your Data?* TechCrunch (Oct. 13, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/13/whats-the-value-of-your-data/.

28

26

oil-but-data.

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Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value".<sup>22</sup> The OECD
 recognizes that data is a key competitive input not only in the digital economy but in all markets:
 "Big data now represents a core economic asset that can create significant competitive advantage
 for firms and drive innovation and growth."<sup>23</sup>

213. In The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Harvard Business School Professor 5 Shoshanna Zuboff notes Google's early success monetizing user data prompted large corporations 6 like Verizon, AT&T and Comcast to transform their business models from fee for services provided 7 to customers to monetizing their user's data—including user data that is not necessary for product 8 or service use, which she refers to as "behavioral surplus."<sup>24</sup> In essence, Professor Zuboff explains 9 that revenue from user data pervades every economic transaction in the modern economy. It is a 10 fundamental assumption of these revenues that there is a *market* for this data; data generated by 11 users on Google's platform has economic value. 12 This is old news. In 2012, Google's Chief Economist Hal Varian, in conversation 214. 13 with the *Economist*, referred to one aspect of data's value as "nowcasting," or "contemporaneous 14 forecasting"-basically an ability to predict what is happening as it actually occurs."<sup>25</sup> This kind 15 of information clearly has economic value. 16 215. Professor Paul M. Schwartz writing in the Harvard Law Review, notes: 17 18 Personal information is an important currency in the new millennium. The monetary value of personal data is large and still 19 growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from the trend. Companies view this information as a corporate asset and have invested heavily in software that facilitates the collection of 20 consumer information. 21

 <sup>22</sup> Exploring the Economic of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, OECD Digital Economy Paper No. 220 at 7 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en.

- <sup>23</sup> Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation, OECD, at 319 (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/supporting-investment-in-knowledge-capital-growth-and-innovation\_9789264193307-en.
- 26 <sup>24</sup> Shoshanna Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism 166 (2019).
- 27 <sup>25</sup> K.N.C., *Questioning the searches*, The Economist (June 13, 2012), https://www.economist.com/schumpeter/2012/06/13/questioning-the-searchers.
- 28

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1	216. This economic value has been leveraged largely by corporations who pioneered the								
2	methods of its extraction, analysis, and use. However, the data also has economic value to users.								
3	Market exchanges have sprung up where individual users like Plaintiffs herein can sell or monetize								
4	their own data. For example, Nielsen Data and Mobile Computer will pay users for their data. <sup>26</sup>								
5	Google itself has launched apps that pay users for their data directly. <sup>27</sup> Likewise, apps such as Zynn,								
6	a TikTok competitor, pay users for to sign up and interact with the app. <sup>28</sup>								
7	217. There are countless examples of this kind of market, which is growing more robust								
8	as information asymmetries are diminished through revelations to users as to how their data is being								
9	collected and used.								
10	218. Indeed, Google once paid users for the very data it now improperly harvests from								
11	Chrome:								
12	Google is building an opt-in user panel that will track and analyze								
13	people's online behaviors via an extension to its Chrome browser, called Screenwise. Users that install the plug-in will have the websites they visit and the years in which they interpret with them								
14	websites they visit and the ways in which they interact with them recorded, and they will then be paid with Amazon gift cards worth up to \$25 a year in return. <sup>29</sup>								
15	up to \$25 a year in feturit.								
16	219. As Professors Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman relayed in their 2016 article "The								
17	Economics of Privacy," published in the Journal of Economic Literature:								
18	Such vast amounts of collected data have obvious and substantial economic value. Individuals' traits and attributes (such as a person's								
19 20	<sup>26</sup> Kevin Mercandante, <i>Ten Apps for Selling Your Data for Cash</i> , Best Wallet Hacks (June 10, 2020), https://wallethacks.com/apps-for-selling-your-data/.								
20 21	<ul> <li><sup>27</sup> Kari Paul, <i>Google launches app that will pay users for their data</i>, The Guardian (June 11, 2019),</li> </ul>								
21	https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/11/Google-user-data-app-privacy-study; Saheli Roy Choudhury and Ryan Browne, <i>Google pays teens to install an app that could collect all</i>								
22	<i>kinds of data</i> , CNBC (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/29/Google-paying-users-to-install-app-to-collect-data-techcrunch.html; Tim Bradshaw, <i>Google offers to pay users for their</i>								
23 24	<i>voice recordings</i> , Financial Times (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/42f6b93c-54a4- 11ea-8841-482eed0038b1.								
24	<sup>28</sup> Jacob Kastrenakes, A New TikTok Clone hit the top of the App Store by Paying users to watch								
26	<i>videos</i> , The Verge (May 29, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/29/21274994/zynn-tiktok-clone-pay-watch-videos-kuaishou-bytedance-rival.								
20	<sup>29</sup> Jack Marshall, <i>Google Pays Users for Browsing Data</i> , DigiDay (Feb. 10, 2012), https://digiday.com/media/google-pays-users-for-browsing-data/.								
28									
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1 2		age, address, gender, income, preferences, and reservation prices, but also her clickthroughs, comments posted online, photos uploaded to social media, and so forth) are increasingly regarded as business assets that can be used to target services or offers, provide relevant advertising, or be traded with other parties. <sup>30</sup>
3	220.	There also a private market for users' personal information. One study by content
4	marketing age	ency Fractl has found that an individual's online identity, including hacked financial
5	accounts, can	be sold for \$1,200 on the dark web. <sup>31</sup> These rates are assumed to be discounted
6	because they	do not operate in competitive markets, but rather, in an illegal marketplace. If a
7	criminal can	sell other users' content, surely users can sell their own. In short, there is economic
8	value to user	s' data that is greater than zero. The exact number will be a matter for experts to
9	determine.	
10	J.	Plaintiffs Have Suffered Economic Injury
11	221.	Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, or dispose of a thing,
12	including inta	angible things such as data or communications.
13	222.	Personal Information, including websites visited by the Plaintiffs, is property under
14	California lav	v.
15	223.	Property includes intangible data, including the very specific data at issue here that
16	Google is tak	ing despite promising users that it would not do so-personal information including
17	Internet comr	nunications history and personally identifiable information.
18	224.	Taking Plaintiffs' PI without authorization is larceny under California law
19	regardless of	whether and to what extent Google monetized the data, and Plaintiffs have a right to
20	disgorgement	and/or restitution damages for the value of the stolen data.
21	225.	Plaintiffs also have suffered benefit of the bargain damages, in that Google took
22	more data tha	in the parties agreed would be exchanged. Those benefit of the bargain damages also
23		
24	20	
25 26	Literature	2, at 444 (June 2016), heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/AcquistiTaylorWagman-JEL-2016.pdf.
27		Aagna, The sad truth about how much your Google data is worth on the dark web,
28	MarketWatch privacy-viola	(June 6, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/spooked-by-the-Google- tions-this-is-how-much-your-personal-data-is-worth-on-the-dark-web-2018-03-20.
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include, but are not limited to, (i) loss of the promised benefits of their Chrome experience; (ii) outof-pocket costs; and (iii) loss of control over property which has marketable value.

