Case	e 3:24-cv-00237-LL-BLM Document 1	Filed 02/05/24 PageID.1 Page 1 of 101
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	John R. Parker, Jr. (SBN 257761) jrparker@almeidalawgroup.com ALMEIDA LAW GROUP LLC 3550 Watt Avenue, Suite 140 Sacramento, California 95608 Tel: (916) 616-2936 <i>Attorneys for Plaintiff & the Classes</i> UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT ISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case No. <u>'24CV0237 LL_BLM</u> CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: 1. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), et seq.; 2. VIOLATION OF CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630, et seq.; 3. VIOLATION OF CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 56, et seq.; 4. VIOLATION OF CAL. CONST. ART. 1 § 1;
19	Defendants.	<i>seq.</i> ; 3. VIOLATION OF CAL.
22		5. INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION;
24 25		6. BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT;
25 26 27		7. LARCENY/RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY, VIOLATION OF
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CALIFORNIA PENAL CODESECTION 496(a) and (c); AND 8. UNJUST ENRICHMENT <u>JURY TRIAL DEMANDED</u>	
9	CLASS A CTION COMPLAINT	
10	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs B.W. and Jane Doe ("Plaintiffs") bring this class action	
11	lawsuit, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the "Class	
12 13	Members"), against San Diego Fertility Center Medical Group, Inc.	
13 14	("SDFC") and Ivy Fertility Services, LLC. ("Ivy Fertility," collectively	
14	"Defendants"). The allegations set forth herein are based on Plaintiffs'	
16	personal knowledge and on information and good faith belief as to all other	
17	matters based upon investigation by counsel.	
18	INTRODUCTION	
19	1. One in 8 couples has trouble getting pregnant or carrying a	
20	pregnancy, and 7.4 million women have received infertility treatment. ¹	
21	Despite the prevalence of infertility, information concerning fertility and	
22	reproductive health is among the most confidential and sensitive information	
23		
24		
25	¹ See How to Support Someone Experiencing Infertility,	
26	https://www.nm.org/healthbeat/healthy-tips/emotional-health/How-to-	
27	Support-Someone-Experiencing-Infertility (last visited February 1, 2024).	
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	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT	

1	in our society. According to a recent study, most infertile women choose to			
2	keep their struggle private from family or friends. ²			
3	2. Regarding the need to keep information about reproductive			
4	health private, the Department of Health and Human Services has noted:			
5	A positive, trusting relationship between individuals and			
6	their health care providers is essential to an individual's			
7	health and well-being. The prospect of releasing highly sensitive PHI can result in medical mistrust and the			
8	deterioration of the confidential, safe environment that is necessary to quality health care, a functional health care system, and the public's health generally. That is even			
9				
10	more true in the context of reproductive health care,			
11	given the potential for stigmatization and other adverse consequences to individuals resulting from disclosures they do not want or expect. ³			
12				
13	3. The mishandling of such private and sensitive health			
14	information can have serious consequences including, but certainly not limited to, discrimination in the workplace and/or denial of insurance coverage. ⁴ Simply put, if people do not trust that their sensitive private			
15				
16				
17	coverage. Shipiy put, il people do not trust that then sensitive private			
18	² See What to Say to Someone Struggling With Infertility,			
19	https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/parenting/support-friend- infertility.html (last visited February 1, 2024).			
20	interunity.numi (last visited redruary 1, 2024).			
21	³ See HIPAA Privacy Rule To Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy,			
22	https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/17/2023-07517/hipaa- privacy-rule-to-support-reproductive-health-care-privacy (last visited			
23	February 1, 2024).			
24	⁴ See Lindsey Ellefson, Telehealth Sites Put Addiction Patient Data at Risk:			
25	New research found pervasive use of tracking tech on substance-abuse-			
26	focused health care websites, potentially endangering users in a post-Roe world, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2022) ("While the sharing of any kind of patient			
27	information is often strictly regulated or outright forbidden, it's even more			
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	3 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT			

information will be kept private and secure, they may be less likely to seek
medical and fertility treatment which can lead to much more serious health
consequences down the road. In addition, protecting medical information and
making sure it is kept confidential and not disclosed to any unauthorized
entities is vitally necessary to maintain public trust in the healthcare system
as a whole.

7 Defendants Collect a Significant Amount of Private Information

8 4. Defendant Ivy Fertility, is "an internationally recognized
9 network of fertility clinics, offers advanced reproductive technologies across
10 the United States," including California.⁵

5. Ivy Fertility "unites top-performing reproductive clinics,"
 including Defendant SDFC "behind a common goal: providing patients
 extraordinary medical care for their family-building needs."⁶

6. Among the many clinical websites, portals, and patient
appointment webpages (collectively, "Web Properties") owned and operated
by Defendant Ivy Fertility are the following:

San Diego Fertility Center – https://www.sdfertility.com/ and
 https://app.ivyfertility.com/contact us/sdfc/scheduleconsultation

us/sdfc/scheduleconsultation

verboten in addiction treatment, as patients' medical history can be
 inherently criminal and stigmatized."),

https://www.wired.com/story/substance-abuse-telehealth-privacy-tracking tech/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

²⁵ ³ *See* https://www.ivyfertility.com/about (last visited Jan. 31, 2024).

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 26 \\ 27 \end{array} \stackrel{6}{\mid} Id.$

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1	Fertility Centers of Orange County –
2	https://fertilitycentersoc.com/iui.html
3	Reproductive Partners Medical Group –
4	https://www.reproductivepartners.com/
5	• Pacific NW Fertility – https://pnwfertility.com/
6	• Fertility Associates of Memphis –
7	https://www.fertilitymemphis.com/
8	• Idaho Fertility Center – https://www.idahofertility.com/
9	Nevada Center for Reproductive Medicine –
10	https://nevadafertility.com/
11	• Nevada Fertility Center – https://www.nvfertility.com/
12	• Utah Fertility Center – https://utahfertility.com/
13	• Virginia Fertility and IVF – https://www.vafertility.com/
14	7. Defendant SDFC, a privately held California corporation
15	established in 1996, operates four fertility clinics, with three locations in
16	California (in Del Mar, Mission Valley and Temecula) and one in New York
17	City. ⁷
18	8. SDFC offers fertility treatments, including infertility testing and
19	diagnosis, in-vitro fertilization ("IVF"), PGD-PGS gender selection, LGBT
20	fertility, male infertility, egg freezing, and fertility preservation. ⁸
21	9. As part of the medical services it provides, Ivy and SDFC own,
22	control and maintain a website for its clinic, https://www.sdfertility.com/
23	("Website").
24	
25	⁷ See https://www.sdfertility.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
26	
27	⁸ <i>Id</i> .
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Defendants actively encourage patients and prospective patients 1 10. 2 to use the Web Properties, including the Website, to communicate with their 3 healthcare providers; manage medical appointments for fertility services; search medical conditions concerning fertility and treatment options; and 4 much more. The Website invites patients to share and search for personal 5 medical information about their own reproductive health. And patients, 6 trusting that this extremely private and sensitive information will be 7 safeguarded, share intimate and personal medical information with SDFC 8 through the Website. 9

SDFC boldly proclaims to its patients in its "Privacy Policy" 10 11. that it is "committed to respecting your privacy" and that it does "not share 11 tracking information with unaffiliated companies, and [does] not allow other 12 companies to place cookies on our Site."9 13

14 As described in more detail below, those statements are false. 12. **Defendants Utilized Tracking Technologies to Monetize Users' Private** 15 Information. 16

17 Plaintiffs and Class Members who visited and used SDFC's 13. Website and Defendants' Web Properties (collectively, the "Users") 18 reasonably believed that they were communicating only with their trusted 19 20 healthcare providers.

At no point have Defendants, despite intentionally incorporating 21 14. invisible tracking codes from unauthorized third parties into their Web 22 Properties and servers, informed Users that their personally identifiable 23 information ("PII") and protected health information ("PHI") (collectively 24 referred to as "PII/PHI" or "Private Information") communicated via their 25

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Disclaimer and Privacy Policy,

27 https://www.sdfertility.com/resources/disclaimer (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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Web Properties was intentionally disclosed to a third party—let alone 1 Facebook,¹⁰ which has a sordid history of privacy violations.¹¹ 2 3 15. However, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs and Class Members, Defendants installed tracking technologies on their Web Properties to collect 4 and disclose their Private Information to unauthorized third parties for its 5 6 own pecuniary gain. 7 16. Specifically, Defendants embedded undetectable tracking Facebook pixels (the "Pixels" or "Facebook Pixels") on the Web Properties, 8 including the Website, which transmit an incredible amount of personal and 9 protected data about its Users to Meta Platforms, Inc., d/b/a Meta ("Meta" or 10 "Facebook"). The collection and transmission of this information is 11 instantaneous, invisible and occurs without any notice to—and certainly no 12 consent from—the Users.¹² 13 14 17. The Facebook Pixel, installed and configured by Defendants, is a piece of code that "tracks the people and [the] type of actions they take"¹³ 15 16 ¹⁰ Meta Platforms, Inc. is doing business as "Meta" and "Facebook." The 17 terms "Meta" and "Facebook" are used interchangeably throughout. 18 ¹¹ This Court will not have to look far to find evidence of Meta's violations 19 of privacy laws. Just in May of last year, for instance, the European Union fined Meta "a record-breaking" \$1.3 billion for violating EU privacy laws. 20 See Hanna Ziady, Meta slapped with record \$1.3 billion EU fine over data 21 privacy, https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/22/tech/meta-facebook-data-privacyeu-fine/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 22 23 ¹² Healthcare providers that use analytics tools like the Facebook Pixel or Google Analytics on their websites may also have those tools embedded on a 24 patient portal login page or even inside a patient portal. 25 ¹³ *Retargeting*, https://www.facebook.com/business/goals/retargeting (last 26 visited Jan. 31, 2023). 27 28 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

as they interact with a website, including how long a person spends on a 1 particular web page, which buttons the person clicks, which pages they view, 2 3 and the text or phrases they type into various portions of the website (such as a general search bar, chat feature or text box). 4 The pixels—which are configured by the website owners, here, 5 18. Ivy Fertility and SDFC—collect and transmit information from Users' 6 browsers to unauthorized third parties, including, but not limited to, 7 Facebook (collectively, "Pixel Information Recipients").¹⁴ 8 9 Together with the patients' Private Information, the data sent to 19. Facebook also discloses Users' unique and persistent Facebook ID 10 ("Facebook ID" or "FID") which allows Facebook and other third parties to 11 personally identify those Users and associates their Private Information with 12 their Facebook profile.¹⁵ 13 14 ¹⁴ The pixel itself is a small snippet of code placed on webpages by the 15 website owner. The process of adding the pixel to a webpage is a multi-step process that, as described in detail in *section E*, must be undertaken by the 16 website owner such as SDFC. 17 While this Complaint primarily focuses on how Defendants embedded 18 the Facebook Pixel on their Websites to collect and disclose Users' Private 19 Information, other secret tracking technologies embedded by Defendants such as Google Analytics, Bing and Twitter tracking codes—also collect 20 such Private Information, and the respective tech companies have the 21 capability to link it to specific user profiles. 22 ¹⁵ The Facebook ID is a string of numbers Facebook uses to identify and 23 connect to a User's Facebook profile. Facebook creates a Facebook ID automatically, whether or not you choose to create a username. See 24 https://www.facebook.com/help/211813265517027 (last accessed Jan. 30, 25 2024). Thus, Facebook, which creates and maintains the Facebook ID directly connected to a User's Facebook account, utilizes the Facebook ID to 26 personally identify each User whose Private Information is disclosed to it. 27 28 8 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

Defendants' Disclosure of Private Information Without Consent Violates the Law.

20. In recent months, and in stark contrast to Defendants, several
medical providers that used the Facebook Pixel in a similar way have
provided their patients with notices of data breaches caused by the Pixel
transmitting their information to third parties.¹⁶

7 21. Simply put (and as detailed herein), covered entities such as
8 Defendants are *not* permitted to use tracking technology tools (like pixels) in
9 a way that exposes patients' Private Information to any third party without
10 express and informed consent from each patient. Neither Plaintiff nor any
11 other Class Members were provided—much less signed—a written
12 authorization permitting Defendants to disclose their Private Information to
13 Facebook or any other third-party data brokers.

14 22. As recognized by both the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
15 and the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") of the Department of Health and
16 Human Services ("HHS"), healthcare companies' use of tracking
17 technologies to collect and divulge their patients' sensitive and confidential
18 information is an extremely serious data security and privacy issue:

19

¹⁶ See, e.g., Cerebral, Inc. Notice of HIPAA Privacy Breach, available at 20 https://cerebral.com/static/hippa privacy breach-21 4000c6eb21449c2ecd8bd13706750cc2.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2024); Advocate Aurora says 3M patients' health data possibly exposed through 22 tracking technologies (Oct. 20, 2022), available at 23 https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/health-tech/advocate-aurora-health-databreach-revealed-pixels-protected-health-information-3 (last visited Jan. 30, 24 2024); Novant Health notifies patients of potential data privacy incident 25 (Aug. 12, 2022), available at https://www.novanthealth.org/home/aboutus/newsroom/press-releases/newsid33987/2672/novant-health-notifies-26 patients-of-potential-data-privacy-incident-.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 27 28 9 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

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1	Don't use behind-the-scenes tracking
2	technologies that contradict your privacy promises or otherwise harm consumers.
3	In today's surveillance economy, the consumer is
4	often the product. Consumer data powers the advertising machine that goes right back to the
5	consumer. <u>But when companies use consumers'</u> sensitive health data for marketing and advartising purposes, such as by sending that data
6	advertising purposes, such as by sending that data to marketing firms via tracking pixels on websites or software development kits on apps, watch out. ¹⁷
7	or software development kits on apps, watch out.
8	23. Similarly, the OCR is clear that "[r]egulated entities [those to
9	which HIPAA applies] are not permitted to use tracking technologies in a
10	manner that would result in impermissible disclosures of PHI to tracking
11	technology vendors or any other violations of the Health Insurance
12	Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") Rules." ¹⁸
13	24. The HIPAA privacy rule sets forth policies to protect all
14	individually identifiable health information that is held or transmitted, and
15	there are approximately 18 HIPAA Identifiers that are considered PII. This
16	information can be used to identify, contact or locate a single person or can
17	be used with other sources to identify a single individual.
18	
19	
20	
21	¹⁷ See Elisa Jillison, Protecting the privacy of health information: A Baker's
22	<i>dozen takeaways from FTC cases,</i> the FTC Business Blog (July 25, 2023) (emphasis added), <i>available at</i> https://www.ftc.gov/business-
23	guidance/blog/2023/07/protecting-privacy-health-information-bakers-dozer
24	takeaways-ftc-cases (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
25	¹⁸ The OCR Bulletin, Use of Online Tracking Technologies by HIPAA
26	Covered Entities and Business Associates, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/hipaa-online-tracking/index.html (emphasis
27	added) (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
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	10 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

25. These HIPAA Identifiers, as relevant here, include names, dates
 related to an individual, email addresses, device identifiers, web URLs, and
 IP addresses.¹⁹

4 Defendants Derive Significant Value from Users' Private Information

26. There is no anonymity in the information disclosed to Facebook
for marketing and analytics purposes; that is, the Pixel collects and discloses
a substantial "data packet" coupled with the FID so that Defendants can,
among other things, send targeted advertisements to Users based on their
sensitive and protected Private Information. Defendants also use this
impermissibly obtained data for analytics purposes to gain additional insights
into how its patients use their Web Properties.²⁰
27. Operating as designed and as implemented by Defendants, the

12 27. Operating as designed and as implemented by Defendants, the
13 Pixel disclosed information that allows a third party (*e.g.*, Facebook) to know
14 when and where a specific patient was seeking confidential medical care, the
15 medical condition(s) that patients inquired about, and the precise care the
16 patient sought or received. Facebook, in turn, sells Plaintiffs' and Class

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- 18

¹⁹ Guidance regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health
 ¹⁹ Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and

20 Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-

21 professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2024).

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- 23 ²⁰ SDFC unquestionably is required to inform its Users if it deploys tracking technologies on its Web Properties so that Users can make informed
- 24 decisions as to whether they want their information to be collected,
- disclosed, and used in this manner. The OCR Bulletin is, again, instructive:

"disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors for marketing purposes,
 without individuals' HIPAA-compliant authorizations, would constitute

27 impermissible disclosures." See OCR Bulletin, supra note 15.

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Members' Private Information to third-party marketers who target Plaintiffs'
 and Class Members' Facebook accounts based on that Private Information.

28. While the information captured and disclosed without
permission may vary depending on the pixel(s) embedded, these "data
packets" can be extensive, sending, for example, the User's first name, last
name, email address, phone number, zip code, and city of residence entered
on the Website. The data packets also include the buttons a User clicks and
the words a User types into a search bar.

