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6	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
7	DISTRICT (	<b>DF ARIZONA</b>
8		Case No. 4:21-cv-00022-RM
9	Alexander C. Baker;	CLASS ACTION
10	All other similarly situated Songwriters;	VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED
11	Adam Bravery LLC;	COMPLAINT (Class Claims 1-6):
	All other similarly situated Royalty	1. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
12	Assignees;	ASCAP & BMI Mandatory Arbitration Clause is Void and
13	Plaintiffs, V.	Unenforceable for Economic Duress
14	American Society of Composers, Authors	2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
15	And Publishers, aka ASCAP;	ASCAP & BMI and Their Officials are State Actors
16	Broadcast Music, Inc., aka BMI;	3. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
17	Mike O'Neil;	ASCAP & BMI Arbitration Clause
18	Erika Stallings;	Violates First and Seventh Amendment without Due Process
19	and	4. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
20	Does 1-10,	Performance Royalties are a Federally
	Defendants.	Protected Right `
21		5. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ASCAP & BMI Owe Songwriters a
22		Fiduciary Duty
23		6. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
24		For Underpayment - Failing To Obey the Royalty Calculation Formula
25		7-15. NON-CLASS TORT CLAIMS
26		
27		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
28		
-		

Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker, by and through his attorney, brings this action on behalf
 of himself and all other similarly-situated Songwriters ("Songwriter Class Members" or
 simply "Songwriters"). Plaintiff Adam Bravery LLC, by and through its attorney, brings
 this action on behalf of itself and all other similarly-situated Royalty Assignees of
 Songwriters.

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### SHORT PLAIN STATEMENT OF THE CLASS ACTION CASE

(Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. ASCAP & BMI)

### A. <u>ASCAP & BMI Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Songwriters And Must Be</u> <u>Held Accountable</u>

1. It is time that ASCAP & BMI are finally held accountable for the \$2 billion they collect annually as fees for music performance licenses. ASCAP & BMI are "not-for-profit" organizations and so-called Performance Royalty Organizations ("PRO"), who act as an agent on behalf of Songwriters to collect, hold, and then appropriately distribute the Performance Royalty money to which each Songwriter is entitled. After operating expenses, half of the money collected is supposed to be paid to Songwriters, the other half is supposed to go to Publishers.

However, Songwriters are presently unable to conduct any type of audit of ASCAP
& BMI, under the theory that ASCAP & BMI do not owe Songwriters a fiduciary duty.
Songwriters come to this Honorable United States District Court, and do hereby challenge
ASCAP & BMI, seeking Declaratory Judgment that yes, ASCAP & BMI do *so* owe
Songwriters a fiduciary duty, and Songwriters do *so* have a right to audit ASCAP & BMI.

 $\| \|_{\mathbf{I}}$ 

### B. Songwriters' Constitutional Rights Must Be Restored

3. Furthermore, BMI Songwriters have discovered that their constitutional right to a civil jury trial under the First and Seventh Amendments was destroyed by the terms of a decades-old Consent Decree, which mandates that BMI force all BMI Songwriters to submit to a Mandatory Arbitration Agreement as a pre-condition of receiving any Performance Royalties at all. Under their respective Consent Decrees, the United States commands both ASCAP & BMI to admit as members any Songwriter with at least one published song. Thus, Songwriters seek a Declaratory Judgment that receiving Performance Royalties is a federally-protected right (not a contractually-created right), and that a Songwriter need not relinquish the right to petition (or any other constitutional right) as a precondition of receiving Performance Royalties.

1

### C. ASCAP & BMI Should Be Declared State Actors

4. Currently boasting an estimated 1.5 million writer members between them, ASCAP
& BMI are "not-for-profit" organizations. Having long ago been prosecuted in federal
antitrust litigation under the Sherman Act, ASCAP & BMI are bound by federal Consent
Decrees, which operate as federal law upon them. The Consent Decrees compel ASCAP &
BMI to act in certain ways as a pre-condition of conducting operations. For this reason,
under the State Compulsion Test, Songwriters seek a Declaratory Judgment that ASCAP
& BMI and their Officials are State Actors for civil rights purposes.

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### D. <u>Collecting Performance Royalties Should Be Declared A Federally-</u> <u>Protected Right</u>

Among other Consent Decree mandates, both ASCAP & BMI are compelled to
 collect Performance Royalty money for any Songwriter with at least one published work.
 Songwriters thus seek a Declaratory Judgment that collecting Performance Royalties is a
 federally-protected statutory right, not a contractually-created right.

15 16

### E. <u>BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Agreement Is Unconstitutional and Is</u> <u>Void For Economic Duress</u>

For all intents and purposes, any Songwriter who seeks to earn Performance Royalty
money must sign with either ASCAP or BMI. Besides ASCAP & BMI, the only other
significant PRO is SESAC (formerly the foreign Society of European Authors and
Composers), a private, "invitation-only" society catering exclusively to highly successful,
established writers, and which Songwriters have no right to join.

22 7. Unlike ASCAP, BMI's Consent Decree compels BMI to include a Mandatory
23 Arbitration Clause in its standard Writer "Agreement." While this may superficially
24 appear to represent a meaningful choice for the Songwriter, it really doesn't.

8. First, for any given time period, Songwriter must sign with either ASCAP or BMI,
but not both. Thus, each of Songwriter's songs is registered with ASCAP or BMI, but not
both. Second, to collect Performance Royalties for any song, the Songwriter and the
Publisher must sign up with *the same* PRO, either ASCAP or BMI. Thus, if the Publisher

is already a publishing member of BMI, the beginning songwriter must also sign up with
 BMI.

Since both ASCAP & BMI are bound to accept any writer with at least one
 published song, and since both ASCAP & BMI disclaim owing a fiduciary to Songwriters,
 ASCAP & BMI are identical in the most fundamental respects. Clearly, a Songwriter must
 sign with either ASCAP or BMI to collect any Performance Royalties at all. And, there are
 many situations in which the Songwriter does not have a meaningful choice to join
 ASCAP, and must sign with BMI, or else not collect Performance Royalties.

9 10. The inability to collect any Performance Royalties can lead to economic ruin. For
10 this reason, Songwriter's seek a Declaratory Judgment that BMI's Mandatory Arbitration
11 Clause is void for economic duress.

11. Moreover, BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause is mandated by a decades-old
Consent Decree to which Songwriters were not party. For this reason, Songwriters seek a
Declaratory Judgment that BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause infringes Songwriter's
First and Seventh Amendment rights to petition and jury trial, without affording the Due
Process promised by the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments.

17 18

### F. Alexander C. Baker and his Assignee Adam Bravery, LLC are Viable Class Representatives

19 12. Songwriter Class Members are ASCAP & BMI writers with at least one published 20 song that generates Performance Royalties. Songwriter Class Representative Alexander C. 21 Baker is a composer, songwriter and music producer who has earned upwards of \$1 22 million in Performance Royalties for the use of his music on TV shows over the last two 23 decades. Baker originally signed with ASCAP in 1990, then moved to BMI in 1999. Baker 24 has earned royalties from both ASCAP & BMI in every distribution quarter since. 25 Assignee Class Representative Adam Bravery LLC is a Limited Liability Company to 26 which Baker assigned the right to receive royalty payments.

27 13. Baker's interests are aligned perfectly with the interests of Songwriters in finding
28 that ASCAP & BMI owe Songwriters a fiduciary duty, and that such fiduciary duty was

1 breached by systematically cheating Songwriters from money owed. Baker's interests are 2 further aligned with Songwriters in voiding the Mandatory Arbitration Clause, in 3 obtaining a declaration that receiving Performance Royalties are a federal-protected right, 4 and in holding ASCAP & BMI and their agents to be State Actors for civil rights purposes.

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#### G. The Court Should Bifurcate the Declaratory Judgments and Try Them Purely As A Matter of Law

7 14. In the interest of judicial economy, Class Action Plaintiffs will request that the 8 Court bifurcate the first five Declaratory Judgment class action claims, pleaded here as the 9 First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action (collectively, the "Declaratory 10 Judgment Claims").

15. 11 Class Action Plaintiffs believe and on that basis allege that there are no material 12 facts in dispute relevant to the Declaratory Judgment Claims. Based on the undisputed facts regarding the standard operating procedure of ASCAP & BMI, a dispute has now 13 14 arisen as to the enforceability and/or constitutionality of various elements of that 15 procedure. Regarding the Declaratory Judgment Claims, there is no need for any discovery by the Parties, nor any fact-finding by the Court. 16

17 16. For the above reasons, Songwriters believe the Declaratory Judgment Claims can 18 and should be bifurcated and brought to a Court Trial in short order.

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#### Η. Class Injury Can Only Be Remedied By Class-Wide Relief

20 As will be set forth fully in Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, despite more than 1 17. million Class Plaintiffs, per Fed. R. Civ. Pro. § 23(b)(2) there will not arise a duty to 22 notify Plaintiffs and provide an opportunity to opt out, because Plaintiffs injury can *only* 23 be remedied by class-wide relief. (See Tinsley v. McKay, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 24 filed Apr. 30, 2018) (No. 17-17501), Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 53.)

### **1** II. SHORT PLAIN STATEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING CASE

2 18. BMI is legally obligated to pay Performance Royalties to Adam Bravery, LLC, the
3 rightful Assignee of Alexander C. Baker, a BMI writer member from 1999-present. After
4 paying royalties faithfully for over 20 years, in March 2020 BMI stopped doing so without
5 legal justification, but upon a false and fabricated pretext.

6 19. Likewise, ASCAP is legally obligated to pay Performance Royalties to Baker, an
7 ASCAP writer member from 1990-1999. ASCAP has failed to obey a July 2016 Court
8 Order and Letter of Direction requiring it to equalize royalties between Baker and his
9 former co-writer.

10 11

III.

12

# A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

20. Class Plaintiffs assert original federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, as Songwriters seek Declaratory Judgments that the Mandatory Arbitration Clause is void for coercion; the Mandatory Arbitration Clause unconstitutionally violates Songwriters' federal rights to petition and to a jury trial; receiving Performance Royalties is a federally-protected right; ASCAP & BMI and its officials are State Actors for civil rights purposes; and that ASCAP & BMI owes a fiduciary duty to its writer members, who thereby have a right to audit.

21. Federal jurisdiction is also asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act, as Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable for civil rights violations.

22. Furthermore, federal jurisdiction was expressly retained in the Consent Decrees. See *United States v. ASCAP*, 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y); *United States v. BMI*, 64 Civ.
3787 (S.D.N.Y.).

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### B. <u>Alexander Baker and Adam Bravery LLC Assert Diversity</u> <u>Jurisdiction</u>

3 23. In addition to federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiffs to the underlying action against
 4 assert diversity jurisdiction.

5
 24. Plaintiff Adam Bravery LLC is a Limited Liability Company registered and
 6
 headquartered in Arizona.

7 25. Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker resides in California.

8 26. Defendant ASCAP is a Delaware corporation, with headquarters in New York.

9 Likewise, Defendant BMI is a Delaware corporation, with headquarters in New York.

On information and belief, Defendants Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings each reside in
 New York.

12 27. The value of Alexander Baker's BMI royalty stream in the underlying case
13 was at least \$100,000, rendered worthless by BMI's unjustified royalty stoppage.

Additionally, Plaintiffs to the underlying case against BMI seeks general
damages of not less than \$1,000,000, and special damages of not less than
\$200,000.

17
29. Therefore federal diversity jurisdiction is proper over all underlying claims by
Plaintiffs Alexander C. Baker and Adam Bravery LLC.

19

## C. <u>Supplemental Jurisdiction</u>

20 30. The District Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State
21 law claims because all of the claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts
22 that are so inextricably intertwined that they cannot reasonably be separated.

23

## IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

<sup>24</sup>
<sup>31.</sup> State long-arm statutes frequently authorize specific personal jurisdiction over
<sup>25</sup>
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<sup>465</sup> U.S. 783, 790 (1984).

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Arizona's long-arm statute has a broad remedial purpose and is liberally construed to
 confer upon Arizona residents the maximum privileges permitted by the federal
 constitution. *Meyers v. Hamilton Corp.*, 143 Ariz. 249, 252, 693 P.2d 904, 907 (1984).

- 4 33. For an Arizona court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,
  5 the plaintiff must show that the defendant had minimum contacts with Arizona such that
  6 maintaining the suit in Arizona does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
  7 substantial justice. *Id.* at 252, 693 P.2d at 907.
- 8 34. "The notion of 'fair play and substantial justice' is a flexible one, requiring courts to
  9 look at the fact situation of each case to determine whether there are sufficient, purposeful
  10 'minimum contacts' with the forum." *O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover,*

11 Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A. v. Bonus Utah, Inc., 156 Ariz. 171, 173, 750 P.2d 1374,

12 1376 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added). See also Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1,

3-4, 13 P.3d 280, 282-83 (2000) ("We cannot decide the issue of personal jurisdiction by
applying any mechanical test or 'talismanic jurisdictional formulas'; the facts of each case
must always be weighed in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with
'fair play and substantial justice.'") (quoting *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S.
462, 485-86 (1985).

18 35. In deciding if minimum contacts exist, "it is not the number of contacts involved but
19 the importance of the particular contacts. Quality, not the quantity of defendant's

20 activities, is what is persuasive." *Meyers*, 143 Ariz. at 253, 693 P.2d at 908. Therefore, **a** 

21 single act is sufficient to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction. O'Connor, 156

22 Ariz. at 173, 750 P.2d at 1376. See, e.g., Id., 156 Ariz. at 173, 750 P.2d at 1376

23 (defendant's hiring of Arizona law firm to file answer on its behalf in pending lawsuit

24 created minimum contact necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over him); *Holmes* 

25 Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc. v. Concrete Pumping, Inc., 131 Ariz. 232, 235, 639 P.2d 1057,

- 26 1060 (Ct. App. 1981) (defendant's single act of ordering a new engine from plaintiff
- 27 without intending to pay for it was sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts test).
- 28

36. Here, BMI's single act of promising to pay royalties to an Arizona citizen, then
 stopping royalties without legal justification is sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts test.