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226. In addition, when Plaintiffs became Chrome users, they gained access to Chrome's
browser in exchange for agreeing to terms of service that Chrome drafted and sharing a limited
amount of data reflecting users' activity on the platform. In other words, those terms of service
assured users that data would not be sent to Google which was intended to, and did, encourage
Plaintiffs to engage more than they would have otherwise. The delta in data between what Chrome
promised and what in fact Chrome sent to Google can be measured in data and also in dollars,
because data has value.

10 227. Data brokers and online marketers have developed sophisticated schemes for 11 assessing the value of certain kinds of data, as discussed above. Experts in the field have identified 12 specific values to assign to certain kinds of activity. While Plaintiffs largely knew that Google 13 generates revenue from business by selling advertising directed at users, it was a material term of 14 the bargain that Plaintiffs' personal information would not be shared with Google if users did not 15 take the affirmative step of activating Sync for their Chrome account. It was also a material term 16 of the bargain that user would not "need to provide any personal information to use Chrome."

17 228. Google did not honor the terms of this bargain. Although the Chrome Privacy Notice
18 stated that Plaintiffs' did not "need to provide any personal information to use Chrome" and that
19 their personal information would not be shared with Google unless they Sync'd their account, in
20 practice, their information was shared with Google as if they had activated Sync.

21 229. When Chrome shared and Google collected Plaintiffs' personal information from
22 Chrome that Plaintiffs had not chosen to share with Google, Google received benefits. First, Google
23 captured-revenues associated with increased user activity on the Chrome browser and from
24 enhanced targeting as a result of ever-more detailed datasets collected about users. Second, Google
25 also transferred costs and harms to Plaintiffs in that Google did not have to invest in protecting that
26 data or preventing its dissemination as it promised users it would.

27 230. As Google expanded the scope of access to Plaintiffs' personal information beyond
28 that which Plaintiffs had agreed, users were denied the benefit of a Chrome experience where they

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were promised the right to determine the terms and scope of their content and personal information
 sharing. Thus, through Chrome's sharing of Plaintiffs' personal information with Google, Plaintiffs
 lost benefits.

4 231. In order to preserve their privacy, Plaintiffs who now understand at least some of 5 Google's violations—and there is much to be revealed about Google's actual activities—are 6 presented with the choice of: (i) reducing or ending their participation on Chrome; or (ii) knowingly 7 accepting less privacy than that which was promised. Each of these options deprives Plaintiffs of 8 the remaining benefits of their original bargain. There is no option which recovers it. None of it 9 recaptures the data taken in violation of Chrome's promises.

10 232. Further, Plaintiffs were denied the benefit of this information and therefore the
ability to mitigate harms they incurred because of Chrome's impermissible disclosure of their
personal information to Google. That is, Google's lack of transparency prevented and still prevents
Plaintiffs' ability to mitigate.

14 233. Google knew that it was collecting users' personal information regardless of
15 whether users had taken affirmative steps to turn on the synchronization feature. Yet, Google failed
16 to warn users so that they could take steps to avoid exposing their information on Chrome.

17 234. Google also knew that it was not possible for users to use Chrome without providing
18 any personal information.

19 235. Google avoided costs it should have incurred because of its own actions—
20 particularly the loss of user engagement which would have resulted from transparent disclosure of
21 Googler's actions—and transferred those costs to Plaintiffs. Warning users would have chilled
22 Chrome engagement as well as discourage potential new users from joining.

23 236. Google was thus not only able to evade or defer these costs but to continue to accrue
value for the Company and to further benefit from the delay due to the time value of money. Google
has thus transferred all the costs imposed by the unauthorized disclosure users' content and personal
information onto Plaintiffs. Google's increased mitigation costs by failing to notify users that their
personal information had been disclosed and to alert them at the earliest time possible so that users
could take steps to minimize their exposure on the browser.

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1	237.	In addition, Plaintiffs have also suffered from the diminished loss of use of their						
2	own personal	information, property which has both personal and economic value to them.						
3	238. Plaintiffs' personal information has value. First, there is transactional, or barter,							
4	value to user content and personal information. Indeed, Google has traded the ability to use its							
5	Chrome browser for the collection of users' personal information-all the while promising users							
6	that it was not	necessary for them to share any personal information to use Chrome and that Chrome						
7	would not sha	are any of their personal information with Google unless they were Synched.						
8	239.	Second, Plaintiffs' property, which has economic value, was taken from them						
9	without their	consent and in contradiction of Chrome's express promise not to send it to Google.						
10	There is a ma	rket for this data, and it has at minimum a value greater than zero.						
11	240.	Users were harmed when Google took their property and exerted exclusive control						
12	over it, collec	ting it without users' knowledge and for still undisclosed purposes.						
13	К.	Google Has Been Unjustly Enriched						
14	241.	Google's \$1 trillion business was built entirely on monetizing the value of Internet						
15	users' data. <sup>32</sup>							
16	242.	Professor Zuboff details Google's role as one of the main drivers of data collection						
17	and monetiza	tion:						
18		In 2016, 89 percent of the revenues of [Google's] parent company,						
19		Alphabet, derived from Google's targeted advertising programs. The scale of raw-material flows is reflected in Google's domination of						
20		the internet, processing over 40,000 search queries every second on average: more than 3.5 billion searches per day and 1.2 trillion						
21		searches per year worldwide in 2017. <sup>33</sup>						
22	243.	Indeed, "Google maximizes the revenue it gets from [landing pages] by giving its						
23	best position	to the advertiser who is likely to pay Google the most in total, based on the price per						
24								
25		owner Alphabet is now worth \$1 trillion, CNN (Jan. 16, 2020),						
26	https://www.c microsoft/ind	cnn.com/2020/01/16/investing/google-trillion-dollar-market-value-apple-						
27	<sup>33</sup> Zuboff, <i>su</i>	<i>pra</i> , at 92						
28								
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click multiplied by Google's estimate of the likelihood that someone will actually clock on the
 ad."<sup>34</sup>

3 244. For its part, Google explains under the header of "How we make money" in its 4 annual financial statements, that its goal is to "deliver relevant ads at just the right time and to give 5 people useful commercial information, regardless of the device they're using."<sup>35</sup> Google explains 6 further that it revenues are based primarily on the delivery of "performance advertising," and 7 "brand advertising."

8 245. Performance advertising, as Google explains, is driven by users' engagement with 9 an advertisement and Google is paid by the advertiser when a user engages in the ad. Brand 10 advertising is built through "enhance[ing] users' awareness of and affinity with advertisers' 11 products and services, through videos, text, images, and other interactive ads that run across various 12 devices." Under both, Google's revenues are built upon the ability to target users with 13 advertisements based upon the personal information that Google has collected.

