UNITED	STATES	DISTR	ICT CO	OURT
EASTER	N DISTR	CICT OF	NEW	YORK

.....X Case No. 17-cv-04002

MOHIUDDIN AHMED, on behalf of himself individually and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

-against-

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

CARSON SMITHFIELD, LLC,	
	Defendant.
	X

Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys, FAGENSON & PUGLISI, PLLC, upon knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, brings this complaint against above-named defendant and in support thereof alleges the following:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This is an action for damages brought by an individual consumer and on behalf of a class for defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, *et seq.* which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and unfair acts and practices.
- 2. This action is also brought pursuant to New York General Business

 Law ("NYGBL") § 349 for an injunction and damages regarding defendant's deceptive acts
 and practices.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (FDCPA) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction exists over the NYGBL § 349 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
- 4. This Court has venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that plaintiff resides in this District and a substantial portion of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this District.

PARTIES

- 5. Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in this District.
- 6. Plaintiff is a consumer within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) as he is a natural person who is alleged by defendant to owe a financial obligation.
- 7. The financial obligation which defendant sought to collect from plaintiff is a debt within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) in that the obligation which defendant sought to collect from plaintiff was originally incurred, if at all, for personal, family or household purposes and concerned an allegedly defaulted Merrick Bank Corporation ("Merrick Bank") credit card debt.
- 8. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer within the meaning of NYGBL § 349 who acted reasonably under the circumstances alleged herein.
 - 9. Defendant is a debt collector as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
- The principal purpose of defendant's business is the collection of defaulted consumer debts.

- 11. Defendant uses the mails in its business the principal purpose of which is the collection of defaulted consumer debts.
- 12. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect defaulted consumer debts owed or due or alleged to be owed or due to others.
- 13. Upon information and belief, defendant is a foreign limited liability company formed under the laws of the State of Delaware.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 14. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-13 as if fully re-stated herein.
- 15. Defendant sent plaintiff a collection letter dated May 30, 2017.
- 16. In the letter, defendant alleged that plaintiff owed a Merrick Bank debt.
- 17. The debt was alleged to be in default.
- 18. Defendant sent the letter to plaintiff in an attempt to collect the allegedly defaulted Merrick Bank debt.
- 19. The letter was defendant's first communication with plaintiff in connection with the collection of the debt.
- 20. The letter was defendant's first written communication with plaintiff in connection with the collection of the debt.
- 21. Defendant sent no letter to plaintiff within five days after the date on which defendant sent the letter dated May 30, 2017.
 - 22. In the letter, defendant stated, in relevant part:

"IMPORTANT NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW - FEDERAL NOTICE:

. . .

If you notify this office verbally or in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification."

- Upon reading the letter, plaintiff believed that federal law permitted him to dispute the debt either verbally or in writing in order to obtain verification of the debt.
- 24. Upon reading the letter, plaintiff believed that federal law gave him the choice to dispute the debt either verbally or in writing and that each method is a valid manner in which to request verification of the debt.
- 25. Upon learning that federal law required him to dispute the debt in writing only in order to obtain verification of the debt and a cessation of debt collection until the verification is provided, and that a verbal request was not sufficient under federal law to obtain such verification or cessation, plaintiff felt annoyed, confused and surprised that defendant would fail to provide him with accurate information concerning his rights under federal law.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

FDCPA § 1692g(a)(4)

- 26. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-25 as if fully re-stated herein.
- 27. In its collection letter defendant stated, in relevant part:

"IMPORTANT NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW - FEDERAL NOTICE:

. . .

If you notify this office verbally or in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification."

- 28. In its collection letter, defendant told plaintiff he may dispute the debt either verbally or in writing within 30 days from receipt of the letter in order for defendant to mail verification of the debt to plaintiff.
 - 29. Defendant's said statement to plaintiff violates the FDCPA, § 1692g(a)(4).