9 For instance, when a User uses Defendants' Web Properties 29. where tracking technologies, such as the Facebook Pixel are present, the 10 Pixel transmits the contents of their communications to Facebook, including, 11 but not limited to: (i) medical reproductive and fertility services and 12 treatments sought; (ii) patient status; (iii) scheduling of appointments; (iv) 13 accessing and viewing the bill page; (v) the text of URLs visited by the User; 14 (vi) User's email address and phone number and (vii) other information that 15 qualifies as PII and PHI under federal and state laws. The data in the "data 16 packets" is then linked to a specific internet protocol ("IP") address, which is 17 itself protected information under HIPAA, as well as the Users' Facebook 18 19 ID.

30. By installing the Facebook Pixel and other tracking
technologies, Defendants effectively planted a bug on Plaintiffs' and Class
Members' web browsers and caused them to unknowingly disclose their
private, sensitive and confidential health-related communications to
Facebook (and, upon information and good faith belief, other third-party data
brokers).

31. The information intercepted by the Pixels and third-party
tracking technologies is used to build incredibly fulsome and robust

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marketing profiles for individual Users and create targeted advertisements
based on the medical conditions and other Private Information disclosed.
Despite the clear and unequivocal prohibition on the disclosure of PHI
without consent, Ivy Fertility and SDFC chose to use the Pixel data for
marketing purposes to bolster their revenue.

6 32. Simply put, Defendants put their desire for revenue over their
7 patients' privacy rights.

8 Defendants' Conduct Caused Concrete & Demonstrable Harm to Users.

9 As healthcare providers, Defendants have certain duties and 33. obligations to their patients. Defendants breached those duties and 10 obligations in one or more of the following ways: (i) failing to adequately 11 review their marketing programs and web-based technology to ensure their 12 Web Properties were safe and secure; (ii) failing to remove or disengage 13 technology that was known and designed to share web Users' information; 14 (iii) failing to obtain the consent of Plaintiffs and Class Members to disclose 15 their PII and PHI to Facebook or other third parties; (iv) failing to take steps 16 to block the transmission of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII and PHI 17 through the Pixels; (v) failing to warn Plaintiffs and Class Members about 18 the tracking technology; and (vi) otherwise failing to design and monitor 19 their Web Properties to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of patient 20 PII and PHI. 21

34. Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered injury because of
Defendants' conduct. These injuries include: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) loss
of benefit of the bargain; (iii) compromise and disclosure of Private
Information; (iv) diminution of value of their Private Information; (iv)

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statutory damages; and (v) the continued and ongoing risk to their Private
 Information.²¹

35. 3 Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms for themselves and a class of all others similarly situated and therefore assert causes of action for (1) 4 Violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5 2511(1), et seq., Unauthorized Interception, Use and Disclosure; (2) 6 Violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), Cal. Penal 7 Code § 630, et seq.; (3) Violation of the California Confidentiality of 8 Medical Information Act ("CMIA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq.; (4) 9 Invasion of Privacy under California Constitution; (5) Common Law 10 Intrusion upon Seclusion; (6) Breach of Implied Contract; (7) Violation of 11 California Penal Code § 496, et seq.; and (8) Unjust Enrichment. 12 13 PARTIES 14 36. Plaintiff B.W. is a natural person and resident of the city of San Diego in San Diego County, California. 15 16 As detailed herein, Plaintiff B.W. accessed Defendants' Web 37. Properties, including the SDFC Website, on her computer and mobile 17 devices and used the Website to look for providers of fertility and infertility 18 treatments, review fertility treatments' costs and insurance options, and 19 submit forms with personal medical information. Plaintiff B.W. has used and 20 continues to use the same devices to maintain and access an active Facebook 21 account throughout the relevant period in this case. 22 23 24 ²¹ The exposed Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members can and likely will—be further disseminated to additional third parties utilizing 25 the data for retargeting or insurance companies utilizing the information to set insurance rates. Furthermore, third parties often offer the unencrypted, 26 unredacted Private Information for sale to criminals on the dark web for use 27 in fraud and cyber-crimes. 28 14 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

38. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a natural person and resident of the city of
 San Diego in San Diego County, California.

3 39. As detailed herein, Plaintiff Jane Doe accessed Defendants' Web
4 Properties, including the SDFC Website, on her mobile device and used the
5 Website to look for providers of fertility treatments, review fertility
6 treatments' costs and insurance options, pay bills and submit forms with
7 personal medical information. Plaintiff has used the same device to maintain
8 and access an active Facebook account throughout the relevant period in this
9 case.

40. Defendant SDFC is a California corporation with its principal
place of business and corporate headquarters at 11425 El Camino Real, San
Diego, California in San Diego County.

- 41. Defendant Ivy Fertility is a Delaware corporation with its
 principal place of business and corporate headquarters at 16870 West
 Bernardo Drive, Suite 120, San Diego, California in San Diego County.
- 16 17

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42.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

Defendants are covered entities under HIPAA.

43. This Court has "federal question" jurisdiction given the federal
claims alleged by Plaintiff. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction
over this action under 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(d) because this is a class action
wherein the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, there are more than 100 members in the
proposed class, and at least one member of the class is a citizen of a state
different from Defendants.

44. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Ivy Fertility
and SDFC because their principal places of business and headquarters are
located in San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California, they

regularly engage in business in the State of California and in County of San
 Diego, and a substantial portion of the acts and omissions giving rise to
 Plaintiffs' claims occurred in and emanated from this county.

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) 45. 4 through (d) because: a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action 5 6 occurred in this District, including decisions made by Defendants governance and management personnel or inaction by those individuals that led to the 7 unauthorized sharing of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information; 8 Defendants principal places of business are located in this District; 9 Defendants collect and redistribute Class Members' Private Information in 10 this District and Defendants caused harm to Class Members residing in this 11 District. 12

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COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Federal Regulators Make Clear that the Use of Tracking Technologies to Collect & Divulge Private Information Without Informed Consent is Illegal.

46. Defendants' surreptitious collection and divulgence of Private
Information is an extremely serious data security and privacy issue. Both the
FTC and the OCR of HHS have—in recent months—reiterated the
importance of and necessity for data security and privacy concerning health
information.

47. For instance, the FTC recently published a bulletin entitled *Protecting the privacy of health information: A baker's dozen takeaways from FTC cases*, in which it noted that "[h]ealth information is not just about
medications, procedures, and diagnoses. *Rather, it is anything that conveys information—or enables an inference—about a consumer's health*.

- ²⁶ [Indeed, [recent FTC enforcement actions involving] *Prenom, BetterHelp,*
- 27 GoodRx, and Flo Health make clear that the fact that a consumer is using a
- 28

particular health-related app or website—one related to mental health or 1 2 fertility, for example—or how they interact with that app (say, turning 'pregnancy mode' on or off) may itself be health information."22 3 The FTC is unequivocal in its stance as it informs-in no 48. 4 uncertain terms—healthcare companies that they should *not* use tracking 5 technologies to collect sensitive health information and disclose it to various 6 7 platforms without informed consent: 8 [Recent FTC enforcement actions such as] BetterHelp, GoodRx, Premom, and Flo make clear 9 that practices like that *may run afoul of the FTC* Act if they violate privacy promises or if the 10 company fails to get consumers' affirmative express consent for the disclosure of sensitive 11 health information. The federal government is taking these violations of health data 12 49. privacy and security seriously, evidenced by recent high-profile FTC 13 settlements against several telehealth companies. 14 15 50. For example, the FTC recently imposed a \$1.5 million penalty on GoodRx for violating the FTC Act by sharing its customers' sensitive PHI 16 with advertising companies and platforms, including Facebook, Google and 17 Criteo. The FTC also reached a \$7.8 million settlement with the online 18 counseling service BetterHelp, resolving allegations that the company shared 19 20 ²² See Elisa Jillison, Protecting the privacy of health information: A Baker's 21 dozen takeaways from FTC cases, the FTC Business Blog (July 25, 2023) (emphasis added), https://www.ftc.gov/business-22 guidance/blog/2023/07/protecting-privacy-health-information-bakers-dozen-23 takeaways-ftc-cases (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 24 ²³ Id. (emphasis added) (further noting that GoodRx & Premom underscore 25 that this conduct may also violate the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires notification to consumers, the FTC and, in some cases, the media, of 26 disclosures of health information without consumers' authorization). 27 28 17 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

customer health data with Facebook and Snapchat for advertising purposes.
 Likewise, the FTC reached a settlement with Flo Health, Inc. related to
 information about fertility and pregnancy that Flo fertility-tracking app was
 improperly sharing with Facebook, Google, and other third parties. And Easy
 Healthcare was ordered to pay a \$100,000 civil penalty for violating the
 Health Breach Notification Rule when its ovulation tracking app, Premon,
 shared health data for advertising purposes.²⁴

8 51. Even more recently, in July 2023, federal regulators sent a letter to approximately 130 healthcare providers warning them about using online 9 tracking technologies that could result in unauthorized disclosures of Private 10 Information to third parties. The letter highlighted the "risks and concerns 11 about the use of technologies, such as the Meta/Facebook Pixel and Google 12 Analytics, that can track a user's online activities," and warned about 13 "[i]mpermissible disclosures of an individual's personal health information 14 15 ²⁴ See How FTC Enforcement Actions Will Impact Telehealth Data Privacy, https://healthitsecurity.com/features/how-ftc-enforcement-actions-will-16 impact-telehealth-data-privacy (last visited Jan. 30, 2024); see also Allison 17 Grande, FTC Targets GoodRx In 1st Action Under Health Breach Rule, Law360 (Feb. 1, 2023), available at www.law360.com/articles/1571369/ftc-18 targets-goodrx-in1st-action-under-health-breach-rule?copied=1 ("The 19 Federal Trade Commission signaled it won't hesitate to wield its full range of enforcement powers when it dinged GoodRx for allegedly sharing sensitive 20 health data with advertisers, teeing up a big year for the agency and boosting 21 efforts to regulate data privacy on a larger scale."); https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/07/ftc-gives-22 final-approval-order-banning-betterhelp-sharing-sensitive-health-data-23 advertising; https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/pressreleases/2023/05/ovulation-tracking-app-premom-will-be-barred-sharing-24 health-data-advertising-under-proposed-ftc (last visited Jan. 30, 2024); 25 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/06/ftc-finalizesorder-flo-health-fertility-tracking-app-shared-sensitive-health-data-facebook-26 google (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 27 28 18 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

to third parties" that could "result in a wide range of harms to an individual 1 2 or others." According to the letter, "[s]uch disclosures can reveal sensitive 3 information including health conditions, diagnoses, medications, medical treatments, frequency of visits to health care professionals, where an 4 individual seeks medical treatment, and more."25 5 6 The Office for Civil Rights at HHS has made clear, in a recent 52. bulletin titled Use of Online Tracking Technologies by HIPAA Covered 7 *Entities and Business Associates*, that the transmission of such protected 8 information violates HIPAA's Privacy Rule: 9 10 Regulated entities [those to which HIPAA applies] are not permitted to use tracking technologies in a 11 manner that would result in impermissible disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors 12 or any other violations of the HIPAA Rules. For example, disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors for marketing purposes, without individuals' HIPAA-compliant 13 14 authorizations, would constitute impermissible disclosures.²⁰ 15 16 The OCR Bulletin reminds healthcare organizations regulated 53. 17 under HIPAA that they may use third-party tracking tools, such as Google 18 Analytics or Pixels *only in a limited way* to perform analysis on data key to 19 operations. They are not permitted, however, to use these tools in a way that 20 may expose patients' PHI to these vendors.²⁷ 21 54. The OCR Bulletin discusses the harms that disclosure may cause 22 patients: 23 ²⁵ See OCR Bulletin, supra note 15. 24 25 ²⁶ Id. 26 ²⁷ See id. 27 28 19 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	An impermissible disclosure of an individual's PHI not only violates the Privacy Rule but also may result in a wide range of additional harms to the individual or others. For example, an impermissible disclosure of PHI may result in identity theft, financial loss, discrimination, stigma, mental anguish, or other serious negative consequences to the reputation, health, or physical safety of the individual or to others identified in the individual's PHI. Such disclosures can reveal incredibly sensitive information about an individual, including diagnoses, frequency of visits to a therapist or other health care professionals, and where an individual seeks medical treatment. While it has always been true that regulated entities may not impermissibly disclose PHI to tracking technology vendors, because of the proliferation of			
9 10	tracking technologies collecting sensitive information, now more than ever, it is critical for regulated entities to ensure that they disclose PHI only as expressly permitted or required by the			
11	HIPAA Privacy Rule. ²⁰			
12	55. Moreover, investigative journalists have published several			
13	reports detailing the seemingly ubiquitous use of tracking technologies on the			
14	digital properties of hospitals, health care providers and telehealth companies			
15	to monetize their Users' Private Information.			
16	56. For instance, THE MARKUP reported that 33 of the largest 100			
17	hospital systems in the country utilized the Meta Pixel to send Facebook a			
18	packet of data whenever a person clicked a button to schedule a doctor's			
19	appointment. ²⁹			
20	57. And, in the aptly titled report "Out of Control": Dozens of			
21	Telehealth Startups Sent Sensitive Health Information to Big Tech			
22				
23	²⁸ <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).			
24	²⁹ See Todd Feathers, Simon Fondrie-Teitler, Angie Waller & Surya Mattu,			
25	Facebook is Receiving Sensitive Medical Information from Hospital			
26	<i>Websites</i> , THE MARKUP, https://themarkup.org/pixel- hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-			
27	hospital-websites (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).			
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Companies, a joint investigation by STAT and THE MARKUP of 50 direct-to consumer telehealth companies reported that telehealth companies or virtual
 care websites were providing sensitive medical information they collect to
 the world's largest advertising platforms.³⁰

- 5 58. Many healthcare sites had at least one tracker—from Meta,
 6 Google, TikTok, Bing, Snap, Twitter, LinkedIn, and/or Pinterest—that
 7 collected patients' answers to medical intake questions.³¹
 - B. Tracking Pixels.

8

9 59. Pixels are routinely used to target specific customers by utilizing
10 data to build profiles for the purposes of retargeting, for example, serving
11 online advertisements to people who have previously engaged with a
12 business's website—and other marketing.

13 60. Here, a User's web browser executes the Pixels via instructions

14 within each webpage of SDFC's Website and Defendants' appointment

15 forms such as https://app.ivyfertility.com/contact-

16 us/sdfc/scheduleconsultation (and, upon information and good faith belief,

17 within Ivy Fertility's Patient Portal) to communicate certain information

18 (within parameters set by Defendants) directly to the corresponding Pixel

¹⁹ ³⁰ Todd Feathers, Katie Palmer (STAT) & Simon Fondrie-Teitler, "*Out Of*

20 Control": Dozens of Telehealth Startups Sent Sensitive Health Information

²¹ to Big Tech Companies: An investigation by The Markup and STAT found 49 out of 50 telehealth websites sharing health data via Big Tech's tracking

22 *tools* (Dec. 13, 2022), https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/12/13/out-of-

control-dozens-of-telehealth-startups-sent-sensitive-health-information-to-

big-tech-companies (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

CLAS

24

³¹ See id. (noting that "[t]rackers on 25 sites, including those run by industry

leaders Hims & Hers, Ro, and Thirty Madison, told at least one big tech

- ²⁶ platform that the user had added an item like a prescription medication to
- $_{27}$ [their cart, or checked out with a subscription for a treatment plan").
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Information Recipients, including Facebook—at the same time as the User's
 browser is sending this information to Defendants.

61. The Pixels can also share the Users' identifying information for
easy tracking via "cookies"³² stored on their computer by any of the Pixel
Information Recipients with whom they have an account. For example,
Facebook stores or updates a Facebook-specific cookie every time a person
accesses their Facebook account from the same web browser.

62. The Facebook Pixel can access this cookie and send certain
identifying information like the User's Facebook ID to Facebook along with
the other data relating to the User's Website inputs. The same is true for
Facebook and the other Pixel Information Recipients, which also create
cookies that are stored in the User's computer and accessed by the Pixels to
identify the User.

14 63. The Pixels are programmable, meaning that Defendants control
15 which of the webpages on the Website contain the Pixels and which events
16 are tracked and transmitted to the Pixel Information Recipients.

17 64. Defendants used the data they collected from Plaintiffs and
18 Class Members, without their consent, to improve their advertising and
19 bolster their revenue.

20 C. Conversions API.

21 65. In addition to the Facebook Pixel, Facebook Conversions API
22 and similar tracking technologies allow businesses to send web events, such

- 23
- ³² "Cookies are small files of information that a web server generates and sends to a web browser Cookies help inform websites about the user, enabling the websites to personalize the user experience." *See*
- ²⁶ https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/privacy/what-are- cookies/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
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as clicks, form submissions, keystroke events and other actions performed by
 the user on the Website, from their own servers to Facebook and other third
 parties.³³

66. Conversions API creates a direct and reliable connection
between marketing data (such as website events and offline conversations)
from Defendants' servers to Facebook.³⁴

7 67. In doing so, Defendants store Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
8 Private Information on their own servers and then transmit it to unauthorized
9 third parties like Facebook.

10 68. Conversions API is an alternative method of tracking versus the
11 Meta Pixel because no privacy protections on the user's end can defeat it.

12 This is because it is "server-side" implementation of tracking technology,

whereas pixels are "client-side"—executed on users' computers in their web
browsers.