### V. VENUE

37. Venue is proper in Arizona because that is the State in which Plaintiff Adam
Bravery LLC is registered to do business. On information and belief regarding
operative case law, Plaintiff Adam Bravery LLC is precluded from seeking relief in
a Federal Court in any other State besides Arizona.

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### VI. PARTIES

### A. Plaintiffs

38. Plaintiff and proposed Songwriter Class Representative Alexander C. Baker 11 ("Baker") is an individual. Baker is a songwriter and music producer, and the aspiring 12 producer of a music-driven animated entertainment franchise titled "Adam Bravery." 13 39. The proposed Songwriter Class is all ASCAP & BMI writer members who signed 14 the Writer "Agreement" of ASCAP and/or BMI, who wish to collect Performance 15 Royalties, but also wish to no longer be bound by the unenforceable, unconscionable 16 and/or unconstitutional terms and conditions imposed upon them by ASCAP & BMI as a 17 pre-condition, and about which Class Action Plaintiffs complain herein throughout. 18 Beyond all else, Songwriters seek to establish, once and for all, that ASCAP & BMI owe 19 them a fiduciary duty. 20

40. Plaintiff and proposed Assignee Class Representative Adam Bravery, LLC, is an
Arizona Limited Liability Company formed by Baker and two other equal members in
2018, is the assignee and legal claimant to benefit from Alexander C. Baker's Performance
Royalty money. The purpose of Adam Bravery LLC is to produce and commercially
exploit a music-driven, animated motion picture authored by Baker, and to commercially
exploit its associated music and merchandise.

27
 41. The proposed Assignee Class is all persons and entities to whom rights to receive
 28
 Performance Royalties have been validly assigned, who wish to collect Performance

Royalties, but also wish to no longer be bound by the unenforceable, unconscionable
 and/or unconstitutional terms and conditions imposed upon them by ASCAP & BMI as a
 pre-condition, and about which Class Action Plaintiffs complain herein throughout.

B. Defendants

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<sup>5</sup>
42. Defendant American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, commonly
<sup>6</sup>
<sup>7</sup>
<sup>7</sup> New York.

<sup>8</sup>
43. Defendant Broadcast Music Inc., commonly known as "BMI," is a Delaware not<sup>9</sup>
for-profit corporation with its principal office in New York.

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<sup>13</sup>
<sup>45.</sup> Defendant Mike O'Neill is the CEO of BMI, and sued in his individual capacity for
<sup>14</sup>
<sup>13</sup> involvement in the false pretext to withhold royalties (Claims 7-12).

<sup>15</sup>
<sup>46.</sup> Defendant Erika Stallings is presently Assistant General Counsel at Facebook, but
<sup>was in-house counsel for BMI at all relevant times, and is believed to be personally
<sup>responsible for issuing a false pretext on which to stop paying royalties to Adam Bravery
<sup>18</sup>
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<sup>19</sup> withhold royalties (Claims 7-12).
</sup></sup>

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### C. Doe Defendants

Doe Defendants are unknown BMI officials involved in authorizing, planning and executing the false pretext for withholding royalties (Claims 7-12).

- 24 VII. STANDING
- 25

### A. Individual Standing for Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker

47. Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker has standing to sue ASCAP & BMI for the Declaratory
Judgments sought in the First – Sixth Causes of Action because he has suffered injury in
fact – both constitutional and monetary injuries.

9

48. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants' actions, Baker has suffered
 injuries in fact, which injuries are the loss of value of his share of ownership in Adam
 Bravery LLC, which loss in value was actually and proximately caused by the destruction
 of the federally protected right to receive BMI Performance Royalty money, which right is
 presently held by Plaintiff Adam Bravery LLC. Baker has also been injured by the
 unjustified withhold of ASCAP royalties.

7 49. Baker seeks to vindicate his First Amendment right to petition and Seventh
8 Amendment right to a jury trial, which rights are vigorously asserted here, but which
9 rights BMI contends was "waived" by virtue of the BMI Writer "Agreement" and its
10 Mandatory Arbitration Clause.

11 50. Baker seeks a Declaratory Judgment that ASCAP & BMI owe him a fiduciary duty,
12 and that such fiduciary duty was breached, not only by the unwarranted royalty stoppages,
13 but also by ASCAP & BMI's failure to abide their own royalty calculation formulas.

14 51. Baker alleges that both ASCAP & BMI breached their fiduciary duty to him, and to
all Songwriters, by cheating them out of Performance Royalties owed, as the demanded
audit will show.

17 52. Moreover, Baker seeks a declaration that BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause is
18 void and/or unconstitutional, or finding performance royalties to be a federally protected
19 right, or finding ASCAP & BMI and its officials to be State Actors would allow Adam
20 Bravery LLC to recover damages, and recover the withheld royalty money, which would
21 restore the lost value of the company.

22 53. Baker's injuries – both constitutional and monetary - are remediable by the relief
23 sought.

24

### B. Organizational Standing for Adam Bravery LLC

Plaintiff Adam Bravery LLC has standing to pursue the Declaratory Judgments
 sought in the First – Fifth Causes of Action because it has suffered injury in fact. As
 Assignee, Adam Bravery LLC has the right to receive royalty money. Under the U.S.
 Constitution, Adam Bravery LLC has a right to petition the government for grievances,

10

and a right to a jury trial, the loss of which rights constitutes injury. Moreover, the
 unjustified withholding Performance Royalty money is clear financial injury.

55. Moreover, an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. *Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2437 (1977)

8 56. Here, for the reasons set forth above, Alexander Baker has standing to sue in his
9 own right for Declaratory Judgments and for civil rights violations. Though he assigned
10 his federally-protected right to receive performance royalties to the LLC, he has a vested
11 financial interest in the LLC as a 1/3 owner.

57. 12 Adam Bravery LLC seeks to protect its right to collect Performance Royalties, 13 which is germane to its overall purpose for two reasons. First, it exists to create and 14 commercially exploit copyrighted content, which commercial exploitation should in the 15 future encompass receiving performance royalties. Second, and most pressingly, Adam Bravery LLC depends crucially on the guarterly income from ASCAP & BMI royalties in 16 17 order to operate. While one member of Adam Bravery LLC – Baker – is party to this 18 lawsuit, neither the Declaratory Judgment nor Civil Rights claims asserted nor the relief 19 requested require the participation of the other members.

58. Therefore, Adam Bravery LLC has standing to pursue Declaratory Judgment and
Civil Rights claims because Defendants acted under color of law to deprive Adam Bravery
LLC of its federally protected right to receive Performance Royalty money. Defendants
also acted to deprive Adam Bravery LLC of its First Amendment Right to Petition, and
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, which right is vigorously asserted here.

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### **1 VIII. FACTS RELEVANT TO CLASS ACTION CLAIMS**

### A. Background on ASCAP & BMI

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<sup>59.</sup> Since well before World War II, ASCAP & BMI have operated as not-for-profit
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60. ASCAP & BMI enter into purported "contracts" with music writers ("writer members," and herein "Songwriters") for the purpose of collecting and distributing Performance Royalty money owed to Songwriters. Performance Royalties are often the only way a Songwriter can monetize.

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### B. Facts Regarding Copyrights In Recorded Music

61. "Copyright" is a right of ownership. It applies to authored works, such as a song, and refers to the exclusive legal rights of (1) reproduction, (2) adaptation, (3) publication, (4) public performance, and (5) public display. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

There are *two* separate copyrights for a piece of recorded music – one copyright in
the musical Composition (held by the Publisher, and often referred to as the "publishing
rights"), and one copyright in the Master Recording (held by the Master Owner, and often
referred to as the "master rights").

63. Under the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.), copyright owners have the exclusive right to license a recorded song for use <sup>1</sup> on a TV show. Thus, use of *one* recorded song on a TV show requires the TV show producer to obtain, at arms length, *two* licenses – a "synchronization" license issued by the Publisher for use of the Composition, and a "master" license issued by the Master Owner for use of the Master.

64. Songwriter is neither the Publisher nor the Master Owner. Songwriter does *not* own *either* of the copyrights. Songwriter has no right to license the use of the recorded song on

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<sup>1</sup> "Use" of recorded music on a TV show involves the rights of reproduction,

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a TV show. Songwriter has no right to license the use of the recorded song to *anyone for any purpose*.

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### C. Facts Regarding Songwriters' Assignment of Public Performance Rights To ASCAP & BMI

5 65. Having contractually assigned all copyright ownership to Publisher, Songwriter
6 retains only the right to collect the so-called "writer's share" of public Performance
7 Royalties.

8 66. By virtue of the license described in the standard Writer "Agreement," Songwriters
9 assign to ASCAP & BMI the right to license the public performances of their songs.
10 ASCAP & BMI each have a vast repertoire of songs written by Songwriters.

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### D. Facts Regarding ASCAP & BMI Granting "Blanket" Licenses

Acting as a global agent on behalf of Songwriters, ASCAP & BMI enter into
blanket license agreements with end-users of recorded music such as TV networks.
ASCAP & BMI charge a license fee in exchange for granting – on behalf of all
Songwriters - the public performance rights to the *entire repertory* of music written by all
ASCAP & BMI Songwriters. Note that as PROs, ASCAP & BMI license *only* the
performance rights, *not* any of the other fundamental rights.

<sup>18</sup>68. Together, ASCAP & BMI collect roughly \$2 billion in license fees on an annual
<sup>19</sup>basis. ASCAP & BMI retain that license fee money for a period of time, typically for
<sup>20</sup>about nine months, taking an unknown amount of the money for operating expenses.
<sup>21</sup>Then, on a quarterly basis, in January, March, June and September of each year, ASCAP
<sup>22</sup>& BMI distribute the remainder money as Performance Royalties, purportedly according
<sup>23</sup>to a formula based on the results of performance surveys, and a weighting factor based on
<sup>24</sup>the type of musical use.

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### E. Facts Distinguishing Performance Royalties from Artist Royalties

69. Performance Royalties - central to this case – are distinguishable from ArtistRoyalties. Artist Royalties are paid by a Record Company to a musical Artist according to

1 the terms of a contract between the Artist and the Record Company. A typical such "artist 2 deal" obligates the for-profit Record Company to pay the Artist royalties based on a 3 negotiated percentage of the revenue from sales of the Artist's musical product, after a *negotiated* recoupment of the Record Company's initial investment into the project. 4 5 70. Note that there is a direct relationship between the money received by the Record Company in revenue vs. the money it owes in royalties. At no time is the money co-6 7 mingled with other moneys owed to other artists, who have their own, different negotiated 8 contracts. For these reasons, prior court cases have found that no fiduciary duty exists 9 between the Artist and the Record Company, as an artist deal contract is negotiated "at 10 arms length." See e.g. Faulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 602 F. Supp. 2d 470, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 11

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### F. Facts Distinguishing Performance Royalties From Royalties Paid On Third Party License Deals

Performance Royalties are also distinguishable from royalties paid on third-party 14 71. 15 license deals. In some cases a copyright owner of a song will grant a license to a Licensee, with the understanding that Licensee then has the right to turn around and grant a license 16 17 for use of the song to a third party. Under such a contract, the Licensee will pay a royalty 18 to Licensor as a *negotiated* percentage of the license fees received from the third party. 19 72. Note that there is a direct relationship between the money received by the Licensee 20 and the royalty owed to the Licensor. At no time is the money co-mingled with other 21 monies owed to other licensors, who have their own, different negotiated contracts. For 22 these reasons, prior court cases have found that no fiduciary duty exists between the 23 Licensor and Licensee in such third-party license agreements, as such agreements are 24 negotiated "at arms length." See e.g. Surge Licensing v. Copyright Promo. LTD, 258 25 A.D.2d 257 26 27 28

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### G. <u>Facts Regarding The Co-Mingling of All Performance Royalty</u> <u>Money</u>

3 73. Performance Royalties are fundamentally different from the other types of royalties
4 for several reasons. First, ASCAP & BMI are not-for-profit entities, whereas Record
5 Companies and Third Parity Licensees are for-profit entities.

6 74. Second, the "agreement" between Songwriter and ASCAP & BMI to collect
7 Performance Royalties is not negotiated at arms length. In fact, the "agreement" is not
8 negotiated at all. There is a standard, one-size-fits-all writer "agreement" that Songwriter
9 signs, or else does not receive Performance Royalties. Unlike the other types of music
10 royalties, Songwriters are bound by identical "agreements."

75. Third, there is no relationship at all between the money collected by ASCAP & BMI 11 and the Performance Royalty paid to Songwriter for use of the song. This is because 12 ASCAP & BMI do not collect money for use of the song, and have no involvement in 13 licensing the song for use on a TV show.<sup>2</sup> Rather, ASCAP & BMI charge TV Networks 14 annual blanket fees, which fee covers their entire repertory, unrelated to any particular 15 song or songs. All of the money collected by ASCAP is co-mingled together in a giant 16 ASCAP pool. Likewise, all of the money collected by BMI is co-mingled together in a 17 giant BMI pool. 18

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 76. If, and only if, a Publisher / Master Owner licenses Songwriter's song for use on a
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 TV show, does a Performance Royalty become due to Songwriter. Performance Royalties
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 are paid to Songwriters in quarterly distributions, allegedly according to a set formula.

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### H. <u>Facts Regarding The Mysterious Nature of the Performance Royalty</u> Formula

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77. In a publication called "ASCAP's Survey and Distribution System: Rules &
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Policies," ASCAP describes its formula, in part, as:

26 Distribution to each writer member (hereinafter called "writer") from this fund shall be calculated on the basis of the number of performance credits

- <sup>2</sup> Songs are licensed to a TV show by the Publisher and Master Owner.
  - 15

of such writer recorded during the most recent available fiscal survey quarter year multiplied by the performance credit value for that quarter year, multiplied by 20%.