- 30. The FDCPA, § 1692g(a)(4), requires that defendant notify plaintiff that he must timely dispute the debt *in writing* in order for defendant to have the duty to provide verification of the debt.
- 31. A verbal dispute is insufficient under § 1692g(a)(4) to preserve plaintiff's right to obtain verification of the debt.
- 32. A verbal dispute is insufficient under § 1692g(a)(4) to place the duty on defendant to provide verification of the debt.
- 33. Further, pursuant to § 1692g(b), as long as plaintiff disputes the debt *in writing* as required by § 1692g(a)(4), defendant must cease collection of the debt until defendant provides verification of the debt to plaintiff.
- 34. A verbal dispute by plaintiff is insufficient to preserve plaintiff's right to have defendant cease collection of the debt until defendant provides verification of the debt.
- 35. A verbal dispute by plaintiff is insufficient to place the duty on defendant to cease collection of the debt until defendant provides verification of the debt.
- 36. If plaintiff were to dispute the debt verbally, as defendant told plaintiff he may do, defendant would be under no duty under the FDCPA to provide verification of the debt to plaintiff.
- 37. If plaintiff were to dispute the debt verbally, as defendant told plaintiff he may do, defendant would be under no duty under the FDCPA to cease collection of the debt until defendant provides verification to plaintiff.
- 38. Defendant's above-quoted statement to plaintiff in its collection letter violates the FDCPA, § 1692g(a)(4).

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

NYGBL § 349

- 39. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 to 38 as if fully re-stated herein.
- 40. Each of the deceptive acts and practices above-mentioned was committed by defendant in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of a service in the State of New York and constitutes a violation of NYGBL § 349.
- 41. Defendant's deceptive acts and practices were consumer-oriented, in that defendant is a collector of consumer debts incurred principally or wholly by natural persons.
- 42. Defendant contacts hundreds of consumers within the State of New York each year by mail in an attempt to collect Merrick Bank debts.
- 43. Defendant's letter to plaintiff is typical of the letters defendant mails to consumers within the State of New York in attempts to collect Merrick Bank debts.
 - 44. Defendant's letter to plaintiff is derived from a letter form.
 - 45. Defendant's letter to plaintiff is derived from a letter template.
- 46. Defendant has a pattern of mailing collection letters to hundreds of consumers within the State of New York each year which inaccurately notifies such consumers of their rights under federal law.
- 47. Defendant's aforesaid inaccurate notification of the consumer's rights is consumer-oriented, in that the notification was not restricted to the collection letter which defendant mailed to plaintiff, but extended to, at a minimum, initial collection letters which defendant mailed to all consumers within the State of New York at all times relevant herein.

- 48. Defendant's said inaccurate notification of the consumer's rights has a broad impact on consumers at large whose accounts are placed with defendant for collection, because at all times relevant herein defendant mailed substantially the same initial letter to all consumers in the State of New York, all of which contained the inaccurate notification of the consumer's legal rights.
- 49. Defendant's inaccurate notification was deceptive in a material way in that
 New York State consumers receiving defendant's letters would believe, erroneously, that a timely
 verbal dispute of their debts would be sufficient to preserve their legal rights and to place certain legal
 duties on defendant.
 - 50. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer within the meaning of the NYGBL.
- 51. Upon learning that federal law required him to dispute the debt in writing only in order to obtain verification of the debt and a cessation of debt collection until the verification is provided, and that a verbal request was not sufficient under the law to obtain such verification or cessation, plaintiff felt annoyed, confused and surprised that defendant would fail to provide him with accurate information concerning his rights under federal law.
- 52. Defendant violated NYGBL § 349(a) and is liable to plaintiff under NYGBL § 349(h).

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

- 53. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-52 as if fully re-stated herein.
- This action is brought on behalf of plaintiff and the members of a class. The class consists of all persons who defendant's records reflect were sent debt collection letters within the State of New York within the period of time commencing one year before the filing of this complaint up to and including the date of the filing of the complaint and who were sent a collection letter (a) in substantially the same form as the letter defendant sent to plaintiff; (b) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a consumer debt; (c) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (d) the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). The class does not include defendant or persons who are officers, directors, employees or representatives of defendant.

55. The class shall be defined as follows:

All natural persons with addresses within the State of New York to whom defendant sent a collection letter concerning a consumer debt, which collection letter states, in sum or substance:

"If you notify this office verbally or in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification."

from one year before the filing of this complaint to the date of the filing of this complaint inclusive, and which letter was not returned by the postal service as undeliverable.

