UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

CALVIN BROOKS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

Case No.

VS.

MOTHER TRUCKER, LLC, a Domestic Limited Liability Company and HENRY ANTHONY GUERRERO, Individually,

Defendants.

/

<u>COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT</u> <u>AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL</u>

Plaintiff, CALVIN BROOKS ("Brooks" or "Plaintiff"), on behalf of himself and other "Truck Driver" employees and former employees similarly situated, by and through undersigned counsel, file this Complaint against Defendants, MOTHER TRUCKER, LLC ("Mother Trucker"), and HENRY ANTHONY GUERRERO ("Guerrero), Individually (collectively "Defendants") and states as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and other similarly situated current and former "Truck Driver" employees of the Defendants, who elect to opt into this action, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), that they are: (i) entitled to unpaid wages from Defendants for overtime work for which they did not receive overtime premium pay, as required by law, (ii) entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201 et seq; (iii) entitled to declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201; and (iv) entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA.

JURISDICTION

2. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper as the claims are brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. §201, <u>et seq.</u>, hereinafter called the "FLSA") to recover unpaid back wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

3. The jurisdiction of the Court over this controversy is based upon 29 U.S.C. §216(b).

4. This Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.

5. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendants maintain their principal place of business within this District and/or resides within this District.

6. Moreover, the common policy, plan and/or scheme that form the basis of the instant case (i.e. Defendants' failure to pay overtime premiums to its hourly paid "Truck Drivers" when they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek), was created and carried out from Defendants' corporate headquarters, located within this District.

PARTIES

7. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was a resident of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

8. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was an hourly paid non-exempt local "Truck Driver" and performed related activities for Defendants.

9. At all times material hereto Defendant, MOTHER TRUCKER, was, and continues to be a Domestic Limited Liability Company.

10. At all times material hereto, Defendant, MOTHER TRUCKER, was, and continues to be, engaged in business in Georgia, with its principal place of business within this District.

11. At all times material hereto, Defendant GUERRERO was and is an individual resident of the State of Georgia.

12. At all times material hereto, GUERRERO owned and operated MOTHER TRUCKER.

13. At all times material hereto, GUERRERO had and/or exercised the authority to hire and fire employees of MOTHER TRUCKER.

14. At all times material hereto, GUERRERO had and/or exercised the authority determine the work schedules for the employees of MOTHER TRUCKER.

15. At all times material hereto, GUERRERO had and/or exercised the authority determine the compensation structure for employees of MOTHER TRUCKER.

16. At all times material hereto, GUERRERO had and/or exercised the authority control the finances and operations MOTHER TRUCKER.

17. By virtue of the fact that GUERRERO had and/or exercised the authority to: (a) hire and fire employees of MOTHER TRUCKER; (b) determine the work schedules for the employees of MOTHER TRUCKER; (c) determine the compensation structure for employees of MOTHER TRUCKER; and (d) control the finances and operations MOTHER TRUCKER, GUERRERO was an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA at all times relevant hereto.

18. At all times material hereto, MOTHER TRUCKER and GUERRERO were Plaintiff's joint employers as defined by 29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq.

COVERAGE

19. At all times material hereto Plaintiff was Defendants' "employee" within the meaning of the FLSA.

20. At all times material hereto, Defendants were Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA.

21. Defendants were, and continue to be, an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA.

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22. At all times material hereto, Defendants were, and continue to be, "an enterprise engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the FLSA.

23. At all times material hereto, Defendants were, and continue to be, an enterprise engaged in the "production of goods for commerce" within the meaning of the FLSA.

24. At all times material hereto, the annual gross revenue of Defendants was in excess of \$500,000.00 per annum.

25. At all times material hereto, Defendants had two (2) or more employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that had been moved in or had been produced for commerce, such as asphalt, cement, and other materials used in heavy civil, commercial and industrial construction projects.

26. At all times hereto, Plaintiff was "engaged in commerce" and subject to individual coverage of the FLSA.

27. At all times hereto, Plaintiff was engaged in the "production of goods for commerce" and subject to the individual coverage of the FLSA.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

28. Defendants operate solely within the State of Georgia, hauling bulk aggregate for use in local construction projects.

29. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly paid "Truck Driver".

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30. Plaintiff worked in this capacity from approximately November 18,2014 through July 31, 2017.

31. As a "Truck Driver," Plaintiff was required to pick up asphalt, cement, and dirt at the job sites and haul it back to the plant to recycle, or, haul asphalt, cement, and dirt from the plant to the jobsites.

32. Plaintiff was paid by the hour without any additional overtime premiums.

33. Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him, routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week as part of their regular job duties.

34. Despite working more than forty (40) hours per week, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff, and those similarly situated to him, overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.

35. Defendants have employed and continue to employ other individuals as "Truck Drivers" who performed and continue to perform the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff and the class members.

36. Defendants have violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 and continue to violate same to date, in that:

a. Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week for his period of employment with Defendants;

b. No payments, or insufficient payments and/or provisions for payment,

have been made by Defendants to properly compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff's regular rate for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week as provided by the FLSA; and

c. Defendants have failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.

37. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A. to represent him in this litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services.

COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

38. Plaintiff and the class members were all "Truck Drivers" and performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they hauled construction materials for Defendants to/from local job sites, all within the State of Georgia.

39. Further, Plaintiff and the class members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were all paid hourly, but were not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Thus, the class members are owed overtime wages for the same reasons as Plaintiff.

40. Defendants' failure to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek as required by the FLSA results from a policy or practice of failure to assure that "Truck Drivers" are/were paid for overtime hours

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worked based on the Defendants' uniform pay policy, under which it paid its "Truck Drivers" on an hourly basis.

41. This policy or practice was applicable to Plaintiff and the class members. Application of this policy or practice does/did not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the non-payment of overtime to Plaintiff applied and continues to apply to all class members. Accordingly, the class members are properly defined as:

All hourly paid "Truck Drivers" who worked for Defendants within the last three years who were not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more workweeks.

42. Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime compensation with respect to Plaintiff and the class members.

43. Defendants did not act in good faith or reliance upon any of the following in formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, *et seq.*, (c) Department of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations.

44. During the relevant period, Defendants violated § 7(a)(1) and § 15(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the

production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for one or more workweeks without compensating such employees for their work at a rate of at least the time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week.

45. Defendants have acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in accordance with the law.

46. Defendants have failed to maintain accurate records of Plaintiff's and the class members' work hours in accordance with the law.

COUNT I VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION

47. Plaintiffs reallege and reaver paragraphs 1 through 46 the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

48. From at least November 2014, and continuing through July 2017, Plaintiff worked in excess of the forty (40) hours per week for which Plaintiff was not compensated at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff's regular rate of pay.

49. Plaintiff was, and is entitled to be paid at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff's regular rate of pay for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours.

50. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed, and continue to fail, to

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maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.

51. To date, Defendants continue to fail to pay their "Truck Driver" employees their FLSA mandated overtime pay, despite their recognition that their position is non-exempt and entitled to same.

52. Defendants' actions in this regard were/are willful and/or showed/show reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by its continued failure to compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff's regular rate of pay for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per weeks when they knew, or should have known, such was, and is due.

53. Defendants have failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of Plaintiff's rights under the FLSA.

54. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff suffered and continue to suffer damages and lost compensation for time worked over forty (40) hours per week, plus liquidated damages.

55. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiff on behalf of himself and those similarly situated Collective Action Members, respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Designation of this action as a collective action on behalf of the Collective Action Members and prompt issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of an FLSA Opt-In Class, appraising them of the pendency of this action, permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims in this action by filing individual Consents to Sue pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and appointing Plaintiff and his counsel to represent the Collective Action members;
- b. A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under the FLSA;
- An injunction against the Defendants and its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons in concert with it, as provided by law, from engaging in each of the unlawful practices, policies and patterns set forth herein;
- An award of unpaid wages and overtime compensation due under the FLSA;
- e. An award of liquidated damages as a result of the Defendants' willful failure to pay wages and overtime compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216;
- f. An award of prejudgment and post judgment interest;
- g. An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable

attorneys' and expert fees; and

h. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff

demands a trial by jury on all questions of fact raised by the complaint.