<sup>3</sup> See https://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/members/payment/drd.pdf

<sup>4</sup> 78. BMI employs a similar formula. How exactly ASCAP & BMI tally the number of
<sup>5</sup> "performance credits," or how a number is assigned to "performance credit value," or how
<sup>6</sup> those numbers relate to the total amount of money collected, is unknown to Plaintiffs.
<sup>7</sup> More importantly, even if the specifics of the formula were known, Plaintiffs are unable to
<sup>8</sup> verify whether ASCAP & BMI are adhering to it.

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### Facts Regarding The Consent Decrees

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 179. Long ago, ASCAP & BMI were each prosecuted by the United States of America
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14 80. The Consent Decrees are periodically renegotiated, or updated. On information and 15 belief, the most recent version of the Consent Decree controlling BMI is the 1994 version, 16 a true and correct copy of which is attached to this complaint as EXHIBIT "A," pp. 2-10. 17 The most recent Consent Decree controlling ASCAP is the 2001 version, a true and 18 correct copy of which is attached to this complaint at EXHIBIT "R," pp. 92-100. 19 81. Under the Consent Decree, ASCAP & BMI have no right to refuse membership to 20any Songwriter with at least one work published. At Article V (A) ("No Right to Refuse"),

the BMI Consent Decree states, in relevant part:

"[BMI] shall not refuse to enter into a contract providing for the licensing by [BMI] of performance rights with any writer who shall have had at least one copyrighted musical composition of his writing commercially published or recorded..."

<sup>25</sup> See EXHIBIT "A," p. 3

 $26 \parallel 82$ . Likewise, at Article XI, A(1), the ASCAP Consent Decree States:

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ASCAP is hereby ordered and directed to admit to membership, nonparticipating or otherwise, [a]ny writer who shall have had at least one

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1	work regularly published, whether or not performance of the work has been recorded in an ASCAP survey.
2	See EXHIBIT "R," p. 98
3	83. The BMI Consent Decree requires BMI to divest all songwriters of their enumerated
4	right to a jury trial. At Article VII (C) ("Arbitration Mandate"), the BMI Consent Decree
5	states:
6	Defendant [BMI] shall include in all contracts which it tenders to writers,
7	publishers and music users relating to the licensing of performance rights a clause requiring the parties to submit to arbitration in the City, County and
8	State of New York under the then prevailing rules of the American
9	Arbitration Association, all disputes of any kind, nature or description in connection with the terms and conditions of such contracts or arising out
10	of the performance thereof or based upon an alleged breach thereof, except
11	that in all contracts tendered by defendant to music users, the clause requiring the parties to submit to arbitration will exclude disputes that are
12	cognizable by the Court pursuant to Article XIV hereof.
13	See EXHIBIT "A," p. 5
14	84. The ASCAP Consent Decree does not include an Arbitration Mandate. See
15	EXHIBIT "R," p. 92 et. seq.
16	J. ASCAP & BMI Standard Writer "Agreement"
17	85. Pursuant to their obligations under the Consent Decrees, ASCAP & BMI offer
18	potential writer-members a standard Writer "Agreement." See current Writer
19	"Agreements" for ASCAP (EXHIBIT "Q," p. 92 et. seq.) and BMI (EXHIBIT "C," p. 17
20	et. seq.)
21	86. The Writer "Agreements" granting performance rights to ASCAP & BMI are "non-
22	exclusive" in one sense, meaning that the Publisher retains the right to license
23	performance rights directly, without utilizing the services of the PRO. However, in a
24	different sense, the Writer "Agreement" is exclusive, in that Songwriter may only belong
25	to one PRO at a time. Any and all songs registered with one PRO forever remain with that
26	PRO, regardless of whether Songwriter later changes his or her affiliation.
27	87. On June 4, 1999, Baker signed the BMI standard Writer "Agreement" (hereafter the
28	"BMI-Baker Writer 'Agreement'"), attached to this Complaint at EXHIBIT "B," p. 12-15.
	17 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

1 88. At paragraph 13 ("Power of Attorney clause"), the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement"
 2 states that:

2	states that.
3	You make, constitute and appoint us, or our nominee, your true and lawful
4	attorney, irrevocably during the Period, in our name or that of our nominee, or in your name, or otherwise, in our sole judgment, to do all
5	acts, take all proceedings, execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all instruments, papers, documents, process or pleadings that, in our sole
6	judgment, may be necessary, proper or expedient to restrain infringement of and/or to enforce and protect the rights granted by you hereunder, and
7 8	to recover damages in respect to or for the infringement or other violation of said rights, and in our sole judgment to join you and/or others in whose
9	names the copyrights to any of the Works may stand.
10	EXHIBIT "B," p. 14
10	89. The current ASCAP Writer "Agreement" has a similar Power of Attorney clause.
12	See EXHIBIT "Q," p. 90, Item 5.
12	90. At paragraph 17 ("Right to Payment of Money") the BMI-Baker Writer
13	"Agreement" states:
15	You acknowledge that the rights obtained by you pursuant to this
16	agreement constitute rights to payment of money and that during the Period we shall hold title to the performing rights granted to us hereunder.
17	EXHIBIT "B," p. 15
18	91. At paragraph 18 ("Promise to Pay") the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" states:
19	We agree to distribute to you royalties and monies collected by us
20	pursuant to the authorization granted in subparagraph 18(a), pursuant to our then prevailing practices, including deduction of our expenses therefor.
21	EXHIBIT "B," p. 15
22	92. Likewise, the current ASCAP Writer "Agreement" promises:
23	a fair, just and equitable distribution of royalties among the membership.
24	EXHIBIT "Q," p. 90, Item 8.
25	93. At paragraph 19, ("Mandatory Arbitration Clause") the BMI-Baker Writer
26	"Agreement" states:
27	All disputes of any kind, nature or description arising in connection with
28	the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be submitted to the
	18 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

American Arbitration Association in New York, New York, for arbitration under its then prevailing rules.

EXHIBIT "B," p. 15

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3 94. The ASCAP Writer "Agreement" does not contain a Mandatory Arbitration Clause. 4 The standard BMI Writer "Agreement" appears to have changed since 1999 when 95. 5 Baker signed his. On February 4, 2020, Baker downloaded from the BMI website its 6 "Writer Kit," which contains the current standard "agreement" ("New Writer 7 'Agreement'") plus instructions on how to fill out the forms. The New Writer 8 "Agreement" is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "C," pp. 16-23. 9 In many respects, the new Writer "Agreement" is identical to the 1999 version that 96. 10 Baker signed. For example, the "Power of Attorney" language in paragraph 13 of the 11 BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" is found at paragraph 15 of the New Writer 12 "Agreement"; EXHIBIT "C," p. 21; the "Right to Payment" language in paragraph 17 of 13 the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" is now present in paragraph 19 of the New Writer 14 "Agreement," Id, p. 22; the "Promise to Pay" language in paragraph 18 of the BMI-Baker 15 Writer "Agreement" is now found at paragraph 20 of the New Writer "Agreement," Id, p. 16 22; and the Mandatory Arbitration Clause at paragraph 19 of the BMI-Baker Writer 17 "Agreement" is now found at paragraph 21 of the New Writer "Agreement," Id, p. 22. 18 However, the New BMI Writer "Agreement" contains a significant difference as 97. 19 compared to the BMI Writer "Agreement" Baker signed, as paragraph 24 of the current 20version ("No Fiduciary Duty") states: 21 You acknowledge that the relationship between you and us which is 22 created by this agreement is one of ordinary contracting parties and is not intended to be a fiduciary relationship with respect to any of the rights or 23 obligations hereunder.

<sup>24</sup> EXHIBIT "C," p. 22

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<sup>25</sup>
<sup>98.</sup> The "No Fiduciary Duty" language is not present in the BMI-Baker Writer
"Agreement." On information and belief, both ASCAP & BMI disclaim owing a fiduciary
<sup>27</sup>
<sup>27</sup> duty to Songwriters.

### K. Background on Class Representative Alexander Baker

99. Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker ("Baker") is a songwriter, lyricist and music
composer. Primarily a pianist and keyboard player, Baker also sings, plays guitar and
percussion instruments. Baker can improvise music and spontaneously compose music, to
specifications, "at the drop of a hat." This ability allowed Baker to be a very prolific
composer.

7 100. In 1990, Baker signed a Writer "Agreement" with ASCAP.

8 101. In 1993 Baker met Clair Marlo. Baker and Marlo formed a business partnership

9 called "Invisible Hand Productions" for the purpose of writing, producing and

10 commercially exploiting music.

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11 102. By 1994, along with his writing partner Marlo, Baker was earning ASCAP

12 Performance Royalties for original music composed for the Muzak background music

13 service. At that time, Baker was informed by Marlo (also an ASCAP writer) and informed

14 by their then-publisher Dean Whitney (DeWhit Music Publishing Company, ASCAP) that

15 BMI *did not collect* from Muzak.

16 103. In 1995 Baker and Marlo were legally married.

17 104. By 1996, Baker and Marlo began working on a "work-for-hire" basis for FirstCom
18 Music, writing and producing collections of music for use on TV shows. FirstCom had
19 both ASCAP & BMI publishing companies.

20 105. Both Baker and Marlo began earning ASCAP Performance Royalties for music
21 licensed by FirstCom to TV shows. However, in or about 1999, Baker and Marlo were
22 informed that, as to Performance Royalties for music on TV shows, BMI paid significantly
23 more than ASCAP.

24 106. On June 4, 1999, Baker resigned from ASCAP and signed with BMI (hereafter the

<sup>25</sup> "BMI-Baker Writer 'Agreement'"), attached to this Complaint at EXHIBIT "B," p. 12-15.

26 107. For a period of about 2 years, 1999 - 2001, Baker was a BMI writer while Marlo

27 remained an ASCAP writer. Since there were numerous co-written songs earning

28 Performance Royalties, Marlo (who handled the business) compared Performance

1	Royalties paid by ASCAP to those paid by BMI for the same performances. It was
2	confirmed that – at least regarding such production music - BMI pays significantly more
3	for TV show usage than does ASCAP.
4	108. In or about 2001, Clair Marlo resigned ASCAP and also became a BMI writer.
5	109. In the ensuing 2 decades, Baker had literally thousands of performances of his
6	music on TV. Baker never failed to earn royalties in any quarterly distribution since. By
7	the year 2010, Baker's annual BMI royalties were over \$100,000 per year.
8	110. Since 2010, Baker's royalties have gradually tapered off, and currently earn about
9	\$40,000 per year.
10	IX. CAUSES OF ACTION IN CLASS ACTION CASE
11	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
12	Declaratory Judgment – 28 U.S.C. § 2201
13	BMI Mandatory Arbitration Clause is Void and Unenforceable Coercion / Economic Duress
14	(Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. BMI)
15	111. Class Action Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference all facts stated
16	above.
17	112. Each BMI Songwriter undisputedly signed a document titled "Writer Agreement"
18	with BMI, which document undisputedly contains a Mandatory Arbitration Clause, the
19	language of which undisputedly purports to mandate arbitration for any dispute arising
20	from the collection and distribution of performance royalties. Each member of the
21	Assignee Class undisputedly assigned the rights to collect royalties under said Writer
22	"Agreement."
23	113. An actual controversy has arisen between Class Action Plaintiffs and BMI.
24	Plaintiffs believe BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause is void and unenforceable because
25	it was signed under coercion. BMI believe the Arbitration Clause is an enforceable
26	agreement.
27	114. Songwriters will be deemed to have been coerced into signing the BMI Writer
28	"Agreement" if they can prove all of the following. (1) That BMI used a wrongful act or
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1 wrongful threat to pressure Songwriters into consenting to the contract; (2) that a 2 reasonable person in Songwriter's position would have believed that they had no 3 reasonable alternative except to consent to the BMI Writer "Agreement"; and (3) that 4 Songwriter would not have consented to the contract without the wrongful act or wrongful 5 threat. (See CACI Jury Instructions, No. 333) 115. At paragraph 19, ("Mandatory Arbitration Clause") the BMI Writer "Agreement" 6 7 states: All disputes of any kind, nature or description arising in connection with 8 the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be submitted to the 9 American Arbitration Association in New York, New York, for arbitration under its then prevailing rules. 10 Applicable case law instructs us that economic duress has taken place when "a 116. 11 reasonably prudent person subject to [economic coercion] may have no reasonable 12 alternative but to succumb when the only other alternative is bankruptcy or financial ruin." 13 (Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1155, 204 Cal. Rptr. 14 86, 87 (1984), and see also Frank Culver Elec., Inc. v. Jorgenson, 136 Ariz. 76, 77-78, 15 664 P.2d 226, 227-28 (App. 1983)) 16

117. If Songwriter's Publisher is a BMI Publisher, then Songwriter does not have the
option of joining ASCAP. Even if Songwriter is an ASCAP writer, if Songwriter seeks to
obtain proper Performance Royalties for performances on TV shows, Songwriter must
resign ASCAP and join BMI as Alexander Baker did in 1999, or else suffer very
significant financial losses.

118. BMI's conduct clearly meets the standard for economic duress, because a typical
BMI Songwriter seeking Performance Royalties for music on TV shows, e.g. Alexander
Baker, has no other method to obtain proper Performance Royalty money besides signing
BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause.