- 56. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because:
 - (A) Based on the fact that the collection letter that is the gravamen of this litigation is a mass-mailed form letter, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, thousands of persons have received similar debt collection letters from defendant which violate the various provisions of the FDCPA.
 - (B) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether defendant violated the FDCPA, § 1692g(a)(4), by sending letters to consumers which stated that the consumers may dispute their debts either verbally or in writing.
 - (C) The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received the letters (the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of defendant.
 - (D) The claims of plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories.
 - (E) Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members' interests.

 Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel. Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class.

- 57. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members' claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy.
- 58. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, plaintiff will seek to certify a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
- 59. Communications from debt collectors, such as those sent by defendant, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer".
- 60. As a result of the above violations, defendant is liable to plaintiff and the members of the class for an injunction and damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial, plus costs and attorneys' fees.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against defendant as follows:

- (a) certifying a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
- (b) awarding maximum statutory damages to the class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial;
- (c) awarding maximum statutory damages to plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial;
- (d) awarding actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial;

(e) awarding reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements pursuant to

15 U.S.C. § 1692k;

(f) enjoining defendant from committing further deceptive acts and practices

with respect to plaintiff pursuant to NYGBL § 349;

(g) awarding statutory damages pursuant to NYGBL § 349 in an amount to be

determined at the time of trial;

(h) in the alternative, awarding actual damages pursuant to NYGBL § 349 in

an amount to be determined at the time of trial;

(i) awarding reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements pursuant

to NYGBL § 349; and

(j) for such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: New York, New York July 6, 2017.

/s/ Novlette R. Kidd

NOVLETTE R. KIDD, ESQ. FAGENSON & PUGLISI, PLLC Attorneys for Plaintiff 450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704 New York, New York 10123 Telephone: (212) 268-2128

Nkidd@fagensonpuglisi.com

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The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as

provided by local rules of cour purpose of initiating the civil d	t. This form, approved by the ocket sheet. (SEE INSTRUC	he Judicial Conference of the TIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF T	ne United States in September 1 HIS FORM.)	974, is required for the use of	the Clerk of Court for the	
MOHIUDDIN AHMED, o similarly situated	n behalf of himself ind	ividually and all others	CARSON SMITHFIELD, LLC			
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Queens (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)			County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.			
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, FAGENSON & PUGLISI York, New York 10123. (, PLLC, 450 Seventh A	^{r)} Avenue, Suite 704, Ne	Attorneys (If Known)			
II. BASIS OF JURISDI	ICTION (Place an "X" in C	One Box Only)	I. CITIZENSHIP OF P	RINCIPAL PARTIES	(Place an "X" in One Box for Plainti	
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	■ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government)	Not a Party)		IF DEF 1 □ 1 Incorporated <i>or</i> Pr of Business In T		
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant	☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)		Citizen of Another State	2		
			Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	3 🗖 3 Foreign Nation	□ 6 □ 6	
IV. NATURE OF SUIT		aly) ORTS	FORFITIIDE/PENALTY		of Suit Code Descriptions.	
□ 110 Insurance □ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY □ 210 Land Condemnation □ 220 Foreclosure □ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment □ 240 Torts to Land □ 245 Tort Product Liability □ 290 All Other Real Property	PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers' Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury 362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice CIVIL RIGHTS 440 Other Civil Rights 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other 448 Education	PERSONAL INJURY 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability 70 Thealth Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal Property Damage 70 Truth in Lending 385 Property Damage 70 Truth in Lending 585 Property Damage 71 Truth in Lending 72 Sample Product Liability PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: 463 Alien Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty 75 Other: 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement	G25 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 690 Other 690 Other G90 Other Labor Act G90 Other Labor Litigation G91 Employee Retirement G91 Employee Reti	322 Appeal 28 USC 158 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 424 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 425 Withdrawal 28	OTHER STATUTES □ 375 False Claims Act □ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC	
	moved from 3 ate Court Cite the U.S. Civil State 15 U.S.C. section Brief description of car Brief description of car Court	Appellate Court atute under which you are find 1692 et seq.	(specify,	er District Litigation Transfer		
VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:	CHECK IF THIS UNDER RULE 2	IS A CLASS ACTION	DEMAND \$	CHECK YES only JURY DEMAND:	if demanded in complaint: Yes □No	
VIII. RELATED CASI IF ANY	E(S) (See instructions):	JUDGE		DOCKET NUMBER		
DATE 07/06/2017 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY		signature of attor /s/ Novlette R. Kid				
	MOUNT	APPLYING IFP	JUDGE	MAG. JUI	OGE	

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CERTIFICATION OF ARBITRATION ELIGIBILITY

Local Arbitration Rule 83.10 provides that with certain exceptions, actions seeking money damages only in an amount not in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs, are eligible for compulsory arbitration. The amount of damages is presumed to be below the threshold amount unless a certification to the contrary is filed.