15 69. Because Conversions API is server-side, it cannot access the
16 Facebook c user cookie to retrieve the Facebook ID.³⁵ Therefore, other

17

18 3³ See https://revealbot.com/blog/facebook-conversions-api/ (last visited_Jan.
19 30, 2024).

 $20 ||^{34} See$

21 https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2041148702652965?id=81885903 2317965 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

22

23 ³⁵ "Our systems are designed to not accept customer information that is unhashed Contact Information, unless noted below. Contact Information is

24 information that personally identifies individuals, such as names, email

addresses and phone numbers, that we use for matching purposes only." *See* https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-

²⁶ api/parameters/customer-information-parameters/ <u>(last visited Jan. 30, 2024)</u>.



roundabout methods of linking the user to their Facebook account are 1 employed.³⁶ For example, Facebook has an entire page within its developers' 2 website about how to de-duplicate data received when both the Facebook 3 Pixel and Conversions API are executed.³⁷ 4

Conversions API tracks the user's website interactions, 5 70. including Private Information being shared, and then transmits this data to 6 Facebook and other third parties. Facebook markets Conversions API as a 7 "better measure [of] ad performance and attribution across your customer's 8 full journey, from discovery to conversion. This helps you better understand 9 how digital advertising impacts both online and offline results."38 10

Defendants installed the Meta Pixel and, upon information and 11 71. good faith belief, Conversions API, as well as other tracking technologies, on 12 many (if not all) of the webpages within their Web Properties (including 13 webpages for patients to pay their bills or for prospective patients seeking 14 appointments) and programmed or permitted those webpages to 15 surreptitiously share patients' private and protected communications with 16 Facebook (and with other Pixel Information Recipients via their proprietary 17 18

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³⁶ "Sending additional customer information parameters may help increase 20 Event Match Quality. Only matched events can be used for ads attribution 21 and ad delivery optimization, and the higher the matching quality, the better." https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api/best-22 practices/#req- rec-params (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 23

³⁷ See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-24 api/deduplicate-pixel- and-server-events (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 25

³⁸About Conversions API, 26

https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2041148702652965?id=818859032 27 317965 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024). 28

tracking codes)—communications that included Plaintiffs' and Class
 Members' Private Information.

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D. Defendants' Method of Transmitting Plaintiffs' & Class Members' Private Information via Pixels.

72. Web browsers are software applications that allow consumers to navigate the web and view and exchange electronic information and communications over the internet. Each "client device" (computer, tablet or smartphone) accesses web content through a web browser (*e.g.*, Google's Chrome, Mozilla's Firefox, Apple's Safari, and/or Microsoft's Edge browsers).

73. Every website is hosted by a computer "server" that holds the
website's contents. The entity(ies) in charge of the website exchange
communications with users' devices as their web browsers query the server
through the internet.

74. Web communications consist of Hypertext Transfer Protocol ("HTTP") or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure ("HTTPS") requests and HTTP or HTTPS responses, and any given browsing session may consist of thousands of individual HTTP requests and HTTP responses, along with corresponding cookies:

> 1. <u>HTTP request</u>: an electronic communication sent from the client device's browser to the website's server. GET Requests are one of the most common types of HTTP Requests. In addition to specifying a particular URL (*i.e.*, web address), GET Requests can also send data to the host server embedded inside the URL and can include cookies. POST Requests can send a large amount of data outside of the URL. (For instance, uploading a PDF to file a motion to a court.)

> 2. <u>Cookies</u>: a small text file that can be used to store information on the client device that can later be communicated to a server or servers. Cookies are sent with HTTP requests from client devices to the host server. Some cookies are "third-party cookies," which means they can store and communicate data when

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	visiting one website to an entirely different website.
1	3. <u>HTTP response</u> : an electronic communication that is
2	sent as a reply to the client device's web browser from
3	the host server in response to an HTTP request. HTTP responses may consist of a web page, another kind of file, text information, or error codes, among other data.
4	75. A patient's HTTP request essentially asks Defendants' Web
5	Properties to retrieve certain information (such as a set of health screening
6	questions). The HTTP response sends the requested information in the form
7	of "Markup." This is the foundation for the pages, images, words, buttons
8	and other features that appear on the participants' screens as they navigate
9	Defendants' Web Properties.
10	76. Every website is comprised of Markup and "Source Code."
11	Source Code is a simple set of instructions that commands the website user's
12 13	browser to take certain actions when the webpage first loads or when a
13	specified event triggers the code.
14	77. Source Code may also command a web browser to send data
15	transmissions to third parties in the form of HTTP requests quietly executed
17	in the background without notifying the web browser's user.
17	78. The Pixels are Source Code that do just that—they
10	surreptitiously transmit a Website User's communications and inputs to the
20	corresponding Pixel Information Recipient, much like a traditional wiretap.
20	79. For example, when individuals visit Defendants' Web
21	Properties, including the Website or Defendants' appointment page, via an
22	HTTP request to Defendants' server, Defendants' server sends an HTTP
23	response (including the Markup) that displays the webpage visible to the
25	User, along with Source Code (including the Pixels).
26	80. Thus, Defendants are, in essence, handing their patients a tapped
20	website and, once a webpage is loaded into the patient's browser, the
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software-based wiretaps are quietly waiting for private communications on
 the webpage to trigger the Pixels, which then intercept those
 communications—intended only for Defendants—and instantaneously
 transmit those communications to Facebook or another corresponding Pixel
 Information Recipient

81. Third parties like Facebook (and other Pixel Information
Recipients) place third-party cookies in the web browsers of users logged
into their services. These cookies uniquely identify the user and are sent with
each intercepted communication to ensure the third party can identify the
specific user associated with the information intercepted (in this case, highly
sensitive Private Information).

82. Defendants intentionally configured Pixels installed on their
Web Properties to capture both the "characteristics" of individual patients'
communications with their Web Properties (their IP addresses, Facebook ID,
cookie identifiers, device identifiers, emails and phone numbers) and the
"content" of these communications (the buttons, links, pages, and tabs they
click and view related to their health conditions and services sought from
Defendants).

19 83. Defendants' appointment software system was also designed to
 20 permit licensees to deploy "custom analytics scripts" within the webpage.
 21 For example, this would allow the website owner to deploy the Facebook
 22 Pixel or Google Analytics to capture the transmission of Private Information,
 23 including medical and health-related information and communications to
 24 third parties.³⁹

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³⁹ See Todd Feathers, Simon Fondrie-Teitler, Angie Waller & Surya Mattu,
 Facebook Is Receiving Sensitive Medical Information from Hospital

- 27 Websites, THE MARKUP (June 16, 2022), available at
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1	84. Upon information and belief, Defendants intercepted and			
2	disclosed the following non-public private information to Facebook:			
3	a. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' status as medical patients;			
4	b. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' communications			
5 6	with Defendants through their Web Properties, including medical conditions for which they sought treatments and treatments sought;			
7	c. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' searches for			
8	appointments, location of treatments, medical conditions, and treatments sought; and			
9	d. PII, including but not limited to patients' locations,			
10	IP addresses, device identifiers, individual's unique Facebook ID and other unique personal identifiers such as email and phone number.			
11	85. Through the Web Properties, Defendants share their patients'			
12	dentities and online activity, including information and search results related			
13	to their private medical treatment.			
14	86. For example, when they visit the SDFC Website, SDFC patients			
15	can search fertility treatments by selecting the "Treatments" menu which			
16	takes them to a list of services offered by SDFC. Patients are then directed to			
17 18	a variety of sensitive fertility treatments, including, for example SDFC's			
18 19	'Surrogacy Program." On those pages the User can further narrow their			
20	 search results by the type of surrogacy service SDFC offers, including gestational surrogacy, egg donorship, or surrogacy and IVF. 87. The User's selections and filters are transmitted to Facebook via 			
20				
21				
22	the Meta Pixels, even if they contain the User's treatment, procedures,			
23	medical conditions, or related queries, without alerting the User, and the			
25	mages below confirm that the communications Defendant SDFC sends to			
26				
27	https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-			
28	medical-information-from-hospital-websites (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).			
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Facebook contain the User's Private Information and personal identifiers,
 including but not limited to their Facebook ID, IP Address, datr and fr
 cookies, along with the search filters the User selected.

88. Here, the search parameters set by the patient and the patient's
FID number are being shared together, thereby allowing Facebook to make
the direct connection between the search parameters and each individual
patient's FID. Even without the FID, other identifying information like IP
address or device identifier is captured by the Pixel and transmitted to
Facebook.

10 89. Facebook categorizes this event as a "PageView," which
11 indicates that the patient viewed the webpage.

12 Every time Defendants send a patient's Website activity data to 90. Facebook, that patient's personally identifiable information is also disclosed, 13 including their FID. An FID is a unique and persistent identifier that 14 Facebook assigns to each user. With it, anyone can look up the user's 15 Facebook profile and name. Notably, while Facebook can easily identify any 16 individual on its Facebook platform with only their unique FID, so too can 17 any ordinary person who knows or has acquired someone's FID. Facebook 18 admits as much on its website. Indeed, ordinary people who come to acquire 19 an FID can connect to the corresponding Facebook profile. 20

91. A user who accesses Defendants' Web Properties while logged
into Facebook will transmit the c_user cookie to Facebook, which contains
that user's unencrypted Facebook ID. Facebook, at a minimum, uses the fr,
fbp, and c_user cookies embedded on SDFC's website to link to FIDs and
corresponding Facebook profiles.

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92. For example, a fertility patient who searches for "genetic testing

options" can search for various services, including "gender selection."⁴⁰
 Figures 1-2: Defendant's transmission to Facebook of User's navigating SDFC's Genetic Testing "Gender Selection":

4			🔭 🔀 Llements Console Sources Network Performance Memory Application Security Lighthouse >> 🛛 😰 🌚 👔 🕽
5	Call Tc-	× Headers Payload	Preview Response Initiator Timing Cookies
	Con IC	▼ Request Headers	
6		:authority: :method:	www.facebook.com GET
7		:path:	/tr/?
8			id=239912582243072&ev=PageView&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdfertility.com% 2Ffertility-treatments%2Fgenetic-testing%2Fgender-
	SDFC		selection&rl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdfertility.com%2F%3Futm_source%3Dgoogl
9			e%26utm_medium%3Dcpc%26utm_campaign%3D20389188676%26utm_adgroup
10			%3D148765088622%26utm_term%3Dsan%2520diego%2520fertility%2520center %26creative%3D677716105816%26matchtype%3De%26gclid%3DCjwKCAiA_OetB
1.1	<		hAtEiwAPTeQZznoq-T9ZEPVjsrk4LU6r4sZSuE1VKyfEEpolWi7yT3TzSJfgm7o-
11			RoCuhwQAvD_BwE&if=false&ts=1706823505559&sw=1600&sh=1067&v=2.9.14 4&r=stable&a=tmgoogletagmanager&ec=0&o=4126&fbp=fb.1.1705439655391.
12			995448301&ler=other⁢=1706823505314&coo=false&cdl=&exp=e1&rqm=GET
13		:scheme: Accept:	https image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,image/svg+xml,image/*,*/*;g=0.8
13		Accept-Encoding:	gzip, deflate, br
14		Accept-Language:	en-US,en;q=0.9
15		Cookie:	sb=6Zc2ZdliKNMQ-s7vCP03IvO7; datr=65c2ZU8pUo0fktnKWDa8avSf; c_user=61552747017033; ps_n=0; xs=37%3AWy_Pbx7xbS-
			E0g%3A2%3A1698083184%3A-1%3A-
16			1%3A%3AAcVuHASfk1PN5hSDwcGve5CoZ-b0MGWF1KH3GbawU1w; fr=1GL7G2m4W8BpRhRKk.AWUWwDfWzW7cQxlWJKizaGMsNl0.Blt9KJ.P3.AAA.0.0
17			.Blt9KJ.AWW0akOzUwE;
10			m_ls=%7B%22c%22%3A%7B%221%22%3A%22HCwAABYgFsb0j5gLEwUWks332e v-GwA%22%2C%222%22%3A%22GTwVQBxMAAAWARaYyr7bDBYAABV-
18			HEwAABYAFpjKvtsMFgAAFcYBHEwAABYBFp7KvtsMFgAAFigA%22%2C%2295%22
19			%3A%22HCwAABYUFpa93KMHEwUWks332ev- GwA%22%7D%2C%22d%22%3A%2283091331-f8b0-4014-84de-
20			82938331fa7d%22%2C%22s%22%3A%220591551-1800-4014-64de- 82938331fa7d%22%2C%22s%22%3A%220%22%2C%22u%22%3A%22881mdu%2
20		D (2%7D
21	-	Referer: Sec-Ch-Ua:	https://www.sdfertility.com/ "Not_A Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="120", "Google Chrome";v="120"
22			20
23		93. The fou	rth line of highlighted text, "id: 239912582243072,"
24	rofe	ers to Defendants	' Pixel ID for the Website and confirms that Defendants
25			
23	hav	e downloaded th	e Pixel into its Source Code on this particular web
26			
27			ng, https://www.sdfertility.com/fertility-
	trea	atments/genetic-to	esting/gender-selection.
28			30
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94. In that same line of text, "ev:" is an abbreviation for event, and
"PageView" is the type of event. Here, this event means that Defendants'
Pixel is sending information about the webpage being viewed, which can
include information like page title, URL and page description.

(

95. The remaining lines of text identify the User as a patient: (i)
seeking medical care from Defendant SDFC via www.sdfertility.com who is
searching for "fertility treatments," (ii) including "genetic testing," and more
specifically, (iii) testing for "gender selection."

10

96. Finally, the second line of highlighted text ("GET"),

11 demonstrates that Defendants' Pixel sent the User's communications, and the

12 Private Information contained therein, alongside the User's personal

13 dentifiers, including Facebook ID and other cookies.

1497. As Users move further into SDFC's Website, Defendants

15 continue to disclose user details through PageView and

16 SubscribedButtonClick events. Defendants disclosed users': (i) appointment

17 booking activities; (ii) browsing medical conditions and treatments; (iii) bill

18 payment activities; (iv) submission of forms containing personal medical

¹⁹ information and, upon information and good faith belief, (v) patient portal

20 activities.

21 98. For example, Defendants also share details about Users' bill
22 payment activities. When a User navigates to the Online Bill Payment page,

23

⁴¹ Defendants have embedded at least six Meta Pixels on their Web
 Properties, including those with ID numbers 1024940958846869,


²⁵ 1666143710464689, 239912582243072, 305890348536996,

- 27 239912582243072, installed on the SDFC Website and identified in Figure 2, is installed in each of the websites that make up Defendants' Web Properties.
- 28


²⁶ 6707064245994307 and 951372101648912. For example, Pixel

Defendants send PageView events revealing that the user was on the page for
 "fertility financing."⁴² Defendants inform Facebook that the User was on the
 page for patients to "pay your bill online," *see* Figure 3:⁴³

4		×	Headers	Payload	Preview	Response	Initiator	Timing	Cookies				
5		:autho :meth				www.facebo GET	ok.com						
6		:path:				/tr/? <mark>id=239912582243072</mark> &ev= <mark>PageView</mark> &dl=https%3A%2F%2F <mark>www.sdfertility.com</mark> % 2F <mark>fertility-financing</mark> %2F <mark>pay-your-bill-</mark>							
7							ttps%3A%2F	%2Fwww.s	dfertility.com%	2Ffertility-			
8						selection&if	=false&ts=1	706824451	797&sw=1600	&sh=1067&v=2.9			
9		:scher	ne:			1&ler=other⁢=1706824451477&coo=false&cdl=&exp=e1&rqm=GET https							
10		Accept-Encoding:					image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,image/svg+xml,image/*,*/*;q=0.8 gzip, deflate, br en-US,en;q=0.9						
11		Accep Cooki	t-Languag e:	le:		sb=6Zc2Zdli	iKNMQ-s7vC	-	datr=65c2ZU8p ks=37%3AWy_P	Uo0fktnKWDa8av: bx7xbS-	Sf;		
12						E0g%3A2%3	A169808318	34%3A-1%3	3A-	WF1KH3GbawU1v	v;		
13						fr=1GL7G2m .Blt9KJ.AWW		Kk.AWUWw	vDfWzW7cQxIV	VJKizaGMsNI0.Blt9	KJ.P3.AAA.0.0		
14		99). \	When	a Use	er searc	hes fc	or a sp	becific d	loctor, D	efendant	s also	
15	send that information to Facebook through PageView events, see Figure 4:44												
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23		web pages Source Code, which all capture PageView events (as well as "SubscribedButtonClick" events on pages where Users engage with the Web Properties by clicking buttons).											
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
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103. In addition to users' search for doctors, searches for fertility
 2 conditions and treatments, appointments and financial information,
 3 Defendants also disclose sensitive information about the sexual orientation of
 4 the User.