119. Such a loss of Performance Royalties is reasonably expected to lead to financial ruin
for a typical Songwriter, because a typical Songwriter works on a "work-for-hire" basis, or
otherwise surrenders copyright ownership. As set forth in the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §

1 101 et. seq.), under a "work-for-hire," the songwriter gives copyright ownership – and all 2 associated royalty rights - to the Publisher. The only royalty right remaining to the 3 songwriter under a work-for-hire is the right to collect Performance Royalties. 4 120. Thus, to earn a living, a BMI Songwriter has no reasonable alternative to BMI. It is either sign BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause, or face economic ruin. This is more than 5 theory or speculation. After collecting royalties upwards of \$1 million over the years, 6 7 Class Representatives Alexander Baker and Adam Bravery LLC are now faced with 8 economic ruin, as a direct and proximate consequence of BMI's unjustified royalty 9 stoppage. Had Baker never signed the Mandatory Arbitration Clause in the first place, he 10 could not possibly have ever received the money he did and would have been 11 economically ruined long ago. 12 121. Therefore, the Court should find that Songwriter's signature on BMI's Mandatory 13 Arbitration Clause was obtained by the coercion of economic duress, and on that basis 14 declare the BMI Mandatory Arbitration Clause null, void and unenforceable. 15 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION** Declaratory Judgment - 28 U.S.C. § 2201 16 ASCAP & BMI and Their Officials are Government Actors for § 1983 Purposes 17 (Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. ASCAP & BMI) 18 122. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged above. 19 123. An actual controversy has arisen, as Songwriters and their Assignees believe that 20 ASCAP & BMI and their Officials are State Actors for civil rights purposes, while 21 ASCAP & BMI maintain that they are private not-for-profit organizations. 22 124. ASCAP & BMI are each Delaware not-for-profit corporations. ASCAP & BMI and 23 its officers are nominally private actors. 24 125. However, ASCAP & BMI and their officers must be held to be government actors 25 for Section 1983 purposes, under the State Compulsion Test. 26 126. Under the State Compulsion Test, a private actor will be treated as a government 27 official for Section 1983 purposes when a state exercises such coercive power that the 28 "choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 23 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

1004 (1982) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson, 419 1 2 U.S. at 357; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Moose Lodge No. 107 3 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173(1965)). 4 127. The State Compulsion Test is met when a state encourages or coerces a private 5 party to engage in the challenged conduct. See Paul C. McCaffrey, Note, "Playing Fair: Why the United States Anti-Doping Agency's Performance-Enhanced Adjudications 6 7 Should be Treated as State Action," 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 645, 664 (2006). 8 128. Here, the Consent Decrees coerce both ASCAP & BMI to collect royalties for "any 9 writer" with at least one published song, thus creating a federal entitlement and federal 10 right. The choice in law is that of the United States of America, not of ASCAP & BMI. ASCAP & BMI have no choice in the matter. 11 12 129. The Ninth Circuit has explained: 13 The state compulsion test asks whether a private actor who violates someone's constitutional rights under the "compulsion" or framework of a 14 state law or a state custom having force of law offends the Fourteenth Amendment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 169-170, 15 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. 16 Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improv. & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 17 1989) 18 19 In addition to mandating membership and the collection of Performance Royalties, 130. 20 the BMI Consent Decree also coerces BMI to deprive its members of the Seventh 21 Amendment right to jury trial by mandating arbitration. Again, the choice in law is that of 22 the United States of America, not of BMI. 23 131. Finding State compulsion is based on the degree of the state's influence over the 24 private actor and, therefore, its potential application is much broader than, for example, the 25 Public Function Test. As Justice Souter noted in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee 26 Secondary School Athletic Association, coercion and encouragement refer to the "kinds of 27 facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private action as public instead.' 28 Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,303 (2001).

In light of the "any writer" mandate, both Consent Decrees' degree of influence 1 132. 2 over ASCAP & BMI is total, as it states essentially all the significant terms under which 3 ASCAP & BMI is and is not allowed to operate. 133. Violations of the Consent Decree would subject ASCAP & BMI to punishment 4 5 under the law. The Consent Decree compels ASCAP & BMI to act in certain ways, and to refrain from acting in other ways, and has all the force and power of federal statutory law. 6 7 134. Thus, the mandates of the Consent Decrees satisfy the State Compulsion Test. 8 135. Moreover, the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq) mentions ASCAP & BMI by 9 *name* in its definition section. Other than the Copyright Act, Plaintiffs are not aware of any 10 other statutes, federal or state, that mention any private entities, whether for-profit or notfor-profit. 11 12 136. Therefore, the Court should issue a Declaratory Judgment that, for Section 1983 purposes, ASCAP & BMI and its officials are State Actors. 13 14 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 Declaratory Judgment **BMI Consent Decree Arbitration Mandate and BMI Arbitration Clause** 16 Violate Right to Petition and Right to Jury Trial Without Due Process 17 (Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. BMI) 18 137. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged above. 19 138. An actual controversy has arisen between Class Action Plaintiffs and BMI. Acting 20 under color of the Consent Decree, BMI has a policy and custom of Mandatory 21 Arbitration. Plaintiffs believe BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause is unconstitutional 22 because it deprives Plaintiffs of the rights to petition and to a jury trial without the due 23 process promised in the Fifth Amendment. BMI believes its Mandatory Arbitration Clause 24 is an enforceable agreement, and that Songwriters voluntarily waived their constitutional 25 rights. 26 139. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part: Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right ... to petition the 27 Government for a redress of grievances. 28 25 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1	140. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
2	In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
3	twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
4	States, than according to the rules of the common law.
5	The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part:
6	No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
7	Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons from the mistaken or
8	unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. (Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259
9	(1978)). Thus, the required elements of due process are those that "minimize substantively
10	unfair or mistaken deprivations" by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a
11	State Actor proposes to deprive them of protected interests. (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
12	67, 81 (1972)).
13	141. In its Section VII (C), the Consent Decree states:
14	"[BMI] shall include in all contracts which it tenders to writers, publishers
15	and music users relating to the licensing of performance rights a clause requiring the parties to submit to arbitration in the City, County and State
16	of New York under the then prevailing rules of the American Arbitration Association, all disputes of any kind, nature or description in connection
17	with the terms and conditions of such contracts or arising out of the
18	performance thereof or based upon an alleged breach thereof" 142. At paragraph 19, ("Mandatory Arbitration Clause") the BMI-Baker Writer
19 20	"Agreement" states:
20	All disputes of any kind, nature or description arising in connection with
21	the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be submitted to the
22	American Arbitration Association in New York, New York, for arbitration under its then prevailing rules.
23	143. Mandating arbitration is, by definition, a prior restraint of the right the petition and
24	of the right to a jury trial. It has long been established that a prior restraint comes to the
25 26	Court "with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." ( <i>Bantam Books v.</i>
26	Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)). Procter & Gamble
27	Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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26 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

144. Thus, the Court should find that the burden of proof shifts to BMI to demonstrate
 the constitutional validity of its Mandatory Arbitration Clause, and that such is a heavy
 burden.

4 145. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's *Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co.*, 486 U.S. 750,
5 752, 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1988) ("Lakewood"), the Eleventh Circuit recently explained
6 the impermissible nature of unbridled discretion in issuing a prior restraint, which explains
7 why BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause must be struck down:

- Perhaps the plainest example of an unconstitutional grant of unbridled discretion is a law that gives a government official power to [allow or disallow speech] but that provides no standards by which the official's decision must be guided.
  - (Barrett v. Walker Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017))

If we look to the plain language of the BMI Consent Decree, which has all the force of federal statutory law, there is no standard by which BMI has any discretion as to when the songwriter's First Amendment right to petition may or may not be restrained. Rather, the Songwriter's constitutional rights are simply done away with. Thus, BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause is worse than "unbridled discretion" to destroy rights, it is the ex ante wholesale destruction of rights, with no exercise of discretion required.

146. The present deprivation of Class Action Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to petition
and to a jury trial must be considered unfair and/or mistaken, because the Consent Decree
and BMI's Mandatory Arbitration Clause purports to ex ante deny Songwriters the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, prior to the songwriter even contemplating such a thing as
performance royalties. Indeed, the deprivation of rights occurred prior to most Songwriters
alive today having even been born.

<sup>25</sup>
<sup>26</sup>
<sup>27</sup>
<sup>147.</sup> "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
<sup>which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
<sup>circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
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an opportunity to present their objections. (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 1 2 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) 3 148. No Songwriter here was party to the BMI Consent Decree, thus was not apprised of the pendency of the action and not afforded any opportunity to present objections. There 4 5 was no notice to the Songwriters that their rights to petition and to a jury trial were at stake, or that by executing the Consent Decree the right to petition and to a jury trial 6 7 would forever be lost. Defendants cannot even reasonably argue that Plaintiffs were 8 afforded due process, let alone could it be proven. 9 149. Therefore, the Court should issue a Declaratory Judgment striking BMI's 10 Mandatory Arbitration Clause as unconstitutional. The Court should find that BMI's 11 Mandatory Arbitration Clause, and the Consent Decree arbitration mandate underlying it, 12 constitute an impermissible prior restraint of the First Amendment right to petition, and of 13 the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and that such prior restraint was imposed 14 upon Plaintiffs without affording them the substantive and procedural due process 15 guaranteed by the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendment. 16 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Judgment - 28 U.S.C. § 2201 17 **Collecting Performance Royalties is a Federal Right** 18 **Regardless of Whether ASCAP & BMI Are State Actors** 19 (Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. ASCAP & BMI) 20 Class Action Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged 150. 21 above. 22 151. And actual controversy has arisen, as Songwriters and their Assignees believe that 23 collecting Performance Royalties is a federally-protected statutory right, whereas ASCAP 24 & BMI believe the collecting Performance Royalties is a contractual right only. 25 The Consent Decree has all the force and power of federal statutory law. At Article 152. 26 V (A) ("No Right to Refuse"), the BMI Consent Decree states, in relevant part: 27 "[BMI] shall not refuse to enter into a contract providing for the licensing by [BMI] of performance rights with any writer who shall have had at 28 28 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1	least one copyrighted musical composition of his writing commercially
2	published or recorded"
3	See EXHIBIT "A," p. 2, emphasis added.
4	153. Likewise, at Article XI, A(1), the ASCAP Consent Decree States:
5	ASCAP is hereby ordered and directed to admit to membership, non- participating or otherwise, <i>any writer</i> who shall have had at least one work
6	regularly published, whether or not performance of the work has been recorded in an ASCAP survey.
7	See EXHIBIT "R," p. 98, emphasis added.
8	154. Clearly the United States intended the Consent Decrees to operate as federal law,
9	and to establish a federal entitlement to collect performance royalties. Otherwise, the
10	United States would not have mandated that ASCAP & BMI collect and distribute
11	royalties to "any writer."
12	155. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a federal entitlement creates a federal
13	right. For example, a person's entitlement to welfare benefits under the federal Social
14	Security Act is a federal right that can be protected by section 1983. See Maine v.
15	Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980) ("Thiboutot").
16	156. In <i>Thiboutot, supra,</i> the Supreme Court contended with the issue of the scope of
17	coverage under Section 1983. The Court began by quoting the text from 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
18	Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
19	custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
20	jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution <i>and laws</i> , shall be liable to the
21	party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
22	for redress."
23	<i>Thiboutot, supra,</i> at 2504, emphasis in original. 157. The Supreme Court then explained the large applicability of Section 1983:
24	
25	Even were the language [of Section 1983] ambiguous, however, any doubt as to its meaning has been resolved by our several cases suggesting,
26	explicitly or implicitly, the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. <i>Rosado v. Wyman</i> , 397
27	U.S. 397 (1970), for example, "held that suits in federal court under §
28	1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social
	29 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

1	Security Act on the part of participating States." Edelman v. Jordan, 415
2	U.S. 651, 675 (1974). <i>Monell v. New York</i> City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that
3	municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, reasoned that "there can be no
4	doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of
5	federally protected rights." Similarly, <i>Owen v. City of Independence</i> , 445
	U.S. 622, 649 (1980), in holding that the common-law immunity for discretionary functions provided no basis for according municipalities a
6	discretionary functions provided no basis for according municipalities a good-faith immunity under § 1983, noted that a court "looks only to
7	whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the Federal
8	Constitution and statutes." <i>Mitchum v. Foster</i> , 407 U.S. 225, 240, n. 30 (1972), and <i>Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.</i> , 405 U.S. 538, 543, n. 7
9	(1972), noted that § 1983's predecessor "was enlarged to provide
10	protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law." <i>Greenwood v. Peacock</i> , 384 U.S. 808, 829-830 (1966), observed that
11	under § 1983 state "officers may be made to respond in damages not only
12	for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well."
13	Thiboutot, supra, at 2504-05
14	158. Thus, the Court must find that the Consent Decree mandate that ASCAP & BMI
15	collect and pay performance royalties to "any writer" creates a federal right in the
16	Songwriter.
17	159. Because there is no language prohibiting assignment of rights to collect royalties,
18	and indeed ASCAP & BMI have a standard form to facilitate assignment of royalties, the
19	federal right to receive performance royalties must extend to Assignees.
20	160. Therefore, the Court should issue a Declaratory Judgment that a songwriter with at
21	least one published musical composition of his or her writing has a federally protected
22	right to collect performance royalties, and that such federal right extends to assignees.
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	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1	FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2	Declaratory Judgment – 28 U.S.C. § 2201 ASCAP & BMI Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Writers and Their Assignees
3	Regardless of Whether ASCAP & BMI Are State Actors
4	(Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. ASCAP & BMI)
5	161. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged above.
6	162. An actual controversy has arisen between Class Action Plaintiffs and ASCAP &
7	BMI. Plaintiffs contend that ASCAP & BMI owes a fiduciary duty to all its Songwriter
8	members, and to their Assignees. ASCAP & BMI contend they do not owe any fiduciary
9	duty to its Songwriters or their Assignees.
10	The standard ASCAP & Writer "Agreement" explicitly makes the PRO Songwriter's "true
11	and lawful attorney." See ASCAP, EXHIBIT "Q," p. 90, Item 5; BMI EXHIBIT "C," p.
12	21, Item 15.
13	163. A true and lawful attorney is a fiduciary, by definition.
14	164. As the Courts have explained:
15	In determining whether one party owes a fiduciary duty to another, the courts focus on the substance of their relationship, not the labels they use.
16	
17	If the "overall purpose" of the parties' agreement is to engage one party to
18	act on the other's behalf, as agent, general contractual language purporting to "preclude [] the existence of an agency relationship" may be
19	disregarded. <i>Samba Enterprises</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23393, 2009 WL 705537, at *7-8 (where purpose of agreement was "to engage Samba to act
20	on iMesh's behalf" and where Samba held itself out as iMesh's "agent" to
21	third parties, "Samba was iMesh's agent," and "owed iMesh fiduciary duties under New York law, notwithstanding clause in contract reciting
22	that it was "not intended to create a 'partnership, franchise, joint venture,
23	agency, or employment relationship.""); see also <i>Veleron Holding, B.V. v.</i> <i>Morgan Stanley</i> , 117 F. Supp. 3d 404, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (where
24	substance of parties' relationship was that of agent to principal, it was "of
25	little consequence that the [contract] declares Morgan Stanley to be 'acting as an independent contractor'''). "It is the character and circumstances
26	surrounding the relationship that determine the duty of the agent." Impax
27	<i>Media, Inc. v. Ne. Advert. Corp.</i> , 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139972, 2018 WL 3962841, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018).
28	

Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. Brannan, No. 18-CV-8231 (AT) (BCM), 2020 U.S. Dist.
 LEXIS 14043, at \*56-57 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020)

3 165. Regardless of labels, the responsibility of ASCAP & BMI are those of a collection
agent, and closely akin to those of an escrow officer: ASCAP & BMI are obligated to
collect Performance Royalty monies due to all Songwriters (blanket license fees), to hold
that money for some period of time, to deduct its own expenses, then calculate the amount
due to each Songwriter, then to pay. Agents and escrow officers are fiduciaries, by
definition.