I Novle	ette R. Kidd	counsel for Plaintiff do hereby certify that the above captioned civil action is		
ineligi	ble for c	, counsel for Plaintiff, do hereby certify that the above captioned civil action is ompulsory arbitration for the following reason(s):		
		monetary damages sought are in excess of \$150,000, exclusive of interest and costs,		
	\boxtimes	the complaint seeks injunctive relief,		
	X	the matter is otherwise ineligible for the following reason Class Action.		
		DISCLOSURE STATEMENT - FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE 7.1		
N/A -	Plaintif	Identify any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more or its stocks: f is a natural person.		
		RELATED CASE STATEMENT (Section VIII on the Front of this Form)		
provides because same ju- case: (A	s that "A c the cases dge and m A) involves	s that are arguably related pursuant to Division of Business Rule 50.3.1 in Section VIII on the front of this form. Rule 50.3.1 (a) ivil case is "related" to another civil case for purposes of this guideline when, because of the similarity of facts and legal issues or arise from the same transactions or events, a substantial saving of judicial resources is likely to result from assigning both cases to the agistrate judge." Rule 50.3.1 (b) provides that "A civil case shall not be deemed "related" to another civil case merely because the civil identical legal issues, or (B) involves the same parties." Rule 50.3.1 (c) further provides that "Presumptively, and subject to the power mine otherwise pursuant to paragraph (d), civil cases shall not be deemed to be "related" unless both cases are still pending before the		
		NY-E DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 50.1(d)(2)		
1.)	Is the c County	ivil action being filed in the Eastern District removed from a New York State Court located in Nassau or Suffolk		
2.)		Inswered "no" above: The events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in Nassau or Suffolk No.		
	b) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in the Eastern District? Yes			
Suffolk	County, olk Coun			
	(N	lote: A corporation shall be considered a resident of the County in which it has the most significant contacts).		
		BAR ADMISSION		
I am cu	irrently ac	dmitted in the Eastern District of New York and currently a member in good standing of the bar of this court. Yes No		
Are yo	u currentl	y the subject of any disciplinary action (s) in this or any other state or federal court? Yes (If yes, please explain) No		
I certify	y the accu	uracy of all information provided above.		

Signature:_/s/ Novlette R. Kidd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Eastern District of New York

Eastern Dist	HEL OF NEW TOLK			
MOHIUDDIN AHMED, on behalf of himself individually and all others similarly situated,)))			
Plaintiff(s))			
V.	Civil Action No. 17-cv-04002			
)			
CARSON SMITHFIELD, LLC,)			
)			
	,)			
Defendant(s))			
SUMMONS II	N A CIVIL ACTION			
To: (Defendant's name and address) CARSON SMITHFIELD, C/O C T Corporation Sys 111 Eighth Avenue New York, New York 100	stem			
A lawsuit has been filed against you. Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: FAGENSON & PUGLISI, PLLC 450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704 New York, New York 10123				
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.				
	DOUGLAS C. PALMER CLERK OF COURT			
Date:				
	Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk			

Civil Action No. 17-cv-04002

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

was ra	This summons for (no ceived by me on (date)	ame of individual and title, if a	ny)			
was re	cerved by the on (aate)		·			
	☐ I personally serve	ed the summons on the inc	lividual at (place)			
		; or				
	☐ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name)					
			, a person of suitable age and discretion who res	sides there,		
	on (date)	copy to the individual's last known address; or				
	☐ I served the summons on (name of individual)					
	designated by law to	accept service of process	s on behalf of (name of organization)			
			on (date)	; or		
	☐ I returned the sum	I returned the summons unexecuted because				
	☐ Other (<i>specify</i>):					
	My fees are \$	for travel and S	\$ for services, for a total of \$	0.00		
	I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.					
Date:		_				
			Server's signature			
		_	Printed name and title			
		_	Server's address			

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

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