14246. The value of Chrome users' personal information to Google is demonstrated in part15by Google's advertisement revenue during the relevant time period. Google reported \$134.8 billion16in advertising revenue in 2019, \$116.4 billion in 2018, \$95.5 billion in 2017, and \$79.3 billion in172016.<sup>36</sup> This translates to 83% of Google's total revenues in 2019, 85% in 2018, 86% in 2017 and1887% in 2016.<sup>37</sup> While not all of that value is unjustly derived from the specific information collected19by Google here, some portion of it is.

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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204419000004/goog10-kq42018.htm.


- <sup>27</sup> <sup>37</sup> 2019 Annual Report; 2018 Annual Report.
- 28


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Peter Coy, *The Secret to Google's Success*, Bloomberg (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-03-05/the-secret-to-googles-success.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>
 <sup>35</sup> 2019 Annual Report, Alphabet Inc. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204420000008/goog10k2019.htm#sFA530FF828B154C8973614936FC32E93.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> 2019 Annual Report, Alphabet Inc. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204420000008/goog10k2019.htm#sFA530FF828B154C8973614936FC32E93; 2018 Annual Report, Alphabet Inc.
 (Feb. 4, 2019),

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average revenue per user per year for Google place the value at \$256.<sup>40</sup> And at \$55 for digital
 revenue per member.<sup>41</sup>

250. The collection of users' PI has also facilitated the revenues of Google's Network
Members' properties which include ads placed through AdMob, AdSense, DoubleClick
AdExchange. Google's Network Members' properties revenues increased by \$21.5 in 2019, \$20
billion in 2018, \$17.6 billion in 2017, and \$15.5 billion in 2016.<sup>42</sup>

7 251. Google uses information collected from users to deliver targeted advertisements to
8 users across Google's services and across users' devices. The delivery of targeted advertisements
9 leads to more engagement with the advertisements, which allows Google to sell the advertisements
10 at a higher rate.

252. Google has recently disclosed the shared take rates from buying portals, Google Ads
and Display & Video 260, and from publisher services, Google Ad Manager. The disclosure show
that "when marketers used Google Ads or Display & Video 360 to buy display ads on Google Ad
Manager," Google keeps 31% of the ad spend.<sup>43</sup> Google's cut of the ad spend further demonstrates
the markup achieved by its collection, and use of users' personal information.

16 253. Google further quantifies the value of users' data through several user-based
17 metrics, including cost-per-impressions and cost-per-click. Google defines "cost-per-impressions"
18 for Google Network Members' properties, such as AdMob, AdSense, DoubleClick AdExchange,
19 as the "impression-based and click-based revenues divided by our total number of impressions and

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- 21 22

<sup>25</sup> <sup>42</sup> 2019 Annual Report; 2018 Annual Report.

<sup>43</sup> Sissie Hsiao, *How our display buying platforms share revenue with publishers*, Google Ad Manager (June 23, 2020), https://blog.google/products/admanager/display-buying-share-revenue-publishers/.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Frederic Filloux, *The ARPUs of the Big Four Dward Everybody Else*, Medium (Feb. 10, 2019),
 https://mondaynote.com/the-arpus-of-the-big-four-dwarf-everybody-else-e5b02a579ed3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Fredric Filloux, *The NYTimes could be worth \$19bn instead of \$2bn*, Medium (Feb. 15, 2015), https://mondaynote.com/the-nytimes-could-be-worth-19bn-instead-of-2bn-8ab635bc6262.

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represents the average amount we charge advertisers for each impression displayed to users."<sup>44</sup> Google reported a 9% increase in cost-per-impressions for 2019, and 2% increase in 2018.

- 3 254. Google also reports the "cost-per-click," which it defines as "click-driven revenues
  4 divided by our total number of paid clicks and represents the average amount we charge advertisers
  5 for each engagement by users."<sup>45</sup> Google does not include the actual cost-per-click in financial
  6 reports. However, the average costs per click on Google Ads is reportedly \$2.32.<sup>46</sup>
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255. Google's user-based revenues are driven by its collection of Internet users' information to create detailed dossiers about individual's personal information, including names, address, education, income, hobbies, interests, relationships, politics, religious beliefs, and more.

10 256. Although Google promises that Chrome users can opt out of Google surveillance by
 11 not providing any personal information to use Chrome and not Synching their data, those promises
 12 are not true. And Chrome plays a large part, with over 2 billion active installs allowing data
 13 generation and extraction trillions of times on a daily basis.<sup>47</sup>

14 257. Unbeknownst to users, Google has programmed Chrome for surveillance no matter
15 what the user does. By encouraging engagement with Chrome with its promise not to share data
16 with Google, Google ensures that it will be able to track an ever-larger percentage of Internet users.

17 258. In other words, Chrome's promise not to send Un-Synched users' PI to Google was
18 intended to (and did) stimulate greater user engagement. Those false promises also prevented
19 decreased user engagement by disclosing what Chrome's actual practices are. And Google directly
20 profited from that increased user engagement.

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- 23 <sup>44</sup> 2019 Annual Report.
- 24  $^{45}$  Id.

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Dan Shewan, *The Comprehensive Guide to Online Advertising Costs*, WordStream (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/07/05/online-advertising-costs#:~:text=The%20average%20cost%20of%20an,18..

 <sup>4&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Frederic Lardinois, *Google says there are now 2 billion active Chrome installs*, TechCrunch (Nov. 10, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/10/google-says-there-are-now-2-billion-active-chrome-installs/.

#### VI. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

259. This is a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) (or, alternatively, 23(c)(4)) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a Class of all persons residing in the United States who used Google's Chrome browser on or after July 27, 2016 without choosing to Sync with any Google account and whose personal information was collected by Google.

260. Excluded from the Class are the Court, Defendants and their officers, directors, employees, affiliates, legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns, and any entity in which any of them have a controlling interest.

261. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

262. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
 predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. The questions of
 law and fact common to the Class include:

- a. Whether Chrome shares user personal information with Google when users were not Synched with their Google accounts;
  - Whether Chrome users can use the service without providing personal information to Chrome;
  - c. Whether Google had authorization from Un-Synched Chrome Users to disclose the content of user communications while in storage on the Chrome browser;

 d. Whether Google had user authorization from Un-Synched Chrome Users to disclose the content of user communications contemporaneous to their making;

e. Whether Google had user authorization from Un-Synched Chrome Users to acquire the content of user communications while they were in storage in the Chrome browser;

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1	f. Whether Google had user authorization from Un-Synched Chrome Users to
2	acquire the content of user communications contemporaneous to their
3	making;
4	g. Whether Google's actions to disclose and acquire the contents of Un-
5	Synched Chrome User communications violate the federal Electronic
6	Communications Privacy Act;
7	h. Whether Google's actions violate the California Invasion of Privacy Act;
8	i. Whether Google breached its contract with Un-Synched Chrome Users;
9	j. Whether the Personal Information improperly collected by Google from the
10	Un-Synched Users has economic value; and
11	k. Whether Google unjustly profited from the improperly collected Personal
12	Information of the Un-Synched Chrome Users.
13	263. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of other Class members, as all members
14	of the Class were similarly affected by Google's wrongful conduct in violation of federal and
15	California law as complained of herein.
16	264. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class
17	and have retained counsel that is competent and experienced in class action litigation. Plaintiffs
18	have no interest that conflict with, or is otherwise antagonistic to the interests of, the other Class
19	members.
20	265. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient
21	adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the
22	damages individual Class and Subclass members have suffered may be relatively small, the expense
23	and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class and Subclass to
24	individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in management of this
25	action as a class action.
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	VII. COUNTS
1	COUNT ONE
2 3	WIRETAP ACT: UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.
4	266. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
5	267. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") prohibits the intentiona
6	interception of the contents any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a device
7	18 U.S.C. § 2511.
8	268. The ECPA protects both the sending and receipt of communications.
9	269. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person whose wire, ora
10	or electronic communication is intercepted.
11	270. Google intentionally intercepted the electronic communications of Plaintiffs an
12	other Un-Synched Chrome Users.
13	271. The transmission of data between plaintiffs and the websites on which Googl
14	tracked and intercepted their communications without authorization while they were Un-Synche
15	were "transfer[s] of signs, signals, writing, data, [and] intelligence of [some] nature transmitte
16	in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system that
17	affects interstate commerce[,]" and were therefore "electronic communications" within th
18	meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
19	272. Google's interception of Plaintiffs' communications was done contemporaneousl
20	with the Plaintiffs' sending and receipt of those communications.
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23	a. The precise text of GET requests that Chrome users' exchange with non-
24	Google websites;
25	b. The precise text of user search queries at non-Google sites;
26	c. The precise text of specific buttons that users click to exchange
27	communications at non-Google websites, such as "Log-In" or "Submit."
28	d. The precise text of information that users submit in forms to exchange
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1	communications at non-Google websites.
2	e. Information that is a general summary or informs Google of the general
3	subject of communications that non-Google websites send back to users in
4	response to search queries and requests for information.
5	274. The following constitute "devices" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5):
6	a. The cookies Google used to track the Plaintiffs' communications while they
7	were not Synched with any Google account, including cookies Google sets
8	and acquires through other entities through cookie-synching;
9	b. The Plaintiffs' browsers;
10	c. The Plaintiffs' computing devices;
11	d. Google's web servers;
12	e. The web-servers of websites from which Google tracked and intercepted the
13	Plaintiffs' communications while they were not Synched with any Google
14	account; and
15	f. The computer code deployed by Google to effectuate its tracking and
16	interception of the Plaintiffs' communications while not Synched with any
17	Google account.
18	275. Google is not a party to Plaintiffs' electronic communications with non-Google
19	websites.
20	276. Google's received the content of Plaintiff communications with non-Google
21	websites through the surreptitious duplication and forwarding of those communications by Chrome
22	to Google.
23	277. Plaintiffs were logged-off of Google Sync when Google intercepted the
24	communications at issue.
25	278. Plaintiffs did not consent to Google's acquisition of the contents of their
26	communications with non-Google websites while using the Chrome browser when not logged-in
27	to Google Sync because Google expressly promised that "[t]he personal information that Chrome
28	stores [about users] won't be sent to Google unless" the Chrome user "choose[s] to store that data
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in" their "Google Account by turning on sync," i.e. formally logging-in to a Google service called
 Sync.

3 279. Google's failure to adequately inform websites using its third-party tracking tools 4 that Google had promised Chrome users that it would not share user personal information unless 5 the user was logged-in to Sync constituted a fraud and mistake of fact that vitiates any alleged 6 consent that Google may claim for the non-Google websites.

7 280. The ECPA includes a separate affirmative defense for the officers, employees, and 8 agents of electronic communication service providers, whose facilities are used in the transmission 9 of electronic communications, "to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal 10 course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the 11 rendition of his service or the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service[.]"

12 281. As alleged herein, the Google services to which Chrome re-directs Chrome user
13 communications are not agents of Chrome.

14 282. The surreptitious re-direction of Chrome user communications to Google while the
15 users were not logged-in to Google Sync was not done in Chrome's "normal course" and is not a
16 "necessary incident to the rendition" of electronic communication service.

17 283. The surreptitious re-direction of Chrome user communications to Google while
18 users were not logged-in to Google Sync was not done for "the protection of the rights or property"
19 of Chrome, but instead for advertising and surveillance purposes by Google's other services.

20 284. As a result of the above actions and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the Court may 21 assess statutory damages to Plaintiffs; injunctive and declaratory relief; punitive damages in an 22 amount to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by 23 Defendant in the future, and a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably 24 incurred.

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#### **COUNT TWO**

#### WIRETAP ACT – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES BY AN ECS 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et. seq.

285. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides that "a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a).

9 286. An "electronic communication service" is defined as "any service which provides
10 to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C.
11 § 2510(15).

287. Google Chrome is an ECS because it provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive electronic communications.

14 288. In the absence of a web-browser, Internet users could not send or receive
15 communications over the Internet.

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289. Chrome is an ECS provided to the public.

290. Chrome intentionally divulged the contents of user communications with nonGoogle websites to Google while those user communications were in transmission on Chrome.

19 291. Google was not an addressee or intended recipient of Plaintiffs' communications on
 20 Chrome while they were not logged-in to Google Sync.

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 292. Google was not an addressee or intended recipient of the non-Google websites
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293. Google was not an agent of the Plaintiffs or the non-Google websites.