9 166. To determine if a fiduciary relationship exists, "New York law inquires whether one 10 person has reposed trust or confidence in the integrity and fidelity of another who thereby 11 gains a resulting superiority or influence over the first." (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. 12 of Am. v. Wometco Ent., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 344, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)) Thus, a fiduciary 13 duty exists where one assumes control and responsibility over another, or where one has a 14 duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters 15 connected with his undertaking. (Abercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243, 274 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))

167. Songwriter has reposed trust and confidence in the integrity of ASCAP & BMI, as
over \$ 2 billion annually is collected, and is supposed to be distributed fairly and
accurately among over 1 million Songwriters, according to a proscribed formula. Thus,
ASCAP & BMI's responsibilities are very closely akin to those of a trustee obligated to
make regular distributions to a number of similarly-situated beneficiaries. A trustee is a
fiduciary, by definition.

168. Because they are entrusted to collect, hold and fairly distribute Songwriters' money,
the relationship between ASCAP & BMI and the Songwriter is the very *essence* of a
fiduciary relationship.

26 169. Therefore the Court should issue a Declaratory Judgment finding a fiduciary
27 relationship between a Songwriter, on the one hand, and ASCAP & BMI on the other.
28 This fiduciary relationship must extend to any subsequent assignees of rights to receive

royalty money. The Court should explicitly define that a fiduciary duty includes the right
 to conduct an audit of ASCAP & BMI, and to make public the *entirety* of the formula by
 which royalties are allocated amongst Songwriters.

4	SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
5	Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Songwriter Class and Assignee Class v. ASCAP & BMI)
6	170. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged above.
7 8	171. ASCAP & BMI owe Songwriters a fiduciary duty. Supra.
8 9	172. ASCAP & BMI collect over \$ 2 billion per year in blanket license fees.
9 10	173. ASCAP & BMI promise to distribute Performance Royalties among Songwriters
11	according to a formula that contains ambiguous and subjective terms such as "credit
12	value." As far as Songwriters can tell, ASCAP & BMI are free to numerically manipulate
12	such ambiguous terms to obtain essentially any result.
13	174. Even to the extent that the royalty calculation formula is objective, Songwriters have
15	no reason to believe that the Performance Royalty money is distributed according to the
16	formula.
17	175. Songwriters believe, and on that basis allege, that ASCAP & BMI manipulate the
18	terms of the formula, or otherwise disobey the formula, on an ad hoc basis so as to cheat
19	Songwriters from the full amount of Performance Royalties due to them, while improperly
20	transferring undue amounts of money to society officers and others.
20	176. Songwriters believe, and on that basis allege, that ASCAP & BMI significantly
22	underpay Songwriters in such amount as proven at trial.
22	X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON CLASS ACTION CLAIMS
24	177. Wherefore, Class Action Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
25	A. Declaratory Relief
26	For a Declaratory Judgment that the Mandatory Arbitration Clause within the Writer
27	"Agreement" of ASCAP & BMI is void for economic duress;
28	

33 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT For a Declaratory Judgment that, for purposes of Section 1983 litigation, ASCAP &
 BMI is a government entity and its officials are government actors;

For a Declaratory Judgment that the Arbitration Mandate in the Consent Decree and in
the standard ASCAP & BMI Writer "Agreement" violates the First Amendment right to
petition and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial;

For a Declaratory Judgment that any songwriter with at least one song published has a
federally-protected right to collect Performance Royalties, and that such federal right is
assignable; and

9 For Declaratory Judgment that ASCAP & BMI owes Songwriters and their Assignees
10 a fiduciary duty, with rights to audit;

11

#### B. <u>Accounting</u>

For a full accounting of revenues received, application of royalty formula, and
 distribution of Performance Royalties, from the most recent year and as far back in time as
 the Court deems reasonable;

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#### C. Damages

For monetary damages in an amount necessary to make Songwriters whole, according to proof;

#### D. Injunctive Relief

For a permanent injunction prohibiting ASCAP & BMI from disclaiming a fiduciary
 duty to its Songwriter members and their Assignees;

For a permanent injunction prohibiting BMI from compelling arbitration as a
 precondition of collecting Performance Royalties for Songwriters;

#### 24 E. <u>Costs and Fees</u>

25 For the cost of the suit plus pre-judgment interest;

26 For attorney fees as allowed by statute and/or by contract; and

- For any other such relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
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#### FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

#### 1 XI. DEMAND FOR COURT TRIAL AND JURY TRIAL ON CLASS 2 **ACTION CLAIMS**

3 Class Action Plaintiffs hereby demand a Court trial on claims 1-5, and a Jury Trial 178. on Claim 6. 4

5 XII. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE UNDERLYING CASE AGAINST BMI 6 The Baker-Marlo Divorce, Stipulation and Royalty Order Α.

179. In June 2014, Alexander Baker ("Baker") filed for divorce from his wife and business partner Clair Marlo ("Marlo"). The divorce proceeding is Los Angeles Superior Court, Case. No. LD068701 ("Baker Family Law Case").

180. On July 7, 2016, Baker and Marlo stipulated and the Family Court ordered that 11 music royalties be equalized between them for all songs created after January 11, 1995 12 (the date of marriage) and before April 7 2015 (putative date of separation), (Royalty 13 Reallocation Order). The Family Court Stipulation and Order is attached to the Complaint 14 as EXHIBIT "D," pp. 25-27. 15

To effectuate the Royalty Reallocation Order, Baker and Marlo were instructed to 181. 16 draft and submit to all royalty-paying entities a Letter of Direction, instructing each entity 17 to reallocate the royalties. Baker and Marlo quickly realized that determining the date of 18 creation for each of thousands of songs was impossible, and decided to instead use date of registration, which is a record known to be kept by all royalty-paying entities. Reasoning that it typically takes 4-6 weeks for a song to be registered after submitting that song to the record company, Baker and Marlo agreed to use the date of June 1, 2015 as the cutoff date for inclusion in the royalty reallocation.

182. On July 18, 2016, Baker and Marlo jointly signed and mailed Letters of Direction to royalty-paying entities, including ASCAP & BMI, instructing them to equalize the music royalties on all music registered after January 11, 1995 and before June 1, 2015. See EXHIBIT "E," p. 29.

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183. BMI did comply with the Letter of Direction, and did reallocate the royalties as
 equal between Baker and Marlo. Beginning with the September 2016 distribution, and
 continuing unabated until March of 2020, BMI made equal payments to Baker and Marlo.
 184. ASCAP did <u>not</u> comply with the Letter of Direction.

5

#### B. Baker's Assignment of BMI Royalties to the LLC

<sup>6</sup> 185. In or about September 2016, on the advice of his tax preparer, Baker formed Write
<sup>7</sup> Hear, LLC, a single-member Limited Liability Company. The purpose of Write Hear,
<sup>8</sup> LLC was to write, produce and commercially exploit music, and to obtain a more
<sup>9</sup> favorable tax treatment. Baker timely notified Marlo on the formation of Write Hear LLC
<sup>10</sup> within the Family Court disclosure process.

11 186. On April 12, 2017, on advice of his tax preparer, Baker assigned his BMI royalty
 12 stream to Write Hear, LLC, which company paid Baker a salary. Baker used BMI's
 13 standard assignment form for the assignment. Baker timely notified Marlo about the
 14 assignment of royalties to Write Hear LLC within the Family Court disclosure process.
 15 See EXHIBIT "F" attached hereto.

<sup>16</sup>
<sup>17</sup>
<sup>187.</sup> Beginning with the June 2017 distribution, BMI paid Performance Royalties to
<sup>17</sup>
<sup>17</sup> Write Hear LLC.

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In or about April 2018, Baker persuaded two other individuals – Lisa Margulies and
 Chris Gebbia – to partner with him in the creation of the Adam Bravery show. Margulies
 had a financial background and also had connections in the animation world. Gebbia had a
 music background and was willing to put in long hours of creative work.

In May of 2018, Baker and his two partners formed Adam Bravery, LLC, an
 Arizona Limited Liability Company. Prior to dissolving Write Hear LLC, all assets of

Write Hear LLC, including equipment and numerous work-for-hire contracts, were
 assigned from Write Hear LLC to Adam Bravery LLC.

3 191. On July 9, 2018, Baker's BMI royalties were assigned from Write Hear LLC to
4 Adam Bravery LLC. The same standard BMI royalty assignment form was used for the
5 assignment as before. Baker timely notified Marlo regarding the assignment of assets,
6 including the assignment of royalties, from Write Hear LLC to Adam Bravery LLC within
7 the Family Court disclosure process. See EXHIBIT "G."

8 192. Beginning with the September 2018 distribution, BMI paid Adam Bravery, LLC.

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### C. <u>BMI and Erika Stallings Fabricate a False "Dispute" and Repeatedly</u> <u>Threaten to Stop Paying Royalties</u>

11 193. In the week prior to July 16, 2019, Marlo's attorneys Mike DiNardo and Joe Yanny
12 contacted Erika Stallings and devised a plan to inflict emotional and financial distress
13 upon Baker, for the purpose of defeating him in court. Under the plan, BMI would
14 withhold paying Baker's share of royalties to Adam Bravery LLC, while continuing to pay
15 Marlo's share of the royalties to Marlo.

16 194. Plaintiffs have no direct knowledge of any bribes or kickbacks paid to Erika

17 Stallings. However, insofar as BMI has certainly stopped paying royalties without legal

18 justification, and Erika Stallings has certainly concocted a false pretext on which to stop

19 paying, it is a reasonable inference that, in exchange for cooperation, Marlo or someone

20 pays Erika Stallings money as a bribe or kickback, in an amount and by methods to be
21 proven to the jury at trial.

22 195. At all relevant times, Defendants knew that the BMI royalties are crucial to the
23 operation of Adam Bravery LLC, including the payment of Baker's salary, his source of
24 livelihood.

25 196. On July 16, 2019, BMI counsel Erika Stallings emailed Baker stating:

I am writing with respect to the July 7, 2016 order from the Superior Court of California regarding the terms of your divorce with Clair Marlo.
 Pursuant to that order, all works created between November 11, 1995 [sic] through April 7, 2015 are to be split 50/50 and both parties agreed to not

#### 37 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

to make any deals with any third parties regarding the aforementioned 1 works. You assigned your share of the works [sic] to Adam Bravery LLC 2 which is owned by you and three other individuals [sic] which is seemingly in violation of the terms of the order. Please advise as to your 3 position. If you have legal counsel in this matter please forward me their 4 contact information. EXHIBIT "H," p. 39 5 197. Besides getting the date wrong (begin date of royalty reallocation is January 11, 6 7 1995, not November 11, 1995), and the number of partners wrong (Baker has two other 8 partners, not three), the July 16, 2019 BMI email was false in one very important, material 9 respect: No "share of the works" was assigned. 10 198. A musical "work" is defined in the Copyright act, and refers to the ownership of copyright of a musical composition. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. 11 ASCAP defines "work" in the text of its Writer "Agreement": 199. 12 13 "Musical Works" Defined. The phrase "musical works" shall be construed to mean musical compositions and dramatico-musical 14 compositions, the words and music there of, and the respective arrangements thereof, and the selections therefrom. 15 EXHIBIT "Q," p. 90, Item 10 16 The Royalty Reallocation Order states that: 200. 17 Neither party shall sell, transfer, assign, or make any deal whatsoever with 18 any third party for any work created 1-11-95 through 4-7-15 without the written consent of the other party or court order. 19 EXHIBIT "D," pp. 25-26, bolding added. 20 201. Under the copyright act, it is valid to assign works, i.e. to assign copyright 21 ownership. Indeed, on the vast majority of royalty-earning musical compositions at issue 2.2 between Baker and Marlo, the copyright is not owned by Baker or Marlo, rather it is 23 owned by a third-party record company. 24 At no time did Baker - whether acting as an individual or on behalf of any LLC -202. 25 ever sell, transfer, assign or make any deal whatsoever with any third party for any work 26 created 1-11-95 through 4-7-2015. The ownership of all works at issue is identical now as 27 before. 28 38

203. What Baker did do was assign his own share of the court-equalized Performance
 Royalty money to pay into a different bank account. Before, Baker's royalties paid into
 Baker's personal bank account. After the first assignment, the royalties paid into the Write
 Hear LLC bank account. After the July 2018 assignment, the royalties paid into the Adam
 Bravery LLC bank account. None of these assignments affected Marlo in any way, shape
 or form.

7 204. A Performance Royalty is not a work.

8 205. A work is not a Performance Royalty.

9 206. In July 2019, and at all relevant times, BMI and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings

10 and each of them understood and appreciated the distinction between "work" and

11 "royalty." BMI and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings and each of them knew that the

12 statement "You assigned your share of the works to Adam Bravery LLC..." was false.