104. For example, when a user navigates to view SDFC's fertility
treatments, the user can select "LGBT Family Building." When the User
clicks on that option, SDFC sends PageView event to Facebook revealing
that the user was on the page "lgbt-fertility-clinic." *See* Figure 8:⁴⁶

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9	X Headers Payload Preview	Response Initiator Timing Cookies						
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11	:path:	/tr/?						
11		id=239912582243072 <mark>&ev=PageView&dl=https%3A%2F%2F</mark> www.sdfertility.com%						
12		2F <mark>fertility-treatments</mark> %2 <mark>Flgbt-fertility-</mark> clinic&rl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdfertility.com%2Fwhy-sdfc%2Ffertility-						
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21	105 Defendente	- 1 :						
22	105. Defendants also inform Facebook when Users view pages concerning a patients' researching resources for miscarriage and pregnancy							
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24	loss. Upon a User loading the page to access the resource page for miscarriage, Defendants send PageView events. The PageView events							
27								
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26	⁴⁶ See https://www.sdfe							
	visited February 1, 2024							
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inform Facebook that the User was on the page for "resources/infertility treatments/miscarriage." See Figure 9:47



108. In conjunction with its advertising business, Facebook
 encourages and promotes entities and website owners, such as Defendants, to
 utilize its "Business Tools" to gather, identify, target, and market products
 and services to individuals.

5 109. Facebook's Business Tools, including the Meta Pixel, are bits of
6 code that advertisers can integrate into their webpages, mobile applications,
7 and servers, thereby enabling the interception and collection of user activity
8 on those platforms.

9 110. In particular, the Meta Pixel "tracks the people and type of
10 actions they take."⁵⁰

11 111. The User's web browser (software applications that allow
12 consumers to exchange electronic communications over the Internet)
13 executes the Pixel via instructions within the webpage to communicate
14 certain information based on parameters selected by the website's owner.

15 112. The Pixel is thus customizable and programmable, meaning that
16 the website owner controls which of its web pages contain the Pixel and
17 which events are tracked and transmitted to Facebook.

18 113. The process of adding the Pixel to webpages is a multi-step
19 process that must be undertaken *by the website owner*.⁵¹

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22 50 *Retargeting*, *supra* note 10.

 23 $\|_{^{51}}$ Business Help Center: How to set up and install a Meta Pixel,

https://www.facebook.com/business/help/952192354843755?id=1205376682
832142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024); see Ivan Mana, How to Set Up & Install the Facebook Pixel (in 2022),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynTNs5FAUm8 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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1	114. Facebook guides the website owner through setting up the Pixel		
2	during the setup process. Specifically, Facebook explains that there are two		
3	steps to set up a pixel:		
4	1. Create your pixel and set up the pixel base code		
5	on your website. You can use a partner integration if one is available to you or you can		
6	manually add code to your website.		
7	2. Set up events on your website to measure the actions you care about, like making a purchase.		
8	You can use a partner integration, the point-and- click event setup tool, or you can manually add code to your website. ⁵²		
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10	115. Aside from the various steps to embed and activate the Pixel,		
11	website owners, like Defendants, must also agree to Facebook's Business		
12	Tools Terms by which Facebook requires website owners using the Meta		
13	Pixel to "represent and warrant" that they have adequately and prominently		
14	notified users about the collection, sharing and usage of data through		
15	Facebook's Business Tools (including the Pixel and Conversions API) ⁵³ and		
16	that websites "will not share Business Tool Data that [websites] know or		
17	reasonably should know includes health, financial information or other		
18	categories of sensitive information " ⁵⁴		
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20	52 Id.		
21	⁵³ Meta Business Tools Terms,		
22	https://www.facebook.com/legal/businesstech?paipv=0&eav=AfbOvnb7E0s Z-wzgCW6xNLFKE0EVH fr6JjkMINTJNqN7i1R-		
23	3MPh5caFgmdgAOxbL8&_rdr (last visited Jan. 30, 2024) ("When you use		
24	any of the Meta Business Tools to send us or otherwise enable the collection of Business Tool Data, these Business Tools Terms govern the use of that		
25	data").		
26	⁵⁴ Id.; see also Pratyush Deep Kotoky, Facebook collects personal data on		
27	abortion seekers: Report (June 16, 2022)		
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	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT		

1	116. Once fully loaded and operational, the Pixel prompts the Users'
2	web browser to transmit specific information based on parameters set by the
3	website owner. This customizable nature of the Meta Pixel allows the
4	website owner to determine which webpages contain the Pixel, which events
5	are tracked and shared with Facebook and whether the tracked events are
6	standard (chosen from the list of 18 provided by Facebook) or custom
7	(defined by the website owner). For example, the Pixel can be set to capture
8	the URLs visited by website visitors via a "PageView" event, or to capture
9	the exact inner text of buttons clicked by a visitor, via a
10	"SubscribedButtonClick" event.
11	117. The Business Tools are automatically configured to capture
12	"Standard Events," such as when a user visits a particular webpage, that
13	webpage's Universal Resource Locator ("URL") and metadata, button clicks,
14	etc. ⁵⁵
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17	https://www.newsbytesapp.com/news/science/facebook-collects-personal-
18	data-on-abortion-seekers/story (quoting Facebook spokesman Dale Hogan as
19	saying that it is "against [Facebook's] policies for websites and apps to send sensitive health data about people through [its] Business Tools") (last visited
20	Jan. 30, 2024).
21	⁵⁵ Specifications for Facebook Pixel Standard Events,
22	https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=1205376682
23	832142 (last_visited Jan. 30, 2024); <i>see also</i> META PIXEL, GUIDES, ADVANCED, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-pixel/advanced/
24	(last visited Jan. 30, 2024); BEST PRACTICES FOR META PIXEL SETUP,
25	https://www.facebook.com/business/help/218844828315224?id=1205376682 832142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024); APP EVENTS API,
26	https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/app-event-api/ (last
27	visited Jan. 30, 2024).
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	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1	118. Advertisers, such as Defendants, can track other User actions		
2	and can create their own tracking parameters by building a "custom event." ⁵⁶		
3	119. When a user accesses a webpage that is hosting the Meta Pixel,		
4	their communications and interactions with the host webpage are		
5	instantaneously and surreptitiously sent to Facebook's servers-traveling		
6	from the user's browser to Facebook's server. ⁵⁷		
7	120. This simultaneous secret transmission contains the original GET		
8	request sent to the host website, along with additional data that the Meta		
9	Pixel is configured to collect. This transmission is initiated by Facebook code		
10	and concurrent with the communications with the host website. Two sets of		
11	code are thus automatically run as part of the browser's attempt to load and		
12	read Defendants' Web Properties-Defendants' own code and Facebook's		
13	embedded code.		
14	121. In particular, Defendants tracked Users and disclosed Users'		
15	Private Information including at least the following:		
16	• What care and treatment options Users viewed and/or sought;		
17 18	 What care and treatment options Users viewed and/or sought; When Users clicked to request an appointment; Users' unique personal identifiers when they requested an appointment including their FID, email address, phone number and IP address; and 		
19	• When Users clicked to access and view the bill page,		
20	122. Accordingly, during the same transmissions, the Web Properties		
21	routinely provide Facebook with Defendants' patients' Facebook IDs, IP		
22	addresses and/or device IDs, and the other information they input into		
23	⁵⁶ About standard and custom website events,		
24	https://www.facebook.com/business/help/964258670337005?id=1205376682		
25	832142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).		
26	⁵⁷ Plaintiffs unequivocally and in good faith plead that Defendants' Pixel		
27	transmissions to Facebook occur simultaneously as Users navigate and use Defendants' Websites.		
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	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT		

Defendants' Web Properties, including not only their medical searches,
 treatment requests, and the webpages they view, but, for those making
 appointments online, also their email address and phone number.

123. This is precisely the type of identifying information that HIPAA
requires healthcare providers to de-anonymize to protect the privacy of
patients.⁵⁸ Plaintiffs' and Class Members' identities can be easily determined
based on the Facebook ID, IP address, and/or reverse lookup from the
collection of other identifying information that was improperly disclosed.

9 124. Instead of taking proactive steps to verify that businesses using
10 the Pixel obtain the required consent, Meta uses an "honor system" under
11 which Meta assumes these businesses have "provided robust and sufficient
12 prominent notice to users regarding the Business Tool Data collection,
13 sharing, and usage."⁵⁹

14 125. After intercepting and collecting this information, Facebook
15 processes it, analyzes it, and assimilates it into datasets like Core Audiences
16 and Custom Audiences. When the Website visitor is also a Facebook user,
17 the information collected via the Meta Pixel is associated with the User's
18 Facebook ID that identifies their name and Facebook profile—their real19 world identity.

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126. The Pixel collects data regardless of whether the visitor has an
21
account. Facebook maintains "shadow profiles" on Users without Facebook
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 ⁵⁸See https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/deidentification/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
- 26 ⁵⁹ See Facebook Business Tools Terms,

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27 https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/businesstools.

accounts and links the information collected via the Meta Pixel to the User's
 real-world identity using their shadow profile.⁶⁰

127. A User's Facebook ID is linked to their Facebook profile, which 3 generally contains a wide range of demographic and other information about 4 the User, including pictures, personal interests, work history, relationship 5 status, and other details. Because the User's Facebook Profile ID uniquely 6 identifies an individual's Facebook account, Facebook—or any ordinary 7 person—can easily use the Facebook Profile ID to quickly and easily locate, 8 9 access and view the User's corresponding Facebook profile. To find the Facebook account associated with a c user cookie, one simply needs to type 10 www.facebook.com/ followed by the c_user ID. 11

12 128. The Private Information disclosed via the Pixel allows Facebook
13 to know that a specific patient is seeking confidential medical care and the
14 type of medical care being sought. Facebook then uses that information to
15 sell advertising to Defendants and other advertisers and/or sells that
16 information to marketers who use it to online target Plaintiffs and Class
17 Members.

18 129. Facebook (and other Pixel Information Recipients) track user
19 data and communications for their own marketing purposes and for the
20 marketing purposes of the website owner. Ultimately, the purpose of
21 collecting user data is to make money.

130. Thus, without any knowledge, authorization or action by a user,
website owners like Defendants use source code to commandeer the user's

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- ²⁵ ⁶⁰ See Russell Brandom, Shadow Profiles Are the Biggest Flaw In
- ²⁶ *Facebook's Privacy Defense*, (Apr 11, 2018),
- ²⁷ https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17225482/facebook-shadow-profileszuckerberg-congress-data-privacy (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
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computing device, causing the device to contemporaneously and invisibly re direct the users' communications to third parties.

131. In this case, Defendants employed the Pixels, among other
tracking technologies, to intercept Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
Information to Facebook and the other Pixel Information Recipients.

6 132. In sum, the Pixels and other tracking technologies on the Web
7 Properties permitted Facebook and any other Pixel Information Recipient to
8 intercept the content of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' highly sensitive
9 communications and Private Information , which communications contained
10 private and confidential medical information.

11 133. These interceptions of Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
12 communications content were performed without Plaintiffs' or Class
13 Members' knowledge, consent, or express written authorization.

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F. Meta Encourages Healthcare Partners, Including Ivy Fertility & SDFC, to Upload Patient Lists for Ad Targeting.

134. Meta operates the world's largest social media company. Meta's
revenue is derived almost entirely from selling targeted advertising. Meta's
Health division is dedicated to marketing to and servicing Meta's healthcare
partners. Meta defines its Partners to include businesses that use Meta's
products, including the Meta Pixel or Meta Audience Network tools to
advertise, market, or support their products and services.

135. Meta works with hundreds of Meta healthcare Partners, using
Meta Collection Tools to learn about visitors to their websites and leverage
that information to sell targeted advertising based on patients' online
behavior. Meta's healthcare Partners also use Meta's other ad targeting tools,
including tools that involve uploading patient lists to Meta.

136. Meta offers an ad targeting option called "Custom Audiences."

1	137. When a patient takes an action on a Meta healthcare partner's	
2	website embedded with the Pixel, the Pixel will be triggered to send Meta	
3	"Event" data that Meta matches to its users.	
4	138. A web developer can then create a "Custom Audience" based on	
5	Events to target ads to those patients.	
6	139. The Pixel can then be used to measure the effectiveness of an	
7	advertising campaign. ⁶¹	
8	140. Meta also allows healthcare partners to create a Custom	
9	Audience uploading a patient list to Meta. As Meta describes it: ⁶²	
10	A Custom Audience made from a customer list is a type of audience you can create to	
11	connect with people who have already shown an interest in your business or product. It's made of information - called "identifiers" - you've collected about your customers (such as	
12	email, phone number and address) and provided to Meta. Prior to use, Meta hashes this information.	
13		
14	Then, we use a process called matching to match the hashed information with Meta technologies profiles so that you can advertise to your customers on Facebook, Instagram	
15	and Meta Audience Network. The more information you can provide, the better the match rate (which means our ability to make the matches). Meta doesn't learn any new identifying	
16	information about your customers.	
17		
18	⁶¹ Meta Business Help Center, <i>About Customer List Custom Audiences</i> (2023),	
19	https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341425252616329?id=2469097953	
20	376494; <i>see also</i> , Meta Blueprint, Connect your data with the Meta Pixel and Conversion API (2023),	
21	https://www.facebookblueprint.com/student/activity/212738?fbclid=IwAR3	
22	HPO1d_fnzRCUAhKGYsLqNA- VcLTMr3G_hxxFr3GZC_uFUcymuZopeNVw#/page/5fc6e67d4a46d349e9d	
23	ff7fa.	
24	⁶² Meta Business Help Center, <i>About Customer List Custom Audiences</i>	
25	(2023),	
26	https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341425252616329?id=2469097953 376494.	
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141. Meta provides detailed instructions for healthcare partners to
 2 send their patients' Private Information to Meta through the customer list
 3 upload. For example:⁶³

Prepare your customer list in advance. To make a Custom Audience from a customer list, you provide us with information about your existing customers and we match this information with Meta profiles. The information on a customer list is known as an "identifier" (such as email, phone number, address) and we use it to help you find the audiences you want your ads to reach.

Your customer list can either be a CSV or TXT file that includes these identifiers. To get the best match rates, use as many identifiers as possible while following our formatting guidelines. You can hover over the identifiers to display the formatting rules and the correct column header. For example, **first name** would appear as **fn** as a column header in your list.

Alternatively, we have a file template you can download to help our system map to your identifiers more easily. (You can upload from Mailchimp as well.)

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 142. Meta healthcare partners can then use the Custom Audiences
 derived from their patient list with the Pixel and Pixel Events for Meta
 marketing campaigns and to measure the success of those campaigns.
 - G. SDFC's Use of the Pixels Violated Its Own Privacy Policies.

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 143. Defendants publish several privacy policies that represent to
 patients and visitors to their Web Properties that they will keep their PHI
 private and secure and that they will only disclose PHI provided to them
 under certain circumstances, *none of which apply here*.⁶⁴

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 144. With respect to tracking technologies and analytics, although
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²³ ⁶³ Create a customer list custom audience,

https://www.facebook.com/business/help/170456843145568?id=2469097953
 376494 (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

⁶⁴ There is a privacy policy for each of the Web Properties and while
 ²⁷ Plaintiffs cite to Defendant SDFC's policy, the allegations regarding that policy are applicable to each of the Web Properties.

1 145. For example, Defendant SDFC's Policy highlights that it is
 2 "committed to respecting your privacy."⁶⁵

3 146. Defendant SDFC acknowledges that it collects IP addresses,
4 cookies, and similar technologies but it claims that "[t]he IP address does not
5 identify you personally," and the cookie technology "is not personally
6 identifying information[.]"⁶⁶

7 147. Patients and other Users of the Web Properties are not informed
8 about, and have not consented to, the collection of their PHI and Website
9 activity or to providing that information to a third party.

10 148. This is precisely the type of information for which HIPAA
11 requires healthcare providers to utilize de-identification techniques to protect
12 the privacy of patients.⁶⁷

13 149. Despite a lack of disclosure, Defendants allow Facebook to
14 "listen in" on patients' confidential communications and to intercept and use
15 for advertising purposes the very information that they promise to keep
16 private.

17 150. Defendants breached their own privacy policies by unlawfully
18 permitting Facebook and likely other third parties to intercept Users' Private
19 Information without obtaining patients' consent or authorization. Facebook
20 then read, understood, and used that Private Information for its own business
21 purposes—i.e., selling targeted advertising to Defendants (and other

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 ⁶⁵ See https://www.sdfertility.com/resources/disclaimer#privacy-policy (last visited January 31, 2024).
- $25 ||_{66} Id.$
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⁶⁷ https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de ⁶⁷ https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de ⁶⁷ https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-

companies) which specifically targeted those Users based on their
 reproductive health conditions.

3 *H. Defendants Violated HIPAA.*

4 151. Defendants' disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
5 Private Information to entities like Facebook also violated HIPAA.

152. Under federal law, a healthcare provider may not disclose PII,
non-public medical information about a patient, potential patient, or
household member of a patient for marketing purposes without the patient's
express written authorization.⁶⁸

10 153. Guidance from HHS instructs healthcare providers that patient
11 status alone is protected by HIPAA.