24 294. The ECPA provides that "a person or entity providing an [ECS] to the public may
25 divulge the contents of any such communication—(i) as otherwise authorized in sections 2511(2)(a)
26 or 2517 of this title;" (ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended
27 recipient of such communication; (iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are

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used, to forward such communication to its destination; (iv) which were inadvertently obtained by 1 the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if such divulgence 2 is made to a law enforcement agency." 3

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299. The affirmative defines for disclosures to law enforcement does not apply. 1 300. As a result of the above actions and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the Court may 2 assess statutory damages to Plaintiffs; injunctive and declaratory relief; punitive damages in an 3 amount to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by 4 Defendant in the future, and a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably 5 incurred. 6 7 **COUNT THREE** 8 STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT – UNAUTHORIZED 9 ACCESS TO STORED ECS COMMUNICATIONS 18 U.S.C. § 2701 10 301. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 11 The Stored Communications Act ("SCA") provides a cause of action against a 302. 12 person who "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 13 communication service is provided" or "who intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that 14 facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic 15 communication while it is in electronic storage in such a system." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 16 As set forth above, Google Chrome is an ECS. Google has explained that a web 303. 17 browser is where Internet users "search, chat, email, and collaborate," and, "in our spare time, we 18 shop, bank, read news, and keep in touch with friends – all using a browser." 19 304. The ECPA does not provide a separate definition for "facility" but instead it is 20 defined within the context of the sentences in which it is used. 21 305. A "facility" under the ECPA is, under the plain language of the statute, that "through 22 which an electronic communication service is provided." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 23 The ECPA also uses the term "facility" when describing the facts necessary to 306. 24 support a law enforcement application for a Wiretap order, which "shall include," among other 25 things "a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the pace 26 where the communication is to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b). As used in this ECPA 27 28 - 70 -

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1	section, "facility" has included telephones and other communications devices that officers have
2	formally requested to be tapped.
3	307. The items through which the electronic communication services of the Chrome web-
4	browser include:
5	a. The Plaintiffs' personal computing devices;
6	b. The Plaintiffs' Chrome browsers;
7	c. The browser-managed files which, together, constitute all of the programs
8	contained within the Plaintiffs' Chrome browsers; and
9	d. Plaintiffs' IP addresses.
10	308. Google intentionally accessed the Plaintiffs' personal computing devices, Chrome
11	browsers, browser-managed files, and IP addresses via the Chrome browser while the Plaintiffs
12	were not logged-in to Google Sync.
13	309. Plaintiffs did not authorize Google to access the content of their communications
14	stored on their personal computers and the Chrome browser while they were not logged-in to
15	Google Sync.
16	310. The information obtained by Google through its unauthorized access included
17	"contents" as described above
18	311. The ECPA defines "electronic storage" as "any temporary, intermediate storage of
19	a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;" and "any
20	storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
21	protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
22	312. Chrome stores the contents of user communications immediately upon a user's
23	sending of any communication in at least two ways:
24	a. For purposes of backup protection so that if the browser inadvertently shuts
25	down, the user can be presented with the option to restore previous
26	communications; and
27	b. For a temporary and intermediate amount of time incidental to the
28	electronic transmission thereof when it places the contents of user
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1	communications into the browser's web-browsing history, which is only
2	kept on the browser for 90 days.
3	313. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed by Google's actions, and pursuant to 18
4	U.S.C. § 2707(c), are entitled to actual damages including profits earned by Google attributable to
5	the violations or statutory minimum damages of \$1,000 per plaintiff, punitive damages, costs, and
6	reasonable attorney's fees.
7	
8	COUNT FOUR
9	STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS BY AN ECS 18 U.S.C. § 2701
10	314. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
11	315. The ECPA provides that "a person or entity providing an electronic communication
12	service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
13	communication while in electronic storage by that service."
14	316. As alleged above, Google Chrome is an ECS to the public.
15	317. As alleged above, Chrome knowingly divulges the contents of user communications
16	to Google while those user communications are in electronic storage by Chrome.
17	318. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed by Google's actions, and pursuant to
18	18 U.S.C. § 2707(c), are entitled to actual damages including profits earned by Google attributable
19 20	to the violations or statutory minimum damages of \$1,000 per plaintiff, punitive damages, costs,
20	and reasonable attorney's fees.
21	COUNT FIVE
22	VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT ("CIPA")
23 24	Cal. Penal Code §§ 631
24 25	319. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
25 26	320. The California Invasion of Privacy Act is codified at Cal. Penal Code §§ 630 to 638
26 27	The Act begins with its statement of purpose:
27	The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technology have led to the development of new devices and
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	tashniques for the number of equal private
	techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting from the
	continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and
Cal. Penal Co	cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society. $de \ 8 \ 630$
321.	Cal. Penal Code § 631(a) provides, in pertinent part:
521.	
	Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other mannerwillfully and without the
	consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning
	of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or
	received at any place within this state; or who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any
	way, any information so obtained, or who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to lawfully do, or permit, or
	cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars
322.	Google is a "person" or "persons" within the meaning of § 631(a).
323.	Under § 631, a defendant must show it had the consent of all parties to
communicati	on.
324.	Google is headquartered in California; designed and contrived and effectuated
scheme to tra	ack its users while not logged-in to Sync in California; and has adopted Californ
substantive la	w to govern its relationship with its users.
325.	At all relevant times, Google's tracking and interceptions of the Plaintiffs' Intern
communicati	ons while not logged-in to Sync was without authorization and consent from t
Plaintiffs.	
326.	Google's non-consensual tracking of logged-out users' Internet browsing w
designed to le	earn or attempt to learn the meaning of the contents of Chrome users' communication
327.	Chrome aided and abetted Google in its learning or attempting to learn the meani
of the conten	ts of Chrome users' communications.
328.	The following items constitute "machine[s], instrument[s], or contrivance[s]" und
the CIPA, an	d even if they do not, Google's deliberate and admittedly purposeful scheme th
facilitated its	interceptions falls under the broad statutory catch-all category of "any other manne