13 207. The assignments of royalties from Baker to Write Hear LLC, and from Write Hear

14 LLC to Adam Bravery LLC did not affect Marlo in any way, nor did it affect the Family

15 Court's ability to reallocate the royalties again, should it choose to do so. Regardless of

16 who BMI is paying Baker's royalties to, any future reallocation would take place at BMI,

17 just as it did in July 2016 when the royalties were reallocated the first time.

18 208. On August 21, 2019, Baker and Marlo received a letter from BMI counsel Erika

19 Stallings entitled "Broadcast Music Inc. Royalties," attached hereto as EXHIBIT "I," p.

20 41. This letter begins by falsely stating:

BMI was recently made aware of a July 7, 2016 order issued by the
 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (the "Order") relating to musical works written during your marriage.

<sup>23</sup> EXHIBIT "I," p. 41.

 $24 \parallel 209$ . In fact, BMI was aware of the Order in July 2016, because the Letter of Direction,

<sup>25</sup> which BMI undisputedly complied with, begins with "Pursuant to July 7, 2016 Orders of

<sup>26</sup> the Court in Los Angeles Superior Court case LD068701..." See EXHIBIT E, p. 29.

 $27 \parallel 210$ . BMI's August 21, 2019 letter is also deceptive in that it does not refer to a royalty

<sup>28</sup> reallocation, but rather to an order "relating to musical works." EXHIBIT "I," p. 41. BMI

and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings and each of them were acting with malice in
willfully attempting to deceive, not only Baker, but also the Court, into falsely believing
that Baker assigned works, when Baker provably did no such thing.
211. The only reasonable inference from these facts is that BMI and Mike O'Neill and
Erika Stallings and each of them conspired and colluded with Marlo and her attorneys to
intentionally injure Baker and Adam Bravery LLC.
212. BMI's August 21, 2019 letter states:
In 2018, Mr. Baker transferred his BMI royalties for the above referenced works to Adam Bravery, LLC, a multimember LLC. Ms. Baker has alleged that this transfer is in violation of the Order. Mr. Baker's position is that the transfer was merely a transfer of payment of royalties, not a
transfer of the works and that no violation of the Order has occurred.
As this is now a disputed matter between the parties, please be advised that unless the parties come to a resolution of this matter by September 5,
2019, BMI will be placing the disputed royalties on withhold and will proceed with filing a third party interpleader action to deposit the royalties
with the court until the dispute is resolved.
EXHIBIT "I," p. 41.
213. BMI has a standard dispute hold policy, which states in relevant part that:
BMI will withhold royalties earned by any works that are the subject of litigation, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint as filed with the court and a written directive to BMI from the court requiring such withholding.
EXHIBIT "J," pp. 45-46
214. If there was any "dispute" as to the proper payee of Baker's BMI royalty stream,
that dispute would be between Baker and Adam Bravery LLC. Nothing Baker did affected
Marlo's royalties in any fashion.
215. As of September 2019, no complaint or any dispute had been filed by Marlo. Any
legitimate dispute hold would stop all royalties payable on the works, according to policy.
Here, BMI threatened to stop royalties paid to Baker, while continuing to pay Marlo. The
only reasonable inference from this fact is that BMI and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings
and each of them have the requisite state of mind to constitute actual malice toward
Plaintiffs.

216. By September 5, 2019, per BMI's request, Baker and Marlo did not reach any
 agreement about the supposed "dispute." Baker and Marlo could not possibly have
 reached any agreement about the supposed "dispute," because there was no dispute
 regarding the proper allocation and payment of BMI royalties on which Baker and Marlo
 could either agree or disagree.

6 217. The July 7, 2016 stipulation and order of the Family Court mandates that royalties
7 are 50-50 between Baker and Marlo, and, as of this writing (March 2021), no order has
8 superseded it.

9 218. Despite BMI's threat to withhold royalties, on September 20, 2019 BMI royalty
10 money was paid to Adam Bravery LLC.

11 219. On September 26, 2019, BMI outside counsel AnnMarie Mori sent Baker an email

12 asking him to stipulate that he and Marlo had a dispute, evidently in an effort to justify

13 BMI withholding the money. Baker responded, in relevant part, as follows:

14 I've never heard of stipulating to a dispute. That's agreeing to disagree, which is the same as no agreement. I don't understand why you are 15 representing [Marlo]. I do know that neither she nor any of her attorneys has ever once contacted me on this issue, so that's strange. I do not know 16 that [Marlo] disputes the propriety of the assignments, I only know that 17 Erica<sub>[sic]</sub> Stallings and AnnMarie Mori represent that [Marlo] disputes the assignments. I have never been served with any court document that 18 indicates that she disputes this, and, frankly Ms. Mori, I don't believe you. The reason I don't believe you is that you lied about being unaware of the 19 Order. Do you have any evidence that [Marlo] disputes the assignment? 20

EXHIBIT "K," p. 49.

220. BMI did not respond any further to the September 26, 2019 email thread.

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### D. Marlo Files Meritless Contempt Action Which is Dismissed

221. On October 2, 2019, by and through attorney Joe Yanny, Marlo filed a Contempt
action in Family Court, alleging that the assignment of royalties violated the court
order. EXHIBIT "L," pp. 52-69. According to plan, Marlo's Contempt action mimicked
BMI's false contention that Baker has assigned "copyright," or assigned "works," when in
fact Baker assigned royalties. Marlo sought severe penalties against Baker, alleging that:

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1 2	Each song is a separate violation of the Court Order. I ask the Court to impose fines of \$1,000 for each of the 3,000 plus songs that were
3	transferred, for Contempt of Court and to impose jail time to [Baker] of up to five days for each violation.
4	EXHIBIT "L," p. 69.
5	222. On October 7, 2019, BMI wrote a letter to Both Marlo and Baker, stating that they
6	had received notice of Marlo's Contempt action filed against Baker, and noting that said
7	Contempt action:
8	sets forth Ms. Marlo's contention that the that the 4/2017 assignment by Mr. Baker of his royalties to Write Hear, LLC, and the subsequent 7/2018
9	assignment of royalties by Mr. Baker on behalf of Write Hear, LLC to Adam Bravery LLC violated the July 2016 Court Order issued in the
10	marital dissolution action.
11	EXHIBIT M, p. 71.
12	223. BMI's October 7, 2019 letter also states:
13 14	Please be advised that BMI has placed a hold on the Assigned Royalties pending an order of the Court resolving the dispute or the written
	agreement of the parties as to the disposition of the Assigned Royalties.
15	EXHIBIT M, p. 71.
16	224. Immediately thereafter, on or about October 10, 2019, the other members of Adam
17	Bravery LLC fired Baker from his full time job.
18	225. On November 7, 2019, the Family Court issued an order dismissing Marlo's Family
19	Law Contempt action under Cal. Penal Code § 1385. EXHIBIT "N," p. 74.
20	226. At the November 7, 2019 Contempt hearing, parties had been sworn in, thus
21	jeopardy attaches and the Contempt action cannot be refilled. A dismissal of a Contempt
22	action is non-appealable order under California law.
23	E. BMI Officially Imposes Dispute Hold, But Then Pays Again Anyway
24	227. After the November 7, 2019 dismissal of Marlo's Contempt action, Baker contacted
25	BMI and demanded that they lift the dispute hold. However, BMI indicated that they
26	would maintain the dispute hold.
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#### 42 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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228. Nevertheless, on January 20, 2020, BMI paid Adam Bravery LLC the royalties per
 the usual January distribution.

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#### F. BMI Stops Paying Royalties

<sup>4</sup> 229. On March 18, 2020, Adam Bravery LLC bank account received the BMI royalties
<sup>5</sup> as per the usual March distribution, in the amount of \$9,243.31. However, within minutes,
<sup>6</sup> BMI reversed the deposit, and electronically removed \$9,243.31 from the Adam Bravery
<sup>7</sup> LLC bank account.

<sup>8</sup> 230. On June 11, 2020, BMI failed to pay \$9,911.00 owed to Adam Bravery, LLC.

<sup>9</sup>231. On September 10, 2020, BMI failed to pay \$9,342.68 owed to Adam Bravery, LLC.

<sup>10</sup> 232. On January 14, 2021, BMI failed to pay \$9,082.93 owed to Adam Bravery, LLC.

<sup>11</sup> 233. On March 19, 2021, BMI failed to pay \$9,731.55 owed to Adam Bravery, LLC.

12 || 234. To date (March 2021), BMI has failed to pay a total of \$47,311.37.

# 14 XIII. CAUSES OF ACTION IN UNDERLYING CASE

#### SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### 42 U.S.C. § 1983

#### Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker and Adam Bravery LLC v. BMI)

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.
Under the State Compulsion Test, BMI and Erika Stallings and Mike O'Neill are
State Actors for civil rights purposes. *Supra*. Baker had a federally-protected right to
collect performance royalties, *supra*, which right was validly assigned to Adam Bravery
LLC.

237. Acting under color of the Consent Decree, which is federal law, BMI and/or Erika
Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill intentionally denied Adam Bravery LLC the Performance
Royalty money that it has a federal right to collect. BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or
Mike O'Neill knew that there is no "dispute" between Marlo and Baker upon which to
base any sort of "Dispute Hold," and he, she or they decided to withhold funds anyway.

238. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege, that BMI has a policy and custom
 allowing for the fabrication of a false pretext on which to impose a "dispute hold," and
 that Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Does are responsible for implementing
 that policy on an ad hoc basis.

5 239. Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Does
6 acted without authorization in fabricating the false pretext under which BMI royalties
7 were stopped.

8 240. BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill knew that Baker depends on the

9 royalties for his livelihood, because Baker told Erika Stallings so in a phone call on or

10 about July 2019. Similarly, BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill knew that

11 Adam Bravery LLC depends on the royalties for its operation and continued existence.

12 BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill knew that withholding royalties would

13 greatly diminish the market value of Adam Bravery LLC, and would injure Baker.

14 241. On March 18, 2020, under direction of Erika Stallings, BMI failed to pay \$9,243.31.
15 To date, BMI failed to pay a total of \$47,311.37.

Adam Bravery LLC was harmed by BMI's failure to pay \$47,311.37 so far, and will
continue to be harmed for every subsequent payment missed.

Baker has on several occasions had communications with an individual working for
a company called "Royalty Exchange." Royalty Exchange is in the business of brokering
the auction sales of royalty streams, such as Baker's. Royalty Exchange estimated that
Baker's royalty stream might fetch \$150,000 at auction, and suggested setting that as a
reserve price.

23 244. BMI official Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neil, each State Actors for Section 1983
24 purposes, intentionally deprived Plaintiffs of their federally-protected right to collect
25 performance royalties. At minimum, Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill acted with a
26 reckless disregard Plaintiffs' federally protected rights.

27 245. As a direct and proximate result of the deprivation of civil rights, Plaintiffs are
28 injured in the amount of royalties withheld to date, and/or the loss of value of the business.

246. Therefore, BMI, Erika Stallings and Mike O'Neill are jointly and severably liable to
 Plaintiffs for Civil Rights violations.

#### 3 4

#### Breach of Contract (Adam Bravery, LLC v. BMI)

**EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION** 

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- 249. In 1999, Baker and BMI entered into the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement," a binding
  contract obligating BMI to pay performance royalties to Baker. At all relevant times prior
  to March 2020, Baker and BMI performed under the contract.
- 250. In July 2016, Baker and co-writer Marlo instructed BMI to equalize royalties
  between them for all works registered after January 11, 1995 and before June 1, 2015.
  BMI complied with the reallocation. At all relevant times prior to March 2020, Baker and
  BMI performed under the modified contract.
- In April 2017, with BMI's consent, Baker validly assigned the right to receive
  royalties to Write Hear LLC. At all relevant times prior to March 2020, Write Hear LLC
  and BMI performed under the modified contract.
- In July 2018, with BMI's consent, Write Hear LLC validly assigned the right to
   receive royalties to Adam Bravery LLC. At all relevant times prior to March 2020, Adam
   Bravery LLC and BMI performed under the modified contract.
- 253. The BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" constitutes the "rights to payment of money,"
  which right to be paid is validly held by Adam Bravery LLC.
- 25 || 254. To date, BMI failed to pay a total of \$47,311.37.
- 28

255. Adam Bravery LLC was harmed by BMI's failure to pay \$47,311.37 so far, and will
 continue to be harmed for every subsequent payment missed.

3 256. Baker has on several occasions had communications with an individual working for
4 a company called "Royalty Exchange." Royalty Exchange is in the business of brokering
5 the auction sales of royalty streams, such as Baker's. Royalty Exchange estimated that
6 Baker's royalty stream might fetch \$150,000 at auction, and suggested setting that as a
7 reserve price.

8 257. As a direct and proximate result of BMI's having stopped paying royalties, the
9 royalty stream is worthless on the market.

10 258. Adam Bravery LLC depends crucially on the royalty money to operate, and has
11 necessarily ceased all operations as a direct and proximate result of BMI's breach of
12 contract.

13 259. The net value of Adam Bravery LLC was diminished by at least \$150,000 as a
14 direct and proximate result of BMI's intentional and baseless failure to pay royalties.
15 260. Therefore, BMI is liable to Adam Bravery LLC for Breach of Contract.

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## NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION Breach of Fiduciary Duty

(Adam Bravery LLC v. BMI)

261. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.
262. A fiduciary is a person in whom another has placed the utmost trust and confidence
263. All attorneys are fiduciaries, which is to say they owe clients fiduciary duties.
263. All attorneys are fiduciaries, which is to say they owe clients fiduciary duties.
263. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §16(3). An attorney owes

25 the client a fiduciary duty of the very highest character. *Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v.* 

26 Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 4th 419, 421, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 784 (2003)

27 264. A fiduciary relationship was formed between BMI (the agent-trustee) and Baker (the principal-beneficiary) upon signing the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" in 1999. The

BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement" explicitly makes BMI Baker's attorney-in-fact, providing
 that:

"You [Baker] make, constitute and appoint us [BMI], or our nominee, your true and lawful attorney, irrevocably during the Period, in our name or that of our nominee, or in your name, or otherwise, in our sole judgment, to do all acts, take all proceedings, execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all instruments, papers, documents, process or pleadings that, in our sole judgment, may be necessary, proper or expedient to restrain infringement of and/or to enforce and protect the rights granted by you hereunder..."