154. HIPAA's Privacy Rule defines "individually identifiable health 12 information" as "a subset of health information, including demographic 13 information collected from an individual" that is (1) "created or received by a 14 health care provider;" (2) "[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or 15 mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an 16 individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health 17 care to an individual;" and either (i) "identifies the individual;" or (ii) "[w]ith 18 respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be 19 used to identify the individual." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 20

155. The Privacy Rule broadly defines protected health information
as individually identifiable health information that is "transmitted by
electronic media; maintained in electronic media; or transmitted or
maintained in any other form or medium." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

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27 ⁶⁸ HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502; 164.508(a)(3), 164.514(b)(2)(i).

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1	156. Under the HIPAA de-identification rule, "health information is		
2	not individually identifiable only if": (i) an expert "determines that the risk is		
3	very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with		
4	other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify		
5	an individual who is a subject of the information" and "documents the		
6	methods and results of the analysis that justify such determination" or (ii)		
7	"the following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or		
8 9	household members of the individual are removed: A. Names;		
10	H. Medical record numbers;		
11	J. Account numbers;		
12	 M. Device identifiers and serial numbers; N. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 		
13	O Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers: and		
14	P. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code and" the covered entity must not "have actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in combination		
15	information could be used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the information." ⁶⁹		
16	157. The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires any "covered entity"—which		
17	includes health care providers—to maintain appropriate safeguards to protect		
18	the privacy of PHI and sets limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures		
19 20	that may be made of PHI without authorization. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103,		
20	164.502.		
21	158. Even the fact that an individual is receiving a medical service,		
22	i.e., is a patient of a particular entity, can be PHI.		
24	159. HHS has instructed health care providers that, while identifying		
25	information alone is not necessarily PHI if it were part of a public source		
26			
27	⁶⁹ See 45 C.F.R. § 160.514.		
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such as a phonebook because it is not related to health data, "[i]f such
information was listed with health condition, health care provision or
payment data, such as an indication that the individual was treated at a
certain clinic, then this information would be PHI."⁷⁰

160. Consistent with this restriction, HHS has issued marketing 5 guidance that provides, "With limited exceptions, the [Privacy] Rule requires 6 an individual's written authorization before a use or disclosure of his or her 7 protected health information can be made for marketing ... Simply put, a 8 covered entity may not sell protected health information to a business 9 associate or any other third party for that party's own purposes. Moreover, 10 covered entities may not sell lists of patients or enrollees to third parties 11 without obtaining authorization from each person on the list."⁷¹ 12

13 161. Here, as described *supra*, Defendants provided patient
14 information to third parties in violation of the Privacy Rule—and its own
15 Privacy Policy. An individual or corporation violates the HIPAA Privacy
16 Rule if it knowingly: "(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
17 [or] (2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an
18 individual."

19 162. The statute states that a "person ... shall be considered to have
20 obtained or disclosed individually identifiable health information ... if the
21

⁷⁰ See Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected
 ⁷⁰ Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and
 ⁷⁰ Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for ⁷⁰ professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html, (last visited

26 7^1 Marketing,

Jan. 30, 2024).

27 https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/marketing/ind ex.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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1 information is maintained by a covered entity ... and the individual obtained
2 or disclosed such information without authorization." 42 U.S.C. §
3 1320(d)(6).

4 163. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6) is subject to criminal
5 penalties where "the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use
6 individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage,
7 personal gain, or malicious harm." 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(b). In such cases,
8 an entity that knowingly obtains individually identifiable health information
9 relating to an individual "shall be fined not more than \$250,000, imprisoned
10 not more than 10 years, or both." 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(b)(1).

164. HIPAA also requires Defendants to "review and modify the 11 security measures implemented ... as needed to continue provision of 12 reasonable and appropriate protection of electronic protected health 13 information," 45 C.F.R. § 164.306I, and to "[i]mplement technical policies 14 15 and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to those persons or 16 software programs that have been granted access rights," 45 C.F.R. § 17 164.312(a)(1)—which Defendants failed to do. 18

19 165. Under HIPAA, Defendants may not disclose PII about a patient,
20 potential patient or household member of a patient for marketing purposes
21 without the patient's express written authorization. See HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. §
22 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501; 164.508(a)(3), 164.514(b)(2)(i).

23 166. Defendants further failed to comply with other HIPAA
24 safeguard regulations as follows:

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a)

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Failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic PHI that Defendants created,

received, maintained and transmitted in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.306(a)(1);

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1 2	b) Failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain and correct security violations in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.308(a)(1);	
3 4 5	c) Failing to identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents and mitigate harmful effects of security incidents known to Defendants in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.308(a)(6)(ii);	
6 7 8	d) Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of electronic PHI in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.306(a)(2);	
9 10 11	e) Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of electronic PHI not permitted under the privacy rules pertaining to individually identifiable health information in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.306(a)(3); and	
12 13 14	f) Failing to design, implement and enforce policies and procedures that would establish physical and administrative safeguards to reasonably safeguard PHI in violation of 45 C.F.R. section 164.530(c).	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19	Facebook (and other Pixel Information Recipients) in violation of HIPAA,	
20	including 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3), as well as the torts alleged below.	
21	168. Defendants intercepted the content of Plaintiffs' and Class	
22	Members' communications, including their Private Information, for a	
23	criminal and tortious purpose. Defendants would not have been able to	
24	obtain the Private Information or the marketing services they did if they had	
25	complied with the law.	
26	169. Commenting on a June 2022 report discussing the use of Meta	
27	Pixels by hospitals and medical centers, David Holtzman, a health privacy	
28	52	
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consultant and a former senior privacy adviser in HHS OCR, which enforces
 HIPAA, stated, "I am deeply troubled by what [the hospitals] are doing with
 the capture of their data and the sharing of it ... It is quite likely a HIPAA
 violation."72

5 170. Defendants' placing third-party tracking codes on their Web
6 Properties is a violation of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' privacy rights
7 under federal law. While Plaintiffs do not bring a claim under HIPAA itself,
8 this violation demonstrates Defendants' wrongdoing relevant to other claims
9 and establishes their duty to maintain patient privacy.

10 I. Defendants' Use of the Pixel Violates OCR Guidance.

11 171. The government has issued guidance warning that tracking
12 technologies like the Pixel may come up against federal privacy law when
13 installed on healthcare websites.

14 172. Healthcare organizations regulated under the HIPAA may use
15 third-party tracking tools, such as Google Analytics or Pixels only in a
16 limited way to perform analysis on data key to operations. They are not
17 permitted, however, to use these tools in a way that may expose patients'
18 PHI to these vendors.⁷³

19 173. According to the Bulletin, Defendants have violated HIPAA
20 rules by implementing the Pixel and other tracking technologies.⁷⁴

²¹ ⁷² ADVISORY BOARD, 'Deeply Troubled': Security experts worry about
 ²² Facebook trackers on hospital sites, https://www.advisory.com/daily ²³ briefing/2022/06/17/data-trackers (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

24 ⁷³ See OCR Bulletin, supra note 15.

25

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²⁵ | ⁷⁴ See id. ("disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors for marketing purposes, without individuals' HIPAA-compliant authorizations, would constitute impermissible disclosures").

1	174. Defendants have shared Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private		
2	Information, including health conditions for which they seek treatments,		
3	treatments and/or medications sought, the frequency with whom they take		
4	steps to obtain healthcare for certain conditions, and their unique identifiers.		
5	This information is, as described in the OCR Bulletin, "highly sensitive."		
6	175. The OCR Bulletin goes on to make clear how broad the		
7	government's view of protected information is as it explains:		
8 9 10	This information might include an individual's medical record number, home or email address, or dates of appointments, as well as an individual's IP address or geographic location, medical device IDs, <i>or any unique identifying code</i> . ⁷⁵		
11	176. Defendants' sharing of Private Information with Facebook and		
12	other Pixel Information Recipients violated Plaintiffs' and Class Members'		
13	rights.		
14	J. Defendants Violated Industry Standards.		
15	177. A medical provider's duty of confidentiality is embedded in the		
16	physician-patient and hospital-patient relationship—it is a cardinal rule.		
17	178. The American Medical Association's ("AMA") Code of		
18	Medical Ethics contains numerous rules protecting the privacy of patient data		
19	and communications.		
20	179. AMA Code of Ethics Opinion 3.1.1 provides:		
21	Protecting information gathered in association with the care of the patient is a core value in health		
22	care Patient privacy encompasses a number of aspects, including, personal data (informational		
23	privacy)[.] ⁷⁶		
24	⁷⁵ <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).		
25			
26	⁷⁶ https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media- browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-3.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).		
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1	180. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.2.4 provides:
2	Information gathered and recorded in association
3	with the care of the patient is confidential. Patients are entitled to expect that the sensitive personal
4	information they divulge will be used solely to enable their physician to most effectively provide
5	needed services. Disclosing information for
6	commercial purposes without consent undermines trust, violates principles of informed consent and confidentiality, and may harm the integrity of the
7	confidentiality, and may harm the integrity of the patient-physician relationship. Physicians who propose to permit third party access to specific
8	propose to permit third-party access to specific patient information for commercial purposes about the provide data that has been de
9	should: (a) Only provide data that has been de- identified. [and] (b) Fully inform each patient whose record would be involved (or the patient's
0	whose record would be involved (or the patient's authorized surrogate when the individual lacks decision making appacity about the numbers for
1	decision-making capacity about the purposes for which access would be granted. ⁷⁷
2	181. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.3.2 provides:
3	Information gathered and recorded in association
4	with the care of a patient is confidential, regardless of the form in which it is collected or stored. Physicians who collect or store patient information
5	Physicians who collect or store patient information electronicallymust: (c) Release patient information only in keeping with ethics guidelines for confidentiality. ⁷⁸
6 7	182. Defendants' use of the Pixels also violates FTC data security
	guidelines. The FTC has promulgated numerous guides for businesses, which
	highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices.
20	183. The FTC's October 2016 publication Protecting Personal
	Information: A Guide for Business ⁷⁹ established cyber-security guidelines fo
	businesses. These guidelines state that businesses should protect the persona
3	$\frac{1}{77}$ Id.
4	
5	78 Id.
6	⁷⁹ See https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-
7	0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
8	55
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patient information that they keep, properly dispose of personal information
that is no longer needed, encrypt information stored on computer networks,
understand their network vulnerabilities, and implement policies to correct
any security problems.

184. In fact, the FTC has recently brought enforcement actions
against several healthcare companies, including Premom, BetterHelp,
GoodRx, and Flow Health for conveying information—or enabling an
inference—about their consumers' health to unauthorized third parties
without the consumers' consent.

10 185. Like the health care companies fined by the FTC in recent years,
11 Defendants failed to implement these basic, industry-wide data security
12 practices.

13 **K.** Users' Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.

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14 186. Plaintiffs and Class Members were aware of Defendants' duty of
15 confidentiality when they sought medical services from Defendants.

16 187. Indeed, when Plaintiffs and Class Members provided their
17 PII/PHI to Defendants, they each had a reasonable expectation that the
18 information would remain private, and that Defendants would not share the
19 Private Information with third parties for a commercial purpose unrelated to
20 patient care.

188. Privacy polls and studies show that the overwhelming majority
of Americans consider obtaining an individual's affirmative consent before a
company collects and shares its customers' data to be one of the most
important privacy rights.

189. For example, a recent Consumer Reports study shows that 92%
of Americans believe that internet companies and websites should be
required to obtain consent before selling or sharing consumer data, and the

same percentage believe those companies and websites should be required to
 provide consumers with a complete list of the data that is collected about
 them.⁸⁰

4 190. Personal data privacy and obtaining consent to share Private
5 Information are material to Plaintiffs and Class Members.

- 6 191. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' reasonable expectations of privacy in their PII/PHI are grounded in, among other things, Defendants' 7 status as healthcare providers, Defendants' common law obligation to 8 maintain the confidentiality of patients' PII/PHI, state and federal laws 9 protecting the confidentiality of medical information, state and federal laws 10 protecting the confidentiality of communications and computer data, state 11 laws prohibiting the unauthorized use and disclosure of personal means of 12 identification, and Defendants' express and implied promises of 13 confidentiality. 14
- 15

L. Unique Personal Identifiers are Protected Health Information.

16 192. While not all health data is covered under HIPAA, the law

17 specifically applies to healthcare providers, health insurance providers, and

- 18 healthcare data clearinghouses.⁸¹
- ¹⁹
 ⁸⁰ Consumers Less Confident About Healthcare, Data Privacy, and Car Safety, New Survey Finds, (May 11, 2017),

21 https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-reports/consumers-lessconfident-about-healthcare-data-privacy-and-car-safety-a3980496907/ (last

- 23
- ²³ ⁸¹ See Alfred Ng & Simon Fondrie-Teitler, *This Children's Hospital Network* ²⁴ ^{Was} Giving Kids' Information to Facebook (June 21, 2022),
- 25 <u>https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/21/this-childrens-hospital-network-was-giving-kids-information-to-facebook</u> (stating that "[w]hen you are going
- $\frac{26}{100}$ to a covered entity's website, and you're entering information related to
- 27 scheduling an appointment, including your actual name, and potentially other
- 28

²² visited Jan. 30, 2024).

1 193. The HIPAA privacy rule sets forth policies to protect all
 2 individually identifiable health information that is held or transmitted, and
 3 there are approximately 18 HIPAA Identifiers that are considered PII. This
 4 information can be used to identify, contact, or locate a single person or can
 5 be used with other sources to identify a single individual.

6 194. These HIPAA Identifiers, as relevant here, include names, dates
7 related to an individual, email addresses, device identifiers, web URLs and
8 IP addresses.⁸²

9 195. Defendants improperly disclosed Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
10 HIPAA identifiers, including their emails, phone numbers, dates they sought
11 treatments, computer IP addresses, device identifiers, and web URLs visited
12 to Facebook through their use of the Pixel *in addition to* services selected,
13 patient statuses, medical conditions, treatments, provider information, and
14 appointment information.

15 196. An IP address is a number that identifies the address of a device
16 connected to the Internet. IP addresses are used to identify and route
17 communications on the Internet. IP addresses of individual Internet users are
18 used by Internet service providers, websites, and third-party tracking
19 companies to facilitate and track Internet communications.

- 20
- 21
- identifying characteristics related to your medical condition, there's a strong
 possibility that HIPAA is going to apply in those situations") (last visited
 Jan. 30, 2024).
- 24

25 ⁸² *Guidance regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and*

26 Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-

27 professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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197. Facebook tracks every IP address ever associated with a
 Facebook user (and with non-users through shadow profiles). Google also
 tracks IP addresses associated with Internet users.

- 4 198. Facebook, Google, and other third-party marketing companies
 5 track IP addresses to target individual homes and their occupants with
 6 advertising.
- 7 199. Under HIPAA, an IP address is considered personally
 8 identifiable information, which is defined as including "any unique
 9 identifying number, characteristic or code," specifically listing IP addresses
 10 among examples. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2).
- 200. HIPAA further declares information as personally identifiable
 where the covered entity has "actual knowledge that the information could be
 used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual
 who is a subject of the information." 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(2)(ii); *see also* 45
 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(O).
- 16 201. Consequently, Defendants' disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class
 17 Members' IP addresses violated HIPAA and industry-wide privacy
 18 standards.
- 19 20

М.

Defendants were Enriched by & Benefitted from the Use of the Pixel & Other Tracking Technologies.

202. Defendants decided to embed the Pixel and other tracking technologies on their Web Properties with the purpose of disclosing Plaintiffs' and Class Members's communications to Facebook and other Pixel Recipients in order to improve marketing by creating campaigns that maximize conversions and thereby decrease costs to Defendants and boost their revenue.

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203. After receiving individually identifiable patient health
 information communicated on Defendants' Web Properties, Facebook
 analyzes this data, improves its own technology and business (including
 machine learning), and then forwards this data and analysis of this data, to
 Defendants.

6 204. Defendants then use this data and analysis for its own
7 commercial purposes that include understanding how Users utilize their Web
8 Properties.

9 205. Facebook, as well, uses this data and analysis for its own
10 commercial purposes, including to improve its platform and better
11 understand the individuals that make up the audiences that its clients
12 (advertisers) pay Facebook to target with ads.

13 206. Defendants also receive an additional commercial benefit from
14 using Facebook's tracking tools, such as the Facebook Pixel, in being able to
15 serve more targeted advertisements to existing and prospective patients on
16 their Meta accounts such as Facebook and Instagram.

17 207. Facebook advertises its Pixel as a piece of code "that can help
18 you better understand the *effectiveness of your advertising* and the actions
19 people take on your site, like visiting a page or adding an item to their cart.
20 You'll also be able to see when customers took an action after seeing your ad
21 on Facebook and Instagram, which can help you with retargeting."⁸³

22 208. Retargeting is a form of online marketing that targets users with
ads based on previous internet communications and interactions. In
particular, retargeting operates through code and tracking pixels placed on a
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²⁶
 ⁸³ What is the Meta Pixel, https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/meta ²⁷
 ⁸³ What is the Meta Pixel, https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/meta ²⁶
 ⁸³ What is the Meta Pixel, https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/meta ²⁷
 ⁸³ What is the Meta Pixel, https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/meta ²⁶
 ⁸³ What is the Meta Pixel, https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/meta ²⁷

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website and cookies to track website visitors and then places ads on other
 websites the visitor goes to later.⁸⁴

209. The process of increasing conversions and retargeting occurs in
the healthcare context by sending a successful action on a health care website
back to Facebook via the tracking technologies and the Pixel embedded on,
in this case, Defendants' Web Properties.