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1		a. The cookies Google used to track the Plaintiffs' communications while they
2		were not logged-in to Google Sync;
3		b. The Plaintiffs' browsers;
4		c. The Plaintiffs' personal computing devices;
5		d. Google's web servers;
6		e. The web-servers of non-Google websites from which Google tracked and
7		intercepted the Plaintiffs' communications while they were not logged-in to
8		Google Sync; and
9		f. The computer code Google deployed to effectuate its tracking and
10		interception of the Plaintiffs' communications while Plaintiffs were not
11		logged-in to Google Sync;
12		g. The plan Google carried out to achieve its tracking and interception of the
13		Plaintiffs' communications while they were not logged-in to Google Sync.
14	329.	Google's learning or attempts to learn the contents of Plaintiffs' communications
15	while not log	ged-in to Google Sync occurred while Plaintiffs' communications with non-Google
16	websites were	e in transit or in the process of being sent or received.
17	330.	Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered loss by reason of these violations,
18	including, bu	t not limited to, violation of their rights to privacy and loss of value in their PI.
19	331.	Pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 637.2, Plaintiffs and the Class have been injured by
20	Defendant's v	violations of Cal. Pen. Code § 631 and each seek damages for the greater of \$5,000 or
21	three times th	e amount of actual damages, as well as injunctive relief.
22		COUNT SIX
23		INVASION OF PRIVACY
24	332.	Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
25	333.	Google has intruded upon the following legally protected privacy interests of
26	Plaintiffs:	
27		a. A right to privacy contained on personal computing devices, including web-
28		browsing history;
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1		b. A right to be free from Internet surveillance absent consent;
2		c. Statutory rights codified in federal and California privacy statutes;
3		d. The California Computer Crime Law, Cal Pen. Code § 502, which applies to
4		all plaintiffs in this case by virtue of Google's choice of California law to
5		govern its relationship with Google users;
6		e. Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) which prohibiting the knowing theft or defrauding
7		of property "by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense[.]"
8	334.	The Google Terms of Service, and other public promises Google made not to track
9	or intercept th	e Plaintiffs' communications or access their computing devices and Chrome browsers
10	while not Syr	ched with any Google accounts.
11	335.	Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances in that:
12		a. Plaintiffs could not reasonably expect Google would commit acts in violation
13		of federal and state laws;
14		b. Google affirmatively promised users it would not cause Chrome to send their
15		personal information to Google unless the users choose to Sync with their
16		Google accounts
17	336.	Google's actions constituted a serious invasion of privacy in that they:
18		a. Invaded a zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, namely the
19		right to privacy in data contained on personal computing devices, including
20		web search and browsing histories;
21		b. Violated several federal criminal laws, including the Wiretap Act, and Stored
22		Communications Act;
23		c. Violated dozens of state criminal laws;
24		d. Invaded the privacy rights of hundreds of millions of Americans without their
25		consent;
26		e. Constituted the unauthorized taking of valuable information from hundreds
27		of millions of Americans through deceit.
28		
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1	337. The surreptitious and unauthorized tracking of the internet communications and
2	associated personal information of millions of Americans' constitutes an egregious breach of social
3	norms.
4	338. Google lacked a legitimate business interest in tracking users without consent.
5	339. Plaintiffs have been damaged by Google's invasion of their privacy and are entitled
6	to just compensation.
7	COUNT SEVEN
8	INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
9	340. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
10	341. Plaintiffs asserting claims for intrusion upon seclusion must plead (1) intrusion into
11	a private place, conversation, or matter; (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.
12	342. In carrying out its scheme to track and intercept Plaintiffs' communications and
13	access their computing devices and Chrome browsers while they were not Synched with other
14	Google accounts in violation of the governing Terms of Service, Google intentionally intruded
15	upon the Plaintiffs' solitude or seclusion in that it effectively placed itself in the middle of
16 17	communications to which it was not an authorized party and acquired data that was private and
17 19	Google was not authorized to acquire.
18 19	343. Google's actions were not authorized by the Plaintiffs nor by the websites with
20	which they were communicating.
20 21	344. Defendant's intentional intrusion into Plaintiffs' Internet communications and their
22	computing devices and Chrome browsers was highly offensive to a reasonable person in that they
23	violated federal and state criminal and civil laws designed to protect individual privacy and against
24	theft.
25	345. The unauthorized disclosure and taking of personal information from hundreds of
26	millions of Americans through deceit is highly offensive behavior.
27	346. Secret monitoring of web browsing is highly offensive behavior.
28	
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1	347. Wiretapping and surreptitious recording of communications is highly offensive		
2	behavior.		
3	348. Public polling on Internet tracking has consistently revealed that the overwhelming		
4	majority of Americans believe it is important or very important to be "in control of who can get		
5	information" about them; to not be tracked without their consent; and to be in "control[] of what		
6	information is collected about [them]."48		
7	349. Plaintiffs have been damaged by Google's invasion of their privacy and are entitled		
8	to reasonable compensation including but not limited to disgorgement of profits related to the		
9	unlawful internet tracking.		
10	COUNT EIGHT		
11	<b>BREACH OF CONTRACT</b>		
12	350. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.		
13	351. Google's relationship with its users is governed by the Google general Terms of		
14	Service, Chrome TOS and Chrome Privacy Notice, current and prior versions of which are attached		
15	to this Complaint as Exhibits 2 through 33.		
16	352. Google promised that Chrome would not report PI to Google unless the Plaintiffs		
17	affirmatively chose to Sync the browser with their Google accounts.		
18	353. Google breached this promise.		
19	354. Plaintiffs fulfilled their obligations under the relevant contracts and are not in breach		
20	of any.		
21	355. As a result of Google's breach, Google was able to obtain the personal property of		
22	Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome Users, earn unjust profits, and caused privacy injury and		
23	other consequential damages.		
24			
25			
26			
27	<sup>48</sup> Auxier and Rainie, "Key takeaways on Americans' views about privacy, surveillance and data- sharing" <u>https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/15/key-takeaways-on-americans-views-</u>		
28	<u>about-privacy-surveillance-and-data-sharing/</u> (last accessed July 23, 2020).		
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1	356. Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome Users also did not receive the benefit of
2	the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form
3	of the PI they agreed to share, which, as alleged above, has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.
4	COUNT NINE
5	BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
6	357. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
7	358. Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
8	performance and enforcement.
9	359. In dealing between Google and its users, Google is invested with discretionary
10	power affecting the rights of its users.
11	360. Google purports to respect and protect its users' privacy.
12	361. Despite its contractual privacy promises not to track users who choose not to Sync
13	Chrome with other Google accounts, Google took actions outside those contractual promises to
14	deprive Plaintiffs and the class of the benefits of their contract with Google.
15	362. Google's tracking and interception of the Internet communications and access to the
16	computing devices and Chrome browsers of logged-off users was objectively unreasonable given
17	Google's privacy promises.
18	363. Chrome's unauthorized disclosures of users' personal information to Google was
19	objectively unreasonable given Chrome's privacy promises.
20	364. Google's conduct in tracking and intercepting the Internet communications and
21	accessing the computing devices and Chrome browsers of logged-off users evaded the spirit of the
22	bargain made between Google and the plaintiffs.
23	365. Google's conduct in this case abused its power to specify terms-in particular,
24	Google's failed to accurately disclose its tracking of users while they were logged-off of Google
25	Sync.
26	366. As a result of Google's misconduct and breach of its duty of good faith and fair
27	dealing, Plaintiffs and the Class suffered damages. Plaintiffs and the Class members did not receive
28	the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration
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in the form of	f their personal information, which, as alleged above, has ascertainable value to be
proven at trial	1.
	COUNT TEN
QU	JASI-CONTRACT (RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT) (IN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTRACT CLAIMS)
367.	Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.
368.	Defendant, intentionally and without consent or other legal justification, violated the
privacy, prope	erty, and statutory rights of Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome Users.
369.	As a result of Defendant's tortious acts, Defendant received and unjustly retained a
benefit at the	expense of Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome Users.
370.	It would be unjust for Defendant to retain the value of the Plaintiffs' property and
any profits ea	rned thereon.
371.	If Plaintiffs' contract claims fail they have no adequate remedy at law to force the
disgorgement	of Defendant's unjustly earned profits. This count is therefore pled in the alternative
to the contrac	t claims.
	COUNT ELEVEN
VI	OLATION OF COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT ("CFAA") 18 U.S.C. §1030(g)
372.	Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.
373.	The CFAA prohibits the knowing "transmission of a program, information, code or
command, and	d as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a
protected com	nputer." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
374.	The Plaintiffs' computers are "protected computers" within the meaning of the
statute.	
375.	The Chrome browser was represented to protect user privacy (by blocking the
transmission of	of PI to Google) unless the user affirmatively elected to Sync the browser with other
Google accou	ints.
376.	Chrome's purported ability to protect user privacy was a core feature of Chrome.
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1	377. Google transmitted code to the Plaintiffs' computers that caused Chrome to transmit	
2	PI to Google without Plaintiff's authorization.	
3	378. The CFAA defines "damage" to mean "impairment to the integrity or availability of	
4	data, a program, a system or information."	
5	379. Google's unauthorized actions impaired the integrity of Plaintiffs' data, browsers	
6	and computer systems by removing a key privacy feature that should have blocked Google's	
7	surveillance.	
8	380. The CFAA provides a private right of action by any person who suffers damage or	
9	loss as a result of Defendant's unauthorized actions.	
10	381. Plaintiffs seek money damages and injunctive relief as provided under the statute.	
11	COUNT TWELVE	
12	VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA COMPUTER DATA ACCESS AND FRAUD ACT Cal. Penal Code § 502	
13	382. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.	
14		
15	383. Defendant violated Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(2) by knowingly and without	
16	permission accessing, taking and using Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' personally identifiable	
17	information.	
18	384. Defendant accessed, copied, used, made use of, interfered with, and/or altered data	
19	belonging to Plaintiffs and Class Members: (1) in and from the State of California; (2) in the states	
20	in which the Plaintiffs and the Class Members are domiciled; and (3) in the states in which the	
21	servers that provided services and communication links between Plaintiffs and the Class Members	
22	and Google.com and other websites with which they interacted were located.	
23	385. Cal. Penal Code § 502 provides: "For purposes of bringing a civil or a criminal	
24	action under this section, a person who causes, by any means, the access of a computer, computer	
25	system, or computer network in one jurisdiction from another jurisdiction is deemed to have	
26	personally accessed the computer, computer system, or computer network in each jurisdiction."	
27	386. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(1) by knowingly and	
28	without permission altering, accessing, and making use of Plaintiffs and Class Members' personally	
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identifiable data in order to execute a scheme to defraud consumers by utilizing and profiting from 1 the sale of their personally identifiable data, thereby depriving them of the value of their personally 2 identifiable data. 3

387. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(6) by knowingly and 4 without permission providing, or assisting in providing, a means of accessing Plaintiffs' and Class 5 Members' computer systems and/or computer networks. 6

388. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(7) by knowingly and 7 without permission accessing, or causing to be accessed, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' computer 8 systems and/or computer networks. 9

389. Pursuant to California Penal Code § 502(b)(10) a "Computer contaminant" is 10 defined as "any set of computer instructions that are designed to ... record, or transmit information 11 within computer, computer system, or computer network without the intent or permission of the 12 owner of the information." 13

390. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(b)(8) by knowingly and 14 without permission introducing a computer contaminant into the transactions between Plaintiffs 15 and the Class Members and websites; specifically, a "cookie" that intercepts and gathers 16 information concerning Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' interactions with certain websites, 17 which information is then transmitted back to Google. 18

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct within the 391. 19 meaning of California Penal Code § 502, Defendant has caused loss to Plaintiffs and the Class 20 Members in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are also entitled to 21 recover their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to California Penal Code § 502(e). 22

23

392. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek compensatory damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, and declarative or other equitable relief. 24

393. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to punitive or exemplary damages 25 pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(4) because Defendant's violations were willful and, upon 26 information and belief, Defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice as defined in Cal. Civil 27 Code § 3294. 28

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1		COUNT THIRTEEN
2		STATUTORY LARCENY
3		California Penal Code §§ 484 and 496
4	394.	Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.
5	395.	Section 496(a) prohibits the obtaining of property "in any manner constituting
6	theft."	
7	396.	Section 484 defines theft, and provides:
8		Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive
9		away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who
10		shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor
11		or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains gradit and thereby froudulently
12		imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft.
13		or service of another, is guilty of them.
14	397.	Section 484 thus defines "theft" to include obtaining property by false pretense.
15	398.	Defendant intentionally designed a program that would operate in a manner
16	unbeknownst t	o Plaintiffs whose computers were thus deceived into providing PI to Defendant.
17	399.	Defendant acted in a manner constituting theft and/or false pretense.
18	400.	Defendant stole, took, and/or fraudulently appropriated Plaintiffs' PI without
19	Plaintiffs' consent.	
20	401.	Defendant concealed, aided in the concealing, sold, and/or utilized Plaintiffs' PI that
21	was obtained	by Defendant for Defendant's commercial purposes and the financial benefit of
22	Defendant.	
23	402.	Defendant knew that Plaintiffs' PI was stolen and/or obtained because Defendant
24	designed the co	ode that tracked Plaintiffs' PI and operated it in a manner that was concealed and/or
25	withheld from	Plaintiffs.
26	403.	The reasonable and fair market value of the unlawfully obtain personal data can be
27	determined in the marketplace.	
28		
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1	COUNT FOURTEEN		
2	VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW ("UCL")		
3	Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.		
4	404. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.		
5	405. The UCL prohibits any "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and		
6	unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.		
7	406. Google is a "person" as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17201.		
8	407. Google violated Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. ("UCL") by engaging in		
9	unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business acts and practices.		
10	408. Google's "unlawful" acts and practices include its violation of the Electronic		
11	Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq.; the Stored Communications Act,		
12	18 U.S.C §§ 2701, et seq.; the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, et seq.;		
13	the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S. C.§ 1030(g); the California Computer Data Access		
14	and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502; California Statutory Larceny, Cal. Penal Code §§ 484 and		
15	496; and the Common Law Right of Privacy.		
16	409. Google's conduct violated the spirit and letter of these laws, which protect property,		
17	economic and privacy interests and prohibit unauthorized disclosure and collection of private		
18	communications and personal information.		
19	410. Google's "unfair" acts and practices include its violation of property, economic and		
20	privacy interests protected by the: Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et		
21	seq.; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 2701, et seq.; the California Invasion of Privacy		
22	Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, et seq.; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S. C.§ 1030(g); the		
23	California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502; California Statutory		
24	Larceny, Cal. Penal Code §§ 484 and 496; and the Common Law Right of Privacy. To establish		
25	liability under the unfair prong, Plaintiffs need not establish that these statutes were actually		
26	violated, although the claims pleaded herein do so.		
27	411. Google and Chrome promised Plaintiffs not to send their PI to Google even when		
28	Plaintiffs were Un-Synched. Plaintiffs thus had no reason to know and could not have anticipated		

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this intrusion into their privacy by the disclosure to Google of Plaintiffs' personal information.
Google's conduct was immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and substantially injurious to
Plaintiffs. Further, Google's conduct narrowly benefitted its own business interests at the expense
of Plaintiffs' fundamental privacy interests protected by the California Constitution and the
common law.