Dated: November 7th, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

<u>/s/ Andrew R. Frisch</u> Andrew R. Frisch MORGAN & MORGAN 600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400 Plantation, FL 33324 Tel: 954-WORKERS Fax: 954-333-3515 E-Mail: <u>afrisch@forthepeople.com</u>


JS44 (Rev. 11/16 NDGA) Case 1:17-cv-04469-CACINPCCOVER SHEEP d 11/07/17 Page 1 of 2

The JS44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket record. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ATTACHED)

I. (a) PLAINTIFF(S)		DEFENDANT(S)
I. (a) PLAINTIFF(S) CALVIN BROOKS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,		MOTHER TRUCKER, LLC, a Domestic Limited Liability Company and HENRY ANTHONY GUERRERO, Individually,
(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF Gwinnett (except in u.s. plaintiff cases)		COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT
(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, TELEPHONE NUMBER, AND E-MAIL ADDRESS) Andrew R. Frisch, Esquire Morgan & Morgan, P.A. 600 Pine Island Road, Suite 400 Plantation, FL 33324 (954) 318-0268 / Email: AFrisch@forthepoeple.com		ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)		ZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES N "X" IN ONE BOX FOR PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANT) (FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY)
1 U.S. GOVERNMENT PLAINTIFF Image: 3 General Question (U.S. GOVERNMENT NOT A PARTY) 2 U.S. GOVERNMENT DEFENDANT Image: 4 Diversity (INDICATE CITIZENSHIP OF PARTIES IN ITEM III)	PLF DEF PLF DEF 1 1 CITIZEN OF THIS STATE 4 4 INCORPORATED OR PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN THIS STATE 2 2 CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE 5 5 INCORPORATED AND PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN THIS STATE 3 3 CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE 6 6 FOREIGN NATION	
IV. ORIGIN (PLACE AN "X "IN ONE BOX ONLY) 1 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 2 REMOVED FROM 3 REMANDED FROM APPELLATE COURT 4 REINSTATED OR 5 ANOTHER DISTRICT (Specify District) 6 LITIGATION - 7 FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE MULTIDISTRICT (Specify District) 7 FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE MULTIDISTRICT - 7 FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
DIRECT FILE		
V. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE - DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) Violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 207 - Overtime Compensation		
 2. Unusually large number of claims or defenses. 3. Factual issues are exceptionally complex 4. Greater than normal volume of evidence. 5. Extended discovery period is needed. 7. Pending particular is a second second		Thems locating or preserving evidence ing parallel investigations or actions by government. iple use of experts. I for discovery outside United States boundaries. ence of highly technical issues and proof.
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY		
RECEIPT # AMOUNT \$ JUDGE MAG. JUDGE (Referral)		iFP MAG. JUDGE (IFP) DF SUIT CAUSE OF ACTION

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VI. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)



VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

VIII. RELATED/REFILED CASE(S) IF ANY

JUDGE

DOCKET NO._

CIVIL CASES ARE DEEMED RELATED IF THE PENDING CASE INVOLVES: (CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX)

- □ 1. PROPERTY INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT.
- □ 2. SAME ISSUE OF FACT OR ARISES OUT OF THE SAME EVENT OR TRANSACTION INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT.
- □ 3. VALIDITY OR INFRINGEMENT OF THE SAME PATENT, COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT.
- 4. APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME BANKRUPTCY CASE AND ANY CASE RELATED THERETO WHICH HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE SAME BANKRUPTCY JUDGE,
- ☐ 5. REPETITIVE CASES FILED BY PRO SE LITIGANTS.
- 6. COMPANION OR RELATED CASE TO CASE(S) BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY FILED (INCLUDE ABBREVIATED STYLE OF OTHER CASE(S)):

☐ 7. EITHER SAME OR ALL OF THE PARTIES AND ISSUES IN THIS CASE WERE PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN CASE NO. DISMISSED. This case ☐ IS ☐ IS NOT (check one box) SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME CASE.

, WHICH WAS

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Former Employee Files Wage and Hour Suit Against Mother Trucker, LLC</u>