7 210. For example, when a User searches for doctors or medical
8 conditions or treatment on SDFC's Website, that information is sent to
9 Facebook. Facebook can then use its data on the User to find more users to
10 click on a SDFC ad and ensure that the targeted Users are more likely to
11 convert.⁸⁵

211. Through this process, the Facebook Pixel loads and captures as
much data as possible when a User loads a healthcare website that has
installed the Pixel. The information the Pixel captures "includes URL names
of pages visited, and actions taken—all of which could be potential examples
of health information."⁸⁶

17 212. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information has
18 considerable value as highly monetizable data, especially insofar as it allows
19 companies to gain insight into their customers so that they can perform
20 targeted advertising and boost their revenues.

²¹ $||_{84}$ The complex world of healthcare retargeting,

- https://www.medicodigital.com/the-complicated-world-of-healthcare retargeting/_(last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
- ...

²⁴ ⁸⁵ See, e.g., How to Make Facebook Ads HIPAA Compliant and Still Get Conversion Tracking (Mar. 14, 2023), https://www.freshpaint.io/blog/how-

²⁵ to-make-facebook-ads-hipaa-compliant-and-still-get-conversion-tracking
 ²⁶ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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⁸⁶ Id.

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213. In exchange for disclosing the Private Information of their
 account holders and patients, Defendants are compensated by Facebook (and
 other Pixel Information Recipients) in the form of enhanced advertising
 services and more cost-efficient marketing on their platforms.

5 214. But companies have started to warn about the potential HIPAA
6 violations associated with using pixels and tracking technologies because
7 many such trackers are not HIPAA-compliant or are only HIPAA-compliant
8 if certain steps are taken.⁸⁷

9 215. For example, Freshpaint, a healthcare marketing vendor,
10 cautioned that "Meta isn't HIPAA-compliant. They don't sign BAAs, and the
11 Meta Pixel acts like a giant personal user data vacuum sending PHI to Meta
12 servers," and "[i]f you followed the Facebook (or other general)
13 documentation to set up your ads and conversion tracking using the Meta
14 Pixel, remove the Pixel now."⁸⁸

15 216. Medico Digital also warns that "retargeting requires sensitivity,
16 logic and intricate handling. When done well, it can be a highly effective
17 digital marketing tool. But when done badly, it could have serious
18 consequences."⁸⁹

19 217. Whether a user has a Facebook profile is not indicative of
 20 damages because Facebook creates shadow profiles, and at least one court
 21

22 $||^{87}$ See The guide to HIPAA compliance in analytics,

- https://campaign.piwik.pro/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-guide-to-HIPAA-compliance-in-analytics.pdf (explaining that Google Analytics 4 is not HIPAA-compliant) (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
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²⁵
⁸⁸ How To Make Facebook Ads HIPAA Compliant and Still Get Conversion
²⁶
¹⁷ Tracking, supra note 90.

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⁸⁹ *The complex world of healthcare retargeting, supra* note 89.

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has recognized that the pixels' ability to track comprehensive browsing
 history is also relevant. *See, e.g., Brown v. Google LLC*, 525 F. Supp. 3d
 1049, 1078–79 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
 where Google combined the unique identifier of the user it collects from
 websites and Google Cookies that it collects across the internet on the same
 user).

7 218. Upon information and good faith belief, Defendants retargeted
8 patients and potential patients, including Plaintiffs and Class Members.

9 219. Thus, utilizing the Pixels directly benefits Defendants by, among
10 other things, reducing the cost of advertising and retargeting.

11

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N. Plaintiffs' Private Information is Extremely Valuable.

12 220. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information has value,
13 and Defendants' disclosure and interception harmed Plaintiffs and the Class
14 by not compensating them for the value of their Private Information and, in
15 turn, decreasing the value of their Private Information.

16 221. Tech companies are under particular scrutiny because they
17 already have access to a massive trove of information about people, which
18 they use to serve their own purposes, including potentially micro-targeting
19 advertisements to people with certain health conditions.

20 222. The value of personal data is well understood and generally
21 accepted as a form of currency. It is now incontrovertible that a robust
22 market for this data undergirds the tech economy.

- 23 223. The robust market for Internet user data has been analogized to
 24 the "oil" of the tech industry.⁹⁰ A 2015 article from TechCrunch accurately
 25
- ²⁶ ||⁹⁰ See https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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noted that "[d]ata has become a strategic asset that allows companies to
acquire or maintain a competitive edge."⁹¹ That article noted that the value of
a single Internet user—or really, a single user's data—varied from about \$15
to more than \$40.

5 224. Conservative estimates suggest that in 2018, Internet companies
6 earned \$202 per American user from mining and selling data (after costs).92
7 That figure is only due to keep increasing; estimates for 2022 were as high as
8 \$434 per user, for a total of more than \$200 billion industry wide.

9 225. Professor Paul M. Schwartz, writing in the Harvard Law
10 Review, notes: "Personal information is an important currency in the new
11 millennium. The monetary value of personal data is large and still growing,
12 and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from the trend.

Companies view this information as a corporate asset and have invested
heavily in software that facilitates the collection of consumer information."⁹³

15 226. This economic value has been leveraged largely by corporations
16 who pioneered the methods of its extraction, analysis, and use. However, the
17 data also has economic value to Internet users. Market exchanges have
18 sprung up where individual users like Plaintiff herein can sell or monetize
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⁹² See What Your Data is Really Worth to Facebook (July 12, 2019),

https://washingtonmonthly.com/2019/07/12/what-your-data-is-really-worth to-facebook/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

²⁶ ⁹³ Paul M. Schwartz, *Property, Privacy, and Personal Data*, 117 Harv. L.
 ²⁷ Rev. 2055, 2056-57 (2004).

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²¹ ⁹¹ See https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/13/whats-the-value-of-your-data/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

their own data. For example, Nielsen Data and Mobile Computer will pay
 Internet users for their data.⁹⁴

3 227. There are countless examples of this kind of market, which is
4 growing more robust as information asymmetries are diminished through
5 revelations to users as to how their data is being collected and used.

6 228. Courts recognize the value of personal information and the harm
7 when it is disclosed without consent.⁹⁵

8 229. Healthcare data is particularly valuable on the black market
9 because it often contains all of an individual's PII and medical conditions as
10 opposed to a single piece of information that may be found in a financial
11 breach.

12 230. Healthcare data is incredibly valuable because, unlike a stolen
13 credit card that can be easily canceled, most people are unaware that their
14 medical information has been sold. Once it has been detected, it can take
15 years to undo the damage caused.

16 231. The value of health data is well-known and various reports have
17 been conducted to identify its value.

232. Specifically, in 2023, the Value Examiner published a report
entitled Valuing Healthcare Data. The report focused on the rise in providers,
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- 21 ⁹⁴ See 10 Apps for Selling Your Data for Cash, https://wallethacks.com/appsfor-selling-your-data/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
- 22
- ⁹⁵ See, e.g., In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F. App'x 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs' allegations that they were harmed by the
- 24 dissemination of their personal information and by losing the sales value of
- that information were sufficient to show damages for their breach of contract
- and fraud claims); In re Marriott Int'l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach
- Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 462 (D. Md. 2020) (recognizing "the value that personal identifying information has in our increasingly digital economy").
- 28

software firms and other companies that are increasingly seeking to acquire
 clinical patient data from healthcare organizations. The report cautioned
 providers that they must de-identify data and that purchasers and sellers of
 "such data should ensure it is priced at fair market value to mitigate any
 regulatory risk."⁹⁶

6 233. Trustwave Global Security published a report entitled The Value
7 of Data. With respect to healthcare data records, the report found that they
8 may be valued at up to \$250 per record on the black market, compared to
9 \$5.40 for the next highest value record (a payment card).⁹⁷

234. The value of health data has also been reported extensively in
the media. For example, Time Magazine published an article in 2017 titled
"How Your Medical Data Fuels a Hidden Multi-Billion Dollar Industry," in
which it described the extensive market for health data and observed that the
market for information was both lucrative and a significant risk to privacy.⁹⁸

15 235. Similarly, CNBC published an article in 2019 in which it
16 observed that "[d]e-identified patient data has become its own small
17 economy: There's a whole market of brokers who compile the data from
18 providers and other health-care organizations and sell it to buyers."⁹⁹

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 $20 || ^{96}See$

- 21 https://www.healthcapital.com/researchmaterialdocuments/publishedarticles/ Valuing%20Healthcare%20Data.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
- ²³ ⁹⁷ See https://www.imprivata.com/blog/healthcare-data-new-prize-hackers (last visited Jan. 30, 2024) (citing https://www.infopoint-
- security.de/media/TrustwaveValue_of_Data_Report_Final_PDF.pdf).
 See https://time.com/4588104/medical-data-industry/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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⁹⁹ See https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/18/hospital-execs-say-theyre-flooded-with-requests-for-your-health-data.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

236. The dramatic difference in the price of healthcare data compared
 to other forms of private information commonly sold is evidence of the value
 of PHI.

4 237. These rates are assumed to be discounted because they do not
5 operate in competitive markets, but rather, in an illegal marketplace. If a
6 criminal can sell other Internet users' stolen data, surely Internet users can
7 sell their own data.

8 238. In short, there is a quantifiable economic value to Internet users'
9 data that is greater than zero. The exact number will be a matter for experts
10 to determine.

239. Defendants shared Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
communications and transactions on their Web Properties without
permission.

240. The unauthorized access to Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
personal and Private Information has diminished the value of that
information, resulting in harm to Web Properties Users, including Plaintiffs
and Class Members.

18 241. Plaintiffs have a continuing interest in ensuring that her future
 19 communications with Defendants are protected and safeguarded from future
 20 unauthorized disclosure.

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REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF B.W.'S EXPERIENCES

2 242. Plaintiff B.W. accessed and used the SDFC Website using her
3 personal phone and tablet while located in California to seek medical
4 treatment for infertility as recently as September 2023.

5 243. B.W. has been a patient of SDFC since approximately
6 September 2023. She was treated for fertility issues, including infertility
7 diagnosis and testing.

8 244. B.W. began using Defendants' Web Properties in September
9 2023 to, among other things, look up the cost of treatments and insurance
10 options for fertility treatments she was seeking from Defendants.

11 245. Information that B.W. provided to Defendants via their Web
 12 Properties included queries about her medical conditions as well as for
 13 testing and diagnosis for depression, infertility, and her symptoms and
 14 treatment for uterine polyps or fibroids (which occur in the endometrium
 15 and are associated with endometriosis and infertility).

16 246. B.W. has had an active Facebook account for more than 10
17 years including during the time she was providing her Private Information
18 to Defendants via their Web Properties.

¹⁹ 247. After she provided information to Defendants and looked for
²⁰ infertility treatments on the Web Properties, B.W. began receiving ads for
²¹ clinical trials related to endometriosis and fibroids, as well as depression,
²² on her Meta accounts (Facebook and Instagram).

23 248. Plaintiff B.W. reasonably expected that her communications
with Defendants via the Web Properties were confidential, solely between
themselves and Defendants, and that such communications would *not* be
transmitted to or intercepted by any third party without her full knowledge
and informed consent.

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249. Plaintiff B.W. provided her Private Information to Defendants
 and trusted that the information would be safeguarded according to
 Defendants' policies and state and federal law.

4 250. As described herein, Defendants worked along with Facebook
5 to intercept Plaintiff B.W.'s communications, including those that contained
6 confidential Private Information, while Plaintiff B.W. was within the state
7 of California.

8 251. Defendants willfully facilitated these interceptions without
9 Plaintiff B.W.'s knowledge, consent, or express written authorization.

252. Within the State of California, Defendants transmitted Plaintiff
B.W.'s FID, computer IP address, location, information such as treatment
sought, and, upon information and good faith belief, appointment type,
physician(s) selected, and medical history to Facebook.

14 253. By doing so without her consent, Defendants breached Plaintiff
15 B.W.'s right to privacy and unlawfully disclosed her Private Information.

16 254. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff B.W. that they shared her
17 Private Information with Facebook.

18 255. Plaintiff B.W. suffered damages in, *inter alia*, the form of (i)
19 invasion of privacy; (ii) violation of confidentiality of her Private
20 Information; (iii) loss of benefit of the bargain; (iv) diminution of value of
21 the Private Information; (v) statutory damages; and (vi) the continued and
22 ongoing risk to her Private Information.

23 256. Plaintiff B.W. has a continuing interest in ensuring that her
24 Private Information is protected and safeguarded from future unauthorized
25 disclosure. Plaintiff B.W. wants to continue to communicate with
26 Defendants; healthcare providers through online platforms but has no
27 practical way of knowing if her communications are being intercepted and

1 disclosed to Facebook, and thus continues to be at risk of harm from

2 Defendants' conduct.

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REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF JANE DOE'S EXPERIENCES

4 257. Plaintiff Jane Doe accessed and used the SDFC Website using
5 her personal phone while located in California to seek medical treatment for
6 infertility starting in September 2017.

7 258. Jane Doe has been a patient of SDFC since September 2017. She
8 set appointments and was treated for fertility issues, including infertility
9 diagnosis and testing.

10 259. Jane Doe began using Defendants' Web Properties in September
 11 2017 to, among other things, look up egg freezing, cost of the egg freezing
 12 treatment and insurance options for fertility treatments she was seeking from
 13 Defendants, make online appointments at SDFC, and to pay bills for egg
 14 freezing and other services she sought from Defendants.

15 260. Information that Jane Doe provided to Defendants via their Web
16 Properties included her personal information such as name, email address,
17 and phone number, as well as her medical history, answers to queries about
18 her medical conditions, and fertility treatments sought such as egg freezing.

¹⁹ 261. Jane Doe has had an active Facebook account for more than 10
 ²⁰ years including during the time she was providing her Private Information to
 ²¹ Defendants via their Web Properties.

22 262. After she provided information to Defendants and looked for
23 egg freezing and other fertility treatments on the SDFC Website, Jane Doe
24 began receiving ads for fertility treatments on her Meta accounts (Facebook
25 and Instagram).

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263. The amount of ads targeting Plaintiff Jane Doe was excessive
and overwhelming, causing her extreme emotional distress.

264. Furthermore, Jane Doe began to receive phone calls from
 fertility clinics, including those located in Mexico, on her personal phone
 number that she provided to Defendants in the process of seeking medical
 services.

5 265. These calls were extremely intrusive and exacerbated her
6 emotional distress.

7 266. Plaintiff Jane Doe reasonably expected that her communications
8 with Defendants via the Web Properties were confidential, solely between
9 herself and Defendants, and that such communications would *not* be
10 transmitted to or intercepted by any third party without her full knowledge
11 and informed consent.

12 267. Plaintiff Jane Doe provided her Private Information to
13 Defendants and trusted that the information would be safeguarded according
14 to Defendants' policies and state and federal law.

- 15 268. As described herein, Defendants worked along with Facebook to
 16 intercept Plaintiff Jane Doe's communications, including those that
 17 contained confidential Private Information, while Plaintiff Jane Doe was
 18 within the state of California.
- 19 269. Defendants willfully facilitated these interceptions without
 20 Plaintiff Jane Doe's knowledge, consent, or express written authorization.
- 21 270. Within the State of California, Defendants transmitted Plaintiff
 22 Jane Doe's email address, phone number, FID, computer IP address,
 23 location, information such as treatment sought, and, upon information and
 24 good faith belief, appointment type, physician(s) selected, and medical
 25 history to Facebook.

26 271. By doing so without her consent, Defendants breached Plaintiff
27 Jane Doe's right to privacy and unlawfully disclosed her Private Information.

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272. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff Jane Doe that they shared
 her Private Information with Facebook.

273. Plaintiff Jane Doe suffered damages in, inter alia, the form of (i)
invasion of privacy; (ii) violation of confidentiality of her Private
Information; (iii) loss of benefit of the bargain; (iv) diminution of value of
the Private Information; (v) statutory damages; and (vi) the continued and
ongoing risk to her Private Information.

8 274. Plaintiff Jane Doe has a continuing interest in ensuring that her
9 Private Information is protected and safeguarded from future unauthorized
10 disclosure. Plaintiff Jane Doe wants to continue to communicate with
11 Defendants; healthcare providers through online platforms but has no
12 practical way of knowing if her communications are being intercepted and
13 disclosed to Facebook, and thus continues to be at risk of harm from
14 Defendants' conduct.

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TOLLING

275. Any applicable statute of limitations has been tolled by the
"delayed discovery" rule. Plaintiffs did not know (and had no way of
knowing) that their Private Information was intercepted and unlawfully
disclosed because Defendants kept this information secret. Plaintiffs only
discovered that their Private Information had been disclosed by Defendants,
in January 2024.

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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

23 276. <u>Class Definition</u>: Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of
24 themselves and on behalf of various classes of persons similarly situated, as
25 defined below, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of the
26 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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1	277. The Nationwide Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined
2	as:
3	All individuals residing in the United States whose
4	Private Information was disclosed to a third party
5	without authorization or consent through the third- party tracking technologies on Defendants Web Properties.
6	
7	278. The California Sub-Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is
8	defined as:
9	All individuals residing in California whose Private
10	All individuals residing in California whose Private Information was disclosed to a third party without authorization or consent through the third-party
11	tracking technologies on Defendants Web Properties.
12	279. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify the class definition or add
13	sub-classes as necessary prior to filing a motion for class certification.
14	280. The "Class Period" is the time period beginning on the date
15	established by the Court's determination of any applicable statute of
16	limitations, after consideration of any tolling, concealment, and accrual
17	issues, and ending on the date of entry of judgment.
18	281. The Nationwide Class, and the California Sub-Class are referred
19	to collectively as the "Classes." Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any
20	affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Defendants; any entity in which Defendants
21	have a controlling interest; any officer director, or employee of Defendants;
22	any successor or assign of Defendants; anyone employed by counsel in this
23	action; any judge to whom this case is assigned, his or her spouse and
24	immediate family members; and members of the judge's staff.
25	282. <u>Numerosity/Ascertainability</u> . Members of the Class are so
26	numerous that joinder of all members would be unfeasible and not
27	practicable. The exact number of Class Members is unknown to Plaintiffs at
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this time. However, it is estimated that there are at least thousands of
 individuals in the Class. The identity of such membership is readily
 ascertainable from Defendants' records and non-party Facebook's records.

283. <u>Typicality</u>. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the
Class because Plaintiffs used the Web Properties and had their personally
identifiable information and protected health information disclosed to
Facebook without her express written authorization or knowledge. Plaintiffs'
claims are based on the same legal theories as the claims of other Class
Members.

284. <u>Adequacy</u>. Plaintiffs are fully prepared to take all necessary
steps to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the Class Members.
Plaintiffs' interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the
Class Members. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys with experience in the
prosecution of class action litigation generally and in the emerging field of
digital privacy litigation specifically. Plaintiffs' attorneys are committed to
vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class.

17 285. <u>Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate/Well-Defined</u>
18 <u>Community of Interest</u>. Questions of law and fact common to the Class
19 predominate over questions that may affect only individual Class Members
20 because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class.
21 Such generally applicable conduct is inherent in Defendants' wrongful
22 conduct. The following questions of law and fact are common to the Class:

 a. Whether and to what extent Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information;

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b. Whether Defendants had duties not to disclosePlaintiffs' and Class Members' Private

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1		Information to unauthorized third parties;
2	с.	Whether Defendants violated their privacy policies
3		by disclosing Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
4		Private Information to Facebook, Meta, or other
5		third parties;
6	d.	Whether Defendants adequately, promptly and
7		accurately informed Plaintiffs and Class Members
8		that their Private Information would be disclosed
9		to third parties;
10	e.	Whether Defendants violated the law by failing to
11		promptly notify Plaintiffs and Class Members that
12		their Private Information had been compromised;
13	f.	Whether Defendants adequately addressed and
14		fixed the practices which permitted the disclosure
15		of patient Private Information;
16	g.	Whether Defendants engaged in unfair, unlawful,
17		or deceptive practices by failing to safeguard
18		Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
19		Information;
20	h.	Whether Defendants violated the consumer
21		protection statutes invoked herein;
22	i.	Whether Defendants knowingly made false
23		representations or omitted material representations
24		as to their data security and/or privacy policy
25		practices;
26	j.	Whether Defendants knowingly omitted material
27		representations with respect to their data security
28		75
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and/or privacy policy practices;

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26	substantially ou	tweighs potential difficulties in management of this class
25	redress on clain	ns that could not practicably be pursued individually,
24	class mechanism	n, including providing injured persons a method for obtaining
23	individual actio	ns would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the
22	unnecessary du	plication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous
21	claims in a sing	le forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the
20	a large number	of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common
19	fair and efficier	at adjudication of the controversy. Such treatment will permit
18	286. <u>Su</u>	periority. Class action treatment is a superior method for the
17		California Constitution.
16		Class Members' privacy rights as provided by the
15	0.	Whether Defendants' actions violate Plaintiffs' and
14		relevant statute; and
13		to damages under CIPA, the CMIA, or any other
12	n.	Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled
11		Information;
10		Defendants' disclosure of their Private
9		currently ongoing harm faced as a result of
8		to injunctive relief to redress the imminent and
7	m.	Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled
6		result of Defendants' wrongful conduct;
5		to actual, consequential or nominal damages as a
4	1.	Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled
3		Plaintiffs' and Class Members' privacy rights;
2	k.	Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated
1		and/or privacy poincy practices;

action. Plaintiffs are unaware of any special difficulty to be encountered in 1 litigating this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 2 3 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF** 4 **COUNT I** 5 VIOLATIONS OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY 6 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the Nationwide Class) 7 8 287. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs 9 above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves 10 and the proposed Class. 11 288. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") 12 prohibits the intentional interception of the content of any electronic 13 communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 14 289. The ECPA protects both sending and receipt of communications. 15 290. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any 16 person whose wire or electronic communications are intercepted, disclosed, 17 or intentionally used in violation of Chapter 119. 18 291. The transmissions of Plaintiffs' PII and PHI to Defendants' Web 19 Properties qualifies as a "communication" under the ECPA's definition of 18 20 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 21 292. Electronic Communications. The transmission of PII and PHI 22 between Plaintiffs and Class Members and Defendants' Web Properties with 23 which they chose to exchange communications are "transfer[s] of signs, 24 signals, writing, ... data, [and] intelligence of [some] nature transmitted in 25 whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or 26 27 28 77 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

photooptical system that affects interstate commerce" and are therefore
 "electronic communications" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).

293. <u>Content</u>. The ECPA defines content, when used with respect to
electronic communications, to "include[] *any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication*." 18 U.S.C. §
2510(8) (emphasis added).

7 294. Interception. The ECPA defines an interception as the
8 "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
9 through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device" and "contents
10 . . . include any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of
11 that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), (8).

12 295. <u>Electronical, Mechanical, or Other Device</u>. The ECPA defines
13 "electronic, mechanical, or other device" as "any device ... which can be
14 used to intercept a[n] ... electronic communication[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).
15 296. The following constitute "devices" within the meaning of 18

16	USC	§ 2510(5):
10	U.S.C.	$\S 2310(3)$:

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a.	The cookies Defendants and Meta use to track Plaintiffs'
	and the Class Members' communications;

- b. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' browsers;
- c. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' computing devices;
- d. Defendants' web-servers and
- e. The Pixels deployed by Defendants to
 effectuate sending and acquiring Users' and
 patients' sensitive communications.

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 297. Plaintiffs and Class Members' interactions with Defendants'
 Web Properties are electronic communications under the ECPA.

298. By utilizing and embedding the Pixel on their Web Properties,
 Defendants intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, and/or
 procured another person to intercept, the electronic communications of
 Plaintiffs and Class Members, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).

5 299. Specifically, Defendants intercepted Plaintiffs' and Class
6 Members' electronic communications via the Meta Pixel, CAPI and other
7 tracking technologies, which tracked, stored and unlawfully disclosed
8 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information to third parties such as
9 Facebook.

300. Defendants intercepted communications that include, but are not 10 limited to, communications to/from Plaintiffs and Class Members regarding 11 PII and PHI, including email, phone number, IP address, Facebook ID, 12 treatment information, and, upon information and good faith belief, medical 13 history, medications and appointment scheduling details. Additionally, 14 through the above-described tracking tools, Defendants transmitted the 15 communications about doctors, treatments and conditions, including but not 16 limited to the name(s), location(s) and specialty(s) of physicians' Plaintiffs 17 searched for on Defendants' Web Properties. This information was, in turn, 18 used by third parties, such as Facebook, to 1) place Plaintiffs in specific 19 health-related categories and 2) target Plaintiffs with particular advertising 20 associated with Plaintiffs' specific reproductive health conditions. 21 Defendants knowingly transmit this data and do so for the purpose of 22 financial gain. 23

301. By intentionally disclosing or endeavoring to disclose Plaintiffs'
and Class Members' electronic communications to affiliates and other third
parties, while knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of an electronic communication in

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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §
 2 2511(1)(c).

3 302. By intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of
4 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' electronic communications, while knowing
5 or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
6 interception of an electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
7 2511(1)(a), Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).

8 303. <u>Unauthorized Purpose</u>. Defendants intentionally intercepted the
9 contents of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' electronic communications for
10 the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act in violation of the
11 Constitution or laws of the United States or of California—namely, invasion
12 of privacy, among others.

304. Any party exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) does not apply. 13 The party exception in $\S 2511(2)(d)$ does not permit a party that intercepts or 14 causes interception to escape liability if the communication is intercepted for 15 the purpose of committing any tortious or criminal act in violation of the 16 Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. Here, as alleged 17 above, Defendants violated a provision of HIPAA, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 18 1320d-6(a)(3). This provision imposes a criminal penalty for knowingly 19 disclosing individually identifiable health information (IIHI) to a third party. 20 HIPAA defines IIHI as: 21

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any information, including demographic
information collected from an individual,
that—(A) is created or received by a health
care provider ... (B) relates to the past, present,
or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual, the provision of
health care to an individual, or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of

health care to an individual, and (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the individual.¹⁰⁰

305. Plaintiffs' information that Defendants disclosed to third parties
qualifies as IIHI, and Defendants violated Plaintiffs' expectations of privacy,
and constitutes tortious and/or criminal conduct through a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1320d(6).

306. Defendants used the wire or electronic communications to
 increase its profit margins. Defendants specifically used the Pixels to track
 and utilize Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII and PHI for financial gain.

307. Defendants were not acting under color of law to intercept
 Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' wire or electronic communication.

¹³ 308. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not authorize Defendants to
 ¹⁴ acquire the content of their communications for purposes of invading
 ¹⁵ Plaintiffs' privacy via the Pixel tracking code. Plaintiffs and absent class
 ¹⁶ members (all of whom are patients) had a reasonable expectation that
 ¹⁷ Defendants would not re-direct their communications content to Facebook,
 ¹⁸ Google or others attached to their personal identifiers in the absence of their
 ¹⁹ knowledge or consent.

309. Any purported consent that Defendants received from Plaintiffs
and Class Members was not valid.

310. In sending and in acquiring the content of Plaintiffs' and Class
 Members' communications relating to the browsing of Defendants' Web
 Properties, researching medical conditions and treatment and scheduling
 appointments with doctors, Defendants' purpose was tortious, criminal and

²⁷ || ¹⁰⁰ *Id.* § 1320d-(6) (emphasis added).

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designed to violate federal and state legal provisions including a knowing
 intrusion into a private place or matter that would be highly offensive to a
 reasonable person.

311. Consumers have the right to rely upon the promises that 4 companies make to them. Defendants accomplished their tracking and 5 retargeting through deceit and disregard, such that an actionable claim may 6 be made, in that it was accomplished through source code that cause 7 Facebook pixels and cookies (including but not limited to the fbp, ga and gid 8 cookies) and other tracking technologies to be deposited on Plaintiffs' and 9 Class members' computing devices as "first-party" cookies that are not 10 blocked. 11 312. Defendants' scheme or artifice to defraud in this action consists 12 13 of: a. the false and misleading statements and 14 omissions in its privacy policies set forth above, 15 including the statements and omissions recited in the claims below; 16 17 b. the placement of the 'fbp' cookie on patient computing devices disguised as a first-party 18 cookie on Defendants' Website rather than a 19 third-party cookie from Meta. 20 313. Defendants acted with the intent to defraud in that they willfully 21 invaded and took Plaintiffs' and Class Members' property: 22 a. property rights to the confidentiality of Private 23 Information and their right to determine whether such information remains confidential and 24 exclusive right to determine who may collect 25 and/or use such information for marketing purposes; and 26 27 28 82 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

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1	b. property rights to determine who has access to their computing devices.
2	314. Defendants acted with the intent to defraud in that they willfully
3	invaded and took Plaintiffs' and Class Members' property:
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5	a. with knowledge that (1) Defendants did not have
6	the right to share such data without written authorization; (2) courts had determined that a
7	healthcare providers' use of the Meta Pixel gave
8	rise to claims for invasion of privacy and violations of state criminal statutes; (3) a
9	reasonable Facebook user would not understand
10	that Meta was collecting their Private
11	Information based on their activities on Defendants' Websites; (4) "a reasonable
12	Facebook user would be shocked to realize" the
13	extent of Meta's collection of Private Information; (5) a Covered Incident had
13	occurred which required a report to be made to
	the FTC pursuant to Meta's consent decrees
15	with the FTC and (6) the subsequent use of health information for advertising was a further
16	invasion of such property rights in making their
17	own exclusive use of their Private Information
18	for any purpose not related to the provision of their healthcare; and
19	
20	b. with the intent to (1) acquire Plaintiffs and Class
21	Members' Private Information without their authorization and without their healthcare
22	providers or covered entities obtaining the right
23	to share such information; (2) use Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information without
24	their authorization and (3) gain access to
25	Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal
26	computing devices through the 'fbp' cookie disguised as a first-party cookie.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	315. A person who violates § 2511(1)(a) is liable for \$10,000 in statutory damages to any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	
 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	316. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	ECPA, Plaintiffs and Class Members were damaged by Defendants' conduct.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	317. For the same reasons as set forth below for Plaintiffs' CIPA
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	Claims, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and Class Members for violations
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	of the ECPA.
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	318. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs and Nationwide Class
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	Members seek all other relief as the Court may deem just and proper,
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	including all available monetary relief, injunctive and declaratory relief, any
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	applicable penalties, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	<u>COUNT II</u>
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, <i>et. seq</i> .
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	(On behalf of Plaintiffs & the California Class)
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	319. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
 20 21 22 23 24 25 	above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
21 22 23 24 25	and the proposed Class.
22 23 24 25	320. The California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA") is codified at
23 24 25	California Penal Code §§ 630 to 638.
24 25	321. CIPA begins with its statement of purpose.
25	The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science
	and technology have led to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping
26	privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of
	such devices and techniques has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be
27	tolerated in a free and civilized society.
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1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 630.

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California Penal Code § 631(a) provides, in pertinent part: Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner . . . willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; or who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars (\$2,500)[.]

322. A defendant must show it had the consent of *all* parties to a
 communication.

¹³ 323. At all relevant times, Defendants aided, employed, agreed with,
 ¹⁴ and conspired with Facebook and other third parties to track and intercept
 ¹⁵ Plaintiffs' and Class Members' internet communications while using the
 ¹⁶ Website, specifically by installing and configuring the Pixel to permit
 ¹⁷ Facebook to eavesdrop on and intercept in real-time the content of Plaintiffs'
 ¹⁸ and Class Members' private communications with Defendants.

¹⁹ 324. The content of those conversations included Private Information,
 ²⁰ such as highly sensitive PHI. Through Defendants' installation and
 ²¹ configuration of the Pixels on their Web Properties, these communications
 ²² were intercepted by Facebook during the communications and without the
 ²³ knowledge, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

325. Defendants intentionally inserted an electronic device into their
 Web Properties that, without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiffs and

1 Class Members, transmitted the substance of their confidential 2 communications with Defendants to a third party. 3 326. Defendants willingly facilitated Facebook's and other third parties' interception and collection of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' private 4 medical information by embedding the Pixel(s) on the Website, thereby 5 6 assisting Facebook's eavesdropping. 7 327. The following items constitute "machine[s], instrument[s], or contrivance[s]" under the CIPA, and even if they do not, the Pixel falls under 8 9 the broad catch-all category of "any other manner": 10 The computer codes and programs Facebook and p. other third parties used to track Plaintiffs' and Class 11 Members' communications while they were navigating the Website; 12 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' browsers; q. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' computing and r. 13 mobile devices; Facebook's web and ad servers: s. 14 The web and ad servers from which Facebook and t. other third parties tracked and intercepted Plaintiffs' and Class Members' communications 15 while they were using a web browser to access or 16 navigate the Website; The computer codes and programs used by Facebook and other third parties to effectuate its tracking and interception of Plaintiffs' and Class u. 17 18 Members' communications while they were using a browser to visit the Website; and 19 The plan Facebook and other third parties carried out to effectuate its tracking and interception of v. 20 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' communications while they were using a web browser or mobile 21 application to visit the Website. 22 328. Defendants fail to disclose that they are using the Pixels to track 23 and automatically and simultaneously transmit highly sensitive personal communications to a third party. Defendants are necessarily aware that these 24 communications are confidential as their Website Privacy Notices 25 acknowledge the confidential nature of PHI and disclaims that it is being 26 27 28 86 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

shared with unidentified third parties without Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
 express authorization.

3 329. The patient communication information that Defendants
4 transmit while using the Pixel and tracking technologies constitutes protected
5 health information.