412. practices under the UCL include "fraudulent" Google's acts or its 6 misrepresentations and omissions assuring Plaintiffs that their PI would not be sent to Google while 7 Un-Synched were intended to, were likely to, and did deceive reasonable consumers such as 8 Plaintiffs. Google also misrepresented its privacy practices by disguising third-party tracking 9 cookies as first-party tracking cookies, a practice already successfully challenged by the FTC in an 10 earlier unrelated action. United States v. Google, Inc., 12-cv-4177-SI (N.D. Cal.). The information 11 that Google misrepresented and concealed would be, and is, material to reasonable consumers, 12 namely, that rather than not sharing the information at issue as represented, in fact that information 13 was shared with Google. 14

413. Plaintiffs have suffered in jury-in-fact, including the loss of money and/or property
as a result of Google's unfair, unlawful and/or deceptive practices, to wit, the unauthorized
disclosure and taking of their personal information which has value as demonstrated by its use and
sale by Google. Plaintiffs have suffered harm in the form of diminution of the value of their private
and personally identifiable data and content.

20 414. Google's actions caused damage to and loss of Plaintiffs' property right to control
21 the dissemination and use of their personal information and communications.

415. Google's misrepresentations and omissions—all which emanated from California—
 were material because they were likely to deceive reasonable consumers.

416. Google reaped unjust profits and revenues in violation of the UCL. This includes
Google's profits and revenues from their targeted-advertising, improvements of Google's other
products. Plaintiffs and the Class seek restitution and disgorgement of these unjust profits and
revenues.

1	417. Plaintiffs and class members seek all monetary and non-monetary relief allowed by				
2	law, including restitution of all profits stemming from Google's unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent				
3	business practices; declaratory relief; reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under California Code				
4	of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; injunctive relief; and other appropriate equitable relief.				
5	COUNT FIFTEEN				
6	PUNITIVE DAMAGES Cal. Civ. Code § 3294				
7 8	418. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.				
9	419. Google has an obligation not to intercept Plaintiffs' electronic communications				
10	without first obtaining consent, and this obligation exists by law independent of any contract with				
10	Plaintiffs.				
12	420. California Civil Code Section 3294(a) allows Plaintiffs to recover additional				
13					
14	of "oppression, fraud or malice."				
15	421. Google intentionally caused injury to Plaintiffs and other Un-Synched Chrome				
16	Users by tracking their web use and collecting other PI without permission, and with a conscious				
17	disregard for their rights, making Google guilty of "malice" as defined by Section 3294(c)(1).				
18	422. Google also intentionally misrepresented the privacy settings of Chrome, which was				
19	a material feature of the browser. Through Google's misrepresentation and deceit, Google deprived				
20	Plaintiffs and the other Un-Synched Chrome Users of property and privacy rights.				
21	423. Google is liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.				
22	COUNT SIXTEEN				
23	DECLARATORY RELIEF				
24	28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)				
25	424. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.				
26	425. An actual and justiciable controversy within the jurisdiction of this Court exists				
27	between the Plaintiffs and Google.				
28					
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1	426. Plaintiffs seek an order declaring the rights of the parties arising out of the facts of				
2	this case, specifically an order declaring:				
3		a. The Chrome Privacy Notice is a part of the contract between Chrome users			
4		and Google;			
5		b. The data collected by Google from Chrome is Personal Information under the			
6		terms of the contract and under California law;			
7	c. Google is in breach of the its contracts with Plaintiffs and Signed-O				
8		Chrome Users by causing PI to be sent from Chrome to Google;			
9		d. Google has violated the privacy rights of Plaintiffs and other Signed-Out			
10		Chrome Users by causing Chrome to collect and report users' PI to Google;			
11		e. Plaintiffs have suffered privacy harm; and			
12		f. Plaintiffs have suffered economic harm.			
13	VIII. PRAY	YER FOR RELIEF			
14	WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:				
15	A. Certify this action is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil				
16	Procedure;				
17	В.	Award compensatory damages, including statutory damages where available, to			
18	Plaintiffs and the Class against Defendant for all damages sustained as a result of Defendant's				
19	wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;				
20	C.	Permanently restrain Defendant, and its officers, agents, servants, employees and			
21	attorneys, from installing cookies on its users' computers that could track the users' computer usage				
22	after logging out of Google or otherwise violating its policies with users;				
23	D.	Award Plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this			
24	action, including counsel fees and expert fees; and				
25	E.	Grant Plaintiffs such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.			
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1	IX.	JURY TRIAL DEMAND					
1 2	1210	The Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable.					
2	Date	Dated: July 27, 2020					
4	BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP KAPLAN, FOX & KILSHEIMER LLI						
5	By:	/s/ Lesley Weaver	By: /s/ David A. Straite				
6	Lesley Weaver (Cal. Bar No. 191305) Angelica M. Ornelas (Cal. Bar No. 285929)		David A. Straite (pro hac vice to be sought)				
7	Josh	ua D. Samra (Cal. Bar No. 313050)	Aaron L. Schwartz ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) 850 Third Avenue				
8	Oakl	12 <sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 1600 and, CA 994607	New York, NY 10022				
	Tel.: Fax:	(415) 445-4003 (415) 445-4020	Telephone: (212) 687-1980 Facsimile: (212) 687-7714				
9	lwea	ver@bfalaw.com	dstraite@kaplanfox.com				
10		elas@bfalaw.com ra@bfalaw.com	aschwartz@kaplanfox.com				
11	~~~~		Laurence D. King (State Bar No. 206423) Mario Choi (State Bar No. 243409)				
12		MONS HANLY CONROY LLC	1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1560 Oakland, CA 94612				
13	<u>By:</u> Mitc	/s/ Jay Barnes hell M. Breit (pro hac vice to be sought)	Tel.: (415) 772-4700 Fax: (415) 772-4707				
14	Jasor	n 'Jay' Barnes ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) Truong ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought)	lking@kaplanfox.com mchoi@kaplanfox.com				
15	Eric 112 I	Johnson ( <i>pro hac vice</i> to be sought) Madison Avenue, 7 <sup>th</sup> Floor					
16		York, NY 10016 (212) 784-6400					
17	Fax:	(212) 213-5949					
18	mbreit@simmonsfirm.com jaybarnes@simmonsfirm.com						
19	Attor	rneys for Plaintiffs					
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	- 87 - Case No.						
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1	ATTESTATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 5-1(i)(3)
2	I, Lesley E. Weaver, attest that concurrence in the filing of this document has been obtained
3	from the other signatories. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
4	Executed this 27th day of July, 2020, at Oakland, California.
5	Executed this 27th day of July, 2020, at Oakland, Camornia.
6	
7	/s/ Lesley Weaver Lesley E. Weaver
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