<sup>8</sup> EXHIBIT "B," p. 14.

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<sup>9</sup> 265. Under the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement," the responsibilities of BMI are closely
<sup>10</sup> akin to those of an escrow officer: BMI promises to collect monies due to Baker, to hold
<sup>11</sup> them for some period of time, to deduct its own fees, then to distribute the remainder as a
<sup>12</sup> royalty payment. This is the very essence of a fiduciary relationship.

<sup>13</sup> 266. Baker formed with BMI a relationship of trust and confidence whereby BMI is
 <sup>14</sup> bound to exercise the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward Baker throughout
 <sup>15</sup> the relationship, by paying Performance Royalties in strict accordance with the royalty
 <sup>16</sup> calculation formula.

17 267. By virtue of the assignment, to which BMI consented, BMI's fiduciary duty extends

to Adam Bravery LLC. Nothing in the language of the assignment contracts restricts the
 assignability of any rights.

268. BMI failed to pay the March 2020 royalty distribution, which is misconduct. To
21 date, BMI has failed to pay a total of \$47,311.37.

269. Plaintiffs have no *direct* evidence of any bribes or kickbacks being paid. But insofar
as BMI has stopped paying royalties without justification, and gone as far as concocting a
false pretext on which to do so, it is a reasonable inference that, in exchange for
cooperation, Marlo pays BMI money as a bribe or kickback, in an amount and by methods
to be proven to the jury at trial. Accepting such a kickback or a bribe in exchange for not
paying royalties is not in Adam Bravery LLC's interest.

1 270. Adam Bravery LLC depends crucially on the royalty money to operate, and has 2 necessarily ceased all operations as a direct and proximate result of BMI's failure to pay 3 royalties as it is legally obligated to do. 4 271. Therefore BMI is liable to Adam Bravery LLC for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 5 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 6 **Constructive Fraud** (Adam Bravery LLC and Alexander C. Baker v. 7 BMI, Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings in their individual capacities) 8 Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the facts alleged above. 272. 9 273. Courts have given instructions on what constitutes constructive fraud: 10 As a general principle constructive fraud comprises any act, omission or concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or 11 confidence which results in damage to another even though the conduct is 12 not otherwise fraudulent. Most acts by an agent in breach of his fiduciary duties constitute constructive fraud. The failure of the fiduciary to disclose 13 a material fact to his principal which might affect the fiduciary's motives or the principal's decision, which is known (or should be known) to the 14 fiduciary, may constitute constructive fraud. Also, a careless misstatement 15 may constitute constructive fraud even though there is no fraudulent intent 16 Salahutdin v. Valley of Cal., Inc., 24 Cal. App. 4th 555, 558, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 464 17 (1994). 18 274. Here, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings fabricated a false "dispute" 19 between Marlo and Baker as a pretext to impose a royalty hold against Baker, while 20 continuing to pay Marlo. Knowing that a Court order prohibited Baker from assigning 21 works, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings falsely contended that Baker 2.2 assigned works, knowing that Baker never did so. Baker assigned his own royalty stream 23 to pay to a business entity, while ownership of the works has remained unchanged. 24 275. BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings further compounded the falsity by 25 construing the fabricated "dispute" as being a dispute between Marlo and Baker, knowing 26 that even if there was a dispute as to the proper payee of Baker's royalty stream, the 27 dispute would be between Baker and Adam Bravery LLC. Marlo's royalties have 28

remained completely unaffected throughout, a fact known to BMI and/or Mike O'Neill
 and/or Erika Stallings.

3 276. BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings compounded the falsity yet again
4 by withholding royalties only from Baker, while continuing to pay Marlo. This
5 demonstrates that BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings do not believe there is a
6 dispute between Baker and Marlo. If there was a dispute between Baker and Marlo, BMI
7 would withhold royalties from both parties, according to their standard policy.

8 277. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege that BMI has never in its entire history
9 imposed a unilateral royalty dispute hold, such as BMI now claims to have imposed
10 unilaterally on Baker and Adam Bravery LLC. Plaintiffs believe, and upon that basis
11 allege that all other royalty dispute holds imposed by BMI in its entire history have
12 involved the withholding of royalties from both parties to the dispute.

13 278. Knowing that there was no actual dispute between Baker and Marlo, BMI and/or
14 Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings undertook a series of steps intended to entrap Baker
15 into admitting that there was a "dispute" upon which to withhold Baker's royalty stream
16 from Adam Bravery LLC. First BMI, in the person of Erika Stallings, emailed Baker and
17 simply asked him for his "position" on the "dispute." Next, BMI requested that Baker
18 "stipulate" that there was a dispute.

19 When the above two attempts failed to succeed in tricking Baker into "admitting" or 279. 20 "stipulating" that there was a "dispute," BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings 21 then insisted that Marlo file a Family Law Contempt action. Marlo did file a contempt 22 action, alleging that Baker's assignment of royalties violated the Family Court Royalty 23 Reallocation Order, and falsely claiming that Baker had assigned works. Even if there 24 had been merit to Marlo's Contempt action (which there was not), this would be a dispute 25 between Baker and the Court. Marlo never alleged that Baker's assignment of royalties to 26 the LLC harmed her or affected her in any way, because it obviously did not.

27 280. The Family Court <u>dismissed</u> Marlo's Contempt action, jeopardy attached, it

28 cannot be refilled, and is non-appealable. While there never was any merit to the idea that

49 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

there was a "dispute" between Baker and Marlo regarding the payment of ASCAP & BMI
 royalties, the dismissal of Marlo's Contempt action must remove any lingering doubt,
 even among the uninitiated.

4 281. There is no dispute between Marlo and Baker regarding the current proper payee of
5 BMI royalties. BMI and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings and each of them know that
6 there is no dispute. BMI and Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings and each of them falsely
7 contend that there is a dispute as a pretext for withholding royalties so as to intentionally
8 injure Baker and Adam Bravery LLC on the one hand, while benefitting Marlo on the
9 other hand.

10 282. While Baker and Adam Bravery LLC never believed BMI in all their false
11 representations, Plaintiffs had no choice but to rely on them. BMI has total power over the
12 situation. If BMI doesn't pay the royalties, then the royalties are not getting paid.

13 283. Because BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings knew that there was no
royalty dispute between Baker and Marlo, and expended great thought and planning
towards trying to falsely convince Baker (and now the Court) that there was a dispute, and
maintained the false story about a dispute even in the face of the Family Court dismissing
Marlo's contempt action, the only reasonable inference to be drawn by the jury is that
BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill acted with actual premeditated malice
toward Plaintiffs.

20 284. BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings knew that withholding money from
21 Adam Bravery LLC would injure and quite possibly destroy the business, BMI and/or
22 Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings knew it was wrong to do so, and did it anyway,
23 having accepted money from as a bribe or kickback, in an amount and by methods to be
24 proven to the jury at trial. While Plaintiffs have no direct evidence of this bribe or
25 kickback, it is a reasonable inference from the facts which are known. At trial, Plaintiffs
26 will ask the jury to make this inference.

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50 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

1	285. Adam Bravery LLC depends crucially on the royalty money to operate, and has
2	necessarily ceased all operations as a direct and proximate result of BMI and/or Mike
3	O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings withholding payment.
4	286. The net value of Adam Bravery LLC has diminished by at least \$150,000 as a direct
5	and proximate result of Defendants' intentional actions of withholding the royalties
6	without justification.
7	287. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege that BMI has a policy and custom
8	allowing for dishonest and injurious conduct, on an ad hoc basis. Alternatively, Plaintiffs
9	allege that BMI does not have such a policy and custom, and that Erika Stallings and/or
10	Mike O'Neill and/or Does acted on their own volition.
11	288. BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill withholding money constitutes
12	malice, fraud and/or oppression as defined in California Civil Code § 3294.
13	289. Therefore BMI and Erika Stallings and Mike O'Neill and each of them are jointly
14	and severally liable to Plaintiffs for constructive fraud.
15	ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
16	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
17	(Alexander C. Baker v. BMI, Miles O'Neill and Feiles Stallings in their individual consection)
18	Mike O'Neill and Erika Stallings in their individual capacities)290.Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.
19	291. Proving Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress requires a showing that
20	Defendant's conduct was both "extreme" and "outrageous." The words "extreme" and
21	"outrageous" are not synonymous. Rather, they function as a double threshold for the
22	nature of the conduct and how unusual it is. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
23	Physical and Emotional Harm. § 46. (Am. Law Inst. 2012).
24	292. Here, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings's conduct is extremely
25	unusual, because it is the only time in BMI's entire existence that they have ever imposed
26	a unilateral dispute hold, i.e. withholding money from one party to the supposed dispute,
27	while paying the other.
28	
	51 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

293. 1 Knowing that there was no actual dispute between Baker and Marlo, BMI and/or 2 Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings undertook a series of steps intended to entrap Baker 3 into "admitting" that there was a "dispute" upon which to withhold Baker's royalty stream 4 from Adam Bravery LLC. First BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings emailed 5 Baker and simply asked him for his "position" on the "dispute." When Baker declined, ASCAP & BMI and/or Erika Stallings falsely threated to withhold Plaintiff's money. This 6 7 is extreme and outrageous conduct. Knowing that Baker depends on the royalty money to 8 survive, BMI's conduct was extreme, and outrageous, and intended to cause emotional 9 distress.

10 294. BMI paid royalties in September 2019. Then, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or 11 Erika Stallings requested that Baker "stipulate" that there was a dispute. After Baker 12 refused to "stipulate" to a dispute (whatever that means), Marlo filed a Contempt action, 13 alleging that Baker's assignment of royalties violated an Order of the Family Court. 14 Because the Contempt action was baseless, and because it came only after BMI attempted 15 to get Baker to "stipulate" to a dispute, it is reasonable to infer that BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings then instructed Marlo to file the baseless Contempt action. 16 17 295. After the Contempt action was filed, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika 18 Stallings again threatened to withhold the money.

19 296. Marlo's Contempt action was dismissed. Even after the Contempt action was
20 dismissed with no possibility of appeal or refilling, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika
21 Stallings continued to insist that they would withhold the money. BMI's conduct was
22 extreme, outrageous and intended to cause emotional distress. BMI and/or Mike O'Neill
23 and/or Erika Stallings knew at all times that Baker depended on the royalty money to
24 survive.

25 297. BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings's threat of withholding turned out
26 to be false again, as BMI paid the royalties in January 2020. BMI paid the royalties again
27 in March 2020. But then, BMI and/or Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings reversed

1 charges and took the money back. As emotionally injurious as the false threats of 2 withholding money are, making good on those threats is even more injurious. 3 In repeatedly threatening to withhold money, and then actually withholding money, 298. 4 with the full knowledge that there is no valid basis to withhold the money, BMI and/or 5 Mike O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings acted to intentionally injure the psyche of Baker. BMI and/or Erika Stallings injured Baker by depriving him of his livelihood, 299. 6 7 starving him and threatening him with homelessness. Because neither BMI nor Erika 8 Stallings have any legal basis for withholding the royalty money has now been done, the 9 question of motive is reasonably raised. In addition to the reasonable inference of bribes 10 and kickbacks, Plaintiffs reserve the right to allege a motive such as bias based on race, or 11 sex, or any other motive revealed in discovery, or reasonably implied by facts obtained in discovery. 12

300. Whatever the motives, Erika Stallings and Mike O'Neill and BMI have the power
to destroy Baker's life, and they have done so, on purpose and with particular glee. BMI
and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill knew at all relevant times that Baker has no
options when it comes to his royalties.

At minimum, BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill acted with reckless
disregard of the probability that Baker would suffer emotional distress, knowing that
Baker depended on the money to survive, and knowing that all reasonable people will be
expected to suffer emotional distress if deprived of their livelihood for no legally valid
reason.

22 302. With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe emotional distress, the 23 courts have set a high bar. Severe emotional distress means "emotional distress of such 24 substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society 25 should be expected to endure it." Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004. 26 303. Here, no reasonable person could be expected to endure the emotional distress of 27 having BMI and/or Erika Stallings and/or Mike O'Neill baselessly threaten to withhold the 28 source of livelihood, then actually withholding the source of livelihood. BMI and/or Mike

O'Neill and/or Erika Stallings' repeated efforts to fabricate a false "dispute" as a pretext
 for stopping royalties, including but not limited to attempting to trick Baker into
 "stipulating" that there was a "dispute," are extreme and outrageous conduct by any
 reasonable standard.

5 304. In deciding whether conduct meets the threshold of "outrageous," the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46(1)(1965) instructs us that the existence of a
special relationship in which there is "abuse of a position, or a relation with the other, which
gives [the actor] ... the power to affect [the] interests" of another may "produce a character
of outrageousness that otherwise might not exist." *Bridges v. Winn Dixie*, 176 Ga. App.
227, 230, 335 S.E.2d 445,447 (1985).

305. Here, BMI occupies a vastly superior position of bargaining power as compared to
Baker. If Baker wants to collect performance royalties, he must agree to BMI's terms,

which terms are mandated in the Consent Decree. Baker has no bargaining power
whatsoever. It is "take it or leave it."

306. If Baker had any power vis-à-vis BMI whatsoever, then the moment BMI started
abusively threatening to withhold royalties, he would have quit BMI and obtained
performance royalties elsewhere. Under the terms of the BMI-Baker Writer "Agreement,"
and under the Consent Decree, which is the law, as far as Baker understands, it is not
possible to change affiliation on any music titles in the past. As to all those royalty-earning
music titles on which Baker has been getting paid for over two decades, Baker and BMI
are "stuck with each other."