330. As demonstrated hereinabove, Defendants violate CIPA by 6 aiding and permitting third parties, including Facebook and its agents, 7 employees, and contractors to receive its patients' online communications in 8 real time through their Web Properties without their consent. Facebook 9 specifically receives the content of these communications and understands it, 10 as the FID is assigned by Facebook and Facebook must understand the 11 content in order to process it and link it to individual Users so that Facebook 12 13 may target advertising to those persons based on their healthcare choices. 14 331. By disclosing Plaintiffs' and Class Members' private health

information, Defendants violated Plaintiffs' and Class Members statutorily
protected right to privacy.

332. As a result of the above violations and pursuant to CIPA Section
637.2, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and Class Members for treble actual
damages related to their loss of privacy in an amount to be determined at
trial, or for statutory damages in the amount of \$5,000 per violation. Section
637.2 specifically states that "[i]t is not a necessary prerequisite to an action
pursuant to this section that the Plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with,
actual damages."

333. Under the statute, Defendants are also liable for reasonable
attorney's fees, litigation costs, injunctive and declaratory relief, and punitive
damages in an amount to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent
the same or similar conduct by Defendants in the future.

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COUNT III

VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDICAL INFORMATION ACT Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56, *et seq*. (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the California Class)

317. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
and the proposed Class.

318. The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, 8 California Civil Code §§ 56, et seq. ("CMIA") prohibits health care 9 providers from disclosing medical information relating to their patients 10 without patient authorization. "Medical information" refers to "any 11 individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, in 12 possession of or derived from a provider of health care . . . regarding a 13 patient's medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment. 14 'Individually Identifiable' means that the medical information includes or 15 contains any element of personal identifying information sufficient to allow 16 identification of the individual[.]" CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05. 17

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319. Defendants are "provider[s] of health care" as defined by California Civil Code § 56.06(b).

320. Plaintiffs and Class Members are patients, and, as health care 20 providers, Defendants had an ongoing obligation to comply with the CMIA's 21 requirements. As set forth above, device identifiers, web URLs, Internet 22 Protocol (IP) addresses, and other characteristics that can uniquely identify 23 Plaintiffs and Class Members are transmitted from within the State of 24 California to Defendants in combination with patient medical conditions, 25 medical concerns, treatment(s) sought by the patients, and doctors viewed 26 along with the medical specialty of the doctor(s) searched for and viewed by 27

patients. This is protected health information under the CMIA.

321. This private medical information is intercepted and transmitted
within the State of California to third parties including Facebook and its
agents, employees, and contactors via Defendants' knowing and intentional
decision to embed enabling software into their Web Properties.

322. Facebook ID is also an identifier sufficient to allow
identification of an individual. Along with patients' Facebook ID,
Defendants disclose to third parties including Facebook and its agents,
employees, and contactors several pieces of information regarding patient
use of their Web Properties including but not limited to the following: patient
medical conditions, medical concerns, treatment(s) sought by the patients,
and medical specialty of the doctor(s) searched for by patients.

323. The information described above constitutes medical
information pursuant to the CMIA because it is patient information derived
from a provider of health care regarding patients' medical treatment and
physical condition, and this medical information is linked with individually
identifying information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(i).

18 324. As demonstrated hereinabove, Defendants fail to obtain their
19 patients' authorization for the disclosure of medical information and fails to
20 disclose in their Website Privacy Notice that it shares protected health
21 information with Facebook or other third parties for marketing purposes.

325. Pursuant to CMIA Section 56.11, a valid authorization for
disclosure of medical information must be: (1) "Clearly separate from any
other language present on the same page and is executed by a signature
which serves no other purpose than to execute the authorization;" (2) signed
and dated by the patient or his representative; (3) state the name and function
of the third party that receives the information; and (4) state a specific date

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after which the authorization expires. Accordingly, the information set forth
 in Defendants' Website Privacy Notice does not qualify as a valid
 authorization.

326. As described above, Defendants are violating the CMIA by
disclosing its patients' medical information to third parties, including
Facebook and its agents, employees, and contractors along with the patients'
individually identifying information. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Class
Members seek all relief available for Defendants' CMIA violations.

9 327. Plaintiffs and Class Members seek nominal damages,
10 compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs of
11 litigation for Defendants' violation(s) of the CMIA.

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<u>COUNT IV</u> INVASION OF PRIVACY—CALIFORNIA CONSTITUION ART. 1 § 1 <u>(On behalf of Plaintiffs & the California Class)</u>

328. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
and the proposed Class.

18 329. Plaintiffs and Class Members have an interest in: (1) precluding the dissemination and/or misuse of their sensitive, confidential 19 20 communications and protected health information; and (2) making personal 21 decisions and/or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion 22 or interference, including, but not limited to, the right to visit and interact 23 with various internet sites without being subjected to wiretaps without 24 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' knowledge or consent. 25 330. At all relevant times, by using Facebook's and other third 26 parties' tracking pixel(s) to record and communicate patients' FIDs and other 27 individually identifying information alongside their confidential medical 28

communications, Defendants intentionally invaded Plaintiffs' and Class
 Members' privacy rights under the California Constitution.

3 331. Plaintiffs and Class Members had a reasonable expectation that
4 their communications, identity, health information, and other data would
5 remain confidential, and that Defendants would not install wiretaps on their
6 Web Properties to secretly transmit communications to a third party.

7 332. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not authorize Defendants to
8 record and transmit Plaintiffs' and Class Members' private medical
9 communications alongside their personally identifiable health information.

333. This invasion of privacy is serious in nature, scope, and impact
because it relates to patients' private medical communications. Moreover, it
constitutes an egregious breach of the societal norms underlying the privacy
right.

14 334. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs and Class Members
15 have suffered harm and injury, including but not limited to an invasion of
16 their privacy rights.

17 335. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged as a direct and
18 proximate result of Defendants' invasion of their privacy and are entitled to
19 just compensation, including monetary damages and an injunction that
20 prevents Defendants from engaging in the same or similar conduct in the
21 future.

336. Plaintiffs and Class Members seek appropriate relief for their
injuries, including but not limited to damages that will reasonably
compensate Plaintiffs and Class Members for the harm to their privacy
interests as a result of the intrusion(s) upon Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
privacy.

337. Plaintiffs and Class Members are further entitled to punitive

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damages resulting from the malicious, willful, and intentional nature of
 Defendants' actions, directed at injuring Plaintiffs and Class Members in
 conscious disregard of their rights. Such damages are needed to deter
 Defendants from engaging in such conduct in the future.

5 338. Plaintiffs seek all other relief as the Court may deem just,
6 proper, and available for invasion of privacy under the California
7 Constitution.

8 <u>COUNT V</u> 9 <u>COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY</u>—INTRUSION UPON 10 <u>SECLUSION</u> 10 (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the Nationwide Class)

¹¹ 339. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
 ¹² above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
 ¹³ and the proposed Class.

¹⁴ 340. Plaintiffs and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of
 ¹⁵ privacy in their communications with Defendants via their Web Properties
 ¹⁶ and the communication platforms and services therein.

¹⁷ 341. Plaintiffs and Class Members communicated sensitive and
 ¹⁸ protected medical information and individually identifiable information that
 ¹⁹ they intended for only Defendants to receive and that they understood
 ²⁰ Defendants would keep private.

²¹ 342. Defendants' disclosure of the substance and nature of those
 ²² communications to third parties without the knowledge and consent of
 ²³ Plaintiffs and Class Members is an intentional intrusion on Plaintiffs' and
 ²⁴ Class Members' solitude or seclusion.

²⁵ 343. Plaintiffs and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of
 ²⁶ privacy because Defendants' Website Privacy Notice states that they can
 ²⁷ expect such privacy. Moreover, Plaintiffs and Class Members have a general

expectation that their communications regarding healthcare with their
 healthcare providers will be kept confidential. Defendants' disclosure of
 private medical information coupled with individually identifying
 information is highly offensive to the reasonable person.

5 344. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs and Class Members
6 have suffered harm and injury, including but not limited to an invasion of
7 their privacy rights.

8 345. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged as a direct and
9 proximate result of Defendants' invasion of their privacy and are entitled to
10 just compensation, including monetary damages.

346. Plaintiffs and Class Members seek appropriate relief for these
injuries, including but not limited to damages that will reasonably
compensate Plaintiffs and Class Members for the harm to their privacy
interests as a result of the intrusion(s) upon Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
privacy.

347. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to punitive
damages resulting from the malicious, willful, and intentional nature of
Defendants' actions, directed at injuring Plaintiffs and Class Members in
conscious disregard of their rights. Such damages are needed to deter
Defendants from engaging in such conduct in the future.

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COUNT VI

BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the Nationwide Class)

348. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
and the proposed Class.

349. Defendants solicited and invited Plaintiffs and Class Members to

provide their Private Information through Defendants' Web Properties as
 part of its regular business practices. Plaintiffs and Class Members accepted
 Defendants' offers and provided their Private Information to Defendant.

350. Defendants required Plaintiffs and Class Members to provide
their Private Information, including email addresses, phone numbers,
computer IP addresses, appointment information, medical insurance
information, medical provider information, medical histories, and other
content submitted on Defendants' Web Properties as a condition of their
receiving healthcare services.

351. As a condition of utilizing Defendants' Web Properties and 10 receiving services from Defendants, Plaintiffs and Class Members provided 11 their Private Information and compensation for their medical care. In so 12 doing, Plaintiffs and Class Members entered into contracts with Defendants 13 by which Defendants agreed to safeguard and protect such information, in its 14 Privacy Practices and elsewhere, to keep such information secure and 15 confidential, and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiffs and Class 16 Members if their data had been breached and compromised or stolen. 17

18 352. Implicit in the agreement between Defendants and their patients
19 was the obligation that both parties would maintain the Private Information
20 confidentially and securely.

353. Defendants had an implied duty of good faith to ensure that the
Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members in their possession was
used only as authorized, such as to provide medical treatment, billing, and
other medical benefits from Defendants.

25 354. Defendants had an implied duty to protect the Private
26 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members from unauthorized disclosure or
27 uses.

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355. Additionally, Defendants implicitly promised to retain this
 Private Information only under conditions that kept such information secure
 and confidential.

4 356. Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably believed and expected
5 that Defendants' data security practices complied with relevant laws and
6 regulations and were consistent with industry standards.

357. Plaintiffs and Class Members fully performed their obligations
under the implied contract with Defendants. Defendants did not. Plaintiffs
and Class Members would not have provided their confidential Private
Information to Defendants in the absence of their implied contracts with
Defendants and would have instead retained the opportunity to control their
Private Information for uses other than medical treatment, billing, and
benefits from Defendants.

14 358. Consumers of medical services value their privacy and the ability to keep confidential their Private Information associated with 15 obtaining such services. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have 16 entrusted their Private Information to Defendants and entered into these 17 implied contracts with Defendants without an understanding that their 18 Private Information would be safeguarded and protected, nor would Plaintiffs 19 and Class Members have entrusted their Private Information to Defendants in 20 the absence of Defendants' implied promise to monitor their Website, 21 computer systems, and networks to ensure that reasonable data security 22 23 measures were adopted and maintained.

24 359. Defendants breached the implied contracts with Plaintiffs and
25 Class Members by disclosing Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
26 Information to unauthorized third parties, failing to properly safeguard and
27 protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information; and violating

industry standards as well as legal obligations that are necessarily
 incorporated into implied contract between Plaintiffs, Class Members, and
 Defendants.

4 360. Defendants' acts and omissions have materially affected the
5 intended purpose of the implied contracts requiring Plaintiffs and Class
6 Members to provide their Private Information in exchange for medical
7 treatment and benefits.

8 361. As a result of Defendants' failure to fulfill the promises in these
9 implied contracts, Plaintiffs and Class Members did not receive the full
10 benefit of the bargain, and instead received healthcare and other services that
11 were of diminished value.

362. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' above-described
breach of contract, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered (and will
continue to suffer) the compromise and disclosure of their Private
Information and identities, the loss of control of their Private Information,
disruption of their medical care and treatment, and the loss of the benefit of
the bargain they had struck with Defendants.

18 363. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' above-described
19 breach of contract, Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to recover
20 actual, consequential, and nominal damages.

COUNT VII

LARCENY/RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY (VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 496(a) and (c)) (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the California Class)

²⁴ 364. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs
 ²⁵ above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves
 ²⁶ and the proposed Class.
 ²⁷ 265 Let a standard the proposed Class.

365. Internet users have a property interest in their personal

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1 information and data.

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366. Cal. Penal Code §496(c) permits "any" person who has been
injured by a violation of section 496(a) to recover three times the amount of
actual damages, costs of suit and attorney's fees in a civil suit.

- 367. Penal Code § 496(a) creates an action against "any" person who
 (1) receives "any" property that has been stolen or obtained in any manner
 constituting theft, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or (2)
 conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing or withholding "any"
 property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or illegally
 obtained.
- 368. Under Penal Code § 1.07(a)(38), "person" means "an individual,
 corporation, or association." Thus, Defendants are a person under section
 496(a).
- 14 369. As set forth herein, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
 15 Information was stolen or obtained by theft, without limitation, under Penal
 16 Code §484, by false or fraudulent representations or pretenses. At no point
 17 did the Defendants have Plaintiffs' and Class Members' consent to duplicate
 18 their searches and send them to Facebook.
- 19 370. Defendants meet the grounds for liability of section 496(a)
 20 because Defendants:
 - a. knew the Private Information was stolen or obtained by theft and/or false pretenses; and, with such knowledge;
 - b. transmitted such information to unauthorized third parties, like Facebook.
- 25 371. Defendants violated the second ground for liability of section
 26 496(a) because Defendants:
 - a. knew the Private Information was stolen or obtained by theft;

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and, with such knowledge; 1 b. concealed, withheld, or aided in concealing or withholding said 2 3 data from their rightful owners by unlawfully tracking the data and disclosing it to unauthorized third parties, like Facebook. 4 5 372. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions described above, Plaintiffs and California Subclass Members were injured by 6 Defendants' violations of section 496(a). 7 8 373. Pursuant to California Penal Code § 496(c), Plaintiffs and 9 California Subclass Members seek actual damages, treble damages, costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 10 11 **COUNT VIII UNJUST ENRICHMENT** 12 (On behalf of Plaintiffs & the Nationwide Class) 13 374. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the paragraphs 14 above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count on behalf of themselves 15 and the proposed Class. 16 375. This claim is pleaded solely in the alternative to Plaintiffs' 17 breach of implied contract claim. 18 376. Plaintiffs and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit upon 19 Defendants in the form of valuable sensitive medical information that 20 Defendants collected from Plaintiffs and Class Members under the guise of 21 keeping this information private. Defendants collected, used, and disclosed 22 this information for their own gain, including for advertisement purposes, 23 sale, or trade for valuable services from third parties. Additionally, Plaintiffs 24 and Class Members conferred a benefit on Defendants in the form of 25 monetary compensation. 26 377. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have used Defendants' 27 28 98 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

services or would have paid less for those services, if they had known that
 Defendants would collect, use, and disclose this information to third parties.

3 378. Defendants appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits
4 conferred upon it by Plaintiffs and Class Members.

379. As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
Members suffered actual damages in an amount equal to the difference in
value between their purchases made with reasonable data privacy and
security practices and procedures that Plaintiffs and Class Members paid for,
and those purchases without unreasonable data privacy and security practices
and procedures that they received.

380. The benefits that Defendants derived from Plaintiffs and Class
Members rightly belong to Plaintiffs and Class Members. It would be
inequitable under unjust enrichment principles for Defendants to be
permitted to retain any of the profit or other benefits they derived from the
unfair and unconscionable methods, acts, and trade practices alleged in this
Complaint.

17 381. Defendants should be compelled to disgorge into a common
18 fund for the benefit of Plaintiffs and Class Members all unlawful or
19 inequitable proceeds they received as a result of its conduct alleged herein.

RELIEF REQUESTED

382. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the proposed Classes,
 respectfully requests that the Court grant the following relief:

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- a. Certification of this action as a class action and
 appointment of Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel to
 represent the Class;
 - b. A declaratory judgment that Defendantsviolated: (1) the California Invasion of Privacy

1	Act; (2) the California Confidentiality of Medical
2	Information Act; and (3) Plaintiffs' and Class
3	Members' privacy rights as provided at common
4	law and pursuant to the California Constitution;
5	c. An order enjoining Defendants from engaging in
6	the unlawful practices and illegal acts described
7	herein; and
8	d. An order awarding Plaintiffs and the Class: (1)
9	actual or statutory damages; (2) punitive damages
10	in an amount to be determined at trial; (3)
11	prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; (4)
12	injunctive relief as the Court may deem proper; (5)
13	reasonable attorney fees and expenses and costs of
14	suit pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
15	§ 1021.5 and/or other applicable law; and (6)
16	Such other and further relief as the Court may
17	deem appropriate.
18	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
19	Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the proposed Classes, demand a
20	trial by jury for all claims asserted herein and so triable.
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22	DATED: February 3, 2024 <u>/s/ Daniel Srourian</u> Daniel Srourian California Par No
23	Daniel Srourian, California Bar No. 285678
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This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Class Action Says Ivy Fertility, San Diego</u> <u>Fertility Center Share Website Visitors' Data with Facebook</u>