22 307. Plaintiff Alexander C. Baker has suffered severe emotional distress, including fear,
23 worry, mortification, outrage, shame, humiliation, degradation, anger, and depression.
24 Baker faces the prospect of being homeless. Baker has extreme difficulty concentrating

25 because he can't process or accept how the system allows BMI and Erika Stallings and

26 Mike O'Neill to perpetrate such intentional injury.

27 308. The intentional, malicious conduct of Defendants is maddening, and would be
28 maddening to any reasonable person similarly-situated to Baker. Baker suffers Post

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1 Traumatic Stress Disorder, but cannot afford the medical treatment required, which 2 inability to afford treatment is directly and proximately caused by Defendants' tortious 3 conduct described herein, and which inability to afford necessary treatment compounds the severity of Baker's emotional distress caused by Defendants. 4 5 309. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege that BMI has a policy and custom allowing for extreme and outrageous conduct, on an ad hoc basis. Alternatively, Plaintiffs 6 7 allege that BMI does not have such a policy and custom, and that Erika Stallings and/or 8 Mike O'Neill and/or Does acted on their own volition. 9 310. Defendants' conduct is the direct and proximate cause of Baker's emotional distress. 10 311. Therefore, BMI, Erika Stallings and Mike O'Neill are jointly and severably liable to Baker for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 11 12 **TWELVTH CAUSE OF ACTION** 13 **Fraudulent Inducement** (Alexander C. Baker v. BMI and Erika Stallings in her individual capacity) 14 Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above. 312. 15 The elements of fraudulent inducement are: (1) a knowingly false representation by 313. 16 the defendant; (2) and intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the 17 plaintiff; and (4) resulting damage. Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be 18 alleged in full, factually and specifically. Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell 19 (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332. The critical pleading elements are that a 20misrepresentation was made, Defendants knew it untrue at the time, and they intended 21 Plaintiff rely on the misrepresentation. At the pleading stage an averment that defendant 22 knew it untrue and that Defendant intended reliance is sufficient. Charpentier v. Los 23 Angeles Rams Football Co., Inc. (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 301, 312. Further, the specificity 24 pleading requires facts that "show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the 25 representations were tendered." Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645. 26 314. Alleging fraud against a corporation must include the names of the persons who 27 made the misrepresentations; their authority to speak for the corporation; to whom they 28

1 spoke; what they said or wrote; and when it was said or written. See *Lazarat* 645;

- 2 Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 153, 157; Perlas v.
- 3 *GMAC Mortg.*, *LLC* (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 429, 434.

4 315. On August 26, 2019, after BMI began threatening to withhold royalties, Baker filed 5 into the Family Law case a Motion for Joinder, seeking to add BMI as a party. Baker sought a simple order that BMI was required to pay royalties in equal amounts to both he 6 7 and to Marlo, as the July 7, 2016 stipulation and order require, as the July 18, 2016 Letter 8 of Direction instruct BMI to do, and as BMI has in fact been doing since September 2016. 9 On September 3, 2019, Baker was contacted by email by attorney AnnMarie Mori, 316. 10 representing BMI. Plaintiff believes that Erika Stallings was at all times making the substantive decisions. Ms. Mori discussed the situation between Baker and Marlo, and 11 concluded: 12

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Therefore, it does not appear that Mr. Baker or Ms. Marlo dispute that at this time the royalty payments should continue to be distributed 50/50. EXHIBIT O, p. 76

In the days immediately following September 3, 2019, Ms. Mori on behalf of BMI
indicated that BMI wished to enter into a stipulation with Baker under which Baker would
dismiss the Motion for Joinder seeking to join BMI to the Family Law case, and BMI
would promise to be bound by any order the Family Court would make allocating the
royalties.

318. On or about September 12, 2019, a phone call was made between AnnMarie Mori
for BMI, Baker, and attorney Marc Angelucci. The purpose of the call was to discuss the
terms of the stipulation to relieve BMI from joinder. Baker sought assurances that, until
further order of the Family Court, that BMI would continue to pay royalties, just as they
had been doing. Ms. Mori repeated her assurances from the Sept. 3 email, stating:

There is not a dispute regarding the current allocation of royalties. It is our understanding that that issue will be decided at trial. Nothing will change at BMI until either the parties stipulate and we receive a new Letter of Direction, or there is a new Court Order. 319. BMI's statement "it does not appear that Mr. Baker or Ms. Marlo dispute that at this
time the royalty payments should continue to be distributed 50/50" is true, but highly
misleading, because it is clearly intended to convince Baker that BMI would not stop
paying royalties, when in fact BMI was planning to stop paying Baker's royalties all
along. BMI knew that the statement was highly misleading and intended to induce a false
belief in Baker that BMI would continue to pay royalties.

320. BMI's statement "Nothing will change at BMI until either the parties stipulate and
we receive a new Letter of Direction, or there is a new Court Order" is false, because
something did change at BMI – they stopped paying Baker's royalties to Adam Bravery
LLC – despite the fact that Marlo and Baker have not issued any new Letter of Direction,

11 nor has there been a new Court Order regarding the allocation of royalties. ASCAP &

BMI was planning to stop paying Baker's royalties all along, thus ASCAP & BMI knew it
was a false statement.

Both of BMI's above statements were intended to deceive Baker, and to induce him
into believing that BMI would not stop paying royalties, when in fact BMI was so
intending to stop paying royalties.

Both of the above statements were intended to induce Baker's reliance, because
Baker had brought a Motion for Joinder seeking to join BMI to the Family Law case, and
BMI knew that Baker would not agree to release BMI from the Joinder Motion unless he
was deceived into thinking that BMI would continue to pay royalties as the BMI-Baker
Writer "Agreement" requires, as the Consent Decree requires, as the July 7, 2016 Court
Order requires, and as the July 18, 2016 Letter of Direction requires.

323. Baker relied on BMI's September 3, 2019 false statement that "it does not appear
that Mr. Baker or Ms. Marlo dispute that at this time the royalty payments should continue
to be distributed 50/50." Baker relied on BMI's false statement "Nothing will change at
ASCAP & BMI until either the parties stipulate and we receive a new Letter of Direction,
or there is a new Court Order." Had Baker not received these false assurances, Baker
would not have agreed to the stipulation dismissing the Joinder action against BMI.

1	324. On or about September 25, 2019, Baker did in fact sign a stipulation with BMI,
2	dismissing the Joinder. EXHIBIT "P," p. 80-82.
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3	325. Plaintiff believes and thus alleges that BMI has a custom and policy which permits
4	it to make fraudulent misrepresentations, despite such fraudulent misrepresentations being
5	generally contrary to public policy. As an alternative theory, Plaintiff alleges that BMI
6	does not have such a policy, but that Erika Stallings in her individual capacity was directly
7	responsible for crafting and implementing intentional misrepresentations.
8	326. Baker was damaged in his reliance on the false statements by BMI, because had he
9	not dismissed the Joinder action, he could have obtained a Court order compelling BMI to
10	obey the July 7, 2016 Order equalizing royalties between Baker and Marlo.
11	327. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege that BMI has a policy and custom
12	allowing for dishonest and injurious conduct, on an ad hoc basis. Alternatively, Plaintiffs
13	allege that BMI does not have such a policy and custom, and that Erika Stallings acted on
14	her own volition.
15	328. Therefore, BMI and/or Erika Stallings are liable to Baker for fraudulent inducement.
16	THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
16 17	THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 42 U.S.C. § 1983
	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties
17	42 U.S.C. § 1983
17 18	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)
17 18 19	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP) 329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.
17 18 19 20	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> </ul>
17 18 19 20 21	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> <li>Supra. Baker has a federally-protected right to collect performance royalties, supra.</li> </ul>
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> <li><i>Supra</i>. Baker has a federally-protected right to collect performance royalties, <i>supra</i>.</li> <li>331. Acting under color of the Consent Decree, which is federal law, ASCAP</li> </ul>
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> <li><i>Supra</i>. Baker has a federally-protected right to collect performance royalties, <i>supra</i>.</li> <li>331. Acting under color of the Consent Decree, which is federal law, ASCAP intentionally denied Alexander Baker the Performance Royalty money that he has a</li> </ul>
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> <li><i>Supra</i>. Baker has a federally-protected right to collect performance royalties, <i>supra</i>.</li> <li>331. Acting under color of the Consent Decree, which is federal law, ASCAP intentionally denied Alexander Baker the Performance Royalty money that he has a federal right to collect. ASCAP knew that there was a July 2016 stipulation and court</li> </ul>
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>42 U.S.C. § 1983</li> <li>Deprivation of Federal Right to Collect Performance Royalties (Alexander C. Baker v. ASCAP)</li> <li>329. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.</li> <li>330. Under the State Compulsion Test, ASCAP is a State Actor for civil rights purposes.</li> <li>Supra. Baker has a federally-protected right to collect performance royalties, supra.</li> <li>331. Acting under color of the Consent Decree, which is federal law, ASCAP intentionally denied Alexander Baker the Performance Royalty money that he has a federal right to collect. ASCAP knew that there was a July 2016 stipulation and court order to pay equal royalties between Baker and Marlo. With regard to the royalties</li> </ul>

1	332. Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege, that ASCAP has a policy and custom	
2	allowing for the fabrication of a false pretext on which to impose a "dispute hold."	
3	333. Beginning September 2016, and continuing in each quarterly distribution thereafter,	
4	ASCAP did not pay Alexander Baker the equalized royalties.	
5	334. ASCAP intentionally deprived Baker of his federally-protected right to collect	
6	performance royalties. At minimum, ASCAP acted with a reckless disregard Baker's	
7	federally protected rights.	
8	335. As a direct and proximate result of the deprivation of civil rights, Baker is injured in	
9	the amount of ASCAP royalties improperly withheld to date, subject to proof.	
10	336. Therefore ASCAP is liable to Alexander Baker for Civil Rights violations.	
11	FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION	
12	Breach of Contract	
13	(Alexander Baker v. ASCAP)	
14	337. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.	
15	338. If for whatever reason ASCAP is not held to be a State Actor, or Plaintiffs right to	
15	receive royalties is not held to be a federally-protected right, then without waiving the	
17	right to present the legal claims set forth above and below, Plaintiff alternatively presents	
17	a Breach of Contract theory, i.e. an alternative to Deprivation of Civil Rights.	
	339. In 1990, Baker and ASCAP entered into a Writer "Agreement," a binding contract	
19 20	obligating ASCAP to pay performance royalties to Baker. At all relevant times prior to	
	September 2016, Baker and ASCAP performed under the contract.	
21	340. In July 2016, Baker and co-writer Marlo instructed ASCAP to equalize royalties	
22	between them for all works registered after January 11, 1995 and before June 1, 2015.	
23	ASCAP did not comply with the reallocation.	
24	341. Starting in September 2016, ASCAP failed to pay the equalized royalties.	
25	342. Baker was harmed by ASCAP's failure to pay Baker, in an amount of money	
26	subject to proof at trial.	
27	343. Therefore, ASCAP is liable to Alexander Baker for Breach of Contract.	
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1 2 3	FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Alexander Baker v. ASCAP) 344. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the facts alleged above.
4	345. ASCAP owes Alexander Baker a fiduciary duty. Supra.
5	346. ASCAP is legally obligated to pay Performance Royalties to Alexander Baker. By
6	failing to pay the court-ordered equalized royalties, ASCAP breached its fiduciary duty
7	every quarter beginning September 2016 – present.
8	347. Therefore, ASCAP is liable to Alexander Baker for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
9	XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON UNDERLYING CLAIMS
10 11	348. Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
11	A. <u>Damages</u>
13	349. General Damages against BMI – for Baker's pain and suffering, for Adam
14	Bravery's lost business, and for all other such general damages as are reasonably certain to
15	flow from the misconduct proven, in an amount found reasonable at trial, but not less than
16	\$1,000,000;
17	Actual Damages against BMI – for the total value of Plaintiffs' BMI royalty stream,
18	plus medical expenses, plus all other money damages actually and proximately caused by
19	Defendants' conduct, such amounts to be proven at trial, but not less than \$200,000;
20	Punitive Damages against BMI - to punish BMI Defendants for intentionally tortious
21	conduct, to make examples of them, and to deter others from similar conduct, in an amount
22	deemed sufficient to achieve the purpose of punitive damages, in light of BMI's stated
23	yearly revenue of over \$1 billion, and the net worth of Erika Stallings and of Mike O'Neill,
24	subject to proof;
25	Actual Damages against ASCAP – for the amount of Performance Royalties
26	improperly withheld, subject to proof;
27	
28	
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#### B. Injunction

For a permanent injunction compelling ASCAP & BMI to pay the Performance
Royalties due and payable for performances of Alexander C. Baker's musical works to
Baker, to Adam Bravery LLC, or to whomever shall in the future become a valid assignee
of said royalties, such payments to be at all times compliant with any pending court order
as to proper allocation;

For a permanent injunction prohibiting BMI from requiring a Mandatory Arbitration
Clause as a pre-condition of obtaining performance royalties;

9 For a permanent injunction prohibiting ASCAP & BMI from disclaiming a fiduciary
10 duty to Baker;

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#### C. Costs and Fees

For the cost of the suit plus pre-judgment interest;

<sup>13</sup> For attorney fees as allowed by statute and/or by contract; and


For any other such relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

### XV. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted on March 25, 2021,

G. Scott Sobel, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiffs



#### **PROOF OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MAIL**

I am over the age of 18. I am not a party to this action. My business address is 1180 S. Beverly Drive, Suite 610, Los Angeles, CA 90035-1158. My email address is GScottSobel@gmail.com. On the date indicated below, I served the indicated persons the following documents:

## PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT EXHIBITS TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I accomplished service by attaching PDF copies of the document(s) to an email sent to the recipients indicated below. The service list is as follows:

Jackson Wagener Attorney for ASCAP jwagener@ascap.com

AnnMarie Mori Attorney for BMI amori@troygould.com

Date of service: March 25, 2021.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

March 25, 2021

G. Scott Sobel, